[ExI] The symbol grounding problem in strong AI

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2009/12/23 Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>:
> This post is about Searle's logic.
>
> --- On Mon, 12/21/09, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> ...it is at least provisionally an open question whether computers, or
>> systems with only syntax, do. You can't assume that they don't as part
>> of your argument to prove that they don't.
>
> You and others keep suggesting that I (or Searle) has begged the question, so in this post I will address that and only that issue. (Again! :-)
>
> Searle assumes these three propositions as premises (he calls them axioms. I prefer to call them premises because premises seem more open to criticism):
>
> P1) Programs are formal (syntactic).
> P2) Minds have mental contents (semantics).
> P3) Syntax is neither constitutive of nor sufficient for semantics.
>
> >From there he draws his conclusion that programs don't cause or have minds, but here we concern ourselves with his premises. Does Searle, as is charged, include his conclusion in his premises? Let's take a look at each premise, one at a time!
>
> Premise P1) states that programs are formal (syntactic). Nothing more, nothing less. What does P1) mean? It means that, at the very least, programs do syntactical form-based operations on symbols, something with which any programmer will agree.
>
> Notice what P3) does not state. It does not state this:
>
> P1) Programs are formal (syntactic) and cannot have semantics.
>
> Nor does it state this:
>
> P1) Programs are formal (syntactic) and cannot have minds.
>
> Nor does it state this:
>
> P1) Programs are merely and only formal (syntactic).
>
> If P3 stated those things or similar then Searle would be guilty as charged; in that case he would have only proved what he assumed. And instead of being a tenured professor of philosophy at UC Berkeley, he would be the laughing stock of the academic community and we mostly likely would never have heard of him.
>
> As for P2 and P3, they say nothing about programs or minds!
>
> Here I will show why it might *seem* that he begged the question.
>
> The argument again:
>
> P1) Programs are formal (syntactic).
> P2) Minds have mental contents (semantics).
> P3) Syntax is neither constitutive of nor sufficient for semantics.
> C1) Programs are neither constitituve nor sufficient for minds.
>
> If you look carefully, you'll see that the argument does not preclude the possibility that something other than syntax gives programs semantics or minds. I suggest that it's because the argument does not preclude some other possibility that your intuitions tell you that he has assumed otherwise.
>
> Consider this alternative argument, which would refute Searle's if true:
>
> P1) Programs are formal (syntactic).
> P2) Minds have mental contents (semantics).
> P3) Syntax is neither constitutive of nor sufficient for semantics.
> P4) Zeus so loved Extropians that he gave programs semantics.
> C1) Programs are therefore constitutive or sufficient for minds.

It is also possible that programs are *only* formal but programs can
have minds because P3 is false, and syntax actually is constitutive
and sufficient for semantics. I base this on the fact that all my
brain does is manipulate information, and yet I feel that I understand
things. Searle of course disagrees because he takes it as axiomatic
that symbol-manipulation can't give rise to understanding; but it also
used to be taken as axiomatic that matter could not give rise to
understanding.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou