[ExI] [Ethics] Consequential, deontological, virtue-based, preference-based..., ...

[Lee Corbin]

Jef wrote

> What is less promising [in the thought of a significant number of
> transhumanist philosophers], is the absence of synthesis of these
> clanky old frameworks, each laboring under the assumption of an
> Archimedean point from which ethical choice might be rationally
> evaluated.

Really?  To me, what you've written is a conjecture that 
they violate the is/ought (naturalistic fallacy) barrier. You
find that they *really* believe that ethical choices can be
rationally arrived at?  What I mean to say is, I would bet
that they all (like me) don't believe that a value-system
can be rationally arrived at, but that the most that "rationality"
can do for us is to rectify and make consistent whatever 
value system we already have (i.e. smooth out the irregularities
of it).

>  It's the free-will "paradox" in disguise, strengthened by
> the moral righteousness of belief in the Truth, perceiving
> the only alternative to be the likes of relativism, mysticism,
> post-modernism, etc.

Yeah, of course, such either/or alternatives sound bad. But
I think that you are right in suggesting that there is an element
of "moral righteousness" in believing in "truth" (if you will
allow me to de-capitalize the word).  Yes, it does always
feel a bit righteous to stand up for "the truth" and decry
falsehood, though my guess is that you also experience
this same sort of, well, righteousness, when affirming some
position that you highly approve of or regard highly.

> It's analogous to the controversy over many-worlds, with both sides
> assuming it's a theory about the real world, rather than an extremely
> sharp tool describing the relationship of the observer to the real
> world.

At this point you part company, of course, not only with all
those you mentioned (Rafal, Max, Robin, Anders) but with
all the well-known and highly regarded philosophers such
as Dennett, who stick steadfastly to a more or less realist
concept of truth. That is, we assume that conjectures (always
by PCR held provisionally) and hypotheses are indeed about
"the real world". 

In other words, we embrace many so-called truths that we
regard as having nothing to do with observers, but being
in fact entirely about the real world.  E.g., that the big bang
occurred 13.7 billion years ago (according to our best
estimates) and that this happened or did not happen quite
without regard to anybody or anything "observing" it.
So whether it's MWI or the heliocentric theory, it's not
at all about "the relationship of the observer to the real
world", but rather is *about* the real world.

> Each of these metaethical theories, when extended,
> arrives at inconsistency.  Each assumes a rational ideal,
> which, unrealistically, entails a rational homunculus at the core.

I suppose you to be including all scientific theories, and
even those "theories" that we normally don't call scientific
but which the human mind generates in the same way, e.g.,
who killed Kennedy, or the best way to fix pasta to satisfy
a certain group of particular guests. But maybe I don't
know what you mean by "metaethical theories". 

Anyway, please give an example of an inconsistency of
the kind you're speaking of!

> Each disregards the systems-theoretic truth that any system will
> exactly express its nature (its values, within the context of its
> environment) while...

Heh, sorry but I can't resist bringing up the most frequent
criticism of non-realistic philosophies, viz., that it becomes
completely incoherent what you could possibly be meaning
by "the systems-theoretic truth" when you have already
rejected any kind of observer independent truths.  :-)

> Of course, our language makes it harder to reason
> outside the everyday context.  We assert something
> is "right" and some people take it to mean correct
> within a given context, while others take it to mean...

Yes.  I totally agree.  The word "right" has to be used sparingly
if at all.  When I use it, I try to make sure of at least one of
two things:  either that the context makes it abundantly clear
that I'm *not* talking about any kind of cosmic Right, or
that I immediately follow up the sentence where I used it
with a disambiguator or redundancy that makes my meaning
clear.

> Truth, while yet others take it to imply a moral imperative.

Oh yes, I totally agree here too.  That's awful. (No sarcasm intended.)

> In my (deeply considered, while orthogonal-to-humble) opinion,
> ethical thought will step up a level when it recognizes that there
> is a very real basis for moral decision-making, not denying the fallacy of
> "ought from is" as seen from without, but exploiting it as necessarily
> seen from within.

Well, it *sure* sounds like you're adopting a form of ought-from-is,
despite your disclaimer.  As I submit, the only (coherent, rational)
basis for moral decision-making is to start from a large collection
of data points taken from your value system (mostly held unconsciously)
and attempt to apply smoothing functions to make the whole as
consistent as possible. 

Sorry if I or others have asked about this before, but what, again,
do you propose that we recognize as "a very real basis for moral
decision-making"?  

I've probably been out of line overly associating your claims
here concerning "moral decision making" with some of your
statements which at face value are simply rejecting realism,
e.g., when you did write  

       ....strengthened by the moral righteousness of belief in
       the Truth, perceiving the only alternative to be the likes
       of relativism, mysticism, post-modernism, etc. ...
       analogous to the controversy over many-worlds, with
       both sides assuming it's a theory about the real world,
       rather than an extremely sharp tool describing the
       relationship of the observer to the real world.

In other words, yes, I understand the focus of your epistle to be
about ethics and morality, but things like the above make me see
it as just part of a larger and very fundamental disagreement you
have with so many of the rest of us.

> Sadly, our present world breeds very few Zen (and I don't
> mean Taoist) scientists and engineers.

Besides allusion to Zen, are there well-known prominent philosophers
whose beliefs are in line with yours whose writings on this question
could be consulted.  That is, I would kind of like to know who else
thinks like you.

Thanks for the nice thoughtful essay,

Best regards,
Lee