[ExI] simulation as an improvement over reality
avantguardian2020 at yahoo.com
Fri Dec 31 06:56:55 UTC 2010
----- Original Message ----
> From: Ben Zaiboc <bbenzai at yahoo.com>
> To: extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
> Sent: Sun, December 26, 2010 6:30:38 AM
> Subject: Re: [ExI] simulation as an improvement over reality
> The Avantguardian <avantguardian2020 at yahoo.com> wrote:
> > ?I just don't see the enlightened self-interest of uploading.
> So don't do it, then.
I'll cross or burn that bridge when I get to it, if I get to it.
> > You don't get to live forever. Instead a bit-pattern that very quickly
> > away from you gets indefinite run time.
> > That's not any closer to immortality than having kids or writing a book.
> What is 'you' then?
I am the consensual illusion that a ripple on a pond is distinct from other
ripples and the pond itself.
> You seem to assume that a bit-pattern is not sufficent to encompass all that
I don't assume it. I theorize it. All I have to assume is that QM is a valid
description of the universe.
> Afaik, there are only two things that could possibly be 'you': atoms or
As far as you know. That is because you seek simple answers and I am not
> We know it's not atoms, because that can be experimentally demonstrated.
> So it must be information. If you know of (or even suspect) a third
>possibility, please tell us.
On the simplest level of abstraction, I am the interaction of space-time,
matter-energy, quantum information, and classical information. On other levels I
am a collective of cells and ideas, a talking bipedal primate, or an asshole. In
the scope of your own head or your computer for that matter, you can represent
me however you wish but reality is not obliged to conform.
> > If identity becomes too malleable somewhere along the line,
> it becomes concomitantly meaningless.
> Now you're making a conceptual jump that I don't see any justification for.
> What makes it 'meaningless'? We already know that identity is malleable.
> I'm a different person to what I was just a few years ago. I don't think my
>identity is 'meaningless' at all!
What makes it meaningful? That you experience it from within no matter how
different your present experience of self is from your previous experiences of
self? By definition, a copy, even a perfect one, would be not be experienced by
you from within. It would be experienced by a copy of you. Now I don't think the
copy would be perfect. But even if the copy was perfect, it would diverge away
from you by lifetimes spent within an alien environment within minutes of your
And if you are alright with having an imperfect copy of you, then you should be
alright with your long lost twin brother showing up, locking you in the cellar,
and assuming your identity. Or cheating death by brainwashing someone else into
honestly believing they are you.
> > And if one contends that identity is inherently meaningless, then what
>precisely are you "preserving" with an upload?
> Identity is not inherently meaningless, but even if it were, an upload would
>still preserve it. If it didn't, it wouldn't be an upload.
Which parameters of you would be conserved by an upload of you after the
upload starts evolving in virtual time? If it's little more than a property
like file.name="Ben Zaiboc", then you're dead, Jim.
> > Virtual environments differ from reality another way too. I offer without
> If you're going to offer things without proof, then anyone is justified in
>dismissing them without proof!
Call it a conjecture for the moment. I am working on a proof.
"There is nothing wrong with America that faith, love of freedom, intelligence,
and energy of her citizens cannot cure."- Dwight D. Eisenhower
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