[ExI] Wernicke's aphasia and the CRA.

[Gordon Swobe]

--- On Tue, 12/8/09, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:

> The child learns to make a particular noise when it is
> hungry and that *becomes* semantics. The syntax is more 
> difficult and comes later.

No matter which comes first, semantics, broadly defined), involves conscious awareness of some object or idea, i.e., *intentionality*.

Here we have a good working definition of intentionality: 

"Intentionality is the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs." 

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality/

I once tried to deny the existence of intentionality. I found the idea of the non-existence of intentionality pretty difficult to hold in mind, because to hold anything in mind is to have intentionality.

And Searle says this beast called intentionality cannot live inside S/H systems. That's what his Chinese Room Argument is all about.

> [Sear;e] has not addressed David Chalmer's argument in
> his 1995 paper (http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html) showing that IF
> it is possible to replicate the behaviour of neurons with
> electronic replacements THEN any subjective experiences associated
> with the original neurons will also be replicated. 

IF pigs had wings THEN pigs could fly, but this does not refute the arguments of those who don't believe pigs fly! :-)

Seriously, as I've stated elsewhere, contrary to popular opinion Searle does not dismiss the possibility of strong AI.

He argues this way:

1) Formal programs running on hardware cannot have semantics. 

2) Because human brains have semantics, human brains must do something besides run formal programs. They must have some causal powers that science has yet to understand. 

Now then, IF we first come to understand those causal powers of brains and IF we then find a way to duplicate those powers in something other than brains, THEN we will create strong AI. On that day, pigs will fly.

-gts