[ExI] Uploading and selfhood
Michael Miller
ain_ani at yahoo.com
Fri Mar 28 17:11:25 UTC 2008
Thanks for the reply G.
I'm not sure what you mean by 'core self'. If we do away with a supernatural 'self' or soul, then isn't the self merely a social construct, made up of our actions and interactions much more than our thoughts?
I think the basic gist is, how can we even talk about 'self' without the social, embodied context which generates our sense of having a self - both in terms of 'oneself' and others? To assume that the self at its core is information, effectively replicates a religious supernaturalism in claiming that action and interaction (which are the processes by which our thoughts and feelings come to happen) are irrelevant. Can a self develop or persist without an environment in which it gains definition?
To drag the conversation briefly back to Wittgenstein, if the WC is part of my world (ie it is in my experience) then it is a part of my self. Everything that we perceive and interact with goes towards making us what we are. The self does not stand isolated against the world, but are integral parts each of the other.
----- Original Message ----
From: Giu1i0 Pri5c0 <pgptag at gmail.com>
To: ExI chat list <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org>
Sent: Friday, March 28, 2008 4:37:59 PM
Subject: Re: [ExI] Uploading and selfhood
On Fri, Mar 28, 2008 at 4:40 PM, Michael Miller <ain_ani at yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> Apologies if this has already been covered, but I've been thinking for a
> little while about uploading and the attendent reduction of selfhood to
> brain processes. The following review (from New Scientist) makes some points
> which I think present the most compelling case against the viability of
> uploading. That is, that the self (and specifically, thoughts) are not
> something located in or identical with the brain - they are a facet of an
> entire entity, dependent just as much on the whole body and the social
> processes of which we are a part. Robert Pepperell puts it well in his book
> the Posthuman Condition when he says "Consciousness is the function of an
> organsm, not an organ".
>
>
> I wonder, how do the proponents of uploading argue against these ideas?
>
>
> Mike
In terms of common-sense values and priorities, core business vs. overhead.
My fingernails are as much a part of my body as my lungs, but lungs
are much more important. My body will stay basically the same without
fingernails, but will die without lungs. So I think (like everyone)
that lungs are more important than fingernails.
Similarly, I agree that "Selves require bodies as well as brains,
material environments as well as bodies, and societies as well as
material environments". But in some very clear sense I would still be
more-or-less-me without my body and surrounding environment, while I
would not be me at all without the informational content of my brain.
So I give much more importance to the informational content of my
brain and would accept an uploaded copy, where only the information is
preserved, as a valid continuation of my current self.
Note that, if your valid point is taken too strictly and literally,
then the WC in your toilet is as much a part of your core self as your
thoughts and feelings. Sure you don't mean that!
G.
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