[ExI] The symbol grounding problem in strong AI

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2009/12/18 Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>:

> No, Searle only assumes exactly what he states he assumes:
>
> P1) Programs are formal (syntactic) [which is NOT to say they have no semantics or that they cannot cause or have minds]
> P2) Minds have mental contents (semantics)
> P3) Syntax is neither constitutive nor sufficient for semantics.
>
> That's all he assumes, Stathis. Nothing more, nothing less.
>
> To prove him wrong we need either show one of his premises as false or show that his conclusion (that programs don't cause minds) doesn't follow.
>
>>> In other words your argument is not about Searle
>> begging the question. If programs are syntactic and can also
>> glean semantics from syntax then Searle's premise 3 is
>> simply false. You just need to show how P3 is false for programs
>> or for people.
>>
>> It is false for people, since people are manifestly
>> conscious.
>
> P3 is about syntax and semantics in a program or in a conscious person or in a book. Doesn't matter. And on Searle's view not even a conscious person can get semantics from syntax.
>
> If you're serious about this subject then it's very important that you look closely at his words and not read anything into them.

If programs are syntactic and programs can have semantics then either
programs have something in addition to syntax (an immaterial soul?) or
syntax can give rise to semantics as an emergent property.

Analogously:

If brains consist of dumb matter and brains can have consciousness
then either brains have something in addition to dumb matter (an
immaterial soul?) or dumb matter can give rise to consciousness as an
emergent property.

The dualists don't believe that dumb matter can give rise to
consciousness and Searle doesn't believe that programs can give rise
to consciousness. But these positions are just prejudice. Moreover, it
has been shown that if dumb matter can give rise to consciousness and
the physics of dumb matter is computable, then computation can give
rise to consciousness. On the other hand, if an immaterial soul is
responsible for our consciousness or the physics of the matter in the
brain is not computable then computation cannot give rise to
consciousness. Searle does not believe in a soul and accepts that the
physics of the brain is computable. Roger Penrose does not believe in
a soul but believes that the physics of the brain is not computable.
Both Searle and Penrose deny that computers can think, but Searle is
inconsistent, while Penrose is at least consistent, though probably
wrong.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou