[ExI] The symbol grounding problem in strong AI

[Gordon Swobe]

--- On Fri, 12/18/09, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:

>> If programs drive your artificial neurons (and they
> do) then Searle rightfully challenges you to show how those
> programs that drive behavior can in some way constitute a
> mind, i.e., he challenges you to show that you have not
> merely invented weak AI, which he does not contest.
> 
> Could you say what you think you would experience and how
> you would behave if these artificial neurons were swapped 
> for some of your biological neurons? I have asked this several 
> times and you have avoided answering.

Because I represent Searle here (even as I criticize him on another discussion list) I will say that I think my consciousness might very well fade away in proportion to the number of neurons you replaced that had relevance to it. 

This could happen even as I continued to behave in a manner consistent with intelligence. In other words, it seems to me that I would change gradually from a living example of strong AI to a living example of weak AI.

>> Programs that run algorithms do not and cannot have
> semantics. They do useful things but have no understanding
> of the things they do. Unless of course Searle's formal
> argument has flaws, and that is what is at issue here.
> 
> Suppose we encounter a race of intelligent aliens.
> Their brains are nothing like either our brains or our computers, 
> using a combination of chemical reactions, electric circuits, 
> and mechanical nanomachinery to do whatever it is they do. We 
> would dearly like to kill these aliens and take their technology 
> and resources, but in order to do this without feeling guilty we 
> need to know if they are conscious. They behave as if they are 
> conscious and they insist they are conscious, but of course 
> unconscious beings may do that as well. Neither does evidence that 
> they evolved naturally convince us, since
> there is nothing to stop nature from giving rise to weak AI
> machines. So, how do we determine if the activity in the alien 
> brains is some fantastically complex program running on fantastically
> complex architecture

I notice first that we need to ask ourselves the same question, (as many here no doubt already have): how do we know for certain that the human brain does not do anything more than run some fantastically complex program on some fantastically complex architecture? 

I think that if my brain runs any programs then it must do something else too. I understand the symbols that my mind processes and having studied Searle's arguments carefully I simply I do not see how a mere program can do the same, no matter how complex. 

As for how we would know about the aliens... I think we would need to present them with the same arguments and information and ask them to use reason and logic to decide for themselves, just as I ask you to use reason and logic to decide for yourself.

>... and if we decide that it is, does that mean that the 
> aliens are not conscious?

Yes.

-gts