[ExI] Uploading and selfhood
Lee Corbin
lcorbin at rawbw.com
Mon Mar 31 03:09:19 UTC 2008
John Clark writes
> Position cannot possibly be the key to identity because of The Identity
> Of Indiscernibles; Leibniz discover the idea about 1690. He said that
> things that you can measure are what's important, and if there is no
> way to find a difference between two things then they are identical
> and switching the position of the objects does not change the physical
> state of the system.
>
> Leibniz's idea turned out to be very practical, although until the
> 20th century nobody realized it, before that his idea had no observable...
Etc., which was very nicely written and makes the most important
points concerning the entire issue very well.
At the very end, however, comes this:
>> If you ask me a question, I will respond, if you ask the other group the
>> question, I will know it is not directed at me.
>
> Yes, if you put them [one's original set of atoms and a perfect copy]
> into an uncontrolled environment the world will soon treat them
> differently and then they will diverge and you would have 2 individuals
> not one.
Although I agree generally, it's really not because "the world will soon
treat them differently" that matters. One might, for example, have a monk
whose devotion and faith was so intense that even being forced to become
an excellent soldier in an inhospitable environment had no effect on who
he really was. For most people, however, I agree: given enough years,
we gradually turn into other people. For me, though, it evidently takes
centuries.
> I would not be happy about having my body destroyed unless I had a
> copy that was made right now.
Nor would I be happy. Except....
> How long is now? About a second, maybe two.
But why so short? Are you *that* attached to the last couple of seconds
of your memories?
What if you were struck on the head and lost all of today's and yesterday's
memories? Wouldn't *you* survive?
So---we just compose two non-identity threatening operations: memory
loss + teleportation. Isn't the composition of those two operations also
non-identity threatening? If you agree, then you should have no problem
being replaced by your frozen duplicate in the next room who was made
yesterday (given that either you or your duplicate must die, and given that
if your decision is to be replaced by your duplicate, then $10M will appear
in John K. Clark's bank account tomorrow).
Moreover, there is a comprehensive equation I finally got around to formulating
back in 2000:
Self + Amn + Exp + Tel = Dup + Susp
where Amn = Amnesia, Exp = experience, Tel = Teleportation,
Dup = Duplication, Susp = Suspended animation,
Lee
P.S. Here is some accompanying explanatory text:
The Exp and Susp terms, one on each side, force agreement
in time.
The Self and Dup make the equation balance in persons.
The amnesia and experience terms cancel in the sense that they
prevent an age difference between the two sides.
An algebraic formulation is further justified in that transfer of
the terms Amn, Exp, or Tel to the other side results in a
different but informative (and correct) thought experiment.
(It wouldn't make any sense to move the "susp" term to the
other side where it would be negative, however, any more
than it would for a revivified cryonicist in the far future to
say, "I haven't changed, so why can't I go wake up instead
back in 2000?". He can't have a negative suspension either.)
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