[ExI] Uploading and selfhood

[Michael Miller]

Okay. You see the reason I posited the question is that I'm trying to figure out what the metaphysics behind the belief in uploading is. The first point you raise, regarding a 1-to-1 mapping, makes me think: what is it precisely that we are trying to map? Is it the physical nature of the body as it is at one particular point in time? Or is it the physical state of the brain at one point in time? Because I think the idea that the two sources I quoted are getting at, is that there is a whole lot more to selfhood (and consciousness) than that. The self being a very fluid, loosely tied bag of stuff, we have inevitably to reduce it to some clear-cut definition in order to be able to 'map' it at all. If we accept that I now am not the same person I was seven years ago, then what exactly is it that we are trying to preserve via uploading? It cannot surely be a continuation of "my" consciousness if we accept the two can exist side by side. So, is it simply our
 pattern of behaviour?

Secondly, how can we claim to know with precision the physical state (which is by definition a temporal process, not a static state) in order to map it '1-to-1'? Is the idea that we simulate the physical processes so that we are sure the virtual-brain behaves in precisely the same way a physical one would (ie, processing information in exactly the same way; dealing with sensory input in exactly the way a biological brain does)? How is this possible before we know how consciousness occurs as an epiphenomenon of physical processes?

----- Original Message ----
From: Damien Broderick <thespike at satx.rr.com>
To: ExI chat list <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org>
Sent: Friday, March 28, 2008 6:41:36 PM
Subject: Re: [ExI] Uploading and selfhood

At 10:34 AM 3/28/2008 -0700, Michael Miller wrote in reply to JKC:

>the self and thoughts are not reducible to the machinery which 
>generates them, whatever that machinery may be. They are not 
>'reducible' at all, especially the self, as it is not an isolatable 
>thing. Therefore, to think that it can be 'transferred' from one set 
>of hardware to another is to posit some kind of supernatural or 
>metaphysical entity as the self. ...unless we're positing some kind 
>of non-physical essential self, how can uploading be any kind of 
>'transferrence' or 'sequel' other than a simulation?

Well, an emulation. John Clark's view is indeed a magical 
one--sympathetic magic, to be precise. This discussion has been going 
on here for well over a decade, so it's not going to get anywhere. 
But to me, the key issue remains this:

If a 1-to-1 mapping is made of you,

(a) will the mapping be convinced it's you?

(Answer: of course, by definition), and

(b) will you be convinced that the mapping over there is you, so that 
you'd now be very relaxed about being obliterated, whichever one you are?

(Answer: you have to make up your own mind/s about that. My personal 
reaction: are you fucking *nuts*?)

But John might well be correct that in a world where this tech is 
routine, people who share my current reaction will swiftly die off, 
overwhelmed by the growing numbers of those who *remember* being the 
people they emulate and hence feel fine about it. (Just shoot that 
terrified look-alike idiot and kick the corpse into the gutter? Maybe 
not, there's no call to be harsh to your progenitor--but no reason to 
be anxious over his death, either. Hey, the template's still in the uploader.)

Damien Broderick 

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