[ExI] The symbol grounding problem in strong AI

[Ben Zaiboc]

Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:

> --- On Sun, 12/13/09, Ben Zaiboc <bbenzai at yahoo.com>
> wrote:
> 
> >> The challenge ... is ...to show that formal
> programs differ in 
> >> some important way from shopping lists, some
> important way that 
> >> allows programs to overcome the symbol grounding
> problem.
> > 
> > I've just been following this thread peripherally, but
> this
> > caught my attention.? Are you *seriously* saying that
> > you think shopping lists don't differ from programs??
> 
> I mean that if we want to refute the position of this
> philosopher who goes by the name of Searle then we need to
> show exactly how programs overcome the symbol grounding
> problem.
> 
> I think everyone will agree that a piece of paper has no
> conscious understanding of the symbols it holds, i.e., that
> a piece of paper cannot overcome the symbol grounding
> problem. If a program differs from a piece of paper such
> that it can have conscious understanding the symbols it
> holds, as in strong AI on a software/hardware system, then
> how does that happen? 
> 
> > Secondly, if you don't think a program can solve the
> > mysteriously difficult 'symbol grounding problem', how
> can a
> > brain do it?? 
> 
> Philosophers and cognitive scientists have some theories
> about how *minds* do it, but nobody really knows for certain
> how the physical brain does it in any sense we might
> duplicate. 

This is like saying we have a theory about how a clock tick attracts a certain insect, but we have no idea how the clock attracts the insect.

Mind is a function of Brain. When I say "how can a brain do it?" I'm saying "how does a mind experience doing it?".  It's the same thing.

> 
> If it has no logical flaws, Searle's formal argument shows
> that however brains do it, they don't do it by running
> programs. 

Another "Whaaaaaa?!" moment.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but you are saying there are phenomena that cannot be represented by any program?

A symphony orchestra doesn't 'run programs' but that doesn't mean that we can't reproduce Rachmininov's 2nd concerto in exact detail by means of a computer program.

To say that "brains don't run programs" is both untrue in a sense, and irrelevant.

The question is: do brains process information?

(and, I suppose, if you really must: "Do programs process information?")

Unless you want to seriously claim that there are things that a lump of biological jelly can do that are theoretically beyond the capacity of any other information-processing system to do, your argument makes no sense.

And if you *are* seriously making this claim, then... well, as Eugen said: "*plonk*".  There is nothing further to discuss.

Ben Zaiboc