[ExI] Problems with Platonia again

Stathis Papaioannou stathisp at gmail.com
Thu Sep 25 14:13:48 UTC 2008

2008/9/25 I wrote, in response to Lee Corbin:

> This same problem arises in any multiverse model, including a single
> infinite universe. Suppose there are two identical versions of you, L1
> and L2, a vast distance apart. Then it isn't possible for you to know
> whether your experiences are those of L1 or L2. In another moment, L1
> evolves into L1' and L2 evolves into L2', both of which have identical
> subjective content. Again, it isn't possible to know which one of
> these you are. And given these facts, it isn't possible for you to
> meaningfully claim that you now, whether L1' or L2', are the
> continuation of L1 or L2, respectively. For if, say, we had the same
> situation except L1 and L2' were eliminated, you would have had
> exactly the same experiences: first as L2, then as L1' remembering
> being L2. (I know you don't like the idea of having your total runtime
> halved in this way, but the point is, you wouldn't notice it had been
> halved, and this has the same significance as the fact that you
> wouldn't notice you had been killed and a copy made elsewhere if you
> underwent teleportation).

I do understand that you would say it isn't the same as teleportation
(as usually conceived) because there is no causal link between the L1
and L2 locations, so there would be a brief loss of consciousness in
going from L1 to L2'. I don't accept that this should be so, but even
if it is, it doesn't really change the situation: we can say that your
consciousness flits about the multiverse every second, minute or any
other arbitrarily long interval, with only a negligible intervening

Stathis Papaioannou

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