[ExI] Under the libertarian yoke was Re: Next Decade May See No Warming

[Rafal Smigrodzki]

On Wed, May 7, 2008 at 1:22 AM, Damien Sullivan
<phoenix at ugcs.caltech.edu> wrote:
> On Wed, May 07, 2008 at 12:19:12AM -0400, Rafal Smigrodzki wrote:
>  > On Sun, May 4, 2008 at 8:43 AM, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>  > >  A tax in a democracy is a kind of conditional contract just like this.
>  >
>  > ### No, most definitely it is not. One of the essential features of a
>  > valid contract is that it is being entered voluntarily, that is,
>  > neither of the parties, their agents, principals, nor allies, is
>  > threatening violence to induce another peaceful party to sign the
>  > contract. Clearly, the agents of the state are threatening deadly
>
>  OTOH, apparently it *is* valid to threaten violence to anyone who
>  doesn't accept the existing distribution of property rights.

### It all depends on what you mean by "doesn't accept", and "valid",
and how did the existing distribution of property rights arise....
more below.

----------------------
>
>  > violence to anybody who fails to meet their peremptory demands, and
>  > therefore neither the state nor its victims can enter into a contract.
>  > The threat of violence is sufficient to invalidate or pre-empt a
>  > contract.
>
>  The US Constitution was accepted by votes of the legislatures of all 13
>  initial states, and by the request of the legislature or convention of
>  each subsequent state.  A very literal social contract.  Of course,
>  there were flaws in the process: non-unanimity (but that needn't matter
>  if you contract to form a state government which can make majority vote
>  decisions), lack of votes to women and blacks.  The fact that none of us
>  were born back then seems less significant, since we're supposed to
>  respect property distributions from before our birth -- despite their
>  ultimate origins being equally flawed.

### While I may at times sound like deontologist, I am much more of a
consequentialist, although paying a lot of attention to the methods of
reaching said consequences.

I envision ethics as the science of understanding the ways of getting
what you want, and as the art of changing what you want based on
understanding what you can do. After some years of thinking about my
feelings, and feeling about my thoughts, I developed a lot of respect
for the intertwined notions of property, non-initiation of violence,
and some other ideas, simply because as far as I can tell, punctilious
observance of such rules leads to better outcomes in the functioning
of a society. Yet, these rules are not complete. They don't fully
encapsulate all recipes for getting things right under all possible
circumstances. If a property distribution is flawed, it can and should
be changed, even if its initial formation was done using appropriate
methods. As I said, using the right methods does not guarantee the
right consequences (although it makes them more likely).

So, if there is a social form of organization that consists of a huge,
non-segmented network established a long time ago, using the best
methods known at the time, I don't pay exclusive attention to the
history of this organization. Instead also I look at the current
functioning of the network, and compare it to what should be possible
to build using modern methods and insights.

One of the insights that seems to be relatively new, at least in its
fully self-conscious, generalized form, is the importance of network
segmentation. The framers of the US constitution understood
segmentation, which is why they built the three branches of
government, instituted the separation of church and state, and the
federal form of territorial organization. Yet, maybe they were not as
insistent as they should have been, or maybe it was simply not
possible to protect their segmentation measures from being subverted
by the likes of Lincoln, Roosevelt, and Bush. In any case, after some
hundreds of years, their constitution is a hollow shell, its meaning
frequently twisted into its very opposite, and the network is not
sufficiently segmented anymore.

The core of my claims is that I don't see the state, any existing
state, as legitimate, because it denies us the benefits of
segmentation.

You may want to consider the above statement: It is consequentialist,
not deontological but it does have a certain deontological ring to it,
since it condemns a whole set of methods, or claims and rights.  There
are tangible benefits to segmentation, and there are methods of
organizing social life that increase or decrease segmentation. Ceteris
paribus, methods that in general decrease segmentation must be
condemned, by reference to the outcomes. As you learn more about the
usual effects of a method, you may adjust your attitude towards it,
you may no longer see it as the efficient way. Yet attitudes towards
methods are also a part of our desires, and thus learning about what
is does change your opinions about what should be. Yes, I say that
there is an "ought" derived what an "is"!

Because I am trying to look at long-term outcomes, and I am using
notions that are not commonly looked at, I have arrived at the
conclusion that it is inefficient (in the sense of leading to
suboptimal realization of desires) and therefore wrong to form a
state, unless you have no other choice. Once you are smart enough to
understand the need for and have the technical knowledge to use a
segmented social network, you should abandon the old schema, even if
in the beginning there was the ring of truth and goodness to it.

Stathis is smart, he knows how to build and maintain a segmented,
non-violent society. You know it too, I am sure. The only difference
between you and me is that I have abandoned an attachment to the old
way, while you still see it as inherently legitimate.

-----------------------------
>
>  > ### You are in fact not capable of giving consent to pay taxes, simply
>  > because you have no choice. Are you following it? No matter what is
>  > your opinion, what kind of "conditions" you are imagining, you *have*
>  > to pay the tax.
>
>  And if you inherit property in a condo, you have to abide by the condo
>  association fees and regulations.  If you don't like it, you can sell
>  out.  Why not regard yourself as having inherited a share in the US
>  association?

### Because the US association denies the benefits of segmentation,
while the network of condos and tenants are inherently segmented.

-------------------------

>
>  > ### Why people keep voting is a whole another issue, none of it
>  > however can legitimize a tax as a form of contractual payment.
>
>  If a group of people unanimously agreed to a constitution which included
>  provisions that fees could be levied on all members by a majority vote,
>  that'd be a contractual 'tax'.
>
>  If they unanimously agreed to a constitution which didn't have that
>  provision, but allowed for supermajority vote adoption of new
>  provisions, then the fee provision could be adopted, and then the fee
>  itself.
>
>  So you can certainly set up something similar to a modern democratic
>  government, contractually, in principle.  You can get closer, too, if
>  all land or water within an area is agreed to be owned by the
>  association.  Then what happens to a child born within the association?

### I counter with a very non-deontological question: What happens to
the modern democratic government in the absence of segmentation?

--------------------------
>
>  > >  That's all very well, but it doesn't address the urgency of the
>  > >  situation. I don't want to punish the people responsible after the
>  > >  train has crashed, I want to prevent the train crashing in the first
>  > >  place.
>  > >
>  > ### Sure. As long as you manage to convince enough people that the
>  > train could crash, you will be able to build a contract to prevent it.
>  >
>  > To summarize, you were able to come up with all the significant parts
>  > of a workable, non-violent solution to a major tragedy of the commons,
>
>  Theoretically workable.  Practicalities of getting 6 billion people to
>  agree, even under economic duress from boycott by the initial
>  contractors, are another matter.
>
>  :::
>
>  I saw an interesting argument recently that minarchy is the least
>  adaptive societal form.  We ultimately solve problems with violence -- if
>  we can't deal with someone who's causing a problem, we try to beat them
>  up.  In anarchy, plenary rights to violence rest with all individuals.
>  If someone starts dumping pollution into "our" air, we can go beat him
>  up, he can defend himself or give in, may the best mob win.
>
>  In a normal state, we give up that right (or have it taken from us) to
>  the state, which holds all plenary rights to force.  Instead of beating
>  him up, we appeal to the state to defend our rights.  Risks: the state
>  may not.  The state may even be used against us.  OTOH, things may work
>  out -- the state may defend our rights against people much more powerful
>  than us, at no risk to our own lives.  Which outcome happens depends on
>  the state, and the people.
>
>  In minarchy, we give up our rights to violence, but the state can act
>  only in a predetermined sphere.  Being minimal, it has no rights outside
>  its initial list.  Expanding that list is probably very problematic if
>  possible at all, since it involves new bans on behavior, or
>  redistributing property rights, which is exactly what minarchy doesn't
>  want.
>
>  But this leaves it helpless when conditions change, when conflicts of
>  property no one thought to define rights about come into play.  Who
>  owned the ozone layer, to defend it against CFCs?  Who in the 18th
>  century imagined one would need rights against acid rain?  Or against
>  Denmark, say, deciding to melt off the Greenland ice cap to develop its
>  property, incidentally threatning oceanside property worldwide?  I have
>  a right to my beach, Denmark has a right to develop Greenland, none of
>  our ancestors imagined our rights would conflict via sea level rise.  In
>  anarchy I go to war with Denmark; in the World State I sue it in a
>  common law court, or appeal to the legislature to define a new right for
>  me.  In minarchy...
>
>  Transfers don't help, because the prior rights aren't defined.  Should I
>  pay Denmark to forego development?  Should Denmark pay me to relocate,
>  or to build seawalls?
>
>  Or, 18th century minarchy land rights meets the plane.  Do I have a
>  right to prevent flights over my property?  Does the height matter?
>  Constitution doesn't say.  Would flight useful over any large distance
>  be possible if the default was rights stretching from the center of the
>  earth out to infinity, through my plot of land?
>
>  What if those rights are defined before the concept of aquifers, and the
>  realization that our separate wells are in fact draining a common
>  source?
>
>  Never mind the current global warming debate.  Say Canada or Russia
>  decide to use space mirrors to raise the temperatures of their
>  countries, benefiting themselves but wreaking havoc with weather
>  patterns elsewhere.  Do they have a right to that, or do I have a right
>  to pre-existing weather patterns?  Is violence to force them to submit
>  to a global weather commission, or self-(property)-defence?

### Again, the argumentation is based on a more clearly deontological
approach than the one I would use. It seems to postulate that a
working minarchy would be constrained by immutable concepts of rights,
and therefore would be quite rigid. But, if you see the libertarian
anarchy as the embodiment of segmentation, rather than the more
limited propertarian or contractarian concept, you can actually devise
flexible methods of dealing with such unforeseen circumstances. A
system of competing but co-territorial jurisdictions could discover
the relevant property right formulations, probably in large measure by
trial and error. Do I need to spell out the possible specific
solutions?

To summarize this overlong post, my arguments for non-violence, and
social network segmentation, are mostly consequentialist, even though
through attention to methods they do have a deontological component.
Your critique was thoughtful and stimulating but I don't think it
addressed the core of my claims, namely the hypothesis that a
segmented social network will eventually turn out, as a matter of
empirical observation, to be better at serving our needs.

And therefore we ought to be anarchocapitalist.

Rafal