From eric at m056832107.syzygy.com  Mon Feb  1 01:03:29 2010
From: eric at m056832107.syzygy.com (Eric Messick)
Date: 1 Feb 2010 01:03:29 -0000
Subject: [ExI] How to ground a symbol
In-Reply-To: <975270.46265.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <20100131230539.5.qmail@syzygy.com>
	<975270.46265.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <20100201010329.5.qmail@syzygy.com>

Gordon:
>This kind of processing goes on in every software/hardware system.

Yes, and apparently you didn't understand me.  I already addressed this
issue later in the same message.  It's at a different layer of
abstraction.

It's fine to ignore parts of messages that you agree with.  It's
disingenuous to act as though a point hadn't been raised when you're
actually ignoring it.

>> Come back after you've written a neural network
>> simulator and trained it to do something useful.
>
>Philosophers of mind don't care much about how "useful" it may seem.

While I haven't actually written a neural network simulator, I have
written quite a few programs that are of similar levels of complexity.
I know from experience that things which seem simple, clear, and well
defined when thought about in an abstract way are in fact complex,
muddy, and ill-defined when one actually tries to implement them.
Until such a system has been shown to do something useful, it's
probably incomplete, and any intuition learned from writing it may
well be useless.  That's why I stipulated usefulness.

>I think artificial neural networks show great promise as decision
> making tools. 

Natural ones do too.

>But 100 billion * 0 = 0.

But 100,000,000,000 * 0.000,000,000,001 = 1.

Your argument depends on the axiomatic assumption that the level of
understanding in a single simulated neuron is *exactly* zero.  Even
the tiniest amount of understanding in a programmed device (like a
thermostat) devastates your argument.  So you cling to the belief that
understanding must be a binary thing, while the universe around you
continues to work by degrees instead of absolutes.

Yes, philosophy deals with absolutes, but where it ignores shades of
gray in the real world it gets things horribly wrong.

-eric


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Mon Feb  1 01:47:46 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Sun, 31 Jan 2010 17:47:46 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] multiple realizability
In-Reply-To: <20100201010329.5.qmail@syzygy.com>
Message-ID: <418148.11027.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Sun, 1/31/10, Eric Messick <eric at m056832107.syzygy.com> wrote:

>> This kind of processing goes on in every
>> software/hardware system.
> 
> Yes, and apparently you didn't understand me.? I
> already addressed this issue later in the same message.? 
> It's at a different layer of abstraction.

The layer of abstraction does not matter to me. What does matter is the extent to which the system has supposed mental operations comprised of computational processes operating over formal elements, i.e., to what extent it operates by formal programs. To that extent, in my view, the system lacks a mind.

One can conceive of an "artificially" constructed neural network that is in every respect identical to a natural brain, in which case that machine has a mind. So let's be clear: my objection is not that strong AI cannot happen. It is that it cannot happen in software/hardware systems, networked or stand-alone.

To make my point even more clear: I reject the doctrine of multiple realizability. I do not believe we can extract the mind from the neurological material that causes the subjective mental phenomena that characterize it, as if one could put a mind on a massive floppy disk and then load that "mental software" onto another substrate. I reject that idea as nothing more than a 21st century version of Cartesian mind/matter dualism.

The irony is that people who don't understand me call me the dualist, and suggest that I rather than they posit the existence of some mysterious mental substance that exists distinct from brain matter. I hope Jeff Davis catches this message.

-gts




      


From stathisp at gmail.com  Mon Feb  1 08:52:56 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 2010 19:52:56 +1100
Subject: [ExI] The digital nature of brains (was: digital simulations)
In-Reply-To: <491598.82004.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <491598.82004.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002010052m43691ef1j71245ef795160bb6@mail.gmail.com>

2010/2/1 Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>:

>> He is the whole system, but his intelligence is only a
>> small and inessential part of the system, as it could easily
>> be replaced by dumber components.
>
> Show me who or what has conscious understanding of the symbols.

The intelligence created by the system has understanding.

>> It's irrelevant that the man doesn't really
>> understand what he is doing. The ensemble of neurons doesn't
>> understand what it's doing either, and they are the whole system too.
>
> I have no objection to your saying that neither the system nor anything contained in it has conscious understanding, but in that case you need to understand that you don't disagree with me; you don't believe in strong AI any more than I do.

The system has understanding, but no part of the system either
separately or taken as an ensemble has understanding.

I've tried to explain this giving several variations on the CRA, none
of which you have directly responded to, so here they are again:

Suppose that each neuron has sufficient intelligence intelligence for
it to know how to do its job. No neuron understands language, but the
person does. There are many tiny specialised intelligences and one
large general intelligence, and the two don't communicate. This is
analogous to the extended CR.

Suppose that the neurons are connected as one entity with sufficient
intelligence to know when to make its constituent parts fire. This
entity doesn't understand language, but the person does. There are two
intelligences, one specialised and one general, and the two don't
communicate. This is analogous to the CR.

Suppose there are several men in the extended CR all doing their bit
manipulating symbols. The men don't understand language, but the
entity created by the system does. There are several small specialised
intelligences (their general intelligence is not put to use) and one
large general intelligence, and the two don't communicate. This is
analogous to a normal brain.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From stathisp at gmail.com  Mon Feb  1 10:04:03 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 2010 21:04:03 +1100
Subject: [ExI] The digital nature of brains (was: digital simulations)
In-Reply-To: <732400.27938.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <20100131182926.5.qmail@syzygy.com>
	<732400.27938.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002010204g309b6eebk6f4f2043529ce48a@mail.gmail.com>

On 1 February 2010 06:22, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
> --- On Sun, 1/31/10, Eric Messick <eric at m056832107.syzygy.com> wrote:

>> This was the start of a series of posts where you said that
>> someone with a brain that had been partially replaced with
>> programmatic neurons would behave as though he was at least partially
>> not conscious.? You claimed that the surgeon would have to
>> replace more and more of the brain until he behaved as though he was
>> conscious, but had been zombified by extensive replacement.
>
> Right, and Stathis' subject will eventually pass the TT just as your subject will in your thought experiment. But in both cases the TT will give false positives. The subjects will have no real first-person conscious intentional states.

I think you have tried very hard to avoid discussing this rather
simple thought experiment. It has one premise, call it P:

P: It is possible to make artificial neurons which behave like normal
neurons in every way, but lack consciousness.

That's it! Now, when I ask if P is true you have to answer "Yes" or
"No". Is P true?

OK, assuming P is true, what happens to a person's behaviour and to
his experiences if the neurons in a part of his brain with an
important role in consciousness are replaced with these artificial
neurons?

I'll answer (a) for you: his behaviour must remain unchanged. It must
remain unchanged because the artificial neurons behave in a perfectly
normal way in their interactions with normal neurons, sensory organs
and effector organs, according to P. If they don't, then P is false,
and you said that P is true. Can you see a way that I haven't seen
whereby it might *not* be a contradiction to claim that the person's
neurons will behave normally but the person will behave differently?

OK, the person's behaviour remains unchanged, by definition if P is
true. What about his experiences? The classic example here is visual
perception. If P is true, then the person would go blind; but if P is
true, he is also forced to behave as if he has normal vision. So
internally, either he must not notice that he is blind, or he must
notice that he is blind but be unable to communicate it. The latter is
impossible for the same reasons as it is impossible that his behaviour
changes: the neurons in his brain which do the thinking are also
constrained to behave normally. That leaves the first option, that he
goes blind but doesn't notice. If this idea is coherent to you, then
you have to admit that you might right now be blind and not know it.
However, you have clearly stated that you think this is preposterous:
a zombie doesn't know it's a zombie, but you know you're not a zombie,
and you would certainly know if you suddenly went blind (as a matter
of fact, some people *don't* recognise when they go blind - it's
called Anton's syndrome - but these people also behave abnormally, so
they aren't zombies or partial zombies).

Where does that leave you? I think you have to say you were mistaken
in saying P is true. It isn't possible to make artificial neurons
which behave like normal neurons in every way but lack consciousness.
Can you see another way out that I haven't seen?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From stefano.vaj at gmail.com  Mon Feb  1 10:16:10 2010
From: stefano.vaj at gmail.com (Stefano Vaj)
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 2010 11:16:10 +0100
Subject: [ExI] Religious idiocy (was: digital nature of brains)
In-Reply-To: <20100129192646.5.qmail@syzygy.com>
References: <e321aa4b1001290903q514170cfj4504aa882bb20240@mail.gmail.com>
	<584374.10388.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
	<20100129192646.5.qmail@syzygy.com>
Message-ID: <580930c21002010216r46ed7bb8wade659b70018224b@mail.gmail.com>

On 29 January 2010 20:26, Eric Messick <eric at m056832107.syzygy.com> wrote:
> Meaning is attached to word symbols when the word symbols are
> associated with sense symbols, not with other word symbols.

Not all symbols are words - and in fact the word "three" can be
associated with the number "3" - but "sense symbols" sounds as a
dubious and redundant concept.

-- 
Stefano Vaj


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Mon Feb  1 12:53:49 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 2010 04:53:49 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] The digital nature of brains (was: digital simulations)
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002010052m43691ef1j71245ef795160bb6@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <641209.68117.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Mon, 2/1/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:

> The system has understanding, but no part of the system
> either separately or taken as an ensemble has understanding.
> I've tried to explain this giving several variations on the
> CRA, none of which you have directly responded to

Because that answer doesn't make any sense to me, Stathis. Looks like you want to skirt the issue by asserting that the system understands things that the man, *considered as the system*, does not understand. You do this by imagining a fictional third entity that you call the "ensemble of neurons" that exists independently of the system. But the ensemble is the system.

Did you read the actual target article? Notice that the system AND the neurons "taken as an ensemble" understand the stories in English but they do not understand the stories in Chinese. Please explain why the ensemble and the system understand English but not Chinese. Why the difference?

-gts




      


From stathisp at gmail.com  Mon Feb  1 13:14:09 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2010 00:14:09 +1100
Subject: [ExI] The digital nature of brains (was: digital simulations)
In-Reply-To: <641209.68117.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <f21c22e31002010052m43691ef1j71245ef795160bb6@mail.gmail.com> 
	<641209.68117.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002010514p3df1c625k7b20f1e74e85c75e@mail.gmail.com>

On 1 February 2010 23:53, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
> --- On Mon, 2/1/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> The system has understanding, but no part of the system
>> either separately or taken as an ensemble has understanding.
>> I've tried to explain this giving several variations on the
>> CRA, none of which you have directly responded to
>
> Because that answer doesn't make any sense to me, Stathis. Looks like you want to skirt the issue by asserting that the system understands things that the man, *considered as the system*, does not understand. You do this by imagining a fictional third entity that you call the "ensemble of neurons" that exists independently of the system. But the ensemble is the system.

Could you respond to the specific examples I have used to demonstrate
this apparently non-obvious point? The neurons do not understand
language, they probably don't "understand" anything, and if they got
together on a day off to talk about it they still wouldn't understand
anything. And yet acting in concert, they produce this new entity, the
person, who does understand language. Note that it works both ways:
the person, who is very much more intelligent than the neurons,
doesn't have a clue what is going on in his head when he thinks
either. It's his head, so how is this possible?

> Did you read the actual target article? Notice that the system AND the neurons "taken as an ensemble" understand the stories in English but they do not understand the stories in Chinese. Please explain why the ensemble and the system understand English but not Chinese. Why the difference?

You have to acknowledge that there are different levels of
abstraction. The man understands English but that's completely
irrelevant to his mechanistic symbol manipulation. It could be that a
lone clever neuron in his frontal lobe understands Russian and recites
Pushkin while squirting its neurotransmitters, but that has nothing to
do with the man understanding Russian, since it does not in any way
impact on the operation of his language centre; and conversely, the
clever Russian-speaking neuron does not necessarily have any idea what
the man is up nor any knowledge of English or Chinese.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Mon Feb  1 13:29:15 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 2010 05:29:15 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] The digital nature of brains (was: digital simulations)
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002010204g309b6eebk6f4f2043529ce48a@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <452387.36160.qm@web36507.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Mon, 2/1/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:

>> Right, and Stathis' subject will eventually pass the
> TT just as your subject will in your thought experiment. But
> in both cases the TT will give false positives. The subjects
> will have no real first-person conscious intentional
> states.
> 
> I think you have tried very hard to avoid discussing this
> rather simple thought experiment. It has one premise, call it P:

I didn't avoid anything. We went over it a million times. :)
 
> P: It is possible to make artificial neurons which behave
> like normal neurons in every way, but lack consciousness.

P = true if we define behavior as you've chosen to define it: the exchange of certain neurotransmitters into the synapses at certain times and other similar exchanges between neurons. I reject as absurd for example your theory that a brain the size of texas constructed of giant neurons made of beer cans and toilet paper will have consciousness merely by virtue of those beer cans squirting neurotransmitters betwixt themselves in the same patterns that natural neurons do. I also reject, in the first place, your implied assumption that the neuron is necessarily the atomic unit of the brain. 

> OK, assuming P is true, what happens to a person's
> behaviour and to his experiences if the neurons in a part of his 
> brain with an important role in consciousness are replaced with these
> artificial neurons?

As I explained many times, because your artificial neurons will not help the patient have complete subjective experience, and because experience affects behavior in healthy people, the surgeon will need to keep re-programming the artificial neurons and most likely replacing and reprogramming other neurons until finally at long last he creates a patient that passes the Turing test. But that patient will not have any better quality consciousness than he started with, and may become far worse off subjectively by the time the surgeon finishes, depending on facts about neuroscience that in 2010 nobody knows.

Eric offered a more straightforward experiment in which he simulated the entire brain. You complicate the matter by doing partial replacements, but the principles that drive my arguments remain the same: formal programs do not have or cause minds. If they did, the computer in front of you this very moment would have a mind and would perhaps be entitled to vote like other citizens.

-gts


      


From stathisp at gmail.com  Mon Feb  1 14:28:04 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2010 01:28:04 +1100
Subject: [ExI] The digital nature of brains (was: digital simulations)
In-Reply-To: <452387.36160.qm@web36507.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <f21c22e31002010204g309b6eebk6f4f2043529ce48a@mail.gmail.com> 
	<452387.36160.qm@web36507.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002010628v31342f47w61b84407f0c5a409@mail.gmail.com>

2010/2/2 Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>:

>> P: It is possible to make artificial neurons which behave
>> like normal neurons in every way, but lack consciousness.
>
> P = true if we define behavior as you've chosen to define it: the exchange of certain neurotransmitters into the synapses at certain times and other similar exchanges between neurons.

Yes, that would be one aspect of the behaviour that needs to be reproduced.

> I reject as absurd for example your theory that a brain the size of texas constructed of giant neurons made of beer cans and toilet paper will have consciousness merely by virtue of those beer cans squirting neurotransmitters betwixt themselves in the same patterns that natural neurons do.

That is a consequence of functionalism but at this point functionalism
is assumed to be wrong. All we need is artificial neurons that fit
inside the head (which excludes structures the size of Texas) and can
fool their neighbours into thinking they are normal neurons.

>  I also reject, in the first place, your implied assumption that the neuron is necessarily the atomic unit of the brain.

OK, P can be made even more general by replacing "neuron" with
"component". The component could be subneuronal in size or a
collection of multiple neurons.It just has to behave normally in
relation to its neighbours.

>> OK, assuming P is true, what happens to a person's
>> behaviour and to his experiences if the neurons in a part of his
>> brain with an important role in consciousness are replaced with these
>> artificial neurons?
>
> As I explained many times, because your artificial neurons will not help the patient have complete subjective experience,

Yes, that's an essential part of P: no subjective experiences

> and because experience affects behavior in healthy people, the surgeon will need to keep re-programming the artificial neurons and most likely replacing and reprogramming other neurons until finally at long last he creates a patient that passes the Turing test. But that patient will not have any better quality consciousness than he started with, and may become far worse off subjectively by the time the surgeon finishes, depending on facts about neuroscience that in 2010 nobody knows.

But how? We agreed that the artificial components BEHAVE NORMALLY.
That is their essential feature, apart from lacking consciousness. You
remove any normal component whatsoever, drop in the replacement, and
the behaviour of the whole brain MUST remain unchanged, or else the
replacement component is not as assumed. I can't believe that you
don't see this, and after being inconsistent being disingenuous is the
worst sin you can commit in philosophical discussions.

> Eric offered a more straightforward experiment in which he simulated the entire brain. You complicate the matter by doing partial replacements, but the principles that drive my arguments remain the same: formal programs do not have or cause minds. If they did, the computer in front of you this very moment would have a mind and would perhaps be entitled to vote like other citizens.

You keep repeating it but it doesn't make it so. I have assumed that
what you are saying is true and tried to show you that it leads to an
absurdity, but you respond by saying that if A behaves exactly the
same as B then A does not behave exactly the same as B, and carry on
as if no-one will notice the problem with this!


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From bbenzai at yahoo.com  Mon Feb  1 14:15:33 2010
From: bbenzai at yahoo.com (Ben Zaiboc)
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 2010 06:15:33 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] extropy-chat Digest, Vol 77, Issue 1
In-Reply-To: <mailman.1.1265025601.205.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
Message-ID: <681115.27739.qm@web113615.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

> From: Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>
> To: ExI chat list <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org>
> Subject: Re: [ExI] How to ground a symbol
> Message-ID: <589903.82027.qm at web36507.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
> 
> --- On Sun, 1/31/10, Ben Zaiboc <bbenzai at yahoo.com>
> wrote:
> 
> > In future, whenever the system sees a rose, it will
> know
> > whether it's a red rose or not, because there'll be a
> part
> > of its internal state that matches the symbol "Red".?
> 
> The system you describe won't really "know" it is red. It
> will merely act as if it knows it is red, no different from,
> say, an automated camera that acts as if it knows the light
> level in the room and automatically adjusts for it. 

Please explain what "really knowing" is.

I'm at a loss to see how something that acts exactly as if it knows something is red can not actually know that.  In fact, I'm at a loss to see how that sentence can even make sense.

You're claiming that something which not only quacks and looks like, but smells like, acts like, sounds like, and is completely indistinguishable down to the molecular level from, a duck, can in fact not be a duck.  That if you discover that the processes which give rise to the molecules and their interactions are due to digital information processing, then, suddenly, no duck.

Ben Zaiboc


      


From bbenzai at yahoo.com  Mon Feb  1 14:28:43 2010
From: bbenzai at yahoo.com (Ben Zaiboc)
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 2010 06:28:43 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] multiple realizability
In-Reply-To: <mailman.1.1265025601.205.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
Message-ID: <629922.52960.qm@web113610.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> declared:

> The layer of abstraction does not matter to me. 

Well, if that's the case, all your philosophising avails you nothing.

At all.

Levels of abstraction are vitally important, and if you dismiss them as irrelevant, you're chucking not just the baby, but the whole universe out with the bathwater.

If you honestly think levels of abstraction irrelevant, then everything is just a vast sea of gluons and quarks (or something even lower down), and there is no such thing as matter, planets, stars, water, trees, or people.

If levels of abstraction are irrelevant, you don't exist.

Ben Zaiboc


      


From hkeithhenson at gmail.com  Mon Feb  1 17:28:56 2010
From: hkeithhenson at gmail.com (Keith Henson)
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 2010 10:28:56 -0700
Subject: [ExI] Glacier Geoengineering
Message-ID: <d1988d2d1002010928v13a4c961u266c5acb52249320@mail.gmail.com>

On Mon, Feb 1, 2010 at 5:00 AM,  Alfio Puglisi <alfio.puglisi at gmail.com> wrote:

> On Sun, Jan 31, 2010 at 10:52 AM, Keith Henson <hkeithhenson at gmail.com>wrote:
>
>> The object is to freeze a glacier to bedrock.

snip
>
> Temperatures at the glacier-bedrock interface can be amazingly high. This
> article talks about bedrock *welding* with temperatures higher than 1,000
> Celsius:
>
> http://jgs.lyellcollection.org/cgi/content/abstract/163/3/417
>
> I guess the energy comes from the potential energy of the ice sliding down
> the terrain.

True.  The article makes the point that it happened in a very short
time in a small volume though.

> This is only enough to take ?out the heat coming out of the earth. ?Probably
>> need it somewhat
>> larger to pull the huge masses of ice in a few decades down to a
>> temperature where they would flow much slower.
>>
>
> If one also needs to remove the heat generated gravitationally, this could
> be potentially much larger than just the Earth's heat flux.

Good point.   Let's put numbers on it.  Take a square km of ice a km
deep.  Consider the case of it sliding at 10 m/year down a 10 m/km
(1%) slope.  So the energy release would be Mgh.  1000 kg/cubic meter
x 10E9cubic m/cubic km x 9.8 x 0.1m =9.8 10E12 J.

That is released over a year, so divide by seconds in a year, 3.15 x
10E7or ~3.1 10E5 watts, which is 310 kW.

So for this case of a fairly fast moving glacier, gravity released
heat would be about 3 times the geo heat.  Of course the heat from
this motion would stop if the glacier was frozen to the bedrock.

Keith


From jonkc at bellsouth.net  Mon Feb  1 17:04:58 2010
From: jonkc at bellsouth.net (John Clark)
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 2010 12:04:58 -0500
Subject: [ExI] How not to make a thought experiment (was: How to ground a
	symbol)
In-Reply-To: <304772.53589.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <304772.53589.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <E961582E-FF63-4D25-9A34-A74C46F7CAFE@bellsouth.net>

On Jan 31, 2010, Gordon Swobe wrote:

> Let me know what you think.
> http://www.mind.ilstu.edu/curriculum/searle_chinese_room/searle_robot_reply.php

More of the same. You ask us to imagine a room too large to fit into the observable universe and then say that it acts intelligently but "obviously" it doesn't understand anything. You just refuse to consider two possibilities:

1)  That you don't fully understand understanding as well as you think you do.
2)  Even if you don't understand how it could understand the room could still understand. 

In fact if Darwin is right (and there is an astronomical amount of evidence that he is) then that room MUST have consciousness despite your or my lack of comprehension of the mechanics of it all. And even if Darwin is not right every one of your arguments against consciousness existing in a robot could just as easily be used to argue against consciousness existing in your fellow human beings; but for some reason you seem unenthusiastic in pursuing that line of thought.

 John K Clark


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From stefano.vaj at gmail.com  Mon Feb  1 18:13:12 2010
From: stefano.vaj at gmail.com (Stefano Vaj)
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 2010 19:13:12 +0100
Subject: [ExI] Understanding is useless
In-Reply-To: <165704.91501.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <65FB1FA7-9C42-47BB-A32A-5B9B2C771FF9@bellsouth.net>
	<165704.91501.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <580930c21002011013m7eb5e8b8r483ea67c719b304f@mail.gmail.com>

On 29 January 2010 20:25, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
> Some people here might even call me a chauvinist of sorts for daring to claim that computers don't understand their own words. I suppose typewriters and cell phones should have civil rights too.

Why, do you suggest that unconscious human beings should lose their own? ;-)

-- 
Stefano Vaj


From eric at m056832107.syzygy.com  Mon Feb  1 18:14:30 2010
From: eric at m056832107.syzygy.com (Eric Messick)
Date: 1 Feb 2010 18:14:30 -0000
Subject: [ExI] Religious idiocy (was: digital nature of brains)
In-Reply-To: <580930c21002010216r46ed7bb8wade659b70018224b@mail.gmail.com>
References: <e321aa4b1001290903q514170cfj4504aa882bb20240@mail.gmail.com>
	<584374.10388.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
	<20100129192646.5.qmail@syzygy.com>
	<580930c21002010216r46ed7bb8wade659b70018224b@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <20100201181430.5.qmail@syzygy.com>

Stefano:
>Eric:
>> Meaning is attached to word symbols when the word symbols are
>> associated with sense symbols, not with other word symbols.
>
>Not all symbols are words - and in fact the word "three" can be
>associated with the number "3" - but "sense symbols" sounds as a
>dubious and redundant concept.

I should probably explain what I mean by the phrase "sense symbols".

As a brain thinks, we can consider it as activating and processing
sequences of sets of symbols.  This is analogous to a CPU having
various bit patterns active on internal busses, with the bit patterns
representing symbols.

Some of the symbols in the brain map 1 to 1 with words in a spoken
language, and we would refer to them as word symbols.  Other brain
symbols appear within the brain as a direct result of the stimulation
of sensory neurons in the body, and this is what I mean by a "sense
symbol".

It's basically the internal representation of directly sensed external
events.

Actually, I was partially mistaken in saying that meaning cannot be
attached to a word by association with other words.  A definition
could associate a new word with a set of old words, and if all of the
old words have meanings (by being grounded or by association) the new
one can acquire meaning as well.

-eric


From Frankmac at ripco.com  Mon Feb  1 18:54:46 2010
From: Frankmac at ripco.com (Frank McElligott)
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 2010 13:54:46 -0500
Subject: [ExI] war is peace
Message-ID: <003f01caa370$0a889bb0$ad753644@sx28047db9d36c>

The largest exporter of oil is Russia, more than the Saudi's.

Yet there was only one bidder, my my a dream auction.

Is this the real world we live in, or are we back in the days of sherwood forest with Robin hood and the sheriff.

The Wizard of Russia 
By Michael Bohm
Michael Bohm is opinion page editor of The Moscow Times.

A year after former Yukos CEO Mikhail Khodorkovsky was arrested on fraud charges, Baikal Finance Group ? a mysterious company with a share capital of only 10,000 rubles ($330) ? acquired Yukos' largest subsidiary, Yuganskneftegaz, for $9.3 billion in an "auction" consisting of only one bidder. After Yuganskneftegaz was sold four days later to state-controlled Rosneft, Andrei Illarionov, economic adviser to then-President Vladimir Putin, called the state expropriation of Yukos "the Biggest Scam of the Year" in his annual year-end list of Russia's worst events. When Illarionov announced his 2009 list in late December, he should have added another award and given it to Putin: "the Best PR Project of the Decade."

The Yukos scam was "legal nihilism" par excellence, but most Russians have a completely different version of the event. The Kremlin's 180-degree PR spin on the Yukos nationalization should be a case study for any nation aspiring to create a Ministry of Truth. As Putin explained in his December call-in show, the Yukos affair was not government expropriation at all, but a way to give money that Yukos "stole from the people" back to the people by helping them buy new homes and repair old ones. Putin, it turns out, is also Russia's Robin Hood. War is peace. Ignorance is strength.  

Oh by the way Obama's job program is going to cost 100 billion, again another robin hood:)

Frank
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From jonkc at bellsouth.net  Mon Feb  1 21:59:53 2010
From: jonkc at bellsouth.net (John Clark)
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 2010 16:59:53 -0500
Subject: [ExI] How not to make a thought experiment
In-Reply-To: <394481.10295.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <394481.10295.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <1CC02E2F-6A82-4B99-A0B4-39BF26253BEC@bellsouth.net>

On Jan 31, 2010, Gordon Swobe wrote:

> digital models of human brains will have the real properties of natural brains if and only if natural brains already exist as digital objects

You've said that before and when you did I said brains are not important minds are, and minds are digital although they are not objects. To save time and avoid needless wear and tear on electrons the next time you have the urge to repeat that same remark yet again lets adopt the convention of you just saying "41" and my retort to your remark will be "42".  

> Philosophers of mind don't care much about how "useful" it may seem.


And that's why philosophers of mind have never produced anything useful and probably never will; computer programers have, mathematicians have, but philosophers of mind not so much.

> They do care if it has a mind capable of having conscious intentional states:

Unfortunately that is all philosophers of mind care about, if they spent just a little time considering what the mind in question actually does regardless of what "intentional state" it is in they would be much more successful. If they spent time taking a high school biology class they would be even better off. But they dislike getting their hands dirty conducting experiments other than the thought kind, and considering actual evidence is even more disagreeable to them.

Darwin contributed astronomically more to understanding what the mind is than any philosopher of mind that ever lived. And these two bit philosophers act as if they've never heard of him; they deserve our contempt.

> Stathis. Looks like you want to skirt the issue by asserting that the system understands things that the man, *considered as the system*, does not understand. 

Some might think that it was outrageous enough to propose a thought experiment that contained a room larger than the observable universe and that operated so slowly that the 13.7 billion year age of the universe is not nearly enough time for it to complete a single action, and then to confidently proclaim exactly what this bizarre amalgamation can and cannot understand; but no, Searle was just getting warmed up. Calling his next step ridiculous doesn't capture its true nature, it's more like ridiculous to the ridiculous power.

Piling absurdity on top of absurdity he now wants us to think about a "man" who "internalized" this contraption that is far too large and far too slow to fit in our universe. I don't know what sort of entity  could do that and I would be a fool to claim to know what that vastly improbable, something, could and couldn't do, and so would you, and so would Searle. I do know one thing, whatever it is you can bet your life that it isn't a man.

> The system you describe won't really "know" it is red. It will merely act as if it knows it is red

Einstein didn't understand physics he just acted like he understood physics. Tiger Woods didn't understand how to play golf he just acted like he understood how to play golf. I've said it before I'll say it again, understanding is useless!

 John K Clark







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From thespike at satx.rr.com  Mon Feb  1 23:47:10 2010
From: thespike at satx.rr.com (Damien Broderick)
Date: Mon, 01 Feb 2010 17:47:10 -0600
Subject: [ExI] US "Air Force recognizes several distinct forms of
	neo-paganism"
Message-ID: <4B6767FE.8080304@satx.rr.com>

http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,584500,00.html

* Witches, Druids and pagans rejoice! The Air Force Academy in Colorado 
is about to recognize its first Wiccan prayer circle, a Stonehenge on 
the Rockies that will serve as an outdoor place of worship for the 
academy's neo-pagans.*

Wiccan cadets and officers on the Colorado Springs base have been 
convening for over a decade, but the school will officially dedicate a 
newly built circle of stones on about March 10, putting the outdoor 
sanctuary on an equal footing with the Protestant, Catholic, Jewish and 
Buddhist chapels on the base.

"When I first arrived here, Earth-centered cadets didn't have anywhere 
to call home," said Sgt. Robert Longcrier, the lay leader of the 
neo-pagan groups on base.

"Now, they meet every Monday night, they get to go on retreats, and they 
have a stone circle."

Academy officials had no tally of the number of Wiccan cadets at the 
school of 4,500, but said they had been angling to set up a proper space 
since the academic year began.

"That's one of the newer groups," said John Van Winkle, a spokesman for 
the academy. "They've had a worship circle on base for some time and 
we're looking to get them an official one."

The Air Force recognizes several distinct forms of neo-paganism, 
including Dianic Wicca, Seax Wicca, Gardnerian Wicca, shamanism and 
Druidism, according to Pagan groups that track the information.

It isn't nearly as comprehensive when it comes to sects within other 
religions. The academy still does not recognize, for instance, the 
massive gulfs between Catholics with guilt problems and those without; 
or the distinct practices of Jews who keep kosher, those who eat bacon, 
and those secretly wish they could.

Since a 2004 survey of cadets on the base revealed dozens of instances 
of harassment and intolerance, superintendent Michael Gould has made 
religious tolerance a priority.

Yet Van Winkle, the academy spokesman, said he could not confirm whether 
the school's superintendent or senior staff would attend the dedication 
ceremony.

"(We) haven't gotten that far yet: First we have to get a date, and then 
once we get a date for the dedication ceremony we'll see who's going to 
be available for it," he told FoxNews.com.

"Once we get a date that's going to be the real driving force for who's 
going to attend."




From msd001 at gmail.com  Tue Feb  2 03:46:15 2010
From: msd001 at gmail.com (Mike Dougherty)
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 2010 22:46:15 -0500
Subject: [ExI] US "Air Force recognizes several distinct forms of
	neo-paganism"
In-Reply-To: <4B6767FE.8080304@satx.rr.com>
References: <4B6767FE.8080304@satx.rr.com>
Message-ID: <62c14241002011946p46d7c02awa01259e1695b244c@mail.gmail.com>

On Mon, Feb 1, 2010 at 6:47 PM, Damien Broderick <thespike at satx.rr.com> wrote:
> "When I first arrived here, Earth-centered cadets didn't have anywhere to
> call home," said Sgt. Robert Longcrier, the lay leader of the neo-pagan
> groups on base.

Earth-centered cadets... didn't have anywhere... to call home.

Is this in comparison to space cadets?  Or is it illustrating a
problem with location or availability of communications equipment?  Or
maybe it's about the alienation of earth-centered cadets feeling
isolated... from their earthican center?

> "Now, they meet every Monday night, they get to go on retreats, and they
> have a stone circle."

On monday night, the earth-centered cadets go on retreats to a stone circle?

> Academy officials had no tally of the number of Wiccan cadets at the school
> of 4,500, but said they had been angling to set up a proper space since the
> academic year began.

I can tell you the "angling" of a stone circle is 360 degrees, no
matter how many bi- sects there are.  Or maybe while on their monday
night retreats they go fishing?  I'm not sure how that is a productive
way to get work done.

> "That's one of the newer groups," said John Van Winkle, a spokesman for the
> academy. "They've had a worship circle on base for some time and we're
> looking to get them an official one."

What criteria is used to make a circle official?  Is a qualified
someone going to measure diameter and circumference to a high degree
of precision before making a declaration?

> The Air Force recognizes several distinct forms of neo-paganism, including
> Dianic Wicca, Seax Wicca, Gardnerian Wicca, shamanism and Druidism,
> according to Pagan groups that track the information.

That's pretty impressive considering most of the time members of these
groups can hardly recognize each other.

> It isn't nearly as comprehensive when it comes to sects within other
> religions. The academy still does not recognize, for instance, the massive
> gulfs between Catholics with guilt problems and those without; or the
> distinct practices of Jews who keep kosher, those who eat bacon, and those
> secretly wish they could.

And what would these group be "officially" recognized as Whole Guilt
Catholics vs Skim Catholics or Bacon Jews vs Fakin Bacon Jews?

> "(We) haven't gotten that far yet: First we have to get a date, and then
> once we get a date for the dedication ceremony we'll see who's going to be
> available for it," he told FoxNews.com.
>
> "Once we get a date that's going to be the real driving force for who's
> going to attend."

Much like high school students deciding if they'll attend a sophomore prom...

I wonder if we could get the Air Force to recognize our Holy
HotTub-based religion and declare an officially sanctioned meeting
place on base?  You know, to be fair and completely "tolerant."


From thespike at satx.rr.com  Tue Feb  2 03:54:15 2010
From: thespike at satx.rr.com (Damien Broderick)
Date: Mon, 01 Feb 2010 21:54:15 -0600
Subject: [ExI] US "Air Force recognizes several distinct forms
	of	neo-paganism"
In-Reply-To: <62c14241002011946p46d7c02awa01259e1695b244c@mail.gmail.com>
References: <4B6767FE.8080304@satx.rr.com>
	<62c14241002011946p46d7c02awa01259e1695b244c@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4B67A1E7.9020905@satx.rr.com>

On 2/1/2010 9:46 PM, Mike Dougherty quoth:

>said John Van Winkle

did make me wonder about a leg-pull... but he pops up on Google more 
than once.


From moulton at moulton.com  Tue Feb  2 05:42:01 2010
From: moulton at moulton.com (moulton at moulton.com)
Date: 2 Feb 2010 05:42:01 -0000
Subject: [ExI] US "Air Force recognizes several distinct forms of
	neo-paganism"
Message-ID: <20100202054201.55588.qmail@moulton.com>


Here is some background info:
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/04/national/04airforce.html
http://www.militaryreligiousfreedom.org/

It looks like things are getting better than they were a few years ago.



From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Tue Feb  2 14:43:10 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2010 06:43:10 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Religious idiocy (was: digital nature of brains)
In-Reply-To: <20100201181430.5.qmail@syzygy.com>
Message-ID: <969214.43756.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Mon, 2/1/10, Eric Messick <eric at m056832107.syzygy.com> wrote:

> Actually, I was partially mistaken in saying that meaning
> cannot be attached to a word by association with other words.  

I think you make an excellent observation here, Eric. The mere association of a symbol to another symbol does not give either symbol meaning. 

Symbols have derived intentionality, whereas people who use symbols have intrinsic intentionality. I'll try to explain what I mean...

Compare:

1) Jack means that the moon orbits the earth.

2) The word "moon" means a large object that orbits the earth.

In the scene described in 1), Jack means something by the symbol "moon". He has intrinsic intentionality. He has a conscious mental state in which *he means* to communicate something about the moon.

In sentence 2), we (English speakers of the human species) attribute intentionality to the symbol "moon", as if the symbol itself has a conscious mental state similar to the one Jack had in 1). We imagine for the sake of convenience that symbols mean to say things about themselves. We often speak of words and other symbols this way, treating them as if they have consciousness mental states, as if they really do mean to tell us what they mean. We anthropomorphize our language. 

The above might seem blindingly obvious (I hope so) but it has bearing on the symbol grounding question. Symbols have meaning only in the minds of conscious agents; that is, the apparent intentionality of words is derived from conscious intentional agents who actually do the meaning.

-gts


      


From bbenzai at yahoo.com  Tue Feb  2 15:08:38 2010
From: bbenzai at yahoo.com (Ben Zaiboc)
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2010 07:08:38 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Glacier Geoengineering
In-Reply-To: <mailman.1.1265112002.9179.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
Message-ID: <847034.14281.qm@web113617.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

I need to ask a question here, please indulge me if the answer should be obvious:

What's the point of sticking glaciers to their bedrock?

Also, if you're going to build up stupendous amounts of potential energy like this, you'd better have a good scheme for dealing with it when it finally breaks loose.  

Hm, maybe not. The frozen-to-bedrock layer will just become the new bedrock, and you'll be back to square one, surely?

Ben Zaiboc


      


From bbenzai at yahoo.com  Tue Feb  2 15:10:42 2010
From: bbenzai at yahoo.com (Ben Zaiboc)
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2010 07:10:42 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] The digital nature of brains
In-Reply-To: <mailman.1.1265112002.9179.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
Message-ID: <263261.91221.qm@web113605.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

Gordon wrote:

"the principles that drive my arguments remain the same: formal programs do not have or cause minds. If they did, the computer in front of you this very moment would have a mind and would perhaps be entitled to vote like other citizens"


This is a good example of a "straw man" argument.  You are misrepresenting the claim that some formal programs can cause minds as a claim that *all* formal programs *must* cause minds.  This is (or should be) obvious nonsense.

As many people now have said, directly and indirectly, many times, it's not the 'formal programness' that's important.  That is completely irrelevant.  What's important is information processing of a particular kind.  This could be implemented by a biological system, an electronic or electromechanical system, a purely chemical system, a nanomechanical system or indeed by a massive array of beer cans and string.  The fact that you find beer cans and string an unlikely substrate for intelligence is beside the point (I find it unlikely too, but for entirely different reasons, to do with practicality, not theoretical possibility).

These 'formal programs' that you keep going on about are just one subset among a large set of possible information processing systems that can give rise to minds, if set up and run in the right way.

Ben Zaiboc


      


From stefano.vaj at gmail.com  Tue Feb  2 18:57:38 2010
From: stefano.vaj at gmail.com (Stefano Vaj)
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2010 19:57:38 +0100
Subject: [ExI] 1984 and Brave New World
In-Reply-To: <12411.23612.qm@web27003.mail.ukl.yahoo.com>
References: <mailman.1390.1264897091.462.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
	<12411.23612.qm@web27003.mail.ukl.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <580930c21002021057x1cb3d14ai15b3cdafd0d9282a@mail.gmail.com>

On 31 January 2010 16:09, Tom Nowell <nebathenemi at yahoo.co.uk> wrote:
> Brave New World reflects the utopian thinking of those who believed a technocratic elite could bestow happiness for all, and its focus on biological engineering of people and society reflects the early 20th century eugenicists. In a time when people were publicly advocating the sterilisation of undesirable types, and where people were using dubious biology to push forward their own political views, Huxley warns us of one way in which this could end up.

Mmhhh.

Where is the "warning"? Huxley does seem to see the Brave New World as
the unavoidable destination of the societal goals worth pursuing.

And where is "eugenics", at least in a transhumanist sense? The
different castes of BNW are kept as stable as possible, no effort to
improve, enhance of change their genetic makeover is in place.

-- 
Stefano Vaj


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Tue Feb  2 23:44:33 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2010 15:44:33 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] meaning & symbols
In-Reply-To: <e321aa4b1002021003n1341d175y850f5520496d2220@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <816357.45313.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Tue, 2/2/10, Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com> wrote:

> According to Eric, association is the sole factor giving
> many symbols meaning in human minds. The only prerequisite is that at
> least one symbol in the web has meaning intrinsically; that is to
> say, it is a sense symbol. Meaning can effectively be shared between
> symbols, and is not diluted in the process.

I think I misread Eric's sentence. Thanks for pointing that out.

In any case I do not believe there exists any such thing as a "sense symbol". 

Organisms with highly developed nervous systems create and ponder mental abstractions, aka symbols, about sense data and about other abstractions. 

Simple organisms on the order of, say, fleas have eyes and other sense organs, so it seems likely that they have awareness of sense data. But because they lack a well developed nervous system it seems very improbable to me that they can do much in the way of forming symbols to represent that data. 

I also do not believe any symbol of any kind can have "instrinsic meaning". Meaning always arises in the context of a conscious mind. X means Y only according to some conscious Z. 

In casual conversation we sometimes speak about words as if they mean something, but they do not actually mean anything. Conscious agents mean things and they use words to convey their meanings.

-gts


      


From possiblepaths2050 at gmail.com  Wed Feb  3 01:01:25 2010
From: possiblepaths2050 at gmail.com (John Grigg)
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2010 18:01:25 -0700
Subject: [ExI] US "Air Force recognizes several distinct forms of
	neo-paganism"
In-Reply-To: <20100202054201.55588.qmail@moulton.com>
References: <20100202054201.55588.qmail@moulton.com>
Message-ID: <2d6187671002021701v18de857bs184fa3e66265410f@mail.gmail.com>

I hope the Air Force Academy got a handle on the serious rape problem they
had, not so many years ago.

John

On Mon, Feb 1, 2010 at 10:42 PM, <moulton at moulton.com> wrote:

>
> Here is some background info:
> http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/04/national/04airforce.html
> http://www.militaryreligiousfreedom.org/
>
> It looks like things are getting better than they were a few years ago.
>
> _______________________________________________
> extropy-chat mailing list
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
>
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From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Wed Feb  3 02:32:09 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2010 18:32:09 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] meaning & symbols
In-Reply-To: <e321aa4b1002021616u4fd11475jbbb3d7ac1b263c18@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <230474.84371.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Tue, 2/2/10, Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com> wrote

> In the second paragraph I almost jumped on you again for
> misusing the concept of abstraction, but then I noticed you said "and
> about other" rather than "and other". You weren't saying that sense data
> are abstractions, if I understand correctly. 

Right.

> When we get to the third paragraph, however, it sounds as
> if you  believe that manking discovered symbols rather than
> invented them.

No. Not sure why you would say that. I certainly do not believe we discover symbols. We create them.

> Here's the thing: the very idea of a symbol is, in and of
> itself, an abstraction. I suspect it's possible to form a 
> coherent model of the mind (by today's standards) without ever 
> mentioning symbols or anything like them. It may not be a particularly 
> elegant model, but it would work as well as any other.

No matter what you may choose to call them, people do speak and understand word-symbols. The human mind thus "has semantics" and any coherent model of it must explain that plain fact. 

The computationalist model fails to explain that plain fact. On that model minds do no more than run programs and programs do no more than manipulate symbols according to rules of syntax. Nothing in the model explains how the mind can have conscious understand the symbols it manipulates. To make the model coherent, its proponents must introduce a homunculous: an observer/user of the supposed brain/computer who sees and understands the meanings of the symbols. But the homunculous fallacy proves fatal to the theory: How does the homunculous understand the symbols if not by some means other than computation? And if that's so then why did we say the mind exists as a computer in the first place? 

> You're correct in saying that sense symbols do not exist,
> but only insofar as there aren't any symbols which DO exist.

Hmm, I count 21 word-symbols in that sentence of yours. 

> All I meant by "intrinsic" meaning was that some symbols in
> the field of all available within a given Z are meaningful
> irrespective of any other symbols. Eric explains that this is so 
> because they are invoked directly by incoming sensory data: I see 
> a dog, I think a dog symbol. 

Yes, but when I look inside your head I see nothing even remotely resembling a digital computer. Instead I see a marvelous product of biological evolution.

-gts


      


From pharos at gmail.com  Wed Feb  3 09:04:36 2010
From: pharos at gmail.com (BillK)
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2010 09:04:36 +0000
Subject: [ExI] meaning & symbols
In-Reply-To: <230474.84371.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <e321aa4b1002021616u4fd11475jbbb3d7ac1b263c18@mail.gmail.com>
	<230474.84371.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <ee50357e1002030104x11f82a75l92b1726ef8f2f84@mail.gmail.com>

On 2/3/10, Gordon Swobe wrote:
>  Yes, but when I look inside your head I see nothing even remotely
> resembling a digital computer. Instead I see a marvelous product
> of biological evolution.
>
>


Yes, You have told us all at great length that you very strongly
believe that only human brains (and other things which must be almost
identical to human brains) can do the magic human 'consciousness'
thing. That's fine, you are allowed to believe anything you like, but
it is only a belief that you cannot 'prove' is correct.
And much reasoning has been produced to show that it is probably a
mistaken belief.

We shall just have to wait until weak AI computers develop, (probably
using new designs and different programming techniques) into machines
that apparently have strong AI, are more intelligent than humans and
have a type of 'consciousness'.

When these machines are out exploring the universe and reporting back
to the remaining humans trapped on earth who are being looked after by
similar intelligent machines, I fully expect you to say 'But they're
not "really* conscious'.


BillK


From stefano.vaj at gmail.com  Wed Feb  3 13:04:44 2010
From: stefano.vaj at gmail.com (Stefano Vaj)
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2010 14:04:44 +0100
Subject: [ExI] US "Air Force recognizes several distinct forms of
	neo-paganism"
In-Reply-To: <4B6767FE.8080304@satx.rr.com>
References: <4B6767FE.8080304@satx.rr.com>
Message-ID: <580930c21002030504m701fe685k6f0e955f191467b5@mail.gmail.com>

On 2 February 2010 00:47, Damien Broderick <thespike at satx.rr.com> wrote:

> http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,584500,00.html
>
> * Witches, Druids and pagans rejoice! The Air Force Academy in Colorado is
> about to recognize its first Wiccan prayer circle, a Stonehenge on the
> Rockies that will serve as an outdoor place of worship for the academy's
> neo-pagans.*
>
>
Good news... Even though I am somewhat diffident of the orthodoxy of US
neopagans. ;-)

-- 
Stefano Vaj
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From stefano.vaj at gmail.com  Wed Feb  3 13:09:05 2010
From: stefano.vaj at gmail.com (Stefano Vaj)
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2010 14:09:05 +0100
Subject: [ExI] Religious idiocy (was: digital nature of brains)
In-Reply-To: <20100201181430.5.qmail@syzygy.com>
References: <e321aa4b1001290903q514170cfj4504aa882bb20240@mail.gmail.com>
	<584374.10388.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
	<20100129192646.5.qmail@syzygy.com>
	<580930c21002010216r46ed7bb8wade659b70018224b@mail.gmail.com>
	<20100201181430.5.qmail@syzygy.com>
Message-ID: <580930c21002030509m60aebf03s28104ee60540978b@mail.gmail.com>

On 1 February 2010 19:14, Eric Messick <eric at m056832107.syzygy.com> wrote:

> Some of the symbols in the brain map 1 to 1 with words in a spoken
> language, and we would refer to them as word symbols.  Other brain
> symbols appear within the brain as a direct result of the stimulation
> of sensory neurons in the body, and this is what I mean by a "sense
> symbol".
>

So, is the integer "3" a word symbol or a sense symbol? And what about the
ASCII decoding of a byte? Or the rasterisation of the ASCII symbol?

And what difference would exactly make?

-- 
Stefano Vaj
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From stefano.vaj at gmail.com  Wed Feb  3 13:15:28 2010
From: stefano.vaj at gmail.com (Stefano Vaj)
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2010 14:15:28 +0100
Subject: [ExI] war is peace
In-Reply-To: <003f01caa370$0a889bb0$ad753644@sx28047db9d36c>
References: <003f01caa370$0a889bb0$ad753644@sx28047db9d36c>
Message-ID: <580930c21002030515y34e2ec6ag9742e901071242b4@mail.gmail.com>

2010/2/1 Frank McElligott <Frankmac at ripco.com>

> The Yukos scam was "legal nihilism" par excellence, but most Russians have
> a completely different version of the event. The Kremlin's 180-degree PR
> spin on the Yukos nationalization should be a case study for any nation
> aspiring to create a Ministry of Truth. As Putin explained in his December
> call-in show, the Yukos affair was not government expropriation at all, but
> a way to give money that Yukos "stole from the people" back to the people by
> helping them buy new homes and repair old ones. Putin, it turns out, is also
> Russia's Robin Hood. War is peace. Ignorance is strength.
>
>
I am really confused. Do you maintain that they were wrong to change their
views? Or that they should have left Yukos in the hands it had fallen in?
And why?

-- 
Stefano Vaj
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From bbenzai at yahoo.com  Wed Feb  3 13:52:04 2010
From: bbenzai at yahoo.com (Ben Zaiboc)
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2010 05:52:04 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] meaning & symbols
In-Reply-To: <mailman.1.1265198402.23237.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
Message-ID: <910459.5460.qm@web113613.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:

> I do not believe there exists any such thing as
> a "sense symbol". 
> 
> Organisms with highly developed nervous systems create and
> ponder mental abstractions, aka symbols, about sense data
> and about other abstractions. 
> 
> Simple organisms on the order of, say, fleas have eyes and
> other sense organs, so it seems likely that they have
> awareness of sense data. But because they lack a well
> developed nervous system it seems very improbable to me that
> they can do much in the way of forming symbols to represent
> that data. 

OK obviously this word 'symbol' needs some clear definition.

I would use the word to mean any distinct pattern of neural activity that has a relationship with other such patterns.  In that sense, sensory symbols exist, as do (visual) word symbols, (auditory) word symbols, concept symbols, which are a higher-level abstraction from the above three types, and hundreds of other types of 'symbol', representing all the different patterns of neural activity that can be regarded as coherent units, like emotional states, memories, linguistic units (nouns, verbs, etc.), and their higher-level 'chunks' (birdness, the concept of fluidity, etc.), and so on.

But that's just me.  Maybe I'm overstretching the use of the word.

What do other people mean by the word 'symbol', in this context?

Gordon points out that they are all meaningless in themselves, only taking on a meaning in the context of a system that can be called a conscious mind.

I'm not sure if the 'conscious' part is necessary, though.  In any event, the 'meaning' arises as a result of the interaction of the symbols, grounded in the system's interaction with its environment.

To say that an organism's 'hunger', which results in it finding and consuming food, is meaningless unless the organism is conscious, is rather a silly statement, and calls into question what we mean by 'meaning'.

Ben Zaiboc


      


From jonkc at bellsouth.net  Wed Feb  3 15:32:24 2010
From: jonkc at bellsouth.net (John Clark)
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2010 10:32:24 -0500
Subject: [ExI] How not to make a thought experiment
In-Reply-To: <969214.43756.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <969214.43756.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <C7EF48C5-DCEE-495D-97FB-860909CAFA73@bellsouth.net>

On Feb 2, 2010, Gordon Swobe wrote:

> The mere association of a symbol to another symbol does not give either symbol meaning. 
> Symbols have derived intentionality, whereas people who use symbols have intrinsic intentionality.

Broken down to its smallest component parts, a symbol is something that consistently and systematically changes the state of the symbol reader. A Turing Machine does this when it encounters a zero or a one, and a punch card reader does this when it encounters a hole. You demand an explanation of human style intentionality and say, correctly, that the examples I cite are far less complex and awe inspiring, but if they were just as mysterious they wouldn't be doing their job. I honestly don't know what you want, you say you want an explanation but when one is provided and its split into parts small enough to comprehend you say I understand that so it can't be the explanation.

Your retort is always I don't understand that or I do understand that so "obviously" that can't be right. Even in theory I don't see how any explanation would satisfy you.

 John K Clark




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From jonkc at bellsouth.net  Wed Feb  3 16:13:18 2010
From: jonkc at bellsouth.net (John Clark)
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2010 11:13:18 -0500
Subject: [ExI] How not to make a thought experiment
In-Reply-To: <230474.84371.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <230474.84371.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <FEE2CC73-D747-4708-8644-5765036B23A5@bellsouth.net>

On Feb 2, 2010, at 9:32 PM, Gordon Swobe wrote:

>  The human mind thus "has semantics" and any coherent model of it must explain that plain fact.

But before that can happen you must explain what you mean by explain.
> 
> The computationalist model fails to explain that plain fact.

It explains it beautifully according to my understanding of the word. You want a theory that is simultaneously completely understandable and utterly mysterious, so naturally you have been disappointed.

> On that model minds do no more than run programs and programs do no more than manipulate symbols according to rules of syntax.

Correct me if I'm wrong but I seem to think you may have said something along those lines before, and I think I even remember people bringing up very good counter arguments against that argument that you have steadfastly ignored.

> Nothing in the model explains how the mind can have conscious understand the symbols it manipulates.

True, they are not comprehensible and incomprehensible at the same time.

> I look inside your head I see nothing even remotely resembling a digital computer.

Then why are people spending hundreds of millions of dollars building digital computers that simulate larger and larger chunks of neurons?

> Instead I see a marvelous product of biological evolution.

How can you dare use the word "Evolution"!? YOUR VIEWS ARE 100% INCOMPATIBLE WITH EVOLUTION!

 John K Clark 







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From ablainey at aol.com  Wed Feb  3 19:54:58 2010
From: ablainey at aol.com (ablainey at aol.com)
Date: Wed, 03 Feb 2010 14:54:58 -0500
Subject: [ExI] meaning & symbols
In-Reply-To: <910459.5460.qm@web113613.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <8CC7321E5DB89A5-D54-12CB@webmail-d081.sysops.aol.com>


 

 


 

 

-----Original Message-----
Ben Zaiboc <bbenzai at yahoo.com> wrote



>OK obviously this word 'symbol' needs some clear definition.

>I would use the word to mean any distinct pattern of neural activity that has a 
>relationship with other such patterns.  In that sense, sensory symbols exist, as 
>do (visual) word symbols, (auditory) word symbols, concept symbols, which are a 
>higher-level abstraction from the above three types, and hundreds of other types 
>of 'symbol', representing all the different patterns of neural activity that can 
>be regarded as coherent units, like emotional states, memories, linguistic units 
>(nouns, verbs, etc.), and their higher-level 'chunks' (birdness, the concept of 
>fluidity, etc.), and so on.
>
>But that's just me.  Maybe I'm overstretching the use of the word.
>
>What do other people mean by the word 'symbol', in this context?
>
>Gordon points out that they are all meaningless in themselves, only taking on a 
>meaning in the context of a system that can be called a conscious mind.
>
>I'm not sure if the 'conscious' part is necessary, though.  In any event, the 
>'meaning' arises as a result of the interaction of the symbols, grounded in the 
>system's interaction with its environment.
>
>To say that an organism's 'hunger', which results in it finding and consuming 
>food, is meaningless unless the organism is conscious, is rather a silly 
>statement, and calls into question what we mean by 'meaning'.
>
>Ben Zaiboc

I agree. The problem is that we are using linguistic symbols to which we give our own personal meaning
to debate a system that we do not fully understand and of which cannot effectively articulate our personal view.

I would go along with the notion that there are sense symbols and many others kinds. So In that context of
"Symbols" I dont think conciousness is necessary. Certainly not at a self awareness level. Does this 
exclude inteligence? I think our definitions need some tweaking.


 
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From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Wed Feb  3 22:05:18 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2010 14:05:18 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] meaning & symbols
In-Reply-To: <ee50357e1002030104x11f82a75l92b1726ef8f2f84@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <837227.95744.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Wed, 2/3/10, BillK <pharos at gmail.com> wrote:

> You have told us all at great length that you very
> strongly believe that only human brains (and other things which must
> be almost identical to human brains) can do the magic human
> 'consciousness' thing. 

I have no interest in magic. I contend only that software/hardware systems as we conceive of them today cannot have subjective mental contents (semantics).

Idealistic dreamers here on ExI take offense. Sorry about that.

-gts




      


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Wed Feb  3 23:08:34 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2010 15:08:34 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] meaning & symbols
In-Reply-To: <ee50357e1002030104x11f82a75l92b1726ef8f2f84@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <642330.6805.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Wed, 2/3/10, John Clark <jonkc at bellsouth.net> wrote:

> Broken down to its smallest component parts, a symbol is something that 
> consistently and systematically changes the state of the symbol reader.

Many things aside from symbols can consistently and systematically change the state of the symbol reader. 

This wikipedia definition seems better:

"A symbol is something such as an object, picture, written word, sound, or particular mark that represents something else by association, resemblance, or convention."

-gts




      


From hkeithhenson at gmail.com  Thu Feb  4 00:26:16 2010
From: hkeithhenson at gmail.com (Keith Henson)
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2010 17:26:16 -0700
Subject: [ExI] Glacier Geoengineering
Message-ID: <d1988d2d1002031626o73eca3cag6c42fcef5d57e2b2@mail.gmail.com>

On Wed, Feb 3, 2010 at 5:00 AM,  Ben Zaiboc <bbenzai at yahoo.com> wrote:

> I need to ask a question here, please indulge me if the answer should be obvious:
>
> What's the point of sticking glaciers to their bedrock?

To slow them down.  That way they don't run off into the sea or down
to lower altitudes where they melt

> Also, if you're going to build up stupendous amounts of potential energy like this, you'd better have a good scheme for dealing with it when it finally breaks loose.
>
> Hm, maybe not. The frozen-to-bedrock layer will just become the new bedrock, and you'll be back to square one, surely?

No, they will still move, but much slower.  Ice is like cold tar and
the colder you get it the slower it moves.

Keith


From ddraig at gmail.com  Tue Feb  2 06:03:23 2010
From: ddraig at gmail.com (ddraig)
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2010 17:03:23 +1100
Subject: [ExI] US "Air Force recognizes several distinct forms of
	neo-paganism"
In-Reply-To: <62c14241002011946p46d7c02awa01259e1695b244c@mail.gmail.com>
References: <4B6767FE.8080304@satx.rr.com>
	<62c14241002011946p46d7c02awa01259e1695b244c@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <f430d9be1002012203x5ce415dcp461bd556fd77a5c@mail.gmail.com>

On 2 February 2010 14:46, Mike Dougherty <msd001 at gmail.com> wrote:

> I can tell you the "angling" of a stone circle is 360 degrees, no
> matter how many bi- sects there are.

Maybe the stones lean inwards? Or outwards? Maybe the whole thing is
designed to be in a slow process of collapse, until you end with
something looking like a stone circle made of dominos?

>> "That's one of the newer groups," said John Van Winkle, a spokesman for the
>> academy. "They've had a worship circle on base for some time and we're
>> looking to get them an official one."
>
> What criteria is used to make a circle official?

Circles are, officially, circular, I believe.

> That's pretty impressive considering most of the time members of these
> groups can hardly recognize each other.

Sure they can. They are fat, and dress in black.

> I wonder if we could get the Air Force to recognize our Holy
> HotTub-based religion and declare an officially sanctioned meeting
> place on base? ?You know, to be fair and completely "tolerant."

Works for me. Is the HPS cute?

Dwayne
-- 
   ddraig at pobox.com irc.deoxy.org #chat
   ...r.e.t.u.r.n....t.o....t.h.e....s.o.u.r.c.e...
  http://www.barrelfullofmonkeys.org/Data/3-death.jpg
our aim is wakefulness,  our enemy is dreamless sleep


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Mon Feb  1 00:54:57 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Sun, 31 Jan 2010 16:54:57 -0800
Subject: [ExI] How to ground a symbol
In-Reply-To: <975270.46265.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <20100131230539.5.qmail@syzygy.com>
	<975270.46265.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1001311654t170bbe3w51baab1646bdc66a@mail.gmail.com>

Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>:
>Eric Messick <eric at m056832107.syzygy.com>:
>> The animations and other text at the site all indicate that
>> this is the type of processing going on in Chinese rooms.
>
> This kind of processing goes on in every software/hardware system.

No, it doesn't. That's only the result of the processing. I went over
this before. The processing itself is so spectacularly more
fine-grained that thinking about it as an "if this input, then this
output" rule is outright fallacious. Yes, you put that input in; yes,
you get that output out; but between these two points, a universe is
created and destroyed.

Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>:
>Eric Messick <eric at m056832107.syzygy.com>:
>> Come back after you've written a neural network
>> simulator and trained it to do something useful.
>
> Philosophers of mind don't care much about how "useful" it may seem. They do care if it has a mind capable of having conscious intentional states: thoughts, beliefs, desires and so on as I've already explained.

The point isn't to have a useful product, it's to demonstrate a
minimal comprehension of how neural network simulations work. You left
out the crux of what Eric said:

"Then we'll see if your intuition still says that computers can't
understand anything."

Getting a neural network simulation to do anything useful is
sufficiently difficult that you will necessarily learn something about
them in the process, and this may change your intuitive impression of
what a computer is capable of.

Besides, we don't care what philosophers of mind think. We care what
computers think. Regrettably, we are forced to talk to the former in
order to learn about the latter.


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Mon Feb  1 02:47:55 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Sun, 31 Jan 2010 18:47:55 -0800
Subject: [ExI] multiple realizability
In-Reply-To: <418148.11027.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <20100201010329.5.qmail@syzygy.com>
	<418148.11027.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1001311847l131b9190p4df880742161d042@mail.gmail.com>

Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>:
> The layer of abstraction does not matter to me.

Bad move. You've been attacked before on the basis that you have
trouble comprehending the importance of abstraction. How far down
through the layers one can go before new complexities cease to emerge
is a tremendous component of the argument against formal programs
being capable of creating consciousness.

To prove this is trivial. All I have to do is invoke a couple of black boxes:

One box contains my brain, and another box contains a standard digital
computer running the best possible simulation of my brain. Both brains
begin in exactly the same state. A single question is sent into each
box at the same moment, and the response coming out of the other side
is identical.

This is the highest level of abstraction, turning whole brains into,
essentially, pseudo-random number generators. They carry states; an
input is combined with the state through a definite function; the
state changes; an output is produced.

Gordon has said before that in situations like these, it is impossible
to determine whether or not either box has consciousness without
"exploratory surgery". I assume Gordon is at least as good a surgeon
as Almighty God, and has unlimited computing power available to
analyze the resulting data instantaneously.

The point is that such surgery is precisely the sort of process which
reduces the level of abstraction. A crash course may be in order.

You are given ten thousand people. You ask, "How many have blue
eyes?". The number splits into two, becoming less abstract. You ask,
"How many are taller than I am?". Now there are four numbers, and one
quarter the abstraction. Eventually any question you ask will be
redundant, as you will have split the population into ten thousand
groups of one. But there is still some abstraction left: people are
not fundamental particles. So you ask enough questions to uniquely
identify every proton, neutron, electron, and any other relevant
components. Yet still your description is abstract, because you've
only differentiated the particles: you haven't determined their exact
locations in space.

And here, in a universe equipped with the Heisenberg uncertainty
principle, we find that you can't. The description is still abstract.
It can be made less so, as we expend greater and greater sums of
energy to pin down ever more precise configurations of human beings,
but to eliminate abstraction entirely would require infinite energy.

In this thread Gordon explicitly rejects the notion that a mind can be
copied, in whole, to another substrate without a catastrophic
interruption in subjective experience. I agree with this, but I think
it's for a completely different reason. I can't say for sure because
his clarification made things less clear.

Proposition A: a machine operating by formal programs cannot replicate
the human mind.
Proposition B: a neural network could conceivably replicate the human mind.
Logical Conclusion: an individual human mind cannot be extracted from
its neurological material.

This does not appear to follow, unless you were counting artificial
neural networks as "neurological material". I understood you to mean
the specific neurons responsible for instantiating the mind in
question originally. By my understanding, that one experiment in which
you replace each individual neuron with an artificial duplicate, one
by one, would preserve the same conscious mind you started with.

Actually I am kind of counting on this last point being true, so I
have a vested interest in finding out whether or not it is. If you can
convince me of my error before I actually act on it, Gordon, I would
appreciate it.

For the record, I am a dualist in the sense that I believe minds are
distinct entities from brains, as well as that programs are distinct
entities from computers. However, I do not believe that minds or
programs are composed of a "substance" in any sense. Both are
insubstantial. Software (which I say includes minds) is one layer of
abstraction higher than its supporting hardware (which I say includes
brains), and therefore one order of magnitude less "real".

I'm not sure what the radix is for that order of magnitude, but I am
absolutely confident that it is exactly one order!


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Mon Feb  1 19:15:11 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 2010 11:15:11 -0800
Subject: [ExI] The digital nature of brains (was: digital simulations)
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002010204g309b6eebk6f4f2043529ce48a@mail.gmail.com>
References: <20100131182926.5.qmail@syzygy.com>
	<732400.27938.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com> 
	<f21c22e31002010204g309b6eebk6f4f2043529ce48a@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002011115m4d5a113bj695826ec64dde534@mail.gmail.com>

Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com>:
> P: It is possible to make artificial neurons which behave like normal
> neurons in every way, but lack consciousness.
>
> That's it! Now, when I ask if P is true you have to answer "Yes" or
> "No". Is P true?

Yes.

But not for any reason relevant to the discussion. The proposition
doesn't illustrate your point. Ordinary neurons behave normally
without producing consciousness all the time! This state can be
produced with trivial effort: either fall asleep, faint, or get
somebody to knock you upside the head. Presto. An entire unconscious
brain, neurons and all.

Request that you clarify the constraints of the experiment.

Now, for the other thing that bothered me...

Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>:
> P = true if we define behavior as you've chosen to define it: the exchange of certain neurotransmitters into the synapses at certain times and other similar exchanges between neurons.

Stathis has not chosen to define behavior this way.

Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com>:
> Yes, that would be one aspect of the behaviour that needs to be reproduced.

See, he's talking about behavior in full: walking, talking, thinking,
everything. I don't know why he didn't come right out and say that
when obviously it's a point of contention. I had to deduce it from
this cryptic reply.

It seems as if Gordon believes behavior has nothing to do with
consciousness, and Stathis believes consciousness is produced as a
direct result of behavior. Further, that the quantity of consciousness
is proportional to the intelligence of that behavior.

I'd be interested to hear from each of you a description of what would
constitute the simplest possible conscious system, and whether or not
such a system would necessarily also have intelligence or
understanding.

I haven't been able to figure out exactly what any of these three
words mean to either of you. I am pretty sure, however, that you each
have radically different definitions.


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Mon Feb  1 19:49:23 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Mon, 1 Feb 2010 11:49:23 -0800
Subject: [ExI] extropy-chat Digest, Vol 77, Issue 1
In-Reply-To: <681115.27739.qm@web113615.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
References: <mailman.1.1265025601.205.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org> 
	<681115.27739.qm@web113615.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002011149l4ddec8e7l99d5e76f24ccaa64@mail.gmail.com>

Ben Zaiboc <bbenzai at yahoo.com>:
>Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>:
>> The system you describe won't really "know" it is red. It
>> will merely act as if it knows it is red, no different from,
>> say, an automated camera that acts as if it knows the light
>> level in the room and automatically adjusts for it.
>
> Please explain what "really knowing" is.
>
> I'm at a loss to see how something that acts exactly as if it knows something is red can not actually know that. ?In fact, I'm at a loss to see how that sentence can even make sense.

Like so many other things, it depends on the method of measurement.
Gordon did not describe any such thing, but we can assume he had at
least a vague notion of one in mind.

It actually is possible to get that paradoxical result, and in fact
it's easy enough that examples of it are widespread in reality. See:
public school systems the world over, and their obsessive tendency to
test knowledge.

It's alarmingly easy to get the right answer on a test without
understanding why it's the right answer, but a certain mental trick is
required to notice when this happens. Basically, you have to
understand your own understanding without falling into an infinite
recursion loop. Human beings are naturally born into that ability, but
most people lose it in school because they learn (incorrectly) that
understanding doesn't make a difference.

Ben Zaiboc <bbenzai at yahoo.com>:
> You're claiming that something which not only quacks and looks like, but smells like, acts like, sounds like, and is completely indistinguishable down to the molecular level from, a duck, can in fact not be a duck. ?That if you discover that the processes which give rise to the molecules and their interactions are due to digital information processing, then, suddenly, no duck.

This is the standard method of measurement in philosophy: omniscience.

The only problem is, omniscience tends to break down rather rapidly
when confronted with questions about subjective experience. If you do
manage to pry a correct answer from your god's-eye view, it will
typically be paradoxical, ambiguous, or both.

Works great for ducks, though, and brains by extension. If you assume
the existence of consciousness in a given brain, and then you
perfectly reconstruct that brain elsewhere on an atomic level, the
copy must necessarily also have consciousness.

But then you have to ask whether or not it's the same consciousness,
and, in my case, I'm forced to conclude that the copy is identical,
but distinct. In the next moment, the two versions will diverge,
ceasing to be identical. So far so good.

However, Gordon usually does not begin with a working consciousness:
he tries to construct one from scratch, and he finds that when he uses
a digital computer to do so, he fails. I'm not sure yet whether this
is a fundamental limitation built into how digital computers work, or
if Gordon is just a really bad programmer. I tend to believe the
latter. Gordon believes the former, so he's extended the notion to
situations in which we DO begin with a working consciousness and then
try to move it to another medium.

Hope that elucidates matters for you.

Also, that it's accurate.


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Tue Feb  2 18:03:01 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2010 10:03:01 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Religious idiocy (was: digital nature of brains)
In-Reply-To: <969214.43756.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <20100201181430.5.qmail@syzygy.com>
	<969214.43756.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002021003n1341d175y850f5520496d2220@mail.gmail.com>

On Tue, Feb 2, 2010 at 6:43 AM, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
> --- On Mon, 2/1/10, Eric Messick <eric at m056832107.syzygy.com> wrote:
>
>> Actually, I was partially mistaken in saying that meaning
>> cannot be attached to a word by association with other words.
>
> I think you make an excellent observation here, Eric. The mere association of a symbol to another symbol does not give either symbol meaning.
>
> Symbols have derived intentionality, whereas people who use symbols have intrinsic intentionality. I'll try to explain what I mean...
>
> Compare:
>
> 1) Jack means that the moon orbits the earth.
>
> 2) The word "moon" means a large object that orbits the earth.
>
> In the scene described in 1), Jack means something by the symbol "moon". He has intrinsic intentionality. He has a conscious mental state in which *he means* to communicate something about the moon.
>
> In sentence 2), we (English speakers of the human species) attribute intentionality to the symbol "moon", as if the symbol itself has a conscious mental state similar to the one Jack had in 1). We imagine for the sake of convenience that symbols mean to say things about themselves. We often speak of words and other symbols this way, treating them as if they have consciousness mental states, as if they really do mean to tell us what they mean. We anthropomorphize our language.
>
> The above might seem blindingly obvious (I hope so) but it has bearing on the symbol grounding question. Symbols have meaning only in the minds of conscious agents; that is, the apparent intentionality of words is derived from conscious intentional agents who actually do the meaning.
>
> -gts
>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> extropy-chat mailing list
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
>

Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>:
>> Actually, I was partially mistaken in saying that meaning
>> cannot be attached to a word by association with other words.
>
> I think you make an excellent observation here, Eric. The mere association of a symbol to another symbol does not give either symbol meaning.

This is exactly what Eric did not say.

The whole paragraph, in case you missed it, was:

Eric Messick <eric at m056832107.syzygy.com>:
> Actually, I was partially mistaken in saying that meaning cannot be
> attached to a word by association with other words. ?A definition
> could associate a new word with a set of old words, and if all of the
> old words have meanings (by being grounded or by association) the new
> one can acquire meaning as well.

According to Eric, association is the sole factor giving many symbols
meaning in human minds. The only prerequisite is that at least one
symbol in the web has meaning intrinsically; that is to say, it is a
sense symbol. Meaning can effectively be shared between symbols, and
is not diluted in the process.


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Wed Feb  3 00:16:42 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2010 16:16:42 -0800
Subject: [ExI] meaning & symbols
In-Reply-To: <816357.45313.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <e321aa4b1002021003n1341d175y850f5520496d2220@mail.gmail.com> 
	<816357.45313.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002021616u4fd11475jbbb3d7ac1b263c18@mail.gmail.com>

Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>:
> In any case I do not believe there exists any such thing as a "sense symbol".
>
> Organisms with highly developed nervous systems create and ponder mental abstractions, aka symbols, about sense data and about other abstractions.
>
> Simple organisms on the order of, say, fleas have eyes and other sense organs, so it seems likely that they have awareness of sense data. But because they lack a well developed nervous system it seems very improbable to me that they can do much in the way of forming symbols to represent that data.

In the second paragraph I almost jumped on you again for misusing the
concept of abstraction, but then I noticed you said "and about other"
rather than "and other". You weren't saying that sense data are
abstractions, if I understand correctly. Nothing to disagree with
there.

When we get to the third paragraph, however, it sounds as if you
believe that manking discovered symbols rather than invented them.
Here's the thing: the very idea of a symbol is, in and of itself, an
abstraction. I suspect it's possible to form a coherent model of the
mind (by today's standards) without ever mentioning symbols or
anything like them. It may not be a particularly elegant model, but it
would work as well as any other.

So, it's really just a matter of convenience to talk about symbols
instead of synapses. Fleas have synapses, if fewer than we do, so if
we wanted to we could easily say that they form and use symbols
(blood, not-blood) within their puny flea-minds. We wouldn't be wrong.

You're correct in saying that sense symbols do not exist, but only
insofar as there aren't any symbols which DO exist.

Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>:
> I also do not believe any symbol of any kind can have "instrinsic meaning". Meaning always arises in the context of a conscious mind. X means Y only according to some conscious Z.

You're right, of course. It was a poor choice of words. I was trying
to convey Eric's theory, which I mostly agree with, in as lazy a
manner as possible.

All I meant by "intrinsic" meaning was that some symbols in the field
of all available within a given Z are meaningful irrespective of any
other symbols. Eric explains that this is so because they are invoked
directly by incoming sensory data: I see a dog, I think a dog symbol.
I have no control over whether or not this happens, except to avoid
looking at dogs. It's impossible to perceive, or even conceive, a
discrete object without simultaneously attaching a symbol to it. Or,
if you prefer, grounding a symbol on it.

(Assuming that we're considering information processing in terms of symbols.)


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Wed Feb  3 03:44:54 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2010 19:44:54 -0800
Subject: [ExI] meaning & symbols
In-Reply-To: <230474.84371.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <e321aa4b1002021616u4fd11475jbbb3d7ac1b263c18@mail.gmail.com> 
	<230474.84371.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002021944h7a2ef637tc1dce17a054378b4@mail.gmail.com>

Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>:
> No matter what you may choose to call them, people do speak and understand word-symbols. The human mind thus "has semantics" and any coherent model of it must explain that plain fact.

I still can't see how the computationalist model fails here, but, more
significantly, I can't see why you think it does. Maybe if I went back
through the archives and read this whole discussion from the start,
but even I don't have that much free time.

Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>:
>Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com>:
>> You're correct in saying that sense symbols do not exist,
>> but only insofar as there aren't any symbols which DO exist.
>
> Hmm, I count 21 word-symbols in that sentence of yours.

And I count 23, because those apostrophes denote points where I've
smashed two discrete words together to save space. I could also get 25
by treating "insofar" as the full three words it's composed of.

Then again, it's really just an arbitrary convention that allows me to
do this, so if I change the convention I could just as easily count
"in saying that" (ins'ingt), "but only" ('tonly), and "insofar as
there" (you get the idea) as single word-symbols as well. There's also
an uncompressed "do not" in there, and the concept of sense symbols
might catch on to such an extent that we start talking about
sensesymbols instead!

So I might just as well say that there are only 14 word symbols in
that sentence. Then again, I only chose those particular words because
it struck me that I almost always put them together in just those
sequences. I could make any two words into one, if I don't care about
efficiency. Therefore, I could squeeze the whole sentence into a
single, magnificently specific word that I'll never, ever have a
chance to use again.

Conclusion: spaces are not (aren't) the be-all end-all demarcation
method of choice, and this is why the word counter in my command-line
shell comes up with a slightly different answer than the one built
into Google Docs.

By the first method this message weighs in at 368 words, whereas the
second confidently gives me a figure of 371.


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Wed Feb  3 16:36:02 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2010 08:36:02 -0800
Subject: [ExI] meaning & symbols
In-Reply-To: <910459.5460.qm@web113613.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
References: <mailman.1.1265198402.23237.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org> 
	<910459.5460.qm@web113613.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002030836q7587b58aq514fc4cf7acb67c7@mail.gmail.com>

Ben Zaiboc <bbenzai at yahoo.com>:
> OK obviously this word 'symbol' needs some clear definition.
>
> I would use the word to mean any distinct pattern of neural activity that has a relationship with other such patterns.
<snip>
> But that's just me. ?Maybe I'm overstretching the use of the word.
>
> What do other people mean by the word 'symbol', in this context?

About the same. It's a problematic definition in that *distinct*
patterns of neural activity are hard to come by, but I can't do any
better.


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Wed Feb  3 16:44:16 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2010 08:44:16 -0800
Subject: [ExI] How not to make a thought experiment
In-Reply-To: <C7EF48C5-DCEE-495D-97FB-860909CAFA73@bellsouth.net>
References: <969214.43756.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
	<C7EF48C5-DCEE-495D-97FB-860909CAFA73@bellsouth.net>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002030844p4f9857cdo69ddfd3cd6453b53@mail.gmail.com>

John Clark <jonkc at bellsouth.net>:
> Your retort is always I don't understand that or I do understand that so
> "obviously" that can't be right. Even in theory I don't see how any
> explanation would satisfy you.

Right now I'm thinking the only way to do it is by forming an
unbreakable line of similarity between Turing machines and human
brains. Not an easy task for the same reason you hinted at: one is
very simple and easy to understand, whereas one is very complex and
difficult to understand.

Basically, it all depends on what Gordon thinks is the simplest
conceivable object capable of intentionality.


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Thu Feb  4 00:30:40 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2010 16:30:40 -0800
Subject: [ExI] meaning & symbols
In-Reply-To: <642330.6805.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <ee50357e1002030104x11f82a75l92b1726ef8f2f84@mail.gmail.com> 
	<642330.6805.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002031630o383814beraebd976e9881a0b@mail.gmail.com>

Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>:
> Many things aside from symbols can consistently and systematically change the state of the symbol reader.

This isn't true even remotely true of all symbol readers real and
imaginary. Maybe you're talking about the human mind specifically.
But, if not:

Turing machines are not real things, but they are symbol readers. If
we imagine a Turing machine whose state can be changed, consistently
and systematically, by anything aside from symbols, we are not really
imagining a Turing machine anymore.

Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>:
> This wikipedia definition seems better:
>
> "A symbol is something such as an object, picture, written word, sound, or particular mark that represents something else by association, resemblance, or convention."

More generally accurate, yes, but in this context not nearly as useful
as Ben Zaiboc's definition. Wikipedia's does not come anywhere near
explaining how one symbol can dynamically give rise to a chain of
other symbols, which, to my thinking, is the very essence of thought.

My guess is that no one here believes meaning can exist outside of
thought, or at least a thought-like process.

The only question is how thought-like the process has to be.


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Thu Feb  4 01:34:32 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2010 17:34:32 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] The digital nature of brains (was: digital simulations)
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002010628v31342f47w61b84407f0c5a409@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <428505.81133.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Mon, 2/1/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:

>> I reject as absurd for example your theory that a
>> brain the size of Texas constructed of giant neurons made of
>> beer cans and toilet paper will have consciousness merely by
>> virtue of those beer cans squirting neurotransmitters
>> betwixt themselves in the same patterns that natural neurons
>> do.
> 
> That is a consequence of functionalism but at this point
> functionalism is assumed to be wrong. 

?? 

Can a conscious Texas-sized brain constructed out of giant neurons made of beer cans and toilet paper exist as a possible consequence of your brand of functionalism? Or not? 

-gts






      


From stathisp at gmail.com  Thu Feb  4 03:03:08 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2010 14:03:08 +1100
Subject: [ExI] The digital nature of brains (was: digital simulations)
In-Reply-To: <428505.81133.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <f21c22e31002010628v31342f47w61b84407f0c5a409@mail.gmail.com> 
	<428505.81133.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002031903u6be6f673of24e0dc15669c562@mail.gmail.com>

On 4 February 2010 12:34, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
> --- On Mon, 2/1/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>>> I reject as absurd for example your theory that a
>>> brain the size of Texas constructed of giant neurons made of
>>> beer cans and toilet paper will have consciousness merely by
>>> virtue of those beer cans squirting neurotransmitters
>>> betwixt themselves in the same patterns that natural neurons
>>> do.
>>
>> That is a consequence of functionalism but at this point
>> functionalism is assumed to be wrong.
>
> ??
>
> Can a conscious Texas-sized brain constructed out of giant neurons made of beer cans and toilet paper exist as a possible consequence of your brand of functionalism? Or not?

It would have to be much, much larger than Texas if it was to be human
equivalent and it probably wouldn't physically possible due (among
other problems) to loss of structural integrity over the vast
distances involved. However, theoretically, there is no problem if
such a system is Turing-complete and if the behaviour of the brain is
computable.

As for the "??": I have ASSUMED that functionalism is wrong, i.e. that
is possible to make a structure which behaves like a brain but lacks
consciousness, to see where this leads. I have shown (with your help)
that it leads to a contradiction, eg. "the structure both does and
does not behave exactly like a normal brain", which implies that the
original assumption must be FALSE. It is like assuming that sqrt(2) is
rational, and then showing that this leads to contradiction, which
implies that sqrt(2) is not rational.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From avantguardian2020 at yahoo.com  Thu Feb  4 06:33:39 2010
From: avantguardian2020 at yahoo.com (The Avantguardian)
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2010 22:33:39 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] How not to make a thought experiment
In-Reply-To: <e321aa4b1002030844p4f9857cdo69ddfd3cd6453b53@mail.gmail.com>
References: <969214.43756.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
	<C7EF48C5-DCEE-495D-97FB-860909CAFA73@bellsouth.net>
	<e321aa4b1002030844p4f9857cdo69ddfd3cd6453b53@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <317129.32350.qm@web65616.mail.ac4.yahoo.com>

----- Original Message ----
> From: Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com>
> To: ExI chat list <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org>
> Sent: Wed, February 3, 2010 8:44:16 AM
> Subject: Re: [ExI] How not to make a thought experiment
> 
> John Clark :
> > Your retort is always I don't understand that or I do understand that so
> > "obviously" that can't be right. Even in theory I don't see how any
> > explanation would satisfy you.
> 
> Right now I'm thinking the only way to do it is by forming an
> unbreakable line of similarity between Turing machines and human
> brains. Not an easy task for the same reason you hinted at: one is
> very simple and easy to understand, whereas one is very complex and
> difficult to understand.
> 
> Basically, it all depends on what Gordon thinks is the simplest
> conceivable object capable of intentionality.

If you equate intentionality with consciousness, one is left with the result that individual cells (of all types)?are conscious. This is because cells demonstrate intentionality. It is one of the lesser known hallmarks of life. Survival is intentional and?anything that left survival strictly to chance would?quickly be weeded out by natural selection. One can clearly see that in this video posted earlier by Spike.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JnlULOjUhSQ

The white blood cell is clearly *intent* on eating the bacterium. And the bacterium is clearly *intent* on evading the theat to its existense.?Therefore a bacterium is the simplest concievable object that I am?confident is capable of intentionality. Although viruses being far?simpler may possibly?also display intentionality if you?interpret trying to?hijack cells and evade?the immune?response as hallmarks of "intention". With regard to the on going discussion, I think that it may be?an important first step?to try to program a computer to be unequivocally "alive" even on the level of a bacterium as a first step. It would be far simpler than trying to create a "brain" from scratch and would lend a great deal of support to the functional case. Not to mention it would disprove vitalism once and for all which would be a feather in the cap of functionalism.???

?
Stuart LaForge 


"Never express yourself more clearly than you think." - Niels Bohr


      



From bbenzai at yahoo.com  Thu Feb  4 09:35:52 2010
From: bbenzai at yahoo.com (Ben Zaiboc)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2010 01:35:52 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] The digital nature of brains
In-Reply-To: <mailman.1466.1265248130.462.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
Message-ID: <496675.14673.qm@web113614.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com> wrote:

> >From my perspective, Gordon has been very consistent
> when it comes to
> what will and will not pass the Turing test. His arguments,
> implicitly
> or explicitly, state that the Turing test does not measure
> consciousness. This is one point on which he and I agree.


The Turing test was designed to answer the question "can machines think?".

It doesn't measure consciousness directly (we don't know of anything that can), but it does measure something which can only be the product of consciousness: The ability of a system to convince a human that it is itself human.  This is equivalent to convincing them that is is conscious.

If this wasn't the case, people would have no real reason to believe that other people were conscious.  

For this reason, I'd say that anything which can convincingly pass the Turing test should be regarded as conscious.  

Obviously, you'd want to take this seriously, and not be satisfied with a five-minute conversation.  It'd have to be over a period of time, involving many different domains of knowledge before you'd be fully convinced, but if and when you were convinced that you were actually talking to a human, You'd have to admit that either you think you were talking to a conscious being, or that you think other humans aren't conscious.


Ben Zaiboc


      


From jameschoate at austin.rr.com  Thu Feb  4 10:25:00 2010
From: jameschoate at austin.rr.com (jameschoate at austin.rr.com)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2010 10:25:00 +0000
Subject: [ExI] The digital nature of brains
In-Reply-To: <496675.14673.qm@web113614.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <20100204102500.86W8S.511470.root@hrndva-web26-z02>

No it does not. It is test which asks if a human being can tell the difference through a remote communications channel between a machine and a human.

It says absolutely nothing about intelligence, thinking, or anything like that with regard to machines. These sorts of claims demonstrate that the claimant has an inverted understanding of the issue. The Turing Test has one, and only one outcome...to measure the limits of human ability.

---- Ben Zaiboc <bbenzai at yahoo.com> wrote: 

> The Turing test was designed to answer the question "can machines think?".

--
 -- -- -- --
Venimus, Vidimus, Dolavimus

jameschoate at austin.rr.com
james.choate at g.austincc.edu
james.choate at twcable.com
h: 512-657-1279
w: 512-845-8989
www.ssz.com
http://www.twine.com/twine/1128gqhxn-dwr/solar-soyuz-zaibatsu
http://www.twine.com/twine/1178v3j0v-76w/confusion-research-center

Adapt, Adopt, Improvise
 -- -- -- --


From stathisp at gmail.com  Thu Feb  4 11:15:11 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2010 22:15:11 +1100
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability (was: The digital nature of
	brains)
In-Reply-To: <e321aa4b1001301907s754efd8atc36849a20a7c21f5@mail.gmail.com>
References: <e321aa4b1001301907s754efd8atc36849a20a7c21f5@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002040315h6a5b05adt1268367d298443ed@mail.gmail.com>

On 31 January 2010 14:07, Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com> wrote:
> Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com>:
>>Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>:
>>> A3: syntax is neither constitutive of nor sufficient for semantics.
>>>
>>> It's because of A3 that the man in the room cannot understand the symbols. I started the robot thread to discuss the addition of sense data on the mistaken belief that you had finally recognized the truth of that axiom. Do you recognize it now?
>>
>> No, I assert the very opposite: that meaning is nothing but the
>> association of one input with another input. You posit that there is a
>> magical extra step, which is completely useless and undetectable by
>> any means.
>
> Crap! Now I'm doing it too. This whole discussion is just an absurdly
> complex feedback loop, neither positive nor negative. It will never
> get better and it will never end. Yet the subject matter is
> interesting, and I am helpless to resist.
>
> First, yes, I agree with Stathis's assertion that association of one
> input with another input, or with another output, or, generally, of
> one datum with another datum, is the very definition of meaning.
> Literally, "A means B". This is mathematically equivalent to, "A
> equals B". Smoke equals fire, therefore, if smoke is true or fire is
> true then both are true. This is very bad reasoning, and very human.
> Nevertheless, we can say that there is a semantic association between
> smoke and fire.
>
> Of course the definitions of semantics and syntax seem to have become
> deranged somewhere along the lines, so someone with a different
> interpretation of their meaning than I have may very well leap at the
> chance to rub my face in it here. This is a risk I am willing to take.
>
> So!
>
> To see a computer's idea of semantics one might look at file formats.
> An image can be represented in BMP or PNG format, but in either case
> it is the same image; both files have the same meaning, though the
> manner in which that meaning is represented differs radically, just as
> 10/12 differs from 5 * 6^-1.
>
> Another source might be desktop shortcuts. You double-click the icon
> for the terrible browser of your choice, and your computer takes this
> to mean instead that you are double-clicking an EXE file in a
> completely different place. Note that I could very naturally insert
> the word "mean" there, implying a semantic association.
>
> Neither of these are nearly so human a use of semantics, because the
> relationship in each case is literal, not causal. However, it is still
> semantics: an association between two pieces of information.
>
> Gordon has no beef with a machine that produces intelligent behavior
> through semantic processes, only with one that produces the same
> behavior through syntax alone.
>
> At this point, though, his argument becomes rather hazy to me. How can
> anything even resembling human intelligence be produced without
> semantic association?
>
> A common feature in Searle's thought experiments, and in Gordon's by
> extension, is that there is a very poor description of the exact
> process by which a conversational computer determines how to respond
> to any given statement. This is necessary to some extent, because if
> anyone could give a precise description of the program that passes the
> Turing test, well, they could just write it.
>
> In any case, there's just no excuse to describe that program with
> rules like: if I hear "What is a pig?" then I will say "A farm
> animal". Sure, some people give that response to that question some of
> the time. But if you ask it twice in a row to the same person, you
> will get dramatically different answers each time. It's a gross
> oversimplification, but I'm forced to admit that it is technically
> valid if one views it only as what will happen, from a very high-level
> perspective, if "What is a pig?" is the very next thing the Chinese
> Room is asked. A whole new lineup of rules like that would be have to
> be generated after each response. Not a very practical solution.
> Effective, but not efficient.
>
> However, it seems to me that even if we had the brute processing power
> to implement a system like that while keeping it realistically
> quick-witted, it would still be impossible to generate that rule
> without the program containing at least one semantic fact, namely,
> "pig = farm animal".
>
> The only part syntactical rules play in this scenario is to insert the
> word "a" at the beginning of the sentence. Syntax is concerned only
> with grammatical correctness. Using syntax alone, one might imagine
> that the answer would be "a noun": the place at which "pig" occurs in
> the sentence implies that the word must be a noun, and this is as
> close as a syntactical rule can come to showing similarity between two
> symbols. If the grammar in question doesn't explicitly provide
> categories for symbols, as in English, then not even this can be done,
> and a meaningful syntax-based response is completely impossible.
>
> I started on this message to point out that Stathis had completely
> missed the point of A3, but sure enough I ended up picking on Searle
> (and Gordon) as well.
>
> In the end, I would like to make the claim: syntax implies semantics,
> and semantics implies syntax. One cannot find either in isolation,
> except in the realm of one's imagination. Like so many other divisions
> imposed between natural (that is, non-imaginary) phenomena, this one
> is valid but false.

I'm not completely sure what you're saying in this post, but at some
point the string of symbol associations (A means B, B means C, C means
D...) is grounded in sensory input. Searle would say that there needs
to be an extra step whereby the symbol so grounded gains "meaning",
but this extra step is not only completely mysterious, it is also
completely superfluous, since every observable fact about the world
would be the same without it. It's like claiming that a subset of
humans have an extra dimension of meaning, meaning*, which is
mysterious and undetectable, but assuredly there making their lives
richer.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From stefano.vaj at gmail.com  Thu Feb  4 11:59:50 2010
From: stefano.vaj at gmail.com (Stefano Vaj)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2010 12:59:50 +0100
Subject: [ExI] Personal conclusions
Message-ID: <580930c21002040359u3141931am117614683d4f67a3@mail.gmail.com>

On 3 February 2010 23:05, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
> I have no interest in magic. I contend only that software/hardware systems as we conceive of them today cannot have subjective mental contents (semantics).

Yes, this is clear by now.

The bunch of threads of which Gordon Swobe is the star, which I have
admittedly followed on and off, also because of their largely
repetitive nature, have been interesting, albeit disquieting, for me.

Not really to hear him reiterate innumerable times that for whatever
reason he thinks that (organic? human?) brains, while obviously
sharing universal computation abilities with cellular automata and
PCs, would on the other hand somewhat escape the Principle of
Computational Equivalence.

But because so many of the people having engaged in the discussion of
the point above, while they may not believe any more in a religious
concept of "soul", seem to accept without a second thought that some
very poorly defined Aristotelic essences would per se exist
corresponding to the symbols "mind", "consciousness", "intelligence",
and that their existence in the sense above would even be an a priori
not really open to analysis or discussion.

Now, if this is the case, I have sincerely troubles in finding a
reason why we should not accept on an equal basis, the article of
faith that Gordon Swobe proposes as to the impossibility for a
computer to exhibit the same.

Otherwise, we should perhaps reconsider a little non really the AI
research programmes in place, but rather, say, the Circle of Vienna,
Popper or Dennett.

-- 
Stefano Vaj


From stathisp at gmail.com  Thu Feb  4 12:07:17 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2010 23:07:17 +1100
Subject: [ExI] Personal conclusions
In-Reply-To: <580930c21002040359u3141931am117614683d4f67a3@mail.gmail.com>
References: <580930c21002040359u3141931am117614683d4f67a3@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002040407i50e14396pd0e7e3ca7de08491@mail.gmail.com>

On 4 February 2010 22:59, Stefano Vaj <stefano.vaj at gmail.com> wrote:

> But because so many of the people having engaged in the discussion of
> the point above, while they may not believe any more in a religious
> concept of "soul", seem to accept without a second thought that some
> very poorly defined Aristotelic essences would per se exist
> corresponding to the symbols "mind", "consciousness", "intelligence",
> and that their existence in the sense above would even be an a priori
> not really open to analysis or discussion.

Probably you and I believe the same things about "mind",
"consciousness" etc., but we use different words.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From stefano.vaj at gmail.com  Thu Feb  4 12:16:45 2010
From: stefano.vaj at gmail.com (Stefano Vaj)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2010 13:16:45 +0100
Subject: [ExI] The digital nature of brains
In-Reply-To: <496675.14673.qm@web113614.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
References: <mailman.1466.1265248130.462.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
	<496675.14673.qm@web113614.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <580930c21002040416o54ebd748rceedf0dabe607034@mail.gmail.com>

On 4 February 2010 10:35, Ben Zaiboc <bbenzai at yahoo.com> wrote:
> For this reason, I'd say that anything which can convincingly pass the
Turing test should be regarded as conscious.

In fact, I suspect that anything that can convincingly pass the Turing test
is simply conscious *by definition*, because it is the test that we
routinely apply to check whether the system we are in touch with is
conscious or not (say, when trying to decide whether some human being is
asleep or dead).

The simple question is: should something, in addition to being able to
perform as well as the average adult, alert human being in a Turing test,
have blue eyes, flesh limbs, a hairy head or a liver to qualify as
"conscious"? If we try to analyse any "intuition" we may have in this sense,
any such intuition evaporates quickly enough

-- 
Stefano Vaj
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From stefano.vaj at gmail.com  Thu Feb  4 12:24:24 2010
From: stefano.vaj at gmail.com (Stefano Vaj)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2010 13:24:24 +0100
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability (was: The digital nature of
	brains)
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002040315h6a5b05adt1268367d298443ed@mail.gmail.com>
References: <e321aa4b1001301907s754efd8atc36849a20a7c21f5@mail.gmail.com>
	<f21c22e31002040315h6a5b05adt1268367d298443ed@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <580930c21002040424x5021098fl5c0599629dc3d8ec@mail.gmail.com>

On 4 February 2010 12:15, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:

> I'm not completely sure what you're saying in this post, but at some
> point the string of symbol associations (A means B, B means C, C means
> D...) is grounded in sensory input.


Defined as?


> Searle would say that there needs
> to be an extra step whereby the symbol so grounded gains "meaning",
> but this extra step is not only completely mysterious, it is also
> completely superfluous, since every observable fact about the world
> would be the same without it.
>

Which sounds pretty equivalent to saying that it does not exist, if one
accepts that one's "world" is simply the set of all observable phenomena,
and that a claim pertaining to the existence of something is meaningless
only if it can be disproved.

-- 
Stefano Vaj
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From stathisp at gmail.com  Thu Feb  4 13:03:26 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2010 00:03:26 +1100
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability (was: The digital nature of
	brains)
In-Reply-To: <580930c21002040424x5021098fl5c0599629dc3d8ec@mail.gmail.com>
References: <e321aa4b1001301907s754efd8atc36849a20a7c21f5@mail.gmail.com> 
	<f21c22e31002040315h6a5b05adt1268367d298443ed@mail.gmail.com> 
	<580930c21002040424x5021098fl5c0599629dc3d8ec@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002040503t5131236co3580bc65df126e09@mail.gmail.com>

2010/2/4 Stefano Vaj <stefano.vaj at gmail.com>:
> On 4 February 2010 12:15, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> I'm not completely sure what you're saying in this post, but at some
>> point the string of symbol associations (A means B, B means C, C means
>> D...) is grounded in sensory input.
>
> Defined as?

Input from the environment. "Chien" is "hund", "hund" is "dog", and
"dog" is the furry creature with four legs and a tail, as learned by
English speakers as young children.

>> Searle would say that there needs
>> to be an extra step whereby the symbol so grounded gains "meaning",
>> but this extra step is not only completely mysterious, it is also
>> completely superfluous, since every observable fact about the world
>> would be the same without it.
>
> Which sounds pretty equivalent to saying that it does not exist, if one
> accepts that one's "world" is simply the set of all observable phenomena,
> and that a claim pertaining to the existence of something is meaningless
> only if it can be disproved.

Yes, or you could create undetectable entities like this whenever the
fancy took you.

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From bbenzai at yahoo.com  Thu Feb  4 13:38:59 2010
From: bbenzai at yahoo.com (Ben Zaiboc)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2010 05:38:59 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Mind extension
In-Reply-To: <mailman.1.1265284805.25978.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
Message-ID: <767464.48754.qm@web113618.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com> wrote:

> By my understanding, that one experiment in which
> you replace each individual neuron with an artificial duplicate, one
> by one, would preserve the same conscious mind you started with.

> Actually I am kind of counting on this last point being true, so I
> have a vested interest in finding out whether or not it is. If you can
> convince me of my error before I actually act on it, Gordon, I would
> appreciate it.


I've been pondering this issue, and it's possible that there's a way around the problem of confirming that consciousness can run on artificial neurons without actually removing existing natural neurons, and condemning the subject to death if it turns out to be untrue.

I'm thinking of an 'mind extension' scenario, where you attach these artificial neurons (or their software equivalent) to an existing brain using neural interfaces, in a configuration that does something useful, like giving an extra sense or an expanded or secondary short-term memory (of course all this assumes good neural interface technology, working artificial neurons and a better understanding of mental architecture than we have just now).  Let the user settle in with the new part of their brain for a while, then they should be able to tell if they 'inhabit' it or if it's just like driving a car: it's something 'out there' that they are operating.  

If they feel that their consciousness now partly resides in the new brain area, it should be possible to duplicate all the vital brain modules and selectively anaesthetise their biological counterparts without any change in subjective experience.  

If the person says "Hang on, I blanked out there" for the period of time the artificial brain parts were operating on their own, we would know that they don't support conscious experience, and the person could say 'no thanks' to uploading, with their original brain intact.

The overall idea is to build extra room for the mind to expand into, and see if it really has or not.  If the new, artificial parts actually don't support consciousness, you'd soon notice. If they do, you could augment your brain to the point where the original was just a tiny part, and you wouldn't even miss it when it eventually dies off.  

Ben Zaiboc


      


From bbenzai at yahoo.com  Thu Feb  4 13:13:12 2010
From: bbenzai at yahoo.com (Ben Zaiboc)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2010 05:13:12 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] multiple realizability
In-Reply-To: <mailman.1.1265284805.25978.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
Message-ID: <764802.35206.qm@web113618.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

I suspect that it's ignorance of the importance of levels of abstraction that can lead to ideas like "minds can come from neural networks, but not from digital programs".  All you need to see is that a digital program can implement a neural network at a higher level of abstraction to demolish this idea.

That's an over-simplification of course, because the digital program/s would more likely implement a set of software objects that interact to implement individual neural nets that interact to implement sets of information processing mechanisms that interact to create a mind.  That's 5 levels of abstraction in my probably over-simplistic concept of the process.  There may well be several more in a realistic implementation.

Ben Zaiboc


      


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Thu Feb  4 13:47:00 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2010 05:47:00 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability (was: The digital nature of
	brains)
In-Reply-To: <580930c21002040424x5021098fl5c0599629dc3d8ec@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <595536.39512.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Thu, 2/4/10, Stefano Vaj <stefano.vaj at gmail.com> wrote:

Stathis wrote:
>> Searle would say that there
>> needs to be an extra step whereby the symbol so grounded gains
>> "meaning", but this extra step is not only completely mysterious, it
>> is also completely superfluous, since every observable fact about
>> the world would be the same without it.

No, he would remind you of the obvious truth there exist facts in the world that have subjective first-person ontologies. We can know those facts only in the first-person but they have no less reality than those objective third-person facts that as you say "would be the same without it".

Real subjective first-person facts of the world include one's own conscious understanding of words.

Stefano wrote:
> Which sounds pretty equivalent to saying that it does not
> exist,

I think you want to deny the reality of the subjective. I don't know why. 

-gts


      


From alfio.puglisi at gmail.com  Thu Feb  4 13:56:39 2010
From: alfio.puglisi at gmail.com (Alfio Puglisi)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2010 14:56:39 +0100
Subject: [ExI] New NASA plans
Message-ID: <4902d9991002040556x5a5407c1r7a8e0bfee32f401a@mail.gmail.com>

Does anyone know if this article from the Economist about Obama's plans for
NASA:

http://www.economist.com/sciencetechnology/displayStory.cfm?story_id=15449787&source=features_box_main

is anywhere accurate? The overall tone is more positive than I expected...
in particular, the elimination of "cost-plus" contracts seems a big step in
cleaning things up. And, well, I'm a huge fan of SpaceX :-)

Alfio
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From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Thu Feb  4 13:32:16 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2010 05:32:16 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] The digital nature of brains (was: digital simulations)
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002031903u6be6f673of24e0dc15669c562@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <854080.27226.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Wed, 2/3/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:

>> Can a conscious Texas-sized brain constructed out of
>> giant neurons made of beer cans and toilet paper exist as a
>> possible consequence of your brand of functionalism? Or
>> not?
> 
> It would have to be much, much larger than Texas if it was
> to be human equivalent and it probably wouldn't physically possible due
> (among other problems) to loss of structural integrity over the
> vast distances involved. However, theoretically, there is no
> problem if such a system is Turing-complete and if the behaviour of
> the brain is computable.

Okay, I take that as a confirmation of your earlier assertion that brains made of beer cans and toilet paper can have consciousness provided those beer cans squirt the correct neurotransmitters between themselves at the correct times. This suggests to me that your ideology has a firmer grip on your thinking that does your sense of the absurd, and that no reductio ad absurdum argument will find traction with you. 

I find it ironic that you try to use reductio ad absurdum arguments with me given that you have apparently inoculated yourself against them. :-)


-gts


      


From bbenzai at yahoo.com  Thu Feb  4 14:26:44 2010
From: bbenzai at yahoo.com (Ben Zaiboc)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2010 06:26:44 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] The digital nature of brains
In-Reply-To: <mailman.1.1265284805.25978.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
Message-ID: <438813.76903.qm@web113617.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

<jameschoate at austin.rr.com> claimed:

> ---- Ben Zaiboc <bbenzai at yahoo.com>
> wrote: 
> 
> > The Turing test was designed to answer the question
> "can machines think?".

> No it does not. It is test which asks if a human being can
> tell the difference through a remote communications channel
> between a machine and a human.
> 
> It says absolutely nothing about intelligence, thinking, or
> anything like that with regard to machines. These sorts of
> claims demonstrate that the claimant has an inverted
> understanding of the issue. The Turing Test has one, and
> only one outcome...to measure the limits of human ability.

Well, we're talking about different things.  I said "it was designed to..", and you replied "no it does not".  Both of these can be true.

The test was intended to test the abilities of a machine to convince a human, not to test the abilities of the human.  Of course that may well be one of its side effects! (apparently a disturbingly high proportion of people - mostly teenagers I think - are convinced by some chatbots)

Ben Zaiboc


      


From stefano.vaj at gmail.com  Thu Feb  4 14:30:37 2010
From: stefano.vaj at gmail.com (Stefano Vaj)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2010 15:30:37 +0100
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability (was: The digital nature of
	brains)
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002040503t5131236co3580bc65df126e09@mail.gmail.com>
References: <e321aa4b1001301907s754efd8atc36849a20a7c21f5@mail.gmail.com>
	<f21c22e31002040315h6a5b05adt1268367d298443ed@mail.gmail.com>
	<580930c21002040424x5021098fl5c0599629dc3d8ec@mail.gmail.com>
	<f21c22e31002040503t5131236co3580bc65df126e09@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <580930c21002040630k1d8931dapd63f2ef62ff51491@mail.gmail.com>

On 4 February 2010 14:03, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:

> 2010/2/4 Stefano Vaj <stefano.vaj at gmail.com>:
> > On 4 February 2010 12:15, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >>
> >> I'm not completely sure what you're saying in this post, but at some
> >> point the string of symbol associations (A means B, B means C, C means
> >> D...) is grounded in sensory input.
> >
> > Defined as?
>
> Input from the environment. "Chien" is "hund", "hund" is "dog", and
> "dog" is the furry creature with four legs and a tail, as learned by
> English speakers as young children.
>

Mmhhh. "Dog" is a sound perceived with one's ears, subvocalised or
represented by the appropriate characters in a given typeface, Pluto may be
a design or icon of such an animal, the bits by which he is rasterised are
another symbol thereof, the pixel of the image of an actual dog on
somebody's retina is another symbol thereof. Symbols all the way down, all
of them "sensorial" after a fashion, for us as exactly as for any other
system.

OTOH, inputs and interfaces are of course crucial to the definition of a
given system. Mr. Jones is different from young baby Brown who is different
from a bat who is different from a PC with a SCSI scanner which is different
from an I-Phone...

-- 
Stefano Vaj
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From bbenzai at yahoo.com  Thu Feb  4 14:35:27 2010
From: bbenzai at yahoo.com (Ben Zaiboc)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2010 06:35:27 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] The simplest possible conscious system
In-Reply-To: <mailman.1.1265284805.25978.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
Message-ID: <820642.67186.qm@web113613.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

The simplest possible conscious system

Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com> asked:

> I'd be interested to hear from each of you a description of what would
> constitute the simplest possible conscious system, and whether or not
> such a system would necessarily also have intelligence or
> understanding.

Hm, interesting challenge.

I'd probably define Intelligence as problem-solving ability, and 
Understanding as the association of new 'concept-symbols' with established ones.

I'd take "Conscious" to mean "Self-Conscious" or "Self-Aware", which almost certainly involves a mental model of one's self, as well as an awareness of the environment, and one's place in it.

I'd guess that the simplest possible conscious system would have an embodiment ('real' or virtual) within an environment, sensors, actuators, the ability to build internal representations of both its environment and itself, and by implication some kind of state memory.  Hm. maybe we already have conscious robots, and don't realise it!

This is just a stab in the dark, though, I may be way off.

As for possessing intelligence and understanding, the simplest possible conscious system almost certainly wouldn't have much of either, although by my definitions above, there would have to be *some* of both. Just not very much (it would need Intelligence only if it's going to try to survive).

Ben Zaiboc


      


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Thu Feb  4 15:00:22 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2010 07:00:22 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] The digital nature of brains
In-Reply-To: <20100204102500.86W8S.511470.root@hrndva-web26-z02>
Message-ID: <325635.76699.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

Spencer:

> How would one determine, in practice, whether or not any
> given information processor is a digital computer?

I would start by looking for the presence of real physical digital electronic hardware and syntactic instructions that run on it. In some cases you will find those instructions in the software. In other cases you will find them coded into the hardware or firmware.

Another way to answer your question: 

If you find yourself wanting to consult a philosopher about whether a given entity might in some sense exist at some level of description as a digital computer then most likely it's not really a digital computer. :) 

>> Is it accurate to say that two digital computers,
>> networked together, may themselves constitute a larger digital computer?

Sure.

>> Is the Internet a digital computer? Or, equivalently,
>> depending on your definition of the Internet: is the Internet a
>> piece of software running on a digital computer?

I see the internet as a network of computers that run software. You could consider it one large computer if you like.

>> Finally, would you say that an artificial neural
>> network is a digital computer?

Software implementations of artificial neural networks certainly fall under the general category of digital computer, yes. However in my view no software of any kind can cause subjective experience to arise in the software or hardware. I consider it logically impossible that syntactical operations on symbols, whether they be 1's and 0's or Shakespeare's sonnets, can cause the system implementing those operations to have subjective mental contents.

The upshot is that 1) strong AI on digital computers is false, and 2) the human brain does something besides run programs, assuming it runs programs at all. 

-gts


      


From jonkc at bellsouth.net  Thu Feb  4 15:47:02 2010
From: jonkc at bellsouth.net (John Clark)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2010 10:47:02 -0500
Subject: [ExI] How not to make a thought experiment
In-Reply-To: <317129.32350.qm@web65616.mail.ac4.yahoo.com>
References: <969214.43756.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
	<C7EF48C5-DCEE-495D-97FB-860909CAFA73@bellsouth.net>
	<e321aa4b1002030844p4f9857cdo69ddfd3cd6453b53@mail.gmail.com>
	<317129.32350.qm@web65616.mail.ac4.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <4C1944CD-40AD-48A1-A274-2CF40D90CA77@bellsouth.net>

On Feb 4, 2010, The Avantguardian wrote:

> a bacterium is the simplest concievable object that I am confident is capable of intentionality.

Stripped to its essentials intentionality means someone or something that can change its internal state, a state that predisposes it to do one thing rather than another; or at least that's what I mean by the word. I like it because it lacks circularity. So I would say that a punch card reader is simpler than a bacterium and it has intentionality. A Turing Machine is even simpler and it has intentionality too. Granted this underlying mechanism may seem a bit mundane and inglorious, but that's in the very nature of explanations; presenting complex and mysterious things in the smallest possible chunks in a way that is easily understood. 

Gordon would disagree with me because for him intentionality means having consciousness, and having consciousness means having intentionality. A circle has no end so that may be why his thread has been going on for so long with no end in sight.

 John K Clark  

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From jameschoate at austin.rr.com  Thu Feb  4 16:43:16 2010
From: jameschoate at austin.rr.com (jameschoate at austin.rr.com)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2010 16:43:16 +0000
Subject: [ExI] The digital nature of brains
In-Reply-To: <438813.76903.qm@web113617.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <20100204164316.1CI9P.454213.root@hrndva-web06-z02>

This is a perfect example of my 'understanding inversion' claim...

First, we're not talking about different things. The Turing Test was suggested, not 'designed' as it's not a algorithm or mechanism. At best it's a heuristic. If you read Turing's papers and the period documentation the fundamental question is 'can the person tell the difference?'. If the answer is 'yes' the -pre-assumptive claim- is that some level of 'intelligence' has been reached in AI technology. Exactly what that level is, is never defined specifically by the original authors. The second and follow on generations of AI researchers have interpreted it to mean that AI has intelligence in the human sense. I would suggest, strongly, that this is a cultural 'taboo' that differentiates main stream from perceived cranks.

They way you flip the meaning of 'can the person tell the difference' to 'machine to convince' are specious and moot. The important point is the human not being able to tell the difference. You say it is not meant to test the ability of humans, but it is the humans who -must be convinced-.

I would say you're trying to massage the test to fit a preconceived cultural desire and not a real technical benchmark. It's about validating human emotion and not mechanical performance.

---- Ben Zaiboc <bbenzai at yahoo.com> wrote: 

> Well, we're talking about different things.  I said "it was designed to..", and you replied "no it does not".  Both of these can be true.
> 
> The test was intended to test the abilities of a machine to convince a human, not to test the abilities of the human.  Of course that may well be one of its side effects! (apparently a disturbingly high proportion of people - mostly teenagers I think - are convinced by some chatbots)

--
 -- -- -- --
Venimus, Vidimus, Dolavimus

jameschoate at austin.rr.com
james.choate at g.austincc.edu
james.choate at twcable.com
h: 512-657-1279
w: 512-845-8989
www.ssz.com
http://www.twine.com/twine/1128gqhxn-dwr/solar-soyuz-zaibatsu
http://www.twine.com/twine/1178v3j0v-76w/confusion-research-center

Adapt, Adopt, Improvise
 -- -- -- --


From jameschoate at austin.rr.com  Thu Feb  4 16:48:30 2010
From: jameschoate at austin.rr.com (jameschoate at austin.rr.com)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2010 16:48:30 +0000
Subject: [ExI] The simplest possible conscious system
In-Reply-To: <820642.67186.qm@web113613.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <20100204164830.VFDFM.454315.root@hrndva-web06-z02>

I would agree, however there is a couple of issues that must be addressed before it becomes meaningful.

First, what is 'conscious'? That definition must not use human brains as an axiomatic measure. Otherwise we're arguing in circles and making an axiomatic assumption that humans are somehow fundamentally gifted with a singular behavior. This destroys our test on several levels. The point being the theoretic structure must demonstrate that human thought is conscious and not be assumptive on that point. We can't use an a priori assumption we are conscious, that we think we are does not make it so.

---- Ben Zaiboc <bbenzai at yahoo.com> wrote: 
> The simplest possible conscious system
> 
> Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com> asked:
> 
> > I'd be interested to hear from each of you a description of what would
> > constitute the simplest possible conscious system, and whether or not
> > such a system would necessarily also have intelligence or
> > understanding.
> 
> Hm, interesting challenge.

--
 -- -- -- --
Venimus, Vidimus, Dolavimus

jameschoate at austin.rr.com
james.choate at g.austincc.edu
james.choate at twcable.com
h: 512-657-1279
w: 512-845-8989
www.ssz.com
http://www.twine.com/twine/1128gqhxn-dwr/solar-soyuz-zaibatsu
http://www.twine.com/twine/1178v3j0v-76w/confusion-research-center

Adapt, Adopt, Improvise
 -- -- -- --


From jonkc at bellsouth.net  Thu Feb  4 16:51:20 2010
From: jonkc at bellsouth.net (John Clark)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2010 11:51:20 -0500
Subject: [ExI] How not to make a thought experiment
In-Reply-To: <642330.6805.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <642330.6805.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <C5F9C8A4-D62A-47F6-AEC8-D87CC9699693@bellsouth.net>

On Feb 3, 2010 Gordon Swobe wrote:

> Many things aside from symbols can consistently and systematically change the state of the symbol reader. 

Like what? And if it consistently and systematically changes the state of the symbol reader exactly what additional quality do these "many things" have that disqualifies them as being symbols?
 
> This wikipedia definition seems better:
> "A symbol is something such as an object, picture, written word, sound, or particular mark that represents something else by association

Rather like a hole in a particular place on a punch card, and its association to a particular column in a punch card reader.

> I take that as a confirmation of your earlier assertion that brains made of beer cans and toilet paper can have consciousness provided those beer cans squirt the correct neurotransmitters between themselves at the correct times.

ABSOLUTELY! 

> This suggests to me that your ideology has a firmer grip on your thinking that does your sense of the absurd, and that no reductio ad absurdum argument will find traction with you.

Before you use a reductio ad absurdum argument you must be certain it's logically contradictory, just being odd is not good enough.  

> I find it ironic that you try to use reductio ad absurdum arguments with me given that you have apparently inoculated yourself against them.

It seems odd to us for beer cans and toilet paper to be conscious but in a beer can world it would seem equally odd for 3 pounds of grey goo to be conscious. Neither is logically contradictory.

> I have no interest in magic.

I'm sure you tell yourself that and I'm sure you believe it, but I don't believe it. Grey goo has magic but beer cans computers and toilet paper don't, despite all the talk of semantics and syntax that is the heart of your argument.

> I contend only that software/hardware systems as we conceive of them today cannot have subjective mental contents

And how did you learn of this very interesting fact? You certainly didn't prove it mathematically or find it in the fossil record, you must have learned of it magically. A magic stronger than Darwin.

  John K Clark










> 
> -gts
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> extropy-chat mailing list
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat

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From kanzure at gmail.com  Thu Feb  4 17:50:01 2010
From: kanzure at gmail.com (Bryan Bishop)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2010 11:50:01 -0600
Subject: [ExI] Blue Brain Project film preview
Message-ID: <55ad6af71002040950o43a4825xa44e985b385c002c@mail.gmail.com>

Noah Sutton is making a documentary:
http://thebeautifulbrain.com/2010/02/bluebrain-film-preview/

"We are very proud to present the world premiere of BLUEBRAIN ? Year
One, a documentary short which previews director Noah Hutton?s 10-year
film-in-the-making that will chronicle the progress of The Blue Brain
Project, Henry Markram?s attempt to reverse-engineer a human brain.
Enjoy the piece and let us know what you think."

There's a longer video that explains what he's up to.

The Emergence of Intelligence in the Neocortical Microcircuit
http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-2874207418572601262&ei=lghrS6GmG4jCqQLA1Yz7DA

- Bryan
http://heybryan.org/
1 512 203 0507


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Thu Feb  4 18:12:27 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2010 10:12:27 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Personal conclusions
In-Reply-To: <580930c21002040359u3141931am117614683d4f67a3@mail.gmail.com>
References: <580930c21002040359u3141931am117614683d4f67a3@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002041012w3f82f46ftb9cd319dd965db5e@mail.gmail.com>

Stefano Vaj <stefano.vaj at gmail.com>:
> Not really to hear him reiterate innumerable times that for whatever
> reason he thinks that (organic? human?) brains, while obviously
> sharing universal computation abilities with cellular automata and
> PCs, would on the other hand somewhat escape the Principle of
> Computational Equivalence.

Yeah... yeah.

He doesn't seem like the type to take Stephen Wolfram seriously.

I'm working on it. Fruitlessly, maybe, but I'm working on it. Getting
some practice in rhetoric, at least.

Stefano Vaj <stefano.vaj at gmail.com>:
> ... very poorly defined Aristotelic essences would per se exist
> corresponding to the symbols "mind", "consciousness", "intelligence" ...

Actually, I gave a fairly rigorous definition for intelligence in an
earlier message. I've refined it since then:

The intelligence of a given system is inversely proportional to the
average action (time * work) which must be expended before the system
achieves a given purpose, assuming that it began in a state as far
away as possible from that purpose.

(As I said before, this definition won't work unless you assume an
arbitrary purpose for the system in question. Purposes are roughly
equivalent to attractors here, but the system may itself be part of a
larger system, like us. Humans are tricky: the easiest solution is to
say they swap purposes many times a day, which means their measured
intelligence would change depending on what they're currently doing.
Which is consistent with observed reality.)

I can't give similarly precise definitions for "mind" or
consciousness, and I wouldn't be able to describe the latter at all.
Tentatively, I think consciousness is devoid of measurable qualities.
This would make it impossible to prove its existence, which to my mind
is a pretty solid argument for its nonexistence. Nevertheless, we talk
about it all the time, throughout history and in every culture. So
even if it doesn't exist, it seems reasonable to assume that it is at
least meaningful to think about.

Stefano Vaj <stefano.vaj at gmail.com>:
> Now, if this is the case, I have sincerely troubles in finding a
> reason why we should not accept on an equal basis, the article of
> faith that Gordon Swobe proposes as to the impossibility for a
> computer to exhibit the same.

Your argument runs like this:

We have assumed at least one truth a priori. Therefore, we should
assume all truths a priori.

No, sorry. Doesn't work that way. All logic is, at base, fundamentally
illogical. You begin by assuming something for no logical reason
whatsoever, and attempt to redeem yourself from there. That doesn't
mean reasoning is futile. There's a big difference between a logical
assumption (which doesn't exist) and a rational assumption (which
does).

Accepting at face value that we have minds, intelligence, and
consciousness, is perfectly rational. Accepting at face value that
computers can not, is not.

I can't say exactly why you should believe either of these statements,
of course. They aren't in the least bit logical. Make of them what you
will. I have to go eat breakfast.


From jonkc at bellsouth.net  Thu Feb  4 18:32:10 2010
From: jonkc at bellsouth.net (John Clark)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2010 13:32:10 -0500
Subject: [ExI] How not to make a thought experiment
In-Reply-To: <595536.39512.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <595536.39512.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <4529BD17-B295-4C3A-B869-2C19DDC12F88@bellsouth.net>

On Feb 4, 2010, Gordon Swobe wrote:
>>> 
> he [Searle] would remind you of the obvious truth there exist facts in the world that have subjective first-person ontologies. We can know those facts[...]

What's with this "we" business? You can know certain subjective facts about the universe from direct experience, and that outranks everything else even logic. But you have no reason to think that I or anybody else or a computer could do that too, and yet you do think that at least for the first two, you think other people are conscious when they are able to act intelligently; you do this because like me you couldn't function it you thought you were the only conscious being in the universe. But every one of the arguments you have used against the existence of consciousness in computers could just as easily be used to argue against the existence of consciousness in your fellow human beings, but you have never done so. 

You could also use your arguments to try to show that even you are not conscious, but as I say direct experience outranks everything else; but you have no reason to believe that other people who act intelligently are fundamentally different from anything else that acts intelligently.  

 John K Clark






> only in the first-person but they have no less reality than those objective third-person facts that as you say "would be the same without it".
> 
> Real subjective first-person facts of the world include one's own conscious understanding of words.
> 
> Stefano wrote:
>> Which sounds pretty equivalent to saying that it does not
>> exist,
> 
> I think you want to deny the reality of the subjective. I don't know why. 
> 
> -gts
> 
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> extropy-chat mailing list
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat

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From avantguardian2020 at yahoo.com  Thu Feb  4 18:24:10 2010
From: avantguardian2020 at yahoo.com (The Avantguardian)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2010 10:24:10 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] How not to make a thought experiment
In-Reply-To: <4C1944CD-40AD-48A1-A274-2CF40D90CA77@bellsouth.net>
References: <969214.43756.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
	<C7EF48C5-DCEE-495D-97FB-860909CAFA73@bellsouth.net>
	<e321aa4b1002030844p4f9857cdo69ddfd3cd6453b53@mail.gmail.com>
	<317129.32350.qm@web65616.mail.ac4.yahoo.com>
	<4C1944CD-40AD-48A1-A274-2CF40D90CA77@bellsouth.net>
Message-ID: <565163.72063.qm@web65609.mail.ac4.yahoo.com>

From: John Clark <jonkc at bellsouth.net>
>To: ExI chat list <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org>
>Sent: Thu, February 4, 2010 7:47:02 AM
>Subject: Re: [ExI] How not to make a thought experiment
>
>
>On Feb 4, 2010, The Avantguardian wrote:
>
>a bacterium is the simplest concievable object that I am?confident is capable of intentionality.
>
>Stripped to its essentials intentionality means someone or something that can change its internal state, a state that predisposes it to do one thing rather >than another; or at least that's what I mean by the word. I like it because it lacks circularity. 

While I understand your dislike of circularity, the definition you give is far too broad. Almost everything has an internal state that can be changed. The discovery of this and the mathematics behind it made?Ludwig Boltzmann famous. A rock has a temperature which is an?"internal state". If the temperature of the rock is higher than that of its surroundings,?its internal state predisposes the rock to?cool down. FWIW evolution by natural selection is based on a circular argument as well. Species evolve by the differential survival and reproduction of the fittest members of the species. What is fitness? Those adaptations?that allows?members of a?species to survive and reproduce.?

>So I would say that a punch card reader is simpler than a bacterium and it has intentionality. A Turing Machine is even simpler and it has intentionality >too.

While I will not discount the possibility that in the future a sufficently complex program running on a computer may exhibit life or consciousness, that program does not currently exist. Currently the "intentionality" of existing software is completely explicit and vicarious. That is to say that all software currently in existence?exhibits only the intentionality of the programmer and not any native or implicit intentionality of its own. By the same token, a mouse trap exhibits explicit intentionality as well, but?lacks implicit intentionality. That is we would say the mouse trap is *intended* to catch a mouse but we would not say the mouse trap is *intent* on catching a mouse.?Now some people may think that is true of?bacteria as well, but we laugh at intelligent design don't we? 

>Granted this underlying mechanism may seem a bit mundane and inglorious, but that's in the very nature of explanations; presenting complex and >mysterious things in the smallest possible chunks in a way that is easily understood.?

The way of reductionism is fraught with the peril of oversimplification. You can reduce an automobile to quarks but that doesn't give you any insight as to how an automobile works.

>Gordon would disagree with me because for him intentionality means having consciousness, and having consciousness means having intentionality.

Then Gordon must accept that a bacterium is conscious. I however would say that implicit intentionality is necessary?for consciousness but not sufficient.?

>A circle has no end so that may be why his thread has been going on for so long with no end in sight.

One can extrapolate insufficent data into any conclusion one likes. Two given points can lie on a straight line or on?a?drawing of a unicorn. Neither of?these is likely the truth. Which is why I prefer empiricaI science to philosophy. I?think experimentation is the only hope of?settling this argument.
??

?Stuart LaForge 


"Never express yourself more clearly than you think." - Niels Bohr


      



From aware at awareresearch.com  Thu Feb  4 18:30:39 2010
From: aware at awareresearch.com (Aware)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2010 10:30:39 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Personal conclusions
In-Reply-To: <f7bfe5741002041020s7ea6e500v8105f580186028ed@mail.gmail.com>
References: <580930c21002040359u3141931am117614683d4f67a3@mail.gmail.com>
	<f7bfe5741002041020s7ea6e500v8105f580186028ed@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <f7bfe5741002041030q7d00928ev1b2316c2220cf15c@mail.gmail.com>

On Thu, Feb 4, 2010 at 10:20 AM, Aware <aware at awareresearch.com> wrote:
> It's simply and necessarily how any system refers to references to
> itself. ?Yes, it's recursive, and therefore unfamiliar and unsupported
> by a language and culture that evolved to deal with relatively shallow
> context and linear relationships of cause and effect. ?Meaning is not
> as perceived by the observer, but in the response of the observer,
> determined by its nature within a particular context.

I left out a key word, sorry.  Should have been:

> It's simply and necessarily how any system refers to references to
> itself.  Yes, it's recursive, and therefore unfamiliar and unsupported
> by a language and culture that evolved to deal with relatively shallow
> context and linear relationships of cause and effect.  Meaning is not
> as perceived by the observer, but in the observed response of the observer,
> determined by its nature within a particular context.

- Jef


From rpwl at lightlink.com  Thu Feb  4 18:18:17 2010
From: rpwl at lightlink.com (Richard Loosemore)
Date: Thu, 04 Feb 2010 13:18:17 -0500
Subject: [ExI] ANNOUNCE: New "Artificial General Intelligence" discussion
 list on Google Groups
In-Reply-To: <55ad6af71002040950o43a4825xa44e985b385c002c@mail.gmail.com>
References: <55ad6af71002040950o43a4825xa44e985b385c002c@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4B6B0F69.8090709@lightlink.com>


In response to the imminent closure of the AGI discussion list, I just 
set this up as an alternative:

http://groups.google.com/group/artificial-general-intelligence

Full name of the group is "Artificial General Intelligence" but the 
short name is AGI-group.  (Note that there is already a google group 
called Artificial General Intelligence, but it appears to be spam-dead.)

Its purpose is to encourage polite and well-informed discussion, so it 
will be moderated to that effect.

Allow me to explain my rationale.  In the past I felt like posting 
substantial content to the AGI list because it seemed that there were 
some people who were well-informed enough to engage in discussion. These 
days, the noise level is so high that I have no interest, because I know 
that the people who would give serious thought to real issues are just 
not listening anymore.

I understand that Ben Goertzel is trying to solve this by setting up the 
H+ forum on AGI.  I wish him luck in this, of course, and I myself have 
joined that forum and will participate if there is useful material 
there.  But I also prefer the faster, easier format of a discussion list 
WHEN THAT LIST IS CONTROLLED.  Consider this to be an experiment, then. 
  If it works, it works.  If not, then not.

Anyone can join.

But if there are people who

   (a) send ad hominem remarks

   (b) rant on about fringe topics

   (c) persistently introduce irrelevant material

... they will first be subjected to KILLTHREADs, and then if it does not 
stop they will be banned.  This process will be escalated slowly, and 
anything as drastic as a ban will be preceded by soliciting the opinions 
of the group if it is a borderline case.

Wow!  That sounds draconian!  Who is to say what is "fringe" and what is 
way out there, but potentially valuable?

Well, the best I can offer is this.  I have over 25 years' experience of 
research in AI, physics and psychology, and I have also investigated 
other "fringe" areas like scientific parapsychology, so I consider my 
standards to be very tolerant when it comes to new ideas (after all, I 
have some outlier ideas of my own), but also savvy enough to know when 
someone is puncturing the envelope, rather than pushing it.


So here goes.  You are all invited to join at the above address.

For the serious people:  let's try to establish a standard early on.




Richard Loosemore







From aware at awareresearch.com  Thu Feb  4 18:20:45 2010
From: aware at awareresearch.com (Aware)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2010 10:20:45 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Personal conclusions
In-Reply-To: <580930c21002040359u3141931am117614683d4f67a3@mail.gmail.com>
References: <580930c21002040359u3141931am117614683d4f67a3@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <f7bfe5741002041020s7ea6e500v8105f580186028ed@mail.gmail.com>

On Thu, Feb 4, 2010 at 3:59 AM, Stefano Vaj <stefano.vaj at gmail.com> wrote:
> On 3 February 2010 23:05, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
>> I have no interest in magic. I contend only that software/hardware systems as we conceive of them today cannot have subjective mental contents (semantics).
>
> Yes, this is clear by now.
>
> The bunch of threads of which Gordon Swobe is the star, which I have
> admittedly followed on and off, also because of their largely
> repetitive nature, have been interesting, albeit disquieting, for me.

Interesting to me too, as an example of our limited capability at
present, even among intelligent, motivated participants, to
effectively specify and frame disparate views and together seek a
greater, unifying context which either resolves the apparent
differences or serves to clarify them.

>
> Not really to hear him reiterate innumerable times that for whatever
> reason he thinks that (organic? human?) brains, while obviously
> sharing universal computation abilities with cellular automata and
> PCs, would on the other hand somewhat escape the Principle of
> Computational Equivalence.

Gordon exhibits a strong reductionist bent; he seems to believe that
Truth WILL be found if only one can see closely and precisely enough
into the heart of the matter.

Ironically, to the extent that he parrots Searle his logic is
impeccable, but he went seriously off that track when engaging with
Stathis in the neuron-replacement thought experiment.  Most who engage
in this debate fall into the same trap of defending functionalism, and
this is where the Chinese Room Argument gets most of its mileage, but
functionalism, materialism and computationalism are really not at
issue.  Searle quite clearly and coherently shows that syntax DOES NOT
entail semantics, no matter how detailed the implementation.

So at the sophomoric level representative of most common objections,
the debate spins around and around, as if Searle were <gasp> denying
functionalist, materialist, or computationalist accounts of reality.
He's not, and neither is Gordon.  The point is that there's a paradox.
 [And paradox is always a matter of insufficient context.  In the
bigger picture, all the pieces must fit.]

John Clark jumps in to hotly defend Truth and his simple but circular
view that consciousness is a Fact, it obviously arrived via Evolution
thus Evolution is the key. And how dare you deny Evolution--or Truth!?

Stathis patiently (he has plenty of patients, as well as patience)
rehashes the defense of functionalism which needs no defending, and
although Gordon occasionally asserts that he doesn't disagree (on
this) he doesn't go far enough to acknowledge and embrace the apparent
truth of functionalist accounts WHILE highlighting the ostensible
paradox presented by Searle.

Eric and Spencer jump in (late in the game, if a merry-go-round can be
said to have a "later" point in the ride) and contribute the next
layer after functionalism:  If we accept that we have "consciousness",
"and unquestionably we do", and we accept materialist, functionalist,
computationalist accounts of reality, then the answer is not to be
found in the objects being represented, but in the complex
associations between them.  They too are correct (within their
context) but their explanation only raises the problem another level,
no closer to resolution.

> But because so many of the people having engaged in the discussion of
> the point above, while they may not believe any more in a religious
> concept of "soul", seem to accept without a second thought that some
> very poorly defined Aristotelic essences would per se exist
> corresponding to the symbols "mind", "consciousness", "intelligence",
> and that their existence in the sense above would even be an a priori
> not really open to analysis or discussion.

Yes, many of our "rationalist" friends decry belief in a soul, but
passionately defend belief in an essential self--almost as if their
self depended on it.  And along the way we get essential [qualia,
experience, intentionality, free-will, meaning, personal identity...]
and paradox.

And despite accumulating evidence of the incoherence of consciousness,
with all its gaps, distortions, fabrication and confabulation, we hang
on to it, and decide it must be a very Hard Problem.  Thus inoculated,
and fortified by the biases built in to our language and culture, we
know that when someone comes along and says that it's actually very
simple, cf. Dennett, Metzinger, Pollack, Buddha..., we can be sure,
even though we can't make sense of what they're saying, that they must
be wrong.

A few deeper thinkers, aiming for greater coherence over greater
context, have suggested that either all entities "have consciousness"
or none do.  This is a step in the right direction.  Then the
question, clarified, might be decided in simply information-theoretic
terms.  But even then, more often they will side with Panpsychism
(even a rock has consciousness, but only a little) than to face the
possibility of non-existence of an essential experiencer.


> Now, if this is the case, I have sincerely troubles in finding a
> reason why we should not accept on an equal basis, the article of
> faith that Gordon Swobe proposes as to the impossibility for a
> computer to exhibit the same.
>
> Otherwise, we should perhaps reconsider a little non really the AI
> research programmes in place, but rather, say, the Circle of Vienna,
> Popper or Dennett.

Searle is right, in his logic.  Wrong, in his premises.  No formal
syntactic system produces semantics.  Further, to the extent that the
human brain is formally described, no semantics will be found there
either.  We never had it, and don't need it.  "It" can't even be
defined in functional terms.  The notion is incoherent, despite the
strength and seductiveness of the illusion.

It's simply and necessarily how any system refers to references to
itself.  Yes, it's recursive, and therefore unfamiliar and unsupported
by a language and culture that evolved to deal with relatively shallow
context and linear relationships of cause and effect.  Meaning is not
as perceived by the observer, but in the response of the observer,
determined by its nature within a particular context.  Yes, it may
feel like a direct attack on the sanctity of Self, but it's not.  It
destroys nothing that ever existed, and opens up thinking on agency
just as valid, extending beyond the boundaries of the cranium, or the
skin, or the organism plus its tools, or ...

Oh well.  Baby steps...

- Jef


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Thu Feb  4 18:57:01 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2010 10:57:01 -0800
Subject: [ExI] The digital nature of brains
In-Reply-To: <325635.76699.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <20100204102500.86W8S.511470.root@hrndva-web26-z02> 
	<325635.76699.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002041057o49f3ebdfn22b6fa333dca5bd4@mail.gmail.com>

 Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
> Spencer:
>> Finally, would you say that an artificial neural network is a digital computer?
>
> Software implementations of artificial neural networks certainly fall under the general category of digital computer, yes.

I could easily have guessed you would say that, but my question
pertains to hard, non-simulated artificial neural networks.

This brings up another point of interest: you seem to place computer
programs within the category of digital computers. This isn't how I
use the term. I would say:

Firefox is not a digital computer, it is instantiated by a digital
computer. All computers are physical objects in reality; if they are
not, they should be explicitly designated as virtual computers.

As a side note, are all computers effectively digital computers? It'd
save me some time, and the Internet some bandwidth, if so. Personally
I could go either way. When I want to be fully inclusive, I usually
say "information processor", which denotes brains just as well as
laptops.


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Thu Feb  4 19:09:39 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2010 11:09:39 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Principle of Computational Equivalence
In-Reply-To: <580930c21002040359u3141931am117614683d4f67a3@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <578968.53151.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Thu, 2/4/10, Stefano Vaj <stefano.vaj at gmail.com> wrote:

> Not really to hear him reiterate innumerable times that for
> whatever reason he thinks that (organic? human?) brains, while
> obviously sharing universal computation abilities with cellular
> automata and PCs, would on the other hand somewhat escape the Principle
> of Computational Equivalence.

I see no reason to consider the so-called Principle of Computational Equivalence of philosophical interest with respect to natural objects like brains.

Given a natural entity or process x and a computation of it c(x) it does not follow that c(x) = x. It does matter whether x = an organic apple or an organic brain.

c(x) = x iff x = a true digital artifact. It seems to me that we have no reason to suppose except as a matter of religious faith that any x in the natural world actually exists as a digital artifact.

For example we might in principle create perfect computations of hurricanes. It would not follow that hurricanes do computations. 

-gts




      


From hkeithhenson at gmail.com  Thu Feb  4 19:09:49 2010
From: hkeithhenson at gmail.com (Keith Henson)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2010 12:09:49 -0700
Subject: [ExI] Space based solar power again
Message-ID: <d1988d2d1002041109t7cd3df54s938fa9d2871eb3eb@mail.gmail.com>

(reply to a discussion on another list about power satellites)

How you get the energy down from GEO is a problem with a couple of
known solutions.

What has to be solved is getting the parts to GEO (or the parts to LEO
and the whole thing to GEO if you build it in LEO).

Even at a million tons per year (what's needed for a decent sized SBSP
project) the odds are against the cost being low enough for power
satellites to make sense (i.e., undercut coal and nuclear) if you try
to transport the parts with chemical rockets.

You either have to go to some non reaction method, magnet launcher,
cannon, launch loop or space elevator, or you have to go to an exhaust
velocity higher than what the energy of chemical fuels will give you.
The non reaction methods are extremely difficult engineering problems,
partly because we live a the bottom of a dense atmosphere, partly
because of the extreme energy needed.

The rule of thumb from the rocket equation is that mass ratio 3 will
get the vehicle up to the exhaust velocity and a mass ratio 2 will get
it to a bit under 0.7 of the exhaust velocity.  Beyond mass ratio 3
the payload fraction rapidly goes to zero.

So to get to LEO on a mass ratio 3 means an average exhaust velocity
of around 9.5 km/sec

The Skylon gets about 10.5 km/sec equivalent Ve in air breathing mode.
 Laser heated hydrogen will give up to 9.8 km/sec.

So much for the physics, on to the engineering!  :-)

Keith


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Thu Feb  4 19:11:07 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2010 11:11:07 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Mind extension
In-Reply-To: <767464.48754.qm@web113618.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
References: <mailman.1.1265284805.25978.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org> 
	<767464.48754.qm@web113618.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002041111t1203edek6e8b27d57bf2b585@mail.gmail.com>

Ben Zaiboc <bbenzai at yahoo.com>:
> (lots and lots of neat stuff)

Ever since Stathis put me on the spot to state my feelings on
uploading and "brain prostheses", and in fact for several years prior,
I've been thinking about pretty much the same thing. At the time I
sent my response I actually thought this is what he was talking about,
but later decided he probably meant a full brain transplant.

Judging by the craziness Alex <ablainey at aol.com> is pulling off with
that EPOC EEG, I'm thinking it would be trivially easy to add new
"wings" to our brains. We might be able to do it right now, with
lab-grown neurons, if we can figure out a way to increase skull
capacity.

I hadn't considered a few of the tests you propose, though.
Specifically, temporarily "turning off" the organic hemisphere to see
if the synthetic hemisphere keeps working. I can imagine a lot of
problems with putting that into practice. Certainly, we couldn't even
try it until we start creating neurons via building rather than via
growing.

Hmm!


From Frankmac at ripco.com  Fri Feb  5 19:14:07 2010
From: Frankmac at ripco.com (Frank McElligott)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2010 14:14:07 -0500
Subject: [ExI] war is peace
Message-ID: <004001caa697$66d15db0$ad753644@sx28047db9d36c>

In Russia, strong leaders are held in high esteem. If you want to take over an oil company, just throw the CEO in jail for tax evasion and the people will say he deserved it and  our Putin knows best. Then to create a legal auction to have the state take over the company under this action with one bidder is ok, it was legal wasn't it. 

Russia is a different place, rules are set by strong leaders and the people go along with it. What is legal is what Putin says is legal. 

As Example from the US, if Obama decided that Goldman Sach's bonus plan was out of the realm of what was good for the country, he could arrest the CEO, stopping him from doing god's work, and then have the government take over the company and thus screwing the shareholders out of hundreds of millions. 

Sorry that's a bad example I should have used AIG instead.  Last year thats what Us Gov't  did with AIG except they have  not arrested no one YET.

What I could have used was the EU taking over the books of Greece because we all know the Greek Gov't is corrupt and for the good of the EU we must  stop tose Greeks  from cheating.

If Greece falls, so does Spain, so does Portugal, and must I say Italy as well?

Greece is in trouble because they lied, AIG was in trouble on count of their greed, and in Russia it's tax problems.

If your Government tells you it is right, you accept it, as we did with Bush and his Weapons of Mass Destruction, in Russia they are  no different, or in EU for that matter.

So my friend , War is Peace, here in the US, in Russia, and now even in the Eurzone.

Hope that helps

Frank
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From lacertilian at gmail.com  Thu Feb  4 19:19:47 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2010 11:19:47 -0800
Subject: [ExI] multiple realizability
In-Reply-To: <764802.35206.qm@web113618.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
References: <mailman.1.1265284805.25978.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org> 
	<764802.35206.qm@web113618.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002041119pfa5fa47idf182824df0b5ab8@mail.gmail.com>

Ben Zaiboc <bbenzai at yahoo.com>:
> I suspect that it's ignorance of the importance of levels of abstraction that can lead to ideas like "minds can come from neural networks, but not from digital programs". ?All you need to see is that a digital program can implement a neural network at a higher level of abstraction to demolish this idea.

Yep.

But, I'm sure Gordon has already been there. My guess is he took a
plane instead of walking or driving, though, and most likely missed
all of the cultural flavor by persistently following a tour guide. I
wouldn't be surprised if he just stayed in a hotel the whole time.

More as an experiment than anything else, I've been trying to figure
out how to take him step-by-step into Abstraction City and show him
everything he missed. Right now I'm stuck on black boxes.

We have a long way to go.


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Thu Feb  4 19:43:45 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2010 11:43:45 -0800
Subject: [ExI] The digital nature of brains (was: digital simulations)
In-Reply-To: <854080.27226.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <f21c22e31002031903u6be6f673of24e0dc15669c562@mail.gmail.com> 
	<854080.27226.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002041143q48ff2af6mdd0870dfbd785253@mail.gmail.com>

Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>:
>Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com>:
>> ... loss of structural integrity over the
>> vast distances involved. However, theoretically, there is no
>> problem if such a system is Turing-complete and if the behaviour of
>> the brain is computable.
<snip>
> I find it ironic that you try to use reductio ad absurdum arguments with me given that you have apparently inoculated yourself against them. :-)

Whenever I've seen Stathis use the term "an absurdity", I've mentally
translated it to "a paradox".

A beer can brain is absurd, but not paradoxical.

An unconscious brain which is exactly identical to a conscious brain
is paradoxical, but not absurd.


From bbenzai at yahoo.com  Thu Feb  4 20:07:37 2010
From: bbenzai at yahoo.com (Ben Zaiboc)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2010 12:07:37 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] The digital nature of brains
In-Reply-To: <mailman.1472.1265308691.462.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
Message-ID: <356658.52755.qm@web113601.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

<jameschoate at austin.rr.com> wrote:

 ---- Ben Zaiboc <bbenzai at yahoo.com> wrote: 
> 
> > Well, we're talking about different things.  I
> said "it was designed to..", and you replied "no it does
> not".  Both of these can be true.

> This is a perfect example of my 'understanding inversion'
> claim...
> 
> First, we're not talking about different things. The Turing
> Test was suggested, not 'designed' as it's not a algorithm
> or mechanism. At best it's a heuristic. If you read Turing's
> papers and the period documentation the fundamental question
> is 'can the person tell the difference?'. If the answer is
> 'yes' the -pre-assumptive claim- is that some level of
> 'intelligence' has been reached in AI technology. Exactly
> what that level is, is never defined specifically by the
> original authors. The second and follow on generations of AI
> researchers have interpreted it to mean that AI has
> intelligence in the human sense. I would suggest, strongly,
> that this is a cultural 'taboo' that differentiates main
> stream from perceived cranks.
> 
> They way you flip the meaning of 'can the person tell the
> difference' to 'machine to convince' are specious and moot.
> The important point is the human not being able to tell the
> difference. You say it is not meant to test the ability of
> humans, but it is the humans who -must be convinced-.
> 
> I would say you're trying to massage the test to fit a
> preconceived cultural desire and not a real technical
> benchmark. It's about validating human emotion and not
> mechanical performance.


Um, I think 'understanding inversion' is right.  I don't actually understand what you're trying to say.

Ben Zaiboc


      


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Thu Feb  4 20:39:00 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2010 12:39:00 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Personal conclusions
In-Reply-To: <f7bfe5741002041020s7ea6e500v8105f580186028ed@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <469838.61714.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Thu, 2/4/10, Aware <aware at awareresearch.com> wrote:

> So at the sophomoric level representative of most common
> objections, the debate spins around and around, as if Searle were
> <gasp> denying functionalist, materialist, or computationalist accounts 
> of reality. He's not, and neither is Gordon.? 

On the contrary, I most certainly do deny the functionalist and computationalist, (but not so much the materialist), accounts of reality.

By the way, to make things as clear as mud: 1) computationalism is a species of functionalism, not a theory that competes with it as suggested, and 2) functionalism is not about making artificial neurons, per se, and 3) nobody here in recent months has articulated a true functionalist or functionalist/computationalist account of mind or reality. 

-gts




      


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Thu Feb  4 21:22:22 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2010 13:22:22 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability (was: The digital nature of
	brains)
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002040315h6a5b05adt1268367d298443ed@mail.gmail.com>
References: <e321aa4b1001301907s754efd8atc36849a20a7c21f5@mail.gmail.com> 
	<f21c22e31002040315h6a5b05adt1268367d298443ed@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002041322t36d35084w2d4ca8276f01c40@mail.gmail.com>

Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
> I'm not completely sure what you're saying in this post, but at some
> point the string of symbol associations (A means B, B means C, C means
> D...) is grounded in sensory input.

I'm talking about syntax and semantics, but especially syntax. In the
context of this discussion, you're making a statement about semantics.

One assumption (or conclusion, it's hard to tell) made by the
notorious Gordon Swobe is that digital computers are capable of
syntax, but not of semantics. I made that post to explore the question
of whether or not that's even possible in theory.

If I was vague and difficult to understand (I was), that might be due
to the fact I have a very fuzzy idea of what Gordon means when he
talks about syntax, and his is the definition I tried to use. I
wouldn't describe your typical CPU as performing syntactical
operations normally, but here I would do so without hesitation.


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Thu Feb  4 21:41:48 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2010 13:41:48 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002041341ue6037b6m71d19613c882e965@mail.gmail.com>

Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>:
> Stathis wrote:
>> Searle would say that there
>> needs to be an extra step whereby the symbol so grounded gains
>> "meaning", but this extra step is not only completely mysterious, it
>> is also completely superfluous, since every observable fact about
>> the world would be the same without it.
>
> No, he would remind you of the obvious truth there exist facts in the world that have subjective first-person ontologies. We can know those facts only in the first-person but they have no less reality than those objective third-person facts that as you say "would be the same without it".

You're both wrong! Only I am right! Me!

>From my limited research, it appears Searle has never said anything
about some unknown extra step necessary to produce meaning. If you
think his arguments imply any such thing, that's your extrapolation,
not his. The Chinese room argument isn't chiefly about meaning: it's
about understanding. They're extremely different things. We take
meaning as input and output, or at least feel like we do, but we
simply HAVE understanding.

And no, it isn't a substance. It's a measurable phenomenon. Not easily
measurable, but measurable nonetheless.

Secondly, "facts with subjective first-person ontologies" is a
nightmarishly convoluted phrase. Does the universe even have facts in
it, technically speaking? I suppose what  I'm meant to do is pick a
component of my subjective experience, say, my headache, and call it a
fact.

Then I say the fact of my headache has a subjective first-person
ontology. But that's redundant: all subjective things are first-person
things, and vice-versa. And "ontology" actually means "the study of
existence". I don't think the fact of my headache has any kind of
study, let alone such an esoteric one. Gordon must have meant
"existence", not "ontology".

Searle uses that same terminology. It makes things terribly difficult.

So to say something has "subjective first-person ontology" really
means it "exists only for the subject". There are facts (my headache)
which exist only for the subject (me). Ah! Now it makes sense. I even
have a word for facts like that: "delusions".

It's a low blow, I know. It shouldn't be, but it is.

Really, it just means we're too hard on especially delusional people.
We need delusions in order to function. They aren't inherently bad.
Who was it that wrote the paper describing how a delusion of self is
unavoidable when implementing a general-purpose consciousness such as
myself? I liked that paper. It appealed to my nihilistic side, which
is also the rest of me.

Ugh, this is going to drive me crazy. I have to remember some keywords
to search for. He used a very specific term to refer to that delusion.
"Distributed agent" was used in the paper, I think, but not the
message that linked to the paper...


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Thu Feb  4 22:17:15 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2010 14:17:15 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <e321aa4b1002041341ue6037b6m71d19613c882e965@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <938103.15549.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Thu, 2/4/10, Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com> wrote:

> Secondly, "facts with subjective first-person ontologies"
> is a nightmarishly convoluted phrase. 

Sorry for the jargon.

> Does the universe even have facts in
> it, technically speaking? I suppose what? I'm meant to
> do is pick a component of my subjective experience, say, my headache,
> and call it a fact.

Exactly right.

> Then I say the fact of my headache has a subjective
> first-person ontology. 

Yes.

> But that's redundant: all subjective things are  first-person
> things, and vice-versa. And "ontology" actually means "the
> study of existence". 

I make the distinction because subjective experiences exist both epistemically and ontologically in the first person; that is, we can do epistemic investigations of their causes (why do you have a headache?) in the same sense that we do epistemic investigations of any third-person objective phenomena, and they also have their *existence* in the first-person and thus a first-person ontology. 

Some people especially my materialist friends seem wont to deny the first-person ontology of consciousness. They deny its existence altogether and attempt to reduce it to something "material", not realizing that in doing so they use the same dualistic vocabulary as do those with whom they want to disagree. Theirs is an over-reaction; we can keep consciousness as a real phenomenon without bringing Descartes back from the dead.

-gts


      


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Thu Feb  4 22:24:59 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2010 14:24:59 -0800
Subject: [ExI] The simplest possible conscious system
In-Reply-To: <820642.67186.qm@web113613.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
References: <mailman.1.1265284805.25978.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org> 
	<820642.67186.qm@web113613.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002041424g4274de8te48349e0e6c665a3@mail.gmail.com>

Ben Zaiboc <bbenzai at yahoo.com>:
> Hm, interesting challenge.
>
> I'd probably define Intelligence as problem-solving ability, and
> Understanding as the association of new 'concept-symbols' with established ones.
>
> I'd take "Conscious" to mean "Self-Conscious" or "Self-Aware", which almost certainly involves a mental model of one's self, as well as an awareness of the environment, and one's place in it.

Somehow I was expecting people to radically disagree on these
definitions, but you actually have very similar conceptions of
consciousness, intelligence and understanding to my own.

Understanding is notably different in my mind, though: I'd say to have
a mental model of a thing is to understand that thing. Symbols don't
really enter into it, except that we use them as shorthand to refer to
understood models.

The more similarly your model behaves to the target system, the better
you understand that system!

Ben Zaiboc <bbenzai at yahoo.com>:
> I'd guess that the simplest possible conscious system would have an embodiment ('real' or virtual) within an environment, sensors, actuators, the ability to build internal representations of both its environment and itself, and by implication some kind of state memory. ?Hm. maybe we already have conscious robots, and don't realise it!

I can conceive of a disembodied consciousness, interacting with its
environment only through verbal communication, which would be simpler.
Top that!

<jameschoate at austin.rr.com>:
> I would agree, however there is a couple of issues that must be addressed before it becomes meaningful.
>
> First, what is 'conscious'? That definition must not use human brains as an axiomatic measure.

I agree. The only problem is that, if consciousness exists, any
English definition of it would at least be inaccurate, if not outright
incorrect. We can only approximate the speed of light using feet, but
we can describe it exactly with meters.

I'm not even sure if consciousness is better considered as a binary
state, present or absent, or if we should be talking about degrees of
consciousness. Certainly, intelligence and understanding are both
scalar quantities. Is the same true of consciousness?

My current theory is that consciousness requires recursive
understanding: that is, understanding of understanding.
Meta-understanding. I don't know if it exhibits any emergent
properties over and above that, though, or if there are any other
prerequisites.


From stathisp at gmail.com  Thu Feb  4 22:27:52 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2010 09:27:52 +1100
Subject: [ExI] The digital nature of brains (was: digital simulations)
In-Reply-To: <854080.27226.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <f21c22e31002031903u6be6f673of24e0dc15669c562@mail.gmail.com> 
	<854080.27226.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002041427n677866abrc74b220f4561cd9f@mail.gmail.com>

On 5 February 2010 00:32, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
> --- On Wed, 2/3/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>>> Can a conscious Texas-sized brain constructed out of
>>> giant neurons made of beer cans and toilet paper exist as a
>>> possible consequence of your brand of functionalism? Or
>>> not?
>>
>> It would have to be much, much larger than Texas if it was
>> to be human equivalent and it probably wouldn't physically possible due
>> (among other problems) to loss of structural integrity over the
>> vast distances involved. However, theoretically, there is no
>> problem if such a system is Turing-complete and if the behaviour of
>> the brain is computable.
>
> Okay, I take that as a confirmation of your earlier assertion that brains made of beer cans and toilet paper can have consciousness provided those beer cans squirt the correct neurotransmitters between themselves at the correct times. This suggests to me that your ideology has a firmer grip on your thinking that does your sense of the absurd, and that no reductio ad absurdum argument will find traction with you.
>
> I find it ironic that you try to use reductio ad absurdum arguments with me given that you have apparently inoculated yourself against them. :-)

I take it that you are aware of the concept of "Turing equivalence"?
It implies that if a digital computer can have a mind, then any Turing
equivalent machine can also have a mind. If a beer can computer is
Turing equivalent then you don't gain anything philosophically by
pointing to it and saying that it's "absurd"; that's more like a
politician's subterfuge than a philosophical argument.

The absurdity I was referring to, on the other hand, is logical
contradiction. Spencer Campbell suggested that these may not be the
same thing but that is what I meant; see
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proof_by_contradiction.

The logical contradiction is the claim that, for example, artificial
brain components can be made which both do and do not behave exactly
the same as normal neurons. Not even God can make it so that both P
and ~P are true; however, God could easily make a beer can and toilet
paper computer or a Chinese Room. It is a difference in kind, not a
difference in degree.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From stathisp at gmail.com  Thu Feb  4 22:43:49 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2010 09:43:49 +1100
Subject: [ExI] Mind extension
In-Reply-To: <767464.48754.qm@web113618.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
References: <mailman.1.1265284805.25978.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org> 
	<767464.48754.qm@web113618.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002041443m7209a7f1h4d83e42dd68f27f0@mail.gmail.com>

On 5 February 2010 00:38, Ben Zaiboc <bbenzai at yahoo.com> wrote:

> I've been pondering this issue, and it's possible that there's a way around the problem of confirming that consciousness can run on artificial neurons without actually removing existing natural neurons, and condemning the subject to death if it turns out to be untrue.
>
> I'm thinking of an 'mind extension' scenario, where you attach these artificial neurons (or their software equivalent) to an existing brain using neural interfaces, in a configuration that does something useful, like giving an extra sense or an expanded or secondary short-term memory (of course all this assumes good neural interface technology, working artificial neurons and a better understanding of mental architecture than we have just now). ?Let the user settle in with the new part of their brain for a while, then they should be able to tell if they 'inhabit' it or if it's just like driving a car: it's something 'out there' that they are operating.
>
> If they feel that their consciousness now partly resides in the new brain area, it should be possible to duplicate all the vital brain modules and selectively anaesthetise their biological counterparts without any change in subjective experience.
>
> If the person says "Hang on, I blanked out there" for the period of time the artificial brain parts were operating on their own, we would know that they don't support conscious experience, and the person could say 'no thanks' to uploading, with their original brain intact.
>
> The overall idea is to build extra room for the mind to expand into, and see if it really has or not. ?If the new, artificial parts actually don't support consciousness, you'd soon notice. If they do, you could augment your brain to the point where the original was just a tiny part, and you wouldn't even miss it when it eventually dies off.

An important point is that if you noticed a difference not only would
that mean the artificial parts don't support normal consciousness, it
would also mean the artificial parts do not exactly reproduce the
objectively observable behaviour of the natural neurons.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From stathisp at gmail.com  Thu Feb  4 22:53:23 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2010 09:53:23 +1100
Subject: [ExI] The digital nature of brains
In-Reply-To: <325635.76699.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <20100204102500.86W8S.511470.root@hrndva-web26-z02> 
	<325635.76699.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002041453k4277d55rb9f254cb2537a23f@mail.gmail.com>

On 5 February 2010 02:00, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:

> Software implementations of artificial neural networks certainly fall under the general category of digital computer, yes. However in my view no software of any kind can cause subjective experience to arise in the software or hardware. I consider it logically impossible that syntactical operations on symbols, whether they be 1's and 0's or Shakespeare's sonnets, can cause the system implementing those operations to have subjective mental contents.

Let's be clear: it is not LOGICALLY impossible that syntax can give
rise to meaning. There is no LOGICAL contradiction in the claim that
when a symbol is paired with a particular type of input, then that
symbol is grounded, and grounding of the symbol is sufficient for
meaning. You don't like this idea because you have a view that there
is a mysterious extra layer to provide meaning, but that is a claim
about the way the world is (one that is not empirically verifiable),
not a LOGICAL claim.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From ablainey at aol.com  Thu Feb  4 23:13:42 2010
From: ablainey at aol.com (ablainey at aol.com)
Date: Thu, 04 Feb 2010 18:13:42 -0500
Subject: [ExI] Pig Symbol
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002041453k4277d55rb9f254cb2537a23f@mail.gmail.com>
References: <20100204102500.86W8S.511470.root@hrndva-web26-z02>
	<325635.76699.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
	<f21c22e31002041453k4277d55rb9f254cb2537a23f@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <8CC7406D403F237-55FC-520D@webmail-m027.sysops.aol.com>


 Following on from Symbols, AI and especially the robot seeing a pig.

 


Here is a website that pretends to be a personality test based upon your drawing of a pig.
There has been over 2 million pigs drawn so far. It seems to me that you could get some 
interesting insight into AI image recognition by feeding in 2 million + drawings of pigs.

The site owner is asking for suggestions of what to do with the drawings. Does anyone
have an AI that needs some training data?

Alex

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From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Thu Feb  4 23:18:34 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2010 15:18:34 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] The digital nature of brains
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002041453k4277d55rb9f254cb2537a23f@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <523017.16837.qm@web36507.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Thu, 2/4/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:

>> Software implementations of artificial neural networks
>> certainly fall under the general category of digital
>> computer, yes. However in my view no software of any kind
>> can cause subjective experience to arise in the software or
>> hardware. I consider it logically impossible that
>> syntactical operations on symbols, whether they be 1's and
>> 0's or Shakespeare's sonnets, can cause the system
>> implementing those operations to have subjective mental
>> contents.
> 
> Let's be clear: it is not LOGICALLY impossible that syntax
> can give rise to meaning. 

I think it is logically impossible.

> There is no LOGICAL contradiction in the
> claim that when a symbol is paired with a particular type of input,
> then that symbol is grounded, and grounding of the symbol is
> sufficient for meaning. 

I take it that on your view a picture dictionary understands the nouns for which it has pictures, since it "pairs" its word-symbols with sense-data, grounding the symbols in the same way that a computer + webcam can pair and ground symbols. 

How about a lunch menu? Does it understand sandwiches? :-)

-gts




      


From eric at m056832107.syzygy.com  Fri Feb  5 00:10:05 2010
From: eric at m056832107.syzygy.com (Eric Messick)
Date: 5 Feb 2010 00:10:05 -0000
Subject: [ExI] Religious idiocy (was: digital nature of brains)
In-Reply-To: <580930c21002030509m60aebf03s28104ee60540978b@mail.gmail.com>
References: <e321aa4b1001290903q514170cfj4504aa882bb20240@mail.gmail.com>
	<584374.10388.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
	<20100129192646.5.qmail@syzygy.com>
	<580930c21002010216r46ed7bb8wade659b70018224b@mail.gmail.com>
	<20100201181430.5.qmail@syzygy.com>
	<580930c21002030509m60aebf03s28104ee60540978b@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <20100205001005.5.qmail@syzygy.com>

Stefano writes:
>So, is the integer "3" a word symbol or a sense symbol?

The integer 3 is a concept for which a brain probably has a symbol.
That symbol will be distinct from the symbol for the word "three", and
both are distinct from the impressions (represented by sense symbols)
generated when someone views a hand with three fingers held up.  All
those symbols are related to each other, and activation of any one is
likely to make it easier to activate any of the others.

> And what about the ASCII decoding of a byte?

I'm not sure exactly what you're asking here.  ASCII maps byte values
to stereotypical glyphs, so I'm assuming you're referring to the glyph
'3' as a decoding of the byte value 0x33.  When you look at that
glyph, a particular sense symbol will be activated, which will likely
lead to activation of the corresponding concept and word symbols
mentioned above.

> Or the rasterisation of the ASCII symbol?

Again, I'm not sure exactly what you're getting at.  Is that
rasterisation what shows up on your video monitor when the computer
displays the '3' glyph?  I could think about the concept of that
occurring, or I could look at the result (see above).

>And what difference would exactly make?

Not much, really.  They're just names for things, so we can talk about
them.  The brain probably uses similar mechanisms to process all those
symbols.  That processing is likely confined to different areas of the
brain for each type of symbol, though.  I don't think anyone knows yet
how the brain does any of this processing.  We don't even know much
about how the symbols might be encoded, although theories do exist.

I happen to like William Calvin's theory as presented in "The Cerebral
Code":

http://williamcalvin.com/bk9/

I don't think we're yet to the point where we can put that theory to
the test.

We do know a good deal about the low level processing, but things get
complicated as we climb the abstraction ladder.

-eric


From eric at m056832107.syzygy.com  Fri Feb  5 00:25:12 2010
From: eric at m056832107.syzygy.com (Eric Messick)
Date: 5 Feb 2010 00:25:12 -0000
Subject: [ExI] meaning & symbols
In-Reply-To: <910459.5460.qm@web113613.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
References: <mailman.1.1265198402.23237.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
	<910459.5460.qm@web113613.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <20100205002512.5.qmail@syzygy.com>

Ben writes:
>OK obviously this word 'symbol' needs some clear definition.
>
>I would use the word to mean any distinct pattern of neural activity
> that has a relationship with other such patterns.  In that sense,
> sensory symbols exist, as do (visual) word symbols, (auditory) word
> symbols, concept symbols, which are a higher-level abstraction from
> the above three types, and hundreds of other types of 'symbol',
> representing all the different patterns of neural activity that can
> be regarded as coherent units, like emotional states, memories,
> linguistic units (nouns, verbs, etc.), and their higher-level
> 'chunks' (birdness, the concept of fluidity, etc.), and so on.

This sounds exactly like what I mean when I use the term "symbol" in
this context.

The question came up about how hard it might be to tease apart
*distinct* patterns of neural activity.  I agree that this is likely
to be tricky.  I expect many symbols will be active in a brain at the
same time, and differentiating them could be hard.  They may change
representation with the brain region they are active in.  I do expect
that a symbol is simpler than a global neural firing pattern, though.

If a firing pattern in one part of the brain triggers a similar firing
pattern in another part of the brain, is the same symbol active in
both areas, or are there two distinct symbols?  I don't think we have
a good enough handle on this to answer such questions yet.

-eric


From possiblepaths2050 at gmail.com  Fri Feb  5 00:50:11 2010
From: possiblepaths2050 at gmail.com (John Grigg)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2010 17:50:11 -0700
Subject: [ExI] "Supreme Court Allows Corporations To Run For Political
	Office, " 	Onion parody article
Message-ID: <2d6187671002041650i3cb96621u60890b5970ebbef4@mail.gmail.com>

This is both funny and creepy...

http://www.theonion.com/content/news_briefs/supreme_court_allows

John  : )
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From aware at awareresearch.com  Fri Feb  5 02:33:29 2010
From: aware at awareresearch.com (Aware)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2010 18:33:29 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Personal conclusions
In-Reply-To: <469838.61714.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <f7bfe5741002041020s7ea6e500v8105f580186028ed@mail.gmail.com>
	<469838.61714.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <f7bfe5741002041833u44fd6770p21367bde1cf8756@mail.gmail.com>

On Thu, Feb 4, 2010 at 12:39 PM, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:

> On the contrary, I most certainly do deny the functionalist and computationalist, (but not so much the materialist), accounts of reality.

Well, sometimes in effect you do; sometimes you don't.  You seem to
enjoy the polemics more than you do the opportunity to encompass a
greater context of understanding.


> By the way, to make things as clear as mud: 1) computationalism is a species of functionalism, not a theory that competes with it as suggested,

Seems to me that { Materialism { Functionalism { Computationalism}}}.
Your "clear as mud" is clearly appropriate.


> and 2) functionalism is not about making artificial neurons, per se,

Stathis would argue, I  think, that such was the point of that part of
his discussion with you.


> and 3) nobody here in recent months has articulated a true functionalist or functionalist/computationalist account of mind or reality.

My central point (were you paying attention?) is that there can be no
"true functionalist/computationalist account of mind..."
notwithstanding the legitimacy of all three of these isms in their
appropriate contexts.

Finally, Gordon, I'd like to thank you for your characteristically
thorough and thoughtful reply to my comments...

- Jef


From x at extropica.org  Fri Feb  5 03:08:29 2010
From: x at extropica.org (x at extropica.org)
Date: Thu, 4 Feb 2010 19:08:29 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <e321aa4b1002041341ue6037b6m71d19613c882e965@mail.gmail.com>
References: <e321aa4b1002041341ue6037b6m71d19613c882e965@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <f7bfe5741002041908s74c6effdo30b671ba88f5449@mail.gmail.com>

On Thu, Feb 4, 2010 at 1:41 PM, Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com> wrote:
> Who was it that wrote the paper describing how a delusion of self is
> unavoidable when implementing a general-purpose consciousness such as
> myself? I liked that paper. It appealed to my nihilistic side, which
> is also the rest of me.
>
> Ugh, this is going to drive me crazy. I have to remember some keywords
> to search for. He used a very specific term to refer to that delusion.
> "Distributed agent" was used in the paper, I think, but not the
> message that linked to the paper...

Pollock, JL, Ismael J.  2006.  Knowledge and reality; So You Think You
Exist? In Defense of Nolipsism :35-62.

I've posted it to this list twice now.  This is the first indication
I've seen that anyone read it.

- Jef


From ablainey at aol.com  Fri Feb  5 08:24:01 2010
From: ablainey at aol.com (ablainey at aol.com)
Date: Fri, 05 Feb 2010 03:24:01 -0500
Subject: [ExI] "Supreme Court Allows Corporations To Run For Political
 Office, "  Onion parody article
In-Reply-To: <2d6187671002041650i3cb96621u60890b5970ebbef4@mail.gmail.com>
References: <2d6187671002041650i3cb96621u60890b5970ebbef4@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <8CC7453B455DDF3-2B10-C068@webmail-d005.sysops.aol.com>


 Funny and true. I can't see how it is different from reality?
This is much more apparent In the UK where each plitical party is a registered bussiness, with its corporate logo and company rules.
Even one of the police forces is now alledgedly a subsidary of IBM.

 


 Politics and authority have always been big business.




 

-----Original Message-----
From: John Grigg <possiblepaths2050 at gmail.com>
To: ExI chat list <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org>; World Transhumanist Association Discussion List <wta-talk at transhumanism.org>; transfigurism <transfigurism at googlegroups.com>
Sent: Fri, 5 Feb 2010 0:50
Subject: [ExI] "Supreme Court Allows Corporations To Run For Political Office, "  Onion parody article


This is both funny and creepy...
 
http://www.theonion.com/content/news_briefs/supreme_court_allows
 
John  : )
 
_______________________________________________
extropy-chat mailing list
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat

 
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From stathisp at gmail.com  Fri Feb  5 09:59:50 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2010 20:59:50 +1100
Subject: [ExI] Principle of Computational Equivalence
In-Reply-To: <578968.53151.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <580930c21002040359u3141931am117614683d4f67a3@mail.gmail.com> 
	<578968.53151.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002050159u6373e7c6i1f97dfca9a7894de@mail.gmail.com>

On 5 February 2010 06:09, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
> --- On Thu, 2/4/10, Stefano Vaj <stefano.vaj at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Not really to hear him reiterate innumerable times that for
>> whatever reason he thinks that (organic? human?) brains, while
>> obviously sharing universal computation abilities with cellular
>> automata and PCs, would on the other hand somewhat escape the Principle
>> of Computational Equivalence.
>
> I see no reason to consider the so-called Principle of Computational Equivalence of philosophical interest with respect to natural objects like brains.
>
> Given a natural entity or process x and a computation of it c(x) it does not follow that c(x) = x. It does matter whether x = an organic apple or an organic brain.
>
> c(x) = x iff x = a true digital artifact. It seems to me that we have no reason to suppose except as a matter of religious faith that any x in the natural world actually exists as a digital artifact.
>
> For example we might in principle create perfect computations of hurricanes. It would not follow that hurricanes do computations.

Gordon, that is all true, but sometimes even a bad copy of an object
does perform the same function as the object. For example, a ball may
fly through the air like an apple even though it isn't an apple and
lacks many of the other properties of an apple. The claim is not that
a computer will be *identical* with the brain but that it will
reproduce the intelligence of the brain and, as a corollary, the
consciousness of the brain, which it turns out (from a logical
argument that you can't or won't follow or even attempt to rebut) is
impossible to disentangle from the intelligence.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From stathisp at gmail.com  Fri Feb  5 10:14:01 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2010 21:14:01 +1100
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability (was: The digital nature of
	brains)
In-Reply-To: <595536.39512.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <580930c21002040424x5021098fl5c0599629dc3d8ec@mail.gmail.com> 
	<595536.39512.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002050214t3013cf5ag38053152df62e524@mail.gmail.com>

On 5 February 2010 00:47, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
> --- On Thu, 2/4/10, Stefano Vaj <stefano.vaj at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Stathis wrote:
>>> Searle would say that there
>>> needs to be an extra step whereby the symbol so grounded gains
>>> "meaning", but this extra step is not only completely mysterious, it
>>> is also completely superfluous, since every observable fact about
>>> the world would be the same without it.
>
> No, he would remind you of the obvious truth there exist facts in the world that have subjective first-person ontologies. We can know those facts only in the first-person but they have no less reality than those objective third-person facts that as you say "would be the same without it".
>
> Real subjective first-person facts of the world include one's own conscious understanding of words.

I don't deny subjective experience but I deny that when I understand
something I do anything more than associate it with another symbol,
ultimately grounded in something I have seen in the real world. That
would seem necessary and sufficient for understanding, and for the
subjective experience of understanding, such as it is. Searle is
postulating an extra layer over and above this which is completely
useless. What's to stop us postulating even more layers: people with
red hair have understanding*, which stands in relation to
understanding as understanding stands in relation to mere
symbol-association. Of course the redheads don't behave any
differently and don't even know they are any different, but when they
use a word they experience something which non-redheads could never
even imagine.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From stathisp at gmail.com  Fri Feb  5 10:30:40 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2010 21:30:40 +1100
Subject: [ExI] The digital nature of brains
In-Reply-To: <523017.16837.qm@web36507.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <f21c22e31002041453k4277d55rb9f254cb2537a23f@mail.gmail.com> 
	<523017.16837.qm@web36507.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002050230p7af3080epe74d63f1832043e4@mail.gmail.com>

On 5 February 2010 10:18, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:

> I take it that on your view a picture dictionary understands the nouns for which it has pictures, since it "pairs" its word-symbols with sense-data, grounding the symbols in the same way that a computer + webcam can pair and ground symbols.
>
> How about a lunch menu? Does it understand sandwiches? :-)

No, they're not intelligent. Your argument here is equivalent to me
pointing to an inert lump of matter in order to demonstrate that
matter is incapable of thinking.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From stathisp at gmail.com  Fri Feb  5 11:35:26 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2010 22:35:26 +1100
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <e321aa4b1002041341ue6037b6m71d19613c882e965@mail.gmail.com>
References: <e321aa4b1002041341ue6037b6m71d19613c882e965@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002050335x6dc0ca08kfa594f7965e7fb4f@mail.gmail.com>

On 5 February 2010 08:41, Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com> wrote:

> >From my limited research, it appears Searle has never said anything
> about some unknown extra step necessary to produce meaning. If you
> think his arguments imply any such thing, that's your extrapolation,
> not his. The Chinese room argument isn't chiefly about meaning: it's
> about understanding. They're extremely different things. We take
> meaning as input and output, or at least feel like we do, but we
> simply HAVE understanding.
>
> And no, it isn't a substance. It's a measurable phenomenon. Not easily
> measurable, but measurable nonetheless.

By definition it isn't measurable, since (according to Searle and
Gordon) it would be possible to perfectly reproduce the behaviour of
the brain, but leave out understanding. It is only possible to observe
behaviour, so if behaviour is separable from understanding, you can't
observe it. I'm waiting for Gordon to say, OK, I've changed my mind,
it is *not* possible to reproduce the behaviour of the brain and leave
out understanding, but he just won't do it.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From pharos at gmail.com  Fri Feb  5 12:35:10 2010
From: pharos at gmail.com (BillK)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2010 12:35:10 +0000
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002050335x6dc0ca08kfa594f7965e7fb4f@mail.gmail.com>
References: <e321aa4b1002041341ue6037b6m71d19613c882e965@mail.gmail.com>
	<f21c22e31002050335x6dc0ca08kfa594f7965e7fb4f@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <ee50357e1002050435q485ebcf3r6a27fbc462d785bd@mail.gmail.com>

On 2/5/10, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> By definition it isn't measurable, since (according to Searle and
>  Gordon) it would be possible to perfectly reproduce the behaviour of
>  the brain, but leave out understanding. It is only possible to observe
>  behaviour, so if behaviour is separable from understanding, you can't
>  observe it. I'm waiting for Gordon to say, OK, I've changed my mind,
>  it is *not* possible to reproduce the behaviour of the brain and leave
>  out understanding, but he just won't do it.
>
>


"You cannot reason people out of a position that they did not reason
themselves into."
? Ben Goldacre (Bad Science)

Gordon is listening to a voice in his head that tells him that
'It *must* be this way.  It just *must*!'
And you can't argue with that.

<http://www.skepdic.com/truebeliever.html>
True-believer syndrome is an expression coined by M. Lamar Keene to
describe an apparent cognitive disorder characterized by believing in
the reality of paranormal or supernatural events after one has been
presented overwhelming evidence that the event was fraudulently
staged.


BillK


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Fri Feb  5 13:05:35 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2010 05:05:35 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002050335x6dc0ca08kfa594f7965e7fb4f@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <426324.97073.qm@web36507.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Fri, 2/5/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:

> By definition it isn't measurable, since (according to
> Searle and Gordon) it would be possible to perfectly reproduce the
> behaviour of the brain, but leave out understanding. 

Does your watch understand what time it is, Stathis? No, of course not. But yet it tells you the correct time anyway, *as if* it had understanding. Amazing!

-gts




      


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Fri Feb  5 13:23:33 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2010 05:23:33 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <ee50357e1002050435q485ebcf3r6a27fbc462d785bd@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <211266.88332.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Fri, 2/5/10, BillK <pharos at gmail.com> wrote:

> Gordon is listening to a voice in his head that tells him,,,

I barely find time to respond to sincere posts from people like Stathis. I have no time to respond to childish insults from the peanut gallery. Please stop.

-gts




      


From stathisp at gmail.com  Fri Feb  5 13:25:24 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 2010 00:25:24 +1100
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <426324.97073.qm@web36507.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <f21c22e31002050335x6dc0ca08kfa594f7965e7fb4f@mail.gmail.com> 
	<426324.97073.qm@web36507.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002050525m26fd306bjcd8105ad098fdc48@mail.gmail.com>

On 6 February 2010 00:05, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
> --- On Fri, 2/5/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> By definition it isn't measurable, since (according to
>> Searle and Gordon) it would be possible to perfectly reproduce the
>> behaviour of the brain, but leave out understanding.
>
> Does your watch understand what time it is, Stathis? No, of course not. But yet it tells you the correct time anyway, *as if* it had understanding. Amazing!

The watch obviously does not behave exactly like a human, so there is
no reason why it should understand time in the same way as a human
does. The point is that is impossible to make a brain or brain
component that behaves *exactly* like the natural equivalent but lacks
understanding. Note that this says nothing about programs or
computers: it is impossible through *any means whatsoever* to make
such a device, even even if you could invoke magic.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Fri Feb  5 13:31:16 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2010 05:31:16 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] The digital nature of brains
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002050230p7af3080epe74d63f1832043e4@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <213871.74812.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Fri, 2/5/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:

>> I take it that on your view a picture dictionary
>> understands the nouns for which it has pictures, since it
>> "pairs" its word-symbols with sense-data, grounding the
>> symbols in the same way that a computer + webcam can pair
>> and ground symbols.
> 
>> How about a lunch menu? Does it understand sandwiches?
> :-)
> 
> No, they're not intelligent. Your argument here is
> equivalent to me pointing to an inert lump of matter in order to 
> demonstrate that matter is incapable of thinking.

True or false, Stathis: 

When program running on a digital computer associates a sense-datum (say, an image of object taken with its web-cam) with the appropriate word-symbol, the system running that program has now by virtue of that association grounded the word-symbol and now has understanding of the meaning of that word-symbol.

-gts





      


From sparge at gmail.com  Fri Feb  5 13:37:31 2010
From: sparge at gmail.com (Dave Sill)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2010 08:37:31 -0500
Subject: [ExI] The digital nature of brains
In-Reply-To: <213871.74812.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <f21c22e31002050230p7af3080epe74d63f1832043e4@mail.gmail.com> 
	<213871.74812.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <ffd22f9d1002050537q2668ebddm4a562625f18baf1d@mail.gmail.com>

On Fri, Feb 5, 2010 at 8:31 AM, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> True or false, Stathis:
>
> When program running on a digital computer associates a sense-datum (say, an image of object taken with its web-cam) with the appropriate word-symbol, the system running that program has now by virtue of that association grounded the word-symbol and now has understanding of the meaning of that word-symbol.

That depends entirely upon the nature of the program.

-Dave


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Fri Feb  5 13:45:26 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2010 05:45:26 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002050525m26fd306bjcd8105ad098fdc48@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <591415.38933.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Fri, 2/5/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:

>> Does your watch understand what time it is, Stathis?
>> No, of course not. But yet it tells you the correct time
>> anyway, *as if* it had understanding. Amazing!
> 
> The watch obviously does not behave exactly like a human,
> so there is no reason why it should understand time in the same way as
> a human does. 

My point here is that intelligent behavior does not imply understanding. 

We can construct robots that behave intelligently like humans but which have no subjective understanding of anything whatsoever. We've already started doing so in limited areas. It's only a matter of time before we do it in a general sense (weak AGI).

> The point is that is impossible to make a brain or
> brain component that behaves *exactly* like the natural
> equivalent but lacks understanding. 

Not impossible at all! Weak AI that passes the Turing test is entirely possible. It will just take a lot of hard work to get there.

-gts




      


From stathisp at gmail.com  Fri Feb  5 13:45:12 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 2010 00:45:12 +1100
Subject: [ExI] The digital nature of brains
In-Reply-To: <213871.74812.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <f21c22e31002050230p7af3080epe74d63f1832043e4@mail.gmail.com> 
	<213871.74812.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002050545y20cfbd39v313eadd01e028b3f@mail.gmail.com>

On 6 February 2010 00:31, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
> --- On Fri, 2/5/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>>> I take it that on your view a picture dictionary
>>> understands the nouns for which it has pictures, since it
>>> "pairs" its word-symbols with sense-data, grounding the
>>> symbols in the same way that a computer + webcam can pair
>>> and ground symbols.
>>
>>> How about a lunch menu? Does it understand sandwiches?
>> :-)
>>
>> No, they're not intelligent. Your argument here is
>> equivalent to me pointing to an inert lump of matter in order to
>> demonstrate that matter is incapable of thinking.
>
> True or false, Stathis:
>
> When program running on a digital computer associates a sense-datum (say, an image of object taken with its web-cam) with the appropriate word-symbol, the system running that program has now by virtue of that association grounded the word-symbol and now has understanding of the meaning of that word-symbol.

Does an amoeba have an understanding of "food" when it makes an
association between the relevant chemotactic signals and the feeling
it gets when it engulfs the morsel? You might say "no, the amoeba and
this behaviour is too simple". Yet it's from compounding such simple
behaviours that we get human level intelligence. The computer
behaviour you described is even simpler than that of the amoeba, so
you would have to grant the amoeba understanding before considering
the possibility that the computer has understanding.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From stathisp at gmail.com  Fri Feb  5 13:51:14 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 2010 00:51:14 +1100
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <591415.38933.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <f21c22e31002050525m26fd306bjcd8105ad098fdc48@mail.gmail.com> 
	<591415.38933.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002050551s4e663370q65afaf21e090fcf6@mail.gmail.com>

On 6 February 2010 00:45, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:

>> The point is that is impossible to make a brain or
>> brain component that behaves *exactly* like the natural
>> equivalent but lacks understanding.
>
> Not impossible at all! Weak AI that passes the Turing test is entirely possible. It will just take a lot of hard work to get there.

Yes, but then when pressed you say that such a brain or brain
component would *not* behave exactly like the natural equivalent!


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Fri Feb  5 14:01:50 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2010 06:01:50 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] The digital nature of brains
In-Reply-To: <ffd22f9d1002050537q2668ebddm4a562625f18baf1d@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <805514.15115.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Fri, 2/5/10, Dave Sill <sparge at gmail.com> wrote:

>> True or false, Stathis:
>>
>> When a program running on a digital computer associates
>> a sense-datum (say, an image of an object taken with its
>> web-cam) with the appropriate word-symbol, the system
>> running that program has now by virtue of that association
>> grounded the word-symbol and now has understanding of the
>> meaning of that word-symbol.
> 
> That depends entirely upon the nature of the program.

I see. So then let us say programmer A writes a program that fails but that programmer B writes one that succeeds. 

What programming tricks did B use such that his program instantiated an entity capable of having subjective understanding of words? (And where can I find him? I want to hire him.)

-gts






      


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Fri Feb  5 14:18:40 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2010 06:18:40 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] The digital nature of brains
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002050545y20cfbd39v313eadd01e028b3f@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <459214.1690.qm@web36507.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Fri, 2/5/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:

>> True or false, Stathis:
>>
>> When a program running on a digital computer associates
>> a sense-datum (say, an image of an object taken with its
>> web-cam) with the appropriate word-symbol, the system
>> running that program has now by virtue of that association
>> grounded the word-symbol and now has [conscious] 
>> understanding of the meaning of that word-symbol.
> 
> Does an amoeba have an understanding of "food" when it
> makes an association between the relevant chemotactic signals 

No, ameobas have nothing I mean by consciousness.

Is my statement above true or false, Stathis? I added the word "conscious" to make me meaning even more clear.

I ask you these T/F questions to try find out exactly what you think.

-gts


      


From sparge at gmail.com  Fri Feb  5 14:19:21 2010
From: sparge at gmail.com (Dave Sill)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2010 09:19:21 -0500
Subject: [ExI] The digital nature of brains
In-Reply-To: <805514.15115.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <ffd22f9d1002050537q2668ebddm4a562625f18baf1d@mail.gmail.com> 
	<805514.15115.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <ffd22f9d1002050619l5bc408d4ya273aa3264ec6b42@mail.gmail.com>

On Fri, Feb 5, 2010 at 9:01 AM, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> I see. So then let us say programmer A writes a program that fails but that programmer B writes one that succeeds.
>
> What programming tricks did B use such that his program instantiated an entity capable of having subjective understanding of words? (And where can I find him? I want to hire him.)

I don't think that achieving intelligence will be the result of
"programming tricks". I also don't think it'll be a one-man effort,
and I'm pretty sure it hasn't been done yet.

-Dave


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Fri Feb  5 14:35:44 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2010 06:35:44 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] The digital nature of brains
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002050545y20cfbd39v313eadd01e028b3f@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <860799.26946.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Fri, 2/5/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:

> You might say "no, the amoeba and this behaviour is too simple". Yet 
> it's from compounding such simple behaviours that we get human level 
> intelligence. 

I do not care how the computer behaves. Does it have conscious understanding of the meaning of the word by virtue of having associated it with an image file of the object represented by the word? I think you know the answer.

-gts



      


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Fri Feb  5 14:12:52 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2010 06:12:52 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002050551s4e663370q65afaf21e090fcf6@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <369222.38842.qm@web36505.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Fri, 2/5/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:

>> Not impossible at all! Weak AI that passes the Turing
>> test is entirely possible. It will just take a lot of hard
>> work to get there.
> 
> Yes, but then when pressed you say that such a brain or
> brain component would *not* behave exactly like the natural
> equivalent!

I've said that such an artificial neuron/brain will require a lot of work before it behaves like the natural equivalent. This is why the surgeon in your thought experiment must keep replacing and re-programming your artificial neurons until finally he creates a patient that passes the TT. 

-gts


      


From stathisp at gmail.com  Fri Feb  5 14:42:09 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 2010 01:42:09 +1100
Subject: [ExI] The digital nature of brains
In-Reply-To: <459214.1690.qm@web36507.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <f21c22e31002050545y20cfbd39v313eadd01e028b3f@mail.gmail.com> 
	<459214.1690.qm@web36507.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002050642u776cafd9k43c0b340e3e4378f@mail.gmail.com>

On 6 February 2010 01:18, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
> --- On Fri, 2/5/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>>> True or false, Stathis:
>>>
>>> When a program running on a digital computer associates
>>> a sense-datum (say, an image of an object taken with its
>>> web-cam) with the appropriate word-symbol, the system
>>> running that program has now by virtue of that association
>>> grounded the word-symbol and now has [conscious]
>>> understanding of the meaning of that word-symbol.
>>
>> Does an amoeba have an understanding of "food" when it
>> makes an association between the relevant chemotactic signals
>
> No, ameobas have nothing I mean by consciousness.
>
> Is my statement above true or false, Stathis? I added the word "conscious" to make me meaning even more clear.
>
> I ask you these T/F questions to try find out exactly what you think.

False, as it is for the amoeba doing the same thing. To have human
level consciousness and understanding it has to have human level
intelligence! You seem to dismiss this obvious point for computers,
yet you're not nearly so generous with bestowing consciousness on
non-human organisms as consistency would require.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From stathisp at gmail.com  Fri Feb  5 14:50:40 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 2010 01:50:40 +1100
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <369222.38842.qm@web36505.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <f21c22e31002050551s4e663370q65afaf21e090fcf6@mail.gmail.com> 
	<369222.38842.qm@web36505.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002050650t47b4e871l3b9324c6a615b37a@mail.gmail.com>

On 6 February 2010 01:12, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
> --- On Fri, 2/5/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>>> Not impossible at all! Weak AI that passes the Turing
>>> test is entirely possible. It will just take a lot of hard
>>> work to get there.
>>
>> Yes, but then when pressed you say that such a brain or
>> brain component would *not* behave exactly like the natural
>> equivalent!
>
> I've said that such an artificial neuron/brain will require a lot of work before it behaves like the natural equivalent. This is why the surgeon in your thought experiment must keep replacing and re-programming your artificial neurons until finally he creates a patient that passes the TT.

You agree that the artificial neuron will perfectly replicate the
behaviour of the natural neuron it replaces, and in the same breath
you say that the brain will start behaving differently and the surgeon
will have to make further adjustments! Do you really not see that this
is a blatant contradiction?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Fri Feb  5 15:00:11 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2010 07:00:11 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002050650t47b4e871l3b9324c6a615b37a@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <204176.88244.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Fri, 2/5/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:

> > --- On Fri, 2/5/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >
> >>> Not impossible at all! Weak AI that passes the
> Turing
> >>> test is entirely possible. It will just take a
> lot of hard
> >>> work to get there.
> >>
> >> Yes, but then when pressed you say that such a
> brain or
> >> brain component would *not* behave exactly like
> the natural
> >> equivalent!
> >
> > I've said that such an artificial neuron/brain will
> require a lot of work before it behaves like the natural
> equivalent. This is why the surgeon in your thought
> experiment must keep replacing and re-programming your
> artificial neurons until finally he creates a patient that
> passes the TT.
> 
> You agree that the artificial neuron will perfectly
> replicate the behaviour of the natural neuron it replaces, and in the
> same breath you say that the brain will start behaving differently and
> the surgeon will have to make further adjustments! Do you really not
> see that this is a blatant contradiction?

I think you've misrepresented or misunderstood me here. Where in the same breath did I say these things? 

In your thought experiment, the artificial program-driven neurons will require a lot of work for the same reason that programming weak AI will require a lot of work. We're not there yet, but it's within the realm of programming possibility.

-gts


      


From rpwl at lightlink.com  Fri Feb  5 15:03:25 2010
From: rpwl at lightlink.com (Richard Loosemore)
Date: Fri, 05 Feb 2010 10:03:25 -0500
Subject: [ExI] Symbol Grounding  [WAS Re:  The digital nature of brains]
In-Reply-To: <805514.15115.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <805514.15115.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <4B6C333D.7090205@lightlink.com>

Gordon Swobe wrote:
> --- On Fri, 2/5/10, Dave Sill <sparge at gmail.com> wrote:
> 
>>> True or false, Stathis:
>>> 
>>> When a program running on a digital computer associates a
>>> sense-datum (say, an image of an object taken with its web-cam)
>>> with the appropriate word-symbol, the system running that program
>>> has now by virtue of that association grounded the word-symbol
>>> and now has understanding of the meaning of that word-symbol.
>> That depends entirely upon the nature of the program.
> 
> I see. So then let us say programmer A writes a program that fails
> but that programmer B writes one that succeeds.
> 
> What programming tricks did B use such that his program instantiated
> an entity capable of having subjective understanding of words? (And
> where can I find him? I want to hire him.)

[I doubt that you could afford me, but I am open to pleasant surprises.]

As to the earlier question, you are asking about the fundamental nature 
of "grounding".  Since there is a huge amount of debate and confusion on 
the topic, I will save you the trouble of searching the mountain of 
prior art and come straight to the answer.

If a system builds a set of symbols that purport to be "about" things in 
the world, then the only way to decide if those symbols are properly 
grounded is to look at

   (a) the mechanisms that build those symbols,
   (b) the mechanisms that use those symbols (to do, e.g., thinking),
   (c) the mechanisms that adapt or update the symbols over time,
   (d) the interconnectedness of the symbols.

If these four aspects of the symbol system are all coherently engaged 
with one another, so that the building mechanisms generate symbols that 
the deployment mechanisms then use in a way that is consistent, and the 
development mechanisms also modify the symbols in a coherent way, and 
the connectedness makes sense, then the symbols are grounded.

The key to understanding this last paragraph is that Harnad's contention 
was that, as a purely practical matter, this kind of global coherence 
can only be achieved if ALL the mechanisms are working together from the 
get-go .... which means that the building mechanisms, in particular, are 
primarily responsible for creating the symbols (using real world 
interaction).  So the normal way for symbols to get grounded is for 
there to be meaningful "pickup" mechanisms that extract the symbols 
autonomously, as a result of the system interacting with the environment.

But notice that pickup of the trivial kind you implied above (the system 
just has an object detector attached to its webcam, and a simple bit of 
code that forms an association with a word) is not by itself enough to 
satisfy the requirements of grounding.  Direct pickup from the senses is 
a NECESSARY condition for grounding, it is not a SUFFICIENT condition. 
Why not?  Because if this hypothetical system is going to be 
intelligent, then you need a good deal more than just the webcam and a 
simple association function - and all that other machinery that is 
lurking in the background has to be coherently connected to the rest. 
Only if the whole lot is built and allowed to develop in a coherent, 
autonomous manner, can the system be said to be grounded.

So, because you only mentioned a couple of mechanisms at the front end 
(webcam and association function) you did not give enough information to 
tell if the symbols are grounded or not.  The correct answer was, then, 
"it depends on the program".

The point of symbol grounding is that if the symbols are connected up by 
hand, the subtle relationships and mechanism-interactions are almost 
certainly not going to be there.  But be careful about what is claimed 
here:  in principle someone *could* be clever enough to hand-wire an 
entire intelligent system to get global coherence, and in that case it 
could actually be grounded, without the symbols being picked up by the 
system itself.  But that is such a difficult task that it is for all 
practical purposes impossible.  Much easier to give the system a set of 
mechanisms that include the pickup (symbol-building) mechanisms and let 
the system itself find the symbols that matter.

It is worth noting that although Harnad did not say it this way, the 
problem is really an example of the complex systems problem (cf my 2007 
paper on the subject).  Complex-system issues are what make it 
practically impossible to hand-wire a grounded system.

You make one final comment, which is about building a system that has a 
"subjective" understanding of words.

That goes beyond grounding, to philosophy of mind issues about 
subjectivity.  A properly grounded system will talk about having 
subjective comprehension or awareness of meanings, not because it is 
grounded per se, but because it has "analysis" mechanisms that 
adjudicate on subjectivity issues, and these mechanisms have systemic 
issues that give rise to subjectivity.  For more details about that, see 
my 2009 paper on Consciousness, which was given at the AGI conference 
last year.



Richard Loosemore





From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Fri Feb  5 15:12:42 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2010 07:12:42 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002050650t47b4e871l3b9324c6a615b37a@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <800656.29106.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

I think you've just confused consciousness with behavior that seems as-if conscious, and that we need to be more precise in our language.

I absolutely disagree with your contention that things (neurons, brains, whatever) that behave as-if they have consciousness must by virtue of that fact have consciousness. 

-gts

-


      


From pharos at gmail.com  Fri Feb  5 15:23:05 2010
From: pharos at gmail.com (BillK)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2010 15:23:05 +0000
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <211266.88332.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <ee50357e1002050435q485ebcf3r6a27fbc462d785bd@mail.gmail.com>
	<211266.88332.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <ee50357e1002050723w6f408c6ei558df500f2a927a3@mail.gmail.com>

On 2/5/10, Gordon Swobe wrote:
>  I barely find time to respond to sincere posts from people like Stathis.
> I have no time to respond to childish insults from the peanut gallery.
> Please stop.
>
>

I see it more as a statement of fact rather than an insult.

You and responders to you have produced over 500 messages going round
in circles while you keep repeating the same *belief*, that it is
impossible for computers to ever understand anything. Your thought
experiments and strawmen arguments get wilder and wilder as you
desperately try to repeat the same *belief* using different words.
Which in turn causes more confusion as it appears that you might be
saying something different, when you're not.

Stathis (and others) arguments have certainly clarified the situation
so that working towards creating human level (and greater)
intelligence in computers appears a worthwhile objective. For that we
should thank him.


BillK


From stathisp at gmail.com  Fri Feb  5 15:25:34 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 2010 02:25:34 +1100
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <204176.88244.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <f21c22e31002050650t47b4e871l3b9324c6a615b37a@mail.gmail.com> 
	<204176.88244.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002050725g336cd77ak28ccc4284ba89024@mail.gmail.com>

On 6 February 2010 02:00, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:

> I think you've misrepresented or misunderstood me here. Where in the same breath did I say these things?
>
> In your thought experiment, the artificial program-driven neurons will require a lot of work for the same reason that programming weak AI will require a lot of work. We're not there yet, but it's within the realm of programming possibility.

The artificial neurons (or subneuronal or multineuronal structures, it
doesn't matter) exhibit the same behaviour as the natural equivalents,
but lack consciousness. That's all you need to know about them: you
don't have to worry how difficult it was to make them, just that they
have been made (provided it is logically possible). Now it seems that
you allow that such components are possible, but then you say that
once they are installed the rest of the brain will somehow malfunction
and needs to be tweaked. That is the blatant contradiction: if the
brain starts behaving differently, then the artificial components lack
the defining property you agreed they have.



-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From aware at awareresearch.com  Fri Feb  5 15:51:59 2010
From: aware at awareresearch.com (Aware)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2010 07:51:59 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <ee50357e1002050435q485ebcf3r6a27fbc462d785bd@mail.gmail.com>
References: <e321aa4b1002041341ue6037b6m71d19613c882e965@mail.gmail.com>
	<f21c22e31002050335x6dc0ca08kfa594f7965e7fb4f@mail.gmail.com>
	<ee50357e1002050435q485ebcf3r6a27fbc462d785bd@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <f7bfe5741002050751j52ac2488q723d2628d0976f6a@mail.gmail.com>

On Fri, Feb 5, 2010 at 4:35 AM, BillK <pharos at gmail.com> wrote:
> On 2/5/10, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>> By definition it isn't measurable, since (according to Searle and
>> ?Gordon) it would be possible to perfectly reproduce the behaviour of
>> ?the brain, but leave out understanding. It is only possible to observe
>> ?behaviour, so if behaviour is separable from understanding, you can't
>> ?observe it. I'm waiting for Gordon to say, OK, I've changed my mind,
>> ?it is *not* possible to reproduce the behaviour of the brain and leave
>> ?out understanding, but he just won't do it.
>
> "You cannot reason people out of a position that they did not reason
> themselves into."
> ? Ben Goldacre (Bad Science)

Ironically, nearly EVERYONE in this discussion is defending the
"obvious, indisputable, common-sense position" that this [qualia |
consciousness | meaning | intentionality...(name your 1st-person
essence)] actually exists as an ontological attribute of certain
systems. It's strongly reminiscent of belief in phlogiston or ?lan
vital, but so much trickier because of the epistemological factor.
Nearly everyone here, with righteous rationality, are defending a
position they did not reason themselves into, even though, when
pressed, they will admit they don't know how to model it or even
clearly define it.

Gordon presents Searle's argument, and no one here gets that the logic
is right, but the premise is wrong--because they are True Believers
sharing that premise.

The "consciousness" you're looking for--that you assume drives your
thinking and receives your experience--doesn't exist.  The illusion of
an essential self (present always only when the system asks) is simply
the necessary behavior of any system referring to references to
itself.

- Jef


From jonkc at bellsouth.net  Fri Feb  5 16:04:28 2010
From: jonkc at bellsouth.net (John Clark)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2010 11:04:28 -0500
Subject: [ExI] How not to make a thought experiment
In-Reply-To: <565163.72063.qm@web65609.mail.ac4.yahoo.com>
References: <969214.43756.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
	<C7EF48C5-DCEE-495D-97FB-860909CAFA73@bellsouth.net>
	<e321aa4b1002030844p4f9857cdo69ddfd3cd6453b53@mail.gmail.com>
	<317129.32350.qm@web65616.mail.ac4.yahoo.com>
	<4C1944CD-40AD-48A1-A274-2CF40D90CA77@bellsouth.net>
	<565163.72063.qm@web65609.mail.ac4.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <3B0B158F-40D3-4F38-A7FD-BFD538221EFB@bellsouth.net>

Me:
>> Stripped to its essentials intentionality means someone or something that can change its internal state, a state that predisposes it to do one thing rather than another; or at least that's what I mean by the word. I like it because it lacks circularity.

>> The Avantguardian

> While I understand your dislike of circularity, the definition you give is far too broad. Almost everything has an internal state that can be changed. The discovery of this and the mathematics behind it made Ludwig Boltzmann famous.

You are making my case for me! Certainly looking at things that way proved to be very productive indeed for Mr. Boltzmann. 

> A rock has a temperature which is an "internal state". If the temperature of the rock is higher than that of its surroundings, its internal state predisposes the rock to cool down.

I have no problem with that, if it's good enough for Boltzmann it's good enough for me.

> evolution by natural selection is based on a circular argument as well. Species evolve by the differential survival and reproduction of the fittest members of the species.

The circularity is in the redundant nature of your sentence not in the Theory of Evolution; it could be better stated just by saying "Species evolve by differential survival". And even then it would only be 50% true because it says nothing about random mutation. And speaking of Evolution, I have pointed out many times that Gordon's ideas are totally incompatible with Darwin's, nobody has disputed this but they just shrug and continue to argue about some arcane point in his latest thought experiment. I don't get it. 

> all software currently in existence exhibits only the intentionality of the programmer and not any native or implicit intentionality of its own.

You are advising us in the above to get right back on the good old circular express; I believe that looking at things that way will bring us about as much enlightenment as Gordon has given us in the last month or so. I also think you are making an error in assuming that intentionality is an all or nothing thing. Yes a Turing Machine finding a zero or a one may seem simple and un-mysterious compared with our deepest desires, but as I said before that is in the very nature of explanations, or at least it is of good ones.

> The way of reductionism is fraught with the peril of oversimplification.

For some reason nowadays it's very fashionable to bad mouth reductionism, but it is at the heart of nearly every scientific discovery made in the last 500 years; waiting until you understand everything before you try to understand anything has not proven to be productive. If you refuse to break down consciousness into smaller easier to understand parts you are doomed to circularity as Gordon has ably demonstrated. 

> I prefer empiricaI science to philosophy.

Me too.

> I think experimentation is the only hope of settling this argument.

But that would not change Gordon's mind, he specifically said that no matter what a robot did, no matter how brilliantly it behaved he would not treat it as conscious because... well... because it's a robot. What really got me was that the other day he had the gall to mention the word "Evolution".

 John K Clark 




>   

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From jonkc at bellsouth.net  Fri Feb  5 17:04:27 2010
From: jonkc at bellsouth.net (John Clark)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2010 12:04:27 -0500
Subject: [ExI] How not to make a thought experiment
In-Reply-To: <591415.38933.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <591415.38933.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <8829C060-4B3A-43D2-A1A1-6BB31AD968D3@bellsouth.net>

Since my last post Gordon Swobe has posted 13 times:

> I do not care how the computer behaves.

Yes Gordon I know, you don't care about behavior and that of course means you don't care about Evolution either, and I have a real problem with that because, even if your thought experiments were superb rather than absurd, real experiments outrank thought experiments.

> My point here is that intelligent behavior does not imply understanding.

That is 100% incompatible with Darwin's ideas.

> We can construct robots that behave intelligently like humans but which have no subjective understanding of anything whatsoever.

That is 100% incompatible with Darwin's ideas.

> Does your watch understand what time it is, Stathis? No, of course not. 

Yet another wonderful example of how not to make a thought experiment. You want to investigate a property so you set up a thought experiment. You have absolutely no way of measuring or even detecting this property, so you just arbitrarily state that this property does or does not exist in this thought experiment, and then claim to have proven something profound about the existence or nonexistence of that property. Don't you think that's just a bit ridiculous?  

John K Clark


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From carlosehuerta at gmail.com  Fri Feb  5 17:23:49 2010
From: carlosehuerta at gmail.com (Carlos Huerta)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2010 12:23:49 -0500
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <f7bfe5741002041908s74c6effdo30b671ba88f5449@mail.gmail.com>
References: <e321aa4b1002041341ue6037b6m71d19613c882e965@mail.gmail.com>
	<f7bfe5741002041908s74c6effdo30b671ba88f5449@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <246CA158-8B20-47A6-AA68-D482AA749F78@gmail.com>

Hi, is there somewhere I can find this (Pollock, JL, Ismael J.  2006.   
Knowledge and reality; So You Think You
Exist? In Defense of Nolipsism) paper for online reading? Or more of  
JL Pollock's work?
Thanks

Get Technical


El Feb 4, 2010, a las 10:08 PM, x at extropica.org escribi?:

> On Thu, Feb 4, 2010 at 1:41 PM, Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com 
> > wrote:
>> Who was it that wrote the paper describing how a delusion of self is
>> unavoidable when implementing a general-purpose consciousness such as
>> myself? I liked that paper. It appealed to my nihilistic side, which
>> is also the rest of me.
>>
>> Ugh, this is going to drive me crazy. I have to remember some  
>> keywords
>> to search for. He used a very specific term to refer to that  
>> delusion.
>> "Distributed agent" was used in the paper, I think, but not the
>> message that linked to the paper...
>
> Pollock, JL, Ismael J.  2006.  Knowledge and reality; So You Think You
> Exist? In Defense of Nolipsism :35-62.
>
> I've posted it to this list twice now.  This is the first indication
> I've seen that anyone read it.
>
> - Jef
> _______________________________________________
> extropy-chat mailing list
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
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From pharos at gmail.com  Fri Feb  5 19:00:54 2010
From: pharos at gmail.com (BillK)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2010 19:00:54 +0000
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <246CA158-8B20-47A6-AA68-D482AA749F78@gmail.com>
References: <e321aa4b1002041341ue6037b6m71d19613c882e965@mail.gmail.com>
	<f7bfe5741002041908s74c6effdo30b671ba88f5449@mail.gmail.com>
	<246CA158-8B20-47A6-AA68-D482AA749F78@gmail.com>
Message-ID: <ee50357e1002051100g6cdae588t6e8a2f8b56b51953@mail.gmail.com>

On 2/5/10, Carlos Huerta wrote:
>
> Hi, is there somewhere I can find this (Pollock, JL, Ismael J.  2006.
> Knowledge and reality; So You Think You
> Exist? In Defense of Nolipsism) paper for online reading? Or more of JL
> Pollock's work?
>


<http://www.u.arizona.edu/~jtismael/nolipsism.pdf>

Isn't Google marvelous?  ;)

BillK


From jrd1415 at gmail.com  Fri Feb  5 20:50:34 2010
From: jrd1415 at gmail.com (Jeff Davis)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2010 13:50:34 -0700
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <f7bfe5741002041908s74c6effdo30b671ba88f5449@mail.gmail.com>
References: <e321aa4b1002041341ue6037b6m71d19613c882e965@mail.gmail.com>
	<f7bfe5741002041908s74c6effdo30b671ba88f5449@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <a6a17bd41002051250l6043d5c8p6744b4a82ab84ded@mail.gmail.com>

On Thu, Feb 4, 2010 at 8:08 PM,  <x at extropica.org> wrote:

                                      <snip>

> Pollock, JL, Ismael J. ?2006. ?Knowledge and reality; So You Think You
> Exist? In Defense of Nolipsism :35-62.
>
> I've posted it to this list twice now. ?This is the first indication
> I've seen that anyone read it.

Can be found at:

http://oscarhome.soc-sci.arizona.edu/ftp/PAPERS/Nolipsism.pdf

Best, jeff davis


From steinberg.will at gmail.com  Fri Feb  5 21:15:32 2010
From: steinberg.will at gmail.com (Will Steinberg)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2010 16:15:32 -0500
Subject: [ExI] The digital nature of brains (was: digital simulations)
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002041427n677866abrc74b220f4561cd9f@mail.gmail.com>
References: <f21c22e31002031903u6be6f673of24e0dc15669c562@mail.gmail.com>
	<854080.27226.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
	<f21c22e31002041427n677866abrc74b220f4561cd9f@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4e3a29501002051315n758e0f95v848faebb866dc406@mail.gmail.com>

Neurons also encode information based on the relative strengths of
connections with adjacent neural structures, as well as in their
propensities towards different underlying currents.  It seems like a lot of
you, perhaps due to the polarizing atmosphere of the land of GetSwobia, have
too easily discounted legitimate logic and mathematics.

Now--the Chinese Room is an absolutely ridiculous analogy and Searle should
be demeaned for it, as should anyone who takes it too seriously, because
semantics ARE NOT STATIC.  I do not understand how anyone can begin to make
any arguments centering around this sort of ill-thought out, sophomoric
idea.  It's as if Searle simply took the first thought experiment he could
think of, immediately deciding, without considering reality, that the rules
of understanding could be "booked"--simply an untruth.  Really, the man
should have a second set of books which give him rules for erasing and
writing in new rules in his first set, and a third set which tells him how
to edit the second, and on and on until we asymptotically approach sets of
books for which I/O is practically meaningless.  Now, in truth, the books of
the mind are not truly leveled like this but probably exist on multiple
levels at once, with different types of information in the brain having
widespread effects on many other types.  Even sets of remarkably few neurons
will demonstrate very, very complicated recursions.  If each neuron has its
own rules for varying connections based on input and prior connection
strength (much like the rules for a TM,) the fact that it can change it owes
rules perhaps lends itself to the idea of mental non-computability, at least
in today's sense of the word.

Swobe is still wrong, but brains aren't Turing equivalent because the brain
does NOT remain a constant T(n) but instead is composed of innumerable
modular T(x); T(y); T(z); each is constantly changing the T-value of itself
and adjacent virtual machines.  Each module has in it some semblance of
UTM-ness allowing it to read others, perhaps owing to a greater mental
structure of which we are not yet aware.

I understand the physicalist's desire to immediately quash all notions of
noncomputability, but this is the same sort of blind partisanship that, if
continued, will prevent us from truly learning how we think.  A static TM is
a limited concept.  Understanding of the brain will dictate our need to
branch out and explore self-modifying Turturingmachineing Machines...
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From pharos at gmail.com  Fri Feb  5 22:13:35 2010
From: pharos at gmail.com (BillK)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2010 22:13:35 +0000
Subject: [ExI] The digital nature of brains (was: digital simulations)
In-Reply-To: <4e3a29501002051315n758e0f95v848faebb866dc406@mail.gmail.com>
References: <f21c22e31002031903u6be6f673of24e0dc15669c562@mail.gmail.com>
	<854080.27226.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
	<f21c22e31002041427n677866abrc74b220f4561cd9f@mail.gmail.com>
	<4e3a29501002051315n758e0f95v848faebb866dc406@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <ee50357e1002051413m7ad375aaw6b5fb1d9edd60a75@mail.gmail.com>

On 2/5/10, Will Steinberg wrote:
<snip>
>  Even sets of remarkably few neurons
> will demonstrate very, very complicated recursions.  If each neuron has its
> own rules for varying connections based on input and prior connection
> strength (much like the rules for a TM,) the fact that it can change it owes
> rules perhaps lends itself to the idea of mental non-computability, at least
> in today's sense of the word.
>
> Swobe is still wrong, but brains aren't Turing equivalent because the brain
> does NOT remain a constant T(n) but instead is composed of innumerable
> modular T(x); T(y); T(z); each is constantly changing the T-value of itself
> and adjacent virtual machines.  Each module has in it some semblance of
> UTM-ness allowing it to read others, perhaps owing to a greater mental
> structure of which we are not yet aware.
>
> I understand the physicalist's desire to immediately quash all notions of
> noncomputability, but this is the same sort of blind partisanship that, if
> continued, will prevent us from truly learning how we think.  A static TM is
> a limited concept.  Understanding of the brain will dictate our need to
> branch out and explore self-modifying Turturingmachineing Machines...
>
>


I strongly agree with this comment.

That's why an eternity ago (was it really only a month ago?) I said
that our present digital computers didn't work the same way as the
brain.

My attempt at a description was:-
The brain is more like an analogue computer. It is not like a digital
computer that runs a program stored in memory. The brain *is* the
program and *is* the computer. And it is a constantly changing
analogue computer as it grows new paths and links. There are no brain
programs that resemble computer programs stored in a coded format
since all the programming and all the data is built into neuronal
networks.

If you want to get really complicated, you can think of the brain as
multiple analogue computers running in parallel, processing different
functions, all growing and changing and passing signals between
themselves.

We may need a new generation of a different kind of computer to
generate this 'consciousness'.
It is a different question whether we need this 'consciousness' in our
intelligent computers.
------------------

BillK


From stefano.vaj at gmail.com  Fri Feb  5 22:44:07 2010
From: stefano.vaj at gmail.com (Stefano Vaj)
Date: Fri, 5 Feb 2010 23:44:07 +0100
Subject: [ExI] Space based solar power again
In-Reply-To: <d1988d2d1002041109t7cd3df54s938fa9d2871eb3eb@mail.gmail.com>
References: <d1988d2d1002041109t7cd3df54s938fa9d2871eb3eb@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <580930c21002051444p34551596o15c5545ff6ec648a@mail.gmail.com>

On 4 February 2010 20:09, Keith Henson <hkeithhenson at gmail.com> wrote:
> Even at a million tons per year (what's needed for a decent sized SBSP
> project) the odds are against the cost being low enough for power
> satellites to make sense (i.e., undercut coal and nuclear) if you try
> to transport the parts with chemical rockets.
>
> You either have to go to some non reaction method, magnet launcher,
> cannon, launch loop or space elevator, or you have to go to an exhaust
> velocity higher than what the energy of chemical fuels will give you.

Or  - be it just in theory - you can go to some nuclear reaction,
Project Orion-like, method, which would be in my understanding much
easier to implement, at the state-of-the-art, than any of the
alternatives.

-- 
Stefano Vaj


From bbenzai at yahoo.com  Sat Feb  6 08:37:55 2010
From: bbenzai at yahoo.com (Ben Zaiboc)
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 2010 00:37:55 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Nolopsism
In-Reply-To: <mailman.1482.1265395981.462.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
Message-ID: <243641.74772.qm@web113601.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

Carlos Huerta <carlosehuerta at gmail.com> asked:
 
> Hi, is there somewhere I can find this (Pollock, JL, Ismael
> J.? 2006.???
> Knowledge and reality; So You Think You
> Exist? In Defense of Nolipsism) paper for online reading?
> Or more of? 
> JL Pollock's work?
> Thanks

Yes, you use a search engine ;>

First on the list after searching for 'Nolipsism' in Scroogle:
http://www.u.arizona.edu/~jtismael/nolipsism.pdf

BTW, this is a great paper.  I've been reading through it, and so far, it seems to make perfect sense.  The basic idea is simple and elegant, and as far as I can see, completely solves all these circular discussions we've been having on this list.  I'm sure certain parties wouldn't agree with that opinion though!

I'm pretty impressed.

Ben Zaiboc


      


From stathisp at gmail.com  Sat Feb  6 09:09:36 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 2010 20:09:36 +1100
Subject: [ExI] The digital nature of brains (was: digital simulations)
In-Reply-To: <4e3a29501002051315n758e0f95v848faebb866dc406@mail.gmail.com>
References: <f21c22e31002031903u6be6f673of24e0dc15669c562@mail.gmail.com> 
	<854080.27226.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
	<f21c22e31002041427n677866abrc74b220f4561cd9f@mail.gmail.com> 
	<4e3a29501002051315n758e0f95v848faebb866dc406@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002060109n2069139ap358abe2340e9508d@mail.gmail.com>

2010/2/6 Will Steinberg <steinberg.will at gmail.com>:

> Swobe is still wrong, but brains aren't Turing equivalent because the brain
> does NOT remain a constant T(n) but instead is composed of innumerable
> modular T(x); T(y); T(z); each is constantly changing the T-value of itself
> and adjacent virtual machines.? Each module has in it some semblance of
> UTM-ness allowing it to read others, perhaps owing to a greater mental
> structure of which we are not yet aware.

A Turing machine is limited in that it does not handle dynamic
interaction with an environment, as brains and digital computers do.
However, all digital computers are said to be Turing emulable, because
any computation the computer can do a Turing machine could also do. A
brain could be emulated on a digital computer provided that there is
nothing in the physics of the brain that is not computable. An example
of non-computable brain physics would be processes that require actual
real numbers a solution of the halting problem in order to model them.
Absent such complications, the brain (or any other part of the
universe) could be modelled by any digital computer with the right
program and enough memory.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From stefano.vaj at gmail.com  Sat Feb  6 09:48:41 2010
From: stefano.vaj at gmail.com (Stefano Vaj)
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 2010 10:48:41 +0100
Subject: [ExI] war is peace
In-Reply-To: <004001caa697$66d15db0$ad753644@sx28047db9d36c>
References: <004001caa697$66d15db0$ad753644@sx28047db9d36c>
Message-ID: <580930c21002060148p119e4ef9h8926a0590fdbf843@mail.gmail.com>

2010/2/5 Frank McElligott <Frankmac at ripco.com>:
> If your Government tells you it is right, you accept it, as we did with Bush
> and his Weapons of Mass Destruction, in Russia they are? no different, or in
> EU for that matter.

Mmhhh, just for the sake of discussion, there is a difference. If the
government X says that WMDs exist in a given place or that global
warming exists and is largely anthropic, either it is empirically true
or it is not. If a given government wants to nationalise a given
company, and makes use of its power (or implements legislation
granting it the power) to do so, it is hard to say that such
nationalisation is not "legal". At most, it may not be "right"
according to one's socio-political views.

But there again, there are a lot of illegal activities (say, writing
Galileo's Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems in 1632, or
starting the US war of independence) that one is ready to condone, if
one likes or approve them.

This is why, being a jurist myself, I am especially wary of invoking
legality or illegality as a value judgment... :-)

-- 
Stefano Vaj


From stefano.vaj at gmail.com  Sat Feb  6 10:02:49 2010
From: stefano.vaj at gmail.com (Stefano Vaj)
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 2010 11:02:49 +0100
Subject: [ExI] The simplest possible conscious system
In-Reply-To: <820642.67186.qm@web113613.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
References: <mailman.1.1265284805.25978.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
	<820642.67186.qm@web113613.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <580930c21002060202i4b0917f0m3d5404c7d219d8b2@mail.gmail.com>

On 4 February 2010 15:35, Ben Zaiboc <bbenzai at yahoo.com> wrote:
> I'd guess that the simplest possible conscious system would have an embodiment ('real' or virtual) within an environment, sensors, actuators, the ability to build internal representations of both its environment and itself, and by implication some kind of state memory. ?Hm. maybe we already have conscious robots, and don't realise it!

If "conscious" is taken to mean "exhibiting the same information
processing features of an average adult, healthy, alert, educated
human being" the theoretical answer for me corresponds to the question
"what is the simplest possible universal computer".

And the answer is discussed quite in depth in A New Kind of Science.

OTOH, most universal computers which are in fact not human beings,
including all those who are much simpler than brains,  would be
monstrously inefficient in performing such task.

So, if you are referring to something which may pass a Turing test
without its opponent (or perhaps the universe...) dying of old age
between one question and its answer, the requirements would of course
be much stricter.

-- 
Stefano Vaj


From stefano.vaj at gmail.com  Sat Feb  6 10:15:21 2010
From: stefano.vaj at gmail.com (Stefano Vaj)
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 2010 11:15:21 +0100
Subject: [ExI] Personal conclusions
In-Reply-To: <e321aa4b1002041012w3f82f46ftb9cd319dd965db5e@mail.gmail.com>
References: <580930c21002040359u3141931am117614683d4f67a3@mail.gmail.com>
	<e321aa4b1002041012w3f82f46ftb9cd319dd965db5e@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <580930c21002060215t5cacb91fqe4555291e02cea4f@mail.gmail.com>

On 4 February 2010 19:12, Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com> wrote:
> The intelligence of a given system is inversely proportional to the
> average action (time * work) which must be expended before the system
> achieves a given purpose, assuming that it began in a state as far
> away as possible from that purpose.

I would say it sounds a good one to me. In particular since it is not
a white-black one and does not invoke metaphysical, ineffable
entities. What about "perfomance in the execution of a given kind of
data processing"?

> This would make it impossible to prove its existence, which to my mind
> is a pretty solid argument for its nonexistence. Nevertheless, we talk
> about it (consciousness) all the time, throughout history and in every culture. So
> even if it doesn't exist, it seems reasonable to assume that it is at
> least meaningful to think about.

Absolutely. In fact, there are a lot of useful and perfectly
legitimate concepts which do not correspond to "entities". If I say
"horizon", "beauty", "computation", "popular will", "sleep", everybody
knows what I am talking about, even though nobody, except perhaps
Plato, thinks that they have to be something you can rap your nuckles
against.

-- 
Stefano Vaj


From bbenzai at yahoo.com  Sat Feb  6 12:41:15 2010
From: bbenzai at yahoo.com (Ben Zaiboc)
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 2010 04:41:15 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] The digital nature of brains
In-Reply-To: <mailman.1482.1265395981.462.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
Message-ID: <375474.21539.qm@web113618.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:

>>> True or false, Stathis:
>>>
>>> When a program running on a digital computer associates
>>> a sense-datum (say, an image of an object taken with its
>>> web-cam) with the appropriate word-symbol, the system
>>> running that program has now by virtue of that association
>>> grounded the word-symbol and now has understanding of the
>>> meaning of that word-symbol.
>>
>> That depends entirely upon the nature of the program.

> I see. So then let us say programmer A writes a program that fails but that programmer B writes one that succeeds. 


Hang on, how would you know?  What test would you use to determine whether programmer B's program has understanding whereas A's hasn't?

> I do not care how the computer behaves. Does it have conscious 
> understanding of the meaning of the word by virtue of having 
> associated it with an image file of the object represented 
> by the word?

Well, if you disregard it's behaviour, how can you know what it's doing?  Whether or not it's having 'conscious understanding' must surely be reflected in its behaviour, and observing its behaviour is the only kind of test that can be done.  If you say "we don't need to look at behaviour, we can look at its structure instead", that presupposes that we know what kinds of structure do and don't give rise to conscious understanding, and as we are creating these systems to investigate this in the first place, we would be assuming the very thing we want to prove. There'd be no point in doing the experiment. That's not science.  It may be philosophy, but it's definitely not science.


Ben Zaiboc


      


From bbenzai at yahoo.com  Sat Feb  6 12:39:06 2010
From: bbenzai at yahoo.com (Ben Zaiboc)
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 2010 04:39:06 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] The digital nature of brains
In-Reply-To: <mailman.1.1265457601.24059.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
Message-ID: <484433.35998.qm@web113602.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

BillK <pharos at gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> ... an eternity ago (was it really only a month
> ago?) I said
> that our present digital computers didn't work the same way
> as the brain.

Is anybody actually claiming that?  I certainly wouldn't.

Computers don't work the same way as the traffic, but that doesn't stop us from using them to model traffic.

This is why levels of abstraction are so crucial.  It doesn't matter that digital computers don't work the same way as the brain. What matters is that digital computers can create virtual objects that do. (or objects that create objects that create objects that do, etc.).


Ben Zaiboc


      


From stefano.vaj at gmail.com  Sat Feb  6 16:08:06 2010
From: stefano.vaj at gmail.com (Stefano Vaj)
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 2010 17:08:06 +0100
Subject: [ExI] Nolopsism
In-Reply-To: <243641.74772.qm@web113601.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
References: <mailman.1482.1265395981.462.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
	<243641.74772.qm@web113601.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <580930c21002060808t6996b91ehb19f34a6c5767e10@mail.gmail.com>

On 6 February 2010 09:37, Ben Zaiboc <bbenzai at yahoo.com> wrote:
> BTW, this is a great paper. ?I've been reading through it, and so far, it seems to make perfect sense. ?The basic idea is simple and elegant, and as far as I can see, completely solves all these circular discussions we've been having on this list. ?I'm sure certain parties wouldn't agree with that opinion though!

Indeed. Even though he is too pessimistic in saying that "cannot
accept that we cannot exist". We should say "we cannot avoid making
use of reflexive indicators", but there are plenty of other useful,
understandable and practical concepts to which no "essence" really
corresponds. Why should one's "self" be an exception? Most of dualism
can easily be reduced to linguistic short-circuits and paradoxes...

-- 
Stefano Vaj


From natasha at natasha.cc  Sat Feb  6 17:21:31 2010
From: natasha at natasha.cc (Natasha Vita-More)
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 2010 11:21:31 -0600
Subject: [ExI] Polytopia Interview with Natasha
Message-ID: <BDC8D171C3D34782AD00E881EE3A73E4@DFC68LF1>

http://spacecollective.org/projects/Polytopia/
Or link to article here:
http://spacecollective.org/Wildcat/5527/The-Audacious-beauty-of-our-future-N
atasha-VitaMore-an-interview
 

Nlogo1.tif  <http://www.natasha.cc/> Natasha Vita-More

 
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From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Sat Feb  6 19:27:40 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 2010 11:27:40 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002050725g336cd77ak28ccc4284ba89024@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <156490.82842.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Fri, 2/5/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:

>> In your thought experiment, the artificial
>> program-driven neurons will require a lot of work for the
>> same reason that programming weak AI will require a lot of
>> work. We're not there yet, but it's within the realm of
>> programming possibility.
> 
> The artificial neurons (or subneuronal or multineuronal
> structures, it doesn't matter)...

If it doesn't matter, then let's keep it straightforward and refer to artificial brains rather than to artificial neurons surgically inserted into the midst of natural neurons. This will eliminate a lot of uncertainties that arise from the present state of ignorance about neuroscience. 

> exhibit the same behaviour as the natural equivalents,
> but lack consciousness. 

In my view an artificial brain can exhibit the same intelligent behaviors as a natural brain without having subjective mental states where we define behavior as, for example, acts of speech. 

> That's all you need to know about them: you don't have to worry how 
> difficult it was to make them, just that they have been made (provided 
> it is logically possible). Now it seems that you allow that such 
> components are possible, but then you say that once they are installed 
> the rest of the brain will somehow malfunction and needs to be tweaked. 
> That is the blatant contradiction: if the brain starts behaving 
> differently, then the artificial components lack
> the defining property you agreed they have.

As above, let's save a lot of confusion and speak of brains rather than individual neurons. 

-gts 



      


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Sat Feb  6 20:09:01 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 2010 12:09:01 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002050335x6dc0ca08kfa594f7965e7fb4f@mail.gmail.com>
References: <e321aa4b1002041341ue6037b6m71d19613c882e965@mail.gmail.com> 
	<f21c22e31002050335x6dc0ca08kfa594f7965e7fb4f@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002061209w69285404xa624a4dc5db85544@mail.gmail.com>

Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com>:
>Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com>:
>> They're extremely different things. We take
>> meaning as input and output, or at least feel like we do, but we
>> simply HAVE understanding.
>>
>> And no, it isn't a substance. It's a measurable phenomenon. Not easily
>> measurable, but measurable nonetheless.
>
> By definition it isn't measurable, since (according to Searle and
> Gordon) it would be possible to perfectly reproduce the behaviour of
> the brain, but leave out understanding. It is only possible to observe
> behaviour, so if behaviour is separable from understanding, you can't
> observe it. I'm waiting for Gordon to say, OK, I've changed my mind,
> it is *not* possible to reproduce the behaviour of the brain and leave
> out understanding, but he just won't do it.

Unfortunately for both you and Gordon, both of you are right in this
case. If you define understanding as I do, that is: to understand a
system is to have a model of that system in your mind, which entails
the ability to correctly guess past or future states of the system
based on an assumed state, or the consequences of an interaction
between this and another understood system.

It's easy to see how this definition covers understanding things like
weather patterns, but it also applies in some unexpected ways. I
understand English. I can guess what will happen in your mind when you
read this sentence; it'll be a pretty inaccurate guess, by any
objective measure, but it will be of a higher quality than pure chance
would predict by many, many orders of magnitude.

To define understanding in terms of associations between symbols does
not make sense to me. I understand that dogs are canines. This has no
relationship whatsoever to my understanding of dogs; I can only make
that statement based on my understanding of English. It's more a fact
about words than it is about animals.

Returning to the original point: Stathis is correct in saying that
understanding has an effect on behavior, and Gordon is correct in
saying that intelligent behavior does not imply understanding. I can
argue these points further if they aren't obvious, but to me they are.
It should be possible, theoretically, to perfectly reproduce human
behavior without reproducing a lick of human understanding. But this
isn't entirely true.

We can set up an experiment in which the (non-understanding) robot
does exactly the same thing as the human, but if we observed the human
and robot in their natural environments for a couple years it ought
soon become obvious that they approach the world in radically
different ways, even if their day-to-day behavior is nearly
indistinguishable.

(The robot I'm thinking of would be built to "understand" the world
right off the bat, rather than learning about things as it goes along,
as we do.)


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Sat Feb  6 20:11:56 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 2010 12:11:56 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <f7bfe5741002050751j52ac2488q723d2628d0976f6a@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <22844.25525.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Fri, 2/5/10, Aware <aware at awareresearch.com> wrote:

> Ironically, nearly EVERYONE in this discussion is defending
> the "obvious, indisputable, common-sense position" that this
> [qualia | consciousness | meaning | intentionality...(name your
> 1st-person essence)] actually exists as an ontological attribute of
> certain systems. 

Spencer mentioned a head-ache as an example of something I would call a fact of reality that exists with a first-person ontology. 

> It's strongly reminiscent of belief in phlogiston...

Have you ever had a head-ache, Jef? How about a tooth-ache? It seems to me that these kinds of phenomena really do exist in the world. 

I actually had a tooth extracted two weeks ago, and I can tell you that few things had more reality to me then than the experience of the tooth-ache that precipitated my desire to see the dentist. Subjective experiences such as these differ from such phenomena as mountains and planets only in so much they have first-person rather than third-person ontologies. My dentist agrees that tooth-aches really do exist, and so does the Bayer company.

I consider myself a materialist, but in the reaction against mind/matter dualism some of my fellow materialists (e.g., Dennett) go overboard and irrationally deny the plain facts of subjective experience. They try to explain it away in third-person terms, fearing that any recognition of the mental will place them in the same came with Descartes. They don't understand that in so doing they embrace and acknowledge Descartes' dualistic vocabulary. 

-gts




      


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Sat Feb  6 20:55:38 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 2010 12:55:38 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability (was: The digital nature of
	brains)
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002050214t3013cf5ag38053152df62e524@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <684806.48339.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Fri, 2/5/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:

> I don't deny subjective experience but I deny that when I
> understand something I do anything more than associate it with another
> symbol, ultimately grounded in something I have seen in the real
> world. That would seem necessary and sufficient for understanding, and
> for the subjective experience of understanding, such as it is.

When I asked you about a digital computer that did exactly that, you acknowledged that said computer lacked conscious understanding of the symbol and went off on a tangent about amoebas.

So then it seems that first you say these sorts of associations are necessary and sufficient for subjective experience of understanding, but then you don't.

re: the amoeba

As I use the word "consciousness", I believe the amoeba has none whatsoever. This unconscious creature exhibits intelligent behavior but because it has no nervous system I doubt very seriously that it has any conscious experience of living. It looks for food intelligently in the same sense that your watch tells the time intelligently and in the same sense in which weak AI systems may one day have the intelligence needed to pass the Turing test; that is, it has intelligence but no consciousness.

-gts




      


From aware at awareresearch.com  Sat Feb  6 21:05:58 2010
From: aware at awareresearch.com (Aware)
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 2010 13:05:58 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <22844.25525.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <f7bfe5741002050751j52ac2488q723d2628d0976f6a@mail.gmail.com>
	<22844.25525.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <f7bfe5741002061305g6ffd10dct8f0c2e1c85f10664@mail.gmail.com>

On Sat, Feb 6, 2010 at 12:11 PM, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:

> Have you ever had a head-ache, Jef? How about a tooth-ache? It seems to me that these kinds of phenomena really do exist in the world.
>
> I actually had a tooth extracted two weeks ago, and I can tell you that few things had more reality to me then than the experience of the tooth-ache that precipitated my desire to see the dentist. Subjective experiences such as these differ from such phenomena as mountains and planets only in so much they have first-person rather than third-person ontologies. My dentist agrees that tooth-aches really do exist, and so does the Bayer company.
>
> I consider myself a materialist, but in the reaction against mind/matter dualism some of my fellow materialists (e.g., Dennett) go overboard and irrationally deny the plain facts of subjective experience. They try to explain it away in third-person terms, fearing that any recognition of the mental will place them in the same came with Descartes. They don't understand that in so doing they embrace and acknowledge Descartes' dualistic vocabulary.

Gordon, you presented the ostensible puzzle of Searle's Chinese Room,
in which YOU are left facing a paradox.

I contributed a very simple, clear and coherent (but perhaps jarringly
non-intuitive) resolution to your paradox.

A resolution that you're unable to accept due to your discomfort with
the notion that there is no ESSENTIAL Gordon Swobe to experience
ESSENTIAL qualia, despite my reassurances that this in no way denies
the very real Gordon Swobe and his experiences as we AND YOU know
them.

A resolution that I've lived with for nearly thirty years now; one
that flipped my world-view inside-out, leaving everything the same but
simpler (no singularity of Self) and that costs nothing, while
providing a more coherent basis for reasoning and extrapolation.

Fine, enjoy your faith in the illusion, and live with the paradox.  In
everyday life, as long as you're not, for example, trying in vain to
find a way to physically implement the qualia you imagine to exist,
you should have little trouble.  Your limited view does get in the way
of more advanced thinking on the topic of agency and its role in
metaethics, which I consider crucial to the ongoing growth of what
matters to us as a society, but hey, you've got lots of company.

This is a very old argument, and all the necessary pieces of the
puzzle are strewn about you.  If you use all the pieces, they fit
together only one way.

- Jef


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Sat Feb  6 22:01:52 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 2010 14:01:52 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <f7bfe5741002061305g6ffd10dct8f0c2e1c85f10664@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <264701.53414.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Sat, 2/6/10, Aware <aware at awareresearch.com> wrote:

>> Have you ever had a head-ache, Jef? How about a
>> tooth-ache? It seems to me that these kinds of phenomena
>> really do exist in the world.
>>
>> I actually had a tooth extracted two weeks ago, and I
>> can tell you that few things had more reality to me then
>> than the experience of the tooth-ache that precipitated my
>> desire to see the dentist. Subjective experiences such as
>> these differ from such phenomena as mountains and planets
>> only in so much they have first-person rather than
>> third-person ontologies. My dentist agrees that tooth-aches
>> really do exist, and so does the Bayer company.
> 
>> I consider myself a materialist, but in the reaction
>> against mind/matter dualism some of my fellow materialists
>> (e.g., Dennett) go overboard and irrationally deny the plain
>> facts of subjective experience. They try to explain it away
>> in third-person terms, fearing that any recognition of the
>> mental will place them in the same camp with Descartes. They
>> don't understand that in so doing they embrace and
>> acknowledge Descartes' dualistic vocabulary.
> 
> Gordon, you presented the ostensible puzzle of Searle's
> Chinese Room, in which YOU are left facing a paradox.
>
> I contributed a very simple, clear and coherent (but
> perhaps jarringly non-intuitive) resolution to your paradox.
> 
> A resolution that you're unable to accept due to your
> discomfort with the notion that there is no ESSENTIAL Gordon Swobe to
> experience ESSENTIAL qualia, despite my reassurances that this in no
> way denies the very real Gordon Swobe and his experiences as we AND
> YOU know them.
> 
> A resolution that I've lived with for nearly thirty years
> now; one that flipped my world-view inside-out, leaving everything
> the same but simpler (no singularity of Self) and that costs nothing,
> while providing a more coherent basis for reasoning and
> extrapolation.
> 
> Fine, enjoy your faith in the illusion, and live with the
> paradox.? In everyday life, as long as you're not, for example, trying
> in vain to find a way to physically implement the qualia you imagine
> to exist, you should have little trouble.? Your limited view
> does get in the way of more advanced thinking on the topic of agency and 
> its role in metaethics, which I consider crucial to the ongoing growth
> of what matters to us as a society, but hey, you've got lots of
> company.
> 
> This is a very old argument, and all the necessary pieces
> of the puzzle are strewn about you.? If you use all the
> pieces, they fit together only one way.

I'll ask again: have you ever had a tooth-ache? 

-gts


      


From avantguardian2020 at yahoo.com  Sat Feb  6 22:41:03 2010
From: avantguardian2020 at yahoo.com (The Avantguardian)
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 2010 14:41:03 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Nolopsism
In-Reply-To: <580930c21002060808t6996b91ehb19f34a6c5767e10@mail.gmail.com>
References: <mailman.1482.1265395981.462.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
	<243641.74772.qm@web113601.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
	<580930c21002060808t6996b91ehb19f34a6c5767e10@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <641575.48388.qm@web65616.mail.ac4.yahoo.com>

----- Original Message ----
> From: Stefano Vaj <stefano.vaj at gmail.com>
> To: ExI chat list <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org>
> Sent: Sat, February 6, 2010 8:08:06 AM
> Subject: Re: [ExI] Nolopsism
> 
> On 6 February 2010 09:37, Ben Zaiboc wrote:
> > BTW, this is a great paper. ?I've been reading through it, and so far, it 
> seems to make perfect sense. ?The basic idea is simple and elegant, and as far 
> as I can see, completely solves all these circular discussions we've been having 
> on this list. ?I'm sure certain parties wouldn't agree with that opinion though!
> 
> Indeed. Even though he is too pessimistic in saying that "cannot
> accept that we cannot exist". We should say "we cannot avoid making
> use of reflexive indicators", but there are plenty of other useful,
> understandable and practical concepts to which no "essence" really
> corresponds. Why should one's "self" be an exception? Most of dualism
> can easily be reduced to linguistic short-circuits and paradoxes...

Philosophically nolipsism bears some resemblance to Buddhism which is fine from a spiritual point of view. E.g. why fear death when there is no "me" to die, etc.?Being an attorney however, I am sure you are aware of the legal can of worms nolipsism opens up. Human rights are tied to identity. If "I" don't exist, then stealing my stuff or even murdering me is a victimless crime. Doesn't make for a happy outcome in my opinion, especially for libertarians.?Probably why the authors back-pedalled from their claims in the conclusion.


      



From lacertilian at gmail.com  Sun Feb  7 00:11:08 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 2010 16:11:08 -0800
Subject: [ExI] The simplest possible conscious system
In-Reply-To: <580930c21002060202i4b0917f0m3d5404c7d219d8b2@mail.gmail.com>
References: <mailman.1.1265284805.25978.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org> 
	<820642.67186.qm@web113613.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
	<580930c21002060202i4b0917f0m3d5404c7d219d8b2@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002061611p1b765a95j49f62f07753130d6@mail.gmail.com>

Stefano Vaj <stefano.vaj at gmail.com>:
> If "conscious" is taken to mean "exhibiting the same information
> processing features of an average adult, healthy, alert, educated
> human being" the theoretical answer for me corresponds to the question
> "what is the simplest possible universal computer".

Of course "conscious" is not taken to mean that here, nor anything
like that, if only for the reasons pointed out by James Choate two or
three days ago. Humans are ludicrously complex examples of
consciousness (assuming they are conscious at all), and almost
completely useless for finding an answer to the question.

Unless, of course, we can incrementally subtract non-vital functions,
paring down a prototypical human being to nothing more than a
consciousness-generating machine. Then we have to think about how
humans do it at all. This is an excellent line of inquiry to pursue.

Most awake people are conscious, and most asleep people are
unconscious. Agreed? Agreed.

What about other states? Peculiar cases may be illustrative here. Is a
lucid dreamer conscious? Any other dreamer? A blacked-out drunk? A
hypnosis subject? An acid head?

I've heard of mental states available in meditation that eradicate the
subject-object duality, and others that are devoid of all content save
for vast diffuse consciousness. The latter is obviously conscious, by
definition, but I don't know about the former; if I am meditating on
an idol, and then perceive myself to be identical with the idol, am I
conscious? Is the idol?

There aren't a lot of sharp lines to be drawn here. This much is
obvious. Aside from that, I have very little to contribute. Can any
experienced psychonauts lend some anecdotal evidence here?


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Sun Feb  7 00:34:53 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 2010 16:34:53 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Personal conclusions
In-Reply-To: <f7bfe5741002041020s7ea6e500v8105f580186028ed@mail.gmail.com>
References: <580930c21002040359u3141931am117614683d4f67a3@mail.gmail.com> 
	<f7bfe5741002041020s7ea6e500v8105f580186028ed@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002061634w48eae258p79252cfc377cedab@mail.gmail.com>

Aware <aware at awareresearch.com>:
> And despite accumulating evidence of the incoherence of consciousness,
> with all its gaps, distortions, fabrication and confabulation, we hang
> on to it, and decide it must be a very Hard Problem. ?Thus inoculated,
> and fortified by the biases built in to our language and culture, we
> know that when someone comes along and says that it's actually very
> simple, cf. Dennett, Metzinger, Pollack, Buddha..., we can be sure,
> even though we can't make sense of what they're saying, that they must
> be wrong.
>
> A few deeper thinkers, aiming for greater coherence over greater
> context, have suggested that either all entities "have consciousness"
> or none do. ?This is a step in the right direction. ?Then the
> question, clarified, might be decided in simply information-theoretic
> terms. ?But even then, more often they will side with Panpsychism
> (even a rock has consciousness, but only a little) than to face the
> possibility of non-existence of an essential experiencer.

Considering the thread's subject, it seems safe to burn some bytes on
personal information. So: I subscribe to panexperientialism myself.
Either everything has subjective experience, or nothing does.

Unfortunately this doesn't help me at all when faced with a question
like, "is a human more conscious than a pig more conscious than a fly
more conscious than a rock?". I want to say yes, really I do, but at
the moment I just can't! I see no reason whatsoever why certain
amounts or types of information processing should "attract" excess
consciousness, if, like me, you want to treat it as a fundamental
property of matter.

So, my contributions to the discussion are probably incremental at
best. I have stepped far enough back to understand that I understand
nothing, and just barely further.

Dennett, Metzinger, Pollack, Buddha (Gautama?). I have some books to
put on my reading list.


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Sun Feb  7 01:15:55 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 2010 17:15:55 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <264701.53414.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <f7bfe5741002061305g6ffd10dct8f0c2e1c85f10664@mail.gmail.com> 
	<264701.53414.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002061715k34828019kc0c73979bb37219f@mail.gmail.com>

Quoting from the "Personal conclusions" thread, because, on
reflection, it seems more relevant over here.

Stefano Vaj <stefano.vaj at gmail.com>:
>Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com>:
>> The intelligence of a given system is inversely proportional to the
>> average action (time * work) which must be expended before the system
>> achieves a given purpose, assuming that it began in a state as far
>> away as possible from that purpose.
>
> I would say it sounds a good one to me. In particular since it is not
> a white-black one and does not invoke metaphysical, ineffable
> entities. What about "perfomance in the execution of a given kind of
> data processing"?

Then you crash straight into the concept of FLOPS, and all the
terrible awful difficulties it entails. "Performance" is not
well-defined with respect to computing, or at least not to the extent
you'd expect, and I shudder to think of how one would go about
distinguishing "a given kind of data processing" from any other kind.

I might give that definition to some strange thing like "cognitive
excellence" which no one ever talks about outside of circles like this
one, but certainly not to intelligence. A total idiot can learn to
multiply large numbers quickly.

The modern computer: a total idiot with astounding cognitive excellence.

Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>:
> Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com>:
>> I don't deny subjective experience but I deny that when I
>> understand something I do anything more than associate it with another
>> symbol, ultimately grounded in something I have seen in the real
>> world. That would seem necessary and sufficient for understanding, and
>> for the subjective experience of understanding, such as it is.
>
> When I asked you about a digital computer that did exactly that, you acknowledged that said computer lacked conscious understanding of the symbol and went off on a tangent about amoebas.
>
> So then it seems that first you say these sorts of associations are necessary and sufficient for subjective experience of understanding, but then you don't.

For once, I agree unequivocally with Gordon Swobe. I'm not sure how to
feel about that! Ambivalent? Nonplussed? I think I'll go with
indifferent.

If Stathis continues to conflate intelligence, understanding,
consciousness, and, worst of all, symbolic association, I may have a
lasting position in the Searle-Gordon camp. It's a shame I believe
formal programs are perfectly capable of reproducing human subjective
experience. Otherwise, I'd fit in just fine.

<x at extropica.org>:
> Pollock, JL, Ismael J. ?2006. ?Knowledge and reality; So You Think You
> Exist? In Defense of Nolipsism :35-62.
>
> I've posted it to this list twice now. ?This is the first indication
> I've seen that anyone read it.
>
> - Jef

Yes! Thank you. Both for reminding me and for posting it to begin
with. I already agreed with the premise, so no tectonic shift of
world-view occurred, but hearing some coherent theories as to WHY we
must believe ourselves to be real, objective, unchanging entities, not
necessarily corresponding to any physical structure, was very
rewarding nonetheless.


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Sun Feb  7 01:18:12 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 2010 17:18:12 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] The simplest possible conscious system
In-Reply-To: <e321aa4b1002061611p1b765a95j49f62f07753130d6@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <820785.29759.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Sat, 2/6/10, Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com> wrote:

> I've heard of mental states available in meditation that
> eradicate the subject-object duality, and others that are devoid of 
> all content save for vast diffuse consciousness. The latter is obviously
> conscious, by definition, but I don't know about the former; if I am
> meditating on an idol, and then perceive myself to be identical with the
> idol, am I conscious? Is the idol?

I have since the 70s practiced transcendental meditation. Occasionally while meditating my mind seems to, as you say, eradicate the subject-object duality. However I can only infer this indirectly, and only after the fact. During those actual moments I have awareness of nothing at all. 

I don't believe in qualia, as such, because the idea implies the possibility of consciousness-without-an-object or consciousness-sans-qualia. Such states seem to me impossible both in theory and in practice. Instead I believe one experiences various qualities or aspects of one's own unified field of consciousness. 

-gts




      


From spike66 at att.net  Sun Feb  7 04:37:34 2010
From: spike66 at att.net (spike)
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 2010 20:37:34 -0800
Subject: [ExI] valentines day advice
In-Reply-To: <641575.48388.qm@web65616.mail.ac4.yahoo.com>
References: <mailman.1482.1265395981.462.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org><243641.74772.qm@web113601.mail.gq1.yahoo.com><580930c21002060808t6996b91ehb19f34a6c5767e10@mail.gmail.com>
	<641575.48388.qm@web65616.mail.ac4.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <9EF6A887A5D648958A8E14DBE5F0912F@spike>


In the midst of all the heavy technical discussion of minds and
consciousness, do let me here interject a bit of useful advice for the lads
as we approach that emotional minefield known as Valentines Day.  Perhaps
you have already chosen a gift for your sweethearts, but this one can be in
addition to that, and will only cost you about 20 bucks.  It might even get
you a get-out-of-jail-free card for your next romantic screwup.

Buy your sweetheart a DVD of the Celtic Woman singing Songs From the Heart.
Take my word for it, me lads.  Then watch it with her.  Be prepared, for at
some time during the performance you can count on her asking some form of
the question "Which of them is the most beautiful?"  You will at that time
respond instantly with "You are, my dear."  This will likely be followed
with a less-than-fully-sincere version of "Bullshit, now which one?"  At
this time you must stick with your original story like a thrice conviced
felon caught with a smoking pistol in his hand, by uttering "All are
beautiful of course, but the radiance of your beauty exceeds them all, as
the noonday sun outshines the stars!"

We know of course that if measured at equal distance, perhaps as many as
half the stars do in fact outshine the sun, for the sensible radiation is
proportional to the inverse square of the distance.  This is a detail that
you and I can keep between just us lads, shall we?  Good.  

Practice the delivery until you can do it without dirisive laughter, on your
first (and only) try.  You can do it: I did, and I was making it up as I
went along.  But of course I benefit from many years of dedicated practice
at this sort of thing.  Hey, I too benefit from the inverse square law,
being no Rock Hudson myself.  You don't even lie, exactly: your own
sweetheart does in fact outshine even the stunning Lisa Kelly, assuming Lisa
is home in Ireland while you sit beside your sweetheart in say, Australia,
or Neptune.

Now get out there and buy that DVD, and practice your lines.  You have only
one chance at it.  Good luck!

spike

   



From lacertilian at gmail.com  Sun Feb  7 05:31:02 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 2010 21:31:02 -0800
Subject: [ExI] The simplest possible conscious system
In-Reply-To: <820785.29759.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <e321aa4b1002061611p1b765a95j49f62f07753130d6@mail.gmail.com> 
	<820785.29759.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002062131i66b31688p3a8bdc8bb0279e8@mail.gmail.com>

Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>:
> I have since the 70s practiced transcendental meditation. Occasionally while meditating my mind seems to, as you say, eradicate the subject-object duality. However I can only infer this indirectly, and only after the fact. During those actual moments I have awareness of nothing at all.

Gordon! I never knew. My opinion of you is again on the upward part of
its fluctuation.

This seems to me a good argument for the idea that all consciousness
is that of a subject being aware of an object. I'd have said that
before, but my source regarding that particular state (from Ken
Wilber, I think) wasn't very specific on the matter.

The vast-consciousness-without-content state does seem to contradict
this theory, though, from what little I know about it. I've heard it
described (probably by Ken Wilber again) as a void which is only aware
of itself. You could interpret that as saying that there technically
is a subject-object duality in the moment, but both positions are
occupied by the same thing and the thing in question actually isn't
anything. Precisely as nolipsism predicts!

And Buddhism, and so on.

Does any of this help us to construct the simplest possible conscious
system? Self-awareness seems to be a good description of
consciousness, but awareness isn't exactly understanding. I'm not sure
what sort of mechanism is responsible for awareness.

You could claim that a Turing machine is aware of the symbol it's
currently reading, and only that symbol. Logically, then, a Turing
machine that does nothing but read a tape of symbols denoting itself
should be conscious. The symbol grounding problem again: how to cause
a symbol to denote anything at all?

General consensus dictates that some sort of interaction with the
environment is necessary. It's obvious to me that this works when
taken to the extremely sophisticated level of human awareness, but I
would be hard pressed to define an exact point at which the
unconsciousness of an ungrounded Turing machine is replaced by the
consciousness of an egotistic Spencer Campbell.

Attaching a webcam to associate images with symbols (using complex
object recognition software, of course), which are then fed to the
machine on tape, does not seem sufficient to produce consciousness
even if you point the camera at a mirror. Yet, I have no good reason
to believe it isn't. Sheer anthropocentric prejudice alone makes me
say that such a system is incapable of awareness: the Swobe Fallacy.

So, I haven't managed to convince myself that a system simpler than a
disembodied verbal AI (discussed previously) is capable of
consciousness. It must be, though, if I can remain conscious even with
duct tape over my mouth. Calling the potential to communicate a
feature of consciousness would be extraordinarily counterintuitive, at
best.

Basically I am talking to myself at this point. Do all possible
consciousnesses do that?

Hmm.


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Sun Feb  7 05:54:47 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Sat, 6 Feb 2010 21:54:47 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Nolopsism
In-Reply-To: <641575.48388.qm@web65616.mail.ac4.yahoo.com>
References: <mailman.1482.1265395981.462.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org> 
	<243641.74772.qm@web113601.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
	<580930c21002060808t6996b91ehb19f34a6c5767e10@mail.gmail.com> 
	<641575.48388.qm@web65616.mail.ac4.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002062154v8b44c1esfc031361f1b66c7f@mail.gmail.com>

The Avantguardian <avantguardian2020 at yahoo.com>:
> Philosophically nolipsism bears some resemblance to Buddhism which is fine from a spiritual point of view. E.g. why fear death when there is no "me" to die, etc.?Being an attorney however, I am sure you are aware of the legal can of worms nolipsism opens up. Human rights are tied to identity. If "I" don't exist, then stealing my stuff or even murdering me is a victimless crime. Doesn't make for a happy outcome in my opinion, especially for libertarians.?Probably why the authors back-pedalled from their claims in the conclusion.

Hi, my name is Spencer Campbell, I will be your Stefano Vaj for tonight.

Are victimless crimes morally, ethically, and legally acceptable? They
ARE crimes, so, no to the last one. The first two are arguable. I feel
confident that a coherent system of law could be made without the
assumption that any selves exist for it to protect. It would
essentially treat people as highly valuable property, no different
from houses or cars, owned by entities just as imaginary as
corporations.

Really it could only streamline everything. We should do this. We
should do this right now.


From nanite1018 at gmail.com  Sun Feb  7 06:23:39 2010
From: nanite1018 at gmail.com (JOSHUA JOB)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 2010 01:23:39 -0500
Subject: [ExI] Nolopsism
In-Reply-To: <e321aa4b1002062154v8b44c1esfc031361f1b66c7f@mail.gmail.com>
References: <mailman.1482.1265395981.462.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
	<243641.74772.qm@web113601.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
	<580930c21002060808t6996b91ehb19f34a6c5767e10@mail.gmail.com>
	<641575.48388.qm@web65616.mail.ac4.yahoo.com>
	<e321aa4b1002062154v8b44c1esfc031361f1b66c7f@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <915E9809-F351-43BE-A6A5-10E53227BD42@GMAIL.COM>

> Are victimless crimes morally, ethically, and legally acceptable? They
> ARE crimes, so, no to the last one. The first two are arguable. I feel
> confident that a coherent system of law could be made without the
> assumption that any selves exist for it to protect. It would
> essentially treat people as highly valuable property, no different
> from houses or cars, owned by entities just as imaginary as
> corporations.
> 
> Really it could only streamline everything. We should do this. We
> should do this right now. -Spencer Campbell
Problem: Who do you punish? This imaginary entity that damaged the property of another imaginary entity? If you do it like that, then I don't see any difference between that and a legal system based on actual "selves." And without a victim, there is no crime. I can't see the purpose of law without individual rights as its basis (rights based on principles derived from the nature of human beings), and if you eliminate the individual, you'll have a hard time justifying anything, ultimately.

Corporations are entities made up of people ultimately, and they are created and owned and controlled by people. Hence a crime against a corporation is a crime against a group of people (the owners or employees). Without individuals, you can't say make laws based on happiness, or prosperity, or anything else, because all of those reference individuals and minds. And obviously "rights" go right out the window.

I'll finish reading the article and probably get back later.

Joshua Job
nanite1018 at gmail.com





From stathisp at gmail.com  Sun Feb  7 07:09:30 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 2010 18:09:30 +1100
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability (was: The digital nature of
	brains)
In-Reply-To: <684806.48339.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <f21c22e31002050214t3013cf5ag38053152df62e524@mail.gmail.com> 
	<684806.48339.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002062309j745d88eck360a2535abb85fe0@mail.gmail.com>

On 7 February 2010 07:55, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
> --- On Fri, 2/5/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> I don't deny subjective experience but I deny that when I
>> understand something I do anything more than associate it with another
>> symbol, ultimately grounded in something I have seen in the real
>> world. That would seem necessary and sufficient for understanding, and
>> for the subjective experience of understanding, such as it is.
>
> When I asked you about a digital computer that did exactly that, you acknowledged that said computer lacked conscious understanding of the symbol and went off on a tangent about amoebas.
>
> So then it seems that first you say these sorts of associations are necessary and sufficient for subjective experience of understanding, but then you don't.

These sorts of associations are the basic stuff of which understanding
is made, but obviously there are degrees of understanding, involving
complex syntax and multiple associations. A human's understanding,
perception and intelligence stands in relationship to that of a simple
computer system's as it stands in relationship to that of a simple
organism.

> re: the amoeba
>
> As I use the word "consciousness", I believe the amoeba has none whatsoever. This unconscious creature exhibits intelligent behavior but because it has no nervous system I doubt very seriously that it has any conscious experience of living. It looks for food intelligently in the same sense that your watch tells the time intelligently and in the same sense in which weak AI systems may one day have the intelligence needed to pass the Turing test; that is, it has intelligence but no consciousness.

The amoeba is not only less conscious than a human, it is also less
intelligent. Do you think it is just a coincidence that intelligence
and consciousness seem to be directly proportional?

A neuron is not essentially different from an amoeba, except in the
fact that it cooperates with other neurons to process information that
the individual neuron does not understand (rather like the man in the
Chinese Room). It is this activity which gives rise to intelligence
and consciousness, not anything to do with the biology of the neuron
itself. The biology of the neuron is akin to the workings of an
internal combustion engine in a car: it is essential to make the car
go and any significant problem with it will make the car stop, but if
you replaced the whole thing with an electric motor and battery system
of similar characteristics the car would go just as well.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From stathisp at gmail.com  Sun Feb  7 08:25:43 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 2010 19:25:43 +1100
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <156490.82842.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <f21c22e31002050725g336cd77ak28ccc4284ba89024@mail.gmail.com> 
	<156490.82842.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002070025y4fd6be73uad53136704f17b91@mail.gmail.com>

On 7 February 2010 06:27, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
> --- On Fri, 2/5/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>>> In your thought experiment, the artificial
>>> program-driven neurons will require a lot of work for the
>>> same reason that programming weak AI will require a lot of
>>> work. We're not there yet, but it's within the realm of
>>> programming possibility.
>>
>> The artificial neurons (or subneuronal or multineuronal
>> structures, it doesn't matter)...
>
> If it doesn't matter, then let's keep it straightforward and refer to artificial brains rather than to artificial neurons surgically inserted into the midst of natural neurons. This will eliminate a lot of uncertainties that arise from the present state of ignorance about neuroscience.

It is a basic requirement of the experiment that the brain replacement
be *partial*. This is in order to demonstrate that there is a problem
with the idea that a brain part could have normal behaviour but lack
consciousness. Having demonstrated that the brain parts must have
consciousness, it should then be obvious that an entirely artificial
brain made out of these parts will also be conscious.

It is true that we don't at present have the capability to make such
artificial brains or neurons, but I have asked you to assume that we
do. Surely this is no more difficult than imagining the Chinese Room!
The Chinese Room is logically possible but probably physically
impossible, while artificial neurons may even become available in our
lifetimes.

>> exhibit the same behaviour as the natural equivalents,
>> but lack consciousness.
>
> In my view an artificial brain can exhibit the same intelligent behaviors as a natural brain without having subjective mental states where we define behavior as, for example, acts of speech.
>
>> That's all you need to know about them: you don't have to worry how
>> difficult it was to make them, just that they have been made (provided
>> it is logically possible). Now it seems that you allow that such
>> components are possible, but then you say that once they are installed
>> the rest of the brain will somehow malfunction and needs to be tweaked.
>> That is the blatant contradiction: if the brain starts behaving
>> differently, then the artificial components lack
>> the defining property you agreed they have.
>
> As above, let's save a lot of confusion and speak of brains rather than individual neurons.

Is there anyone out there still following this thread who is confused
by my description of the thought experiment or doesn't understand its
rationale? Please email me off list if you prefer.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From stathisp at gmail.com  Sun Feb  7 08:32:23 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 2010 19:32:23 +1100
Subject: [ExI] The simplest possible conscious system
In-Reply-To: <820785.29759.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <e321aa4b1002061611p1b765a95j49f62f07753130d6@mail.gmail.com> 
	<820785.29759.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002070032t73b4d0abl1c35c8b643ab82d0@mail.gmail.com>

On 7 February 2010 12:18, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:

> I don't believe in qualia, as such, because the idea implies the possibility of consciousness-without-an-object or consciousness-sans-qualia. Such states seem to me impossible both in theory and in practice. Instead I believe one experiences various qualities or aspects of one's own unified field of consciousness.

There isn't any context in which you could use "qualia" where
"experience" or "perception" would not do as well.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From bbenzai at yahoo.com  Sun Feb  7 10:53:22 2010
From: bbenzai at yahoo.com (Ben Zaiboc)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 2010 02:53:22 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <mailman.1508.1265531570.462.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
Message-ID: <455971.33560.qm@web113605.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:

--- On Sat, 2/6/10, Aware <aware at awareresearch.com> wrote:
>
>> A resolution that you're unable to accept due to your
>> discomfort with the notion that there is no ESSENTIAL Gordon Swobe to
>> experience ESSENTIAL qualia, despite my reassurances that this in no
>> way denies the very real Gordon Swobe and his experiences as we AND
>> YOU know them.
...

>> This is a very old argument, and all the necessary pieces
>> of the puzzle are strewn about you.? If you use all the
>> pieces, they fit together only one way.

> I'll ask again: have you ever had a tooth-ache?


Gordon, your repeated question shows that you're either ignoring or not getting the point of Jef's reply.
If it makes no sense to you, please say so, don't just regurgitate the same question that he is replying to.

On the other hand, if you're simply ignoring things that you don't like reading, what's the point of continuing the conversation?

Ben Zaiboc



      


From bbenzai at yahoo.com  Sun Feb  7 11:04:36 2010
From: bbenzai at yahoo.com (Ben Zaiboc)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 2010 03:04:36 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Nolopsism
In-Reply-To: <mailman.1508.1265531570.462.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
Message-ID: <370344.96441.qm@web113608.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

The Avantguardian <avantguardian2020 at yahoo.com> wrote:

> Philosophically nolipsism bears some resemblance to 
> Buddhism which is fine from a spiritual point of view. 
> E.g. why fear death when there is no "me" to die, etc.? 
> Being an attorney however, I am sure you are aware of 
> the legal can of worms nolipsism opens up. Human rights 
> are tied to identity. If "I" don't exist, then  
> stealing my stuff or even murdering me is a victimless crime. 
> Doesn't make for a happy outcome in my opinion, 
> especially for libertarians. 
> Probably why the authors back-pedalled from their 
> claims in the conclusion.


Philosophically, it may be as you say.  Practically, though, it's not really that useful because it makes no actual difference to the way we regard things like fear of death, or to the law.

It's in the scientific arena that nolipsism is most useful, because it explains what subjectivity actually is, and clears the nonsense and confusion out of the way.  We know, at least in theory, that subjectivity can be built into an artificial mind, and we can finally dump the concept of the 'hard problem' in the bin.

The concept of a "de se" designator explains why we don't have souls, not why we shouldn't have property rights. 

Ben Zaiboc


      


From nebathenemi at yahoo.co.uk  Sun Feb  7 11:21:51 2010
From: nebathenemi at yahoo.co.uk (Tom Nowell)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 2010 11:21:51 +0000 (GMT)
Subject: [ExI] Glacier Geoengineering
In-Reply-To: <mailman.1.1265457601.24059.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
Message-ID: <671565.18196.qm@web27001.mail.ukl.yahoo.com>

Keith's proposal relies on using a lot of organic liquids with a low vapor point. 

Keith, how are you proposing to trap the vapor, condense it and re-use it? If this process isn't highly efficient, you get two big problems:
1) you need to add a lot more liquid, which costs energy to make, adding to expense and cost
2) you have to worry about the environmental problems when the vapor condenses somewhere else. In fact, even with a tiny amount of leakage this can become a problem. I'm not sure how much of these it would take to become toxic rather than mild irritants, but in the volumes needed to freeze glaciers there is a risk of a major spill. Seeing as places with the huge glaciers like Antarctica and Greenland have coastlines with fragile polar ecosystems, I can see this being a problem.

In Kim Stanley Robinson's recent trilogy of ecothrillers (40 days of rain/ 50 degrees below/ 60 days) one of the protagonists investigates geoengineering for a presidential candidate and advises him in the last book. The scheme they use for direct lowering of sea-levels is pumping sea water on to the West Antarctic where the glaciers are highly stable, and increasing glacier coverage that way.

Tom


      


From aware at awareresearch.com  Sun Feb  7 13:21:55 2010
From: aware at awareresearch.com (Aware)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 2010 05:21:55 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Nolopsism
In-Reply-To: <e321aa4b1002062154v8b44c1esfc031361f1b66c7f@mail.gmail.com>
References: <mailman.1482.1265395981.462.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
	<243641.74772.qm@web113601.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
	<580930c21002060808t6996b91ehb19f34a6c5767e10@mail.gmail.com>
	<641575.48388.qm@web65616.mail.ac4.yahoo.com>
	<e321aa4b1002062154v8b44c1esfc031361f1b66c7f@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <f7bfe5741002070521r61a4d00bmec1a5786f0506c61@mail.gmail.com>

On Sat, Feb 6, 2010 at 9:54 PM, Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com> wrote:
> The Avantguardian <avantguardian2020 at yahoo.com>:
>> Philosophically nolipsism bears some resemblance to Buddhism which is fine from a spiritual point of view. E.g. why fear death when there is no "me" to die, etc.?Being an attorney however, I am sure you are aware of the legal can of worms nolipsism opens up. Human rights are tied to identity. If "I" don't exist, then stealing my stuff or even murdering me is a victimless crime. Doesn't make for a happy outcome in my opinion, especially for libertarians.?Probably why the authors back-pedalled from their claims in the conclusion.
>
> Hi, my name is Spencer Campbell, I will be your Stefano Vaj for tonight.
>
> Are victimless crimes morally, ethically, and legally acceptable? They
> ARE crimes, so, no to the last one. The first two are arguable. I feel
> confident that a coherent system of law could be made without the
> assumption that any selves exist for it to protect. It would
> essentially treat people as highly valuable property, no different
> from houses or cars, owned by entities just as imaginary as
> corporations.
>
> Really it could only streamline everything. We should do this. We
> should do this right now.

Spencer, a more coherent system of justice is possible, and "we"
continue to move, in fits and starts, in this direction already for
many millennia.

But it's not based on abolishment of the self.  As Pollock's paper
shows, a sense of self is NECESSARY for situated effectiveness.

Rather, it's a matter of identification of self over a GREATER sphere of agency.

Increasing agreement on the rightness or "morality" of actions
corresponds to the extent such actions are assessed as promoting an
increasing context of increasingly coherent, hierarchical,
fine-grained, evolving but present (subjective) values, via methods
methods increasingly effective, in principle, over increasing
(objective) scope of interaction. Lather, rinse, repeat.

Yes, it's a mouthful, and I estimate it takes several hundred pages to
unpack in order to accommodate the priors of most here.

- Jef


From jonkc at bellsouth.net  Sun Feb  7 16:54:32 2010
From: jonkc at bellsouth.net (John Clark)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 2010 11:54:32 -0500
Subject: [ExI] How not to make a thought experiment
In-Reply-To: <684806.48339.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <684806.48339.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <1608D5D4-35BB-4CCC-8E48-7B3A679037B6@bellsouth.net>

Since my last post Gordon Swobe has posted 5 times.

> I consider myself a materialist

Gordon considers himself a rationalist too, but we all know that is not the case.

> but in the reaction against mind/matter dualism some of my fellow materialists (e.g., Dennett) go overboard and irrationally deny the plain facts of subjective experience

BULLSHIT. Dennett is not a fool and only a fool would deny subjective experiance

> As I use the word "consciousness", I believe the amoeba has none whatsoever. This unconscious creature exhibits intelligent behavior but [...]

But what? If Gordon believes an amoeba acts intelligently (something I will not defend) then he has absolutely no reason to believe it is not conscious, except perhaps for a mysterious little voice in his head whispering otherwise.

And let me repeat for the 422 time that Gordon's ideas and Darwin's are 100% incompatible. If consciousness and intelligence are not linked them science has no explanation how consciousness came to be on planet Earth, and yet we know with absolute certainty that it did at least once and probably many billions of times. People, this is not a minor point, this is a show stopper as far as Gordon's ideas are concerned. Charles Darwin had the single best idea that any human being ever had and it is at the center of all the biological sciences. Either Gordon Swobe is the greatest genius the human race has ever produced or the man is dead wrong.

I must confess to being a little disappointed in Extropians because I seem to be the only one who sees how important Evolution is; instead they dispute Gordon on some obscure point in his latest ridiculous thought experiment. Real experiments take precedence over thought experiments and planet Earth has been conducting one for the last 3 billion years. The results of that experiment are unambiguous, consciousness and intelligence MUST be linked and if you or me or Gordon doesn't understand exactly how that could be it doesn't change the fact that it is. 

 John K Clark  







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From max at maxmore.com  Sun Feb  7 17:23:48 2010
From: max at maxmore.com (Max More)
Date: Sun, 07 Feb 2010 11:23:48 -0600
Subject: [ExI] The Audacious beauty of our future - Natasha Vita-More,
 an  interview
Message-ID: <201002071750.o17Hoark026457@andromeda.ziaspace.com>

It's good to see an extensive and informative interview that's also 
presented in such an appealing format. Congrats!

I haven't come across this site before, but it's nicely designed and 
appears to have some other intriguing content.

http://spacecollective.org/Wildcat/5527/The-Audacious-beauty-of-our-future-Natasha-VitaMore-an-interview

Max



From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Sun Feb  7 18:58:26 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 2010 10:58:26 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <455971.33560.qm@web113605.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <82654.40894.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

How about you, Ben? Have you ever had a toothache? Was it a real toothache? Or was it just an illusion?

-gts



      


From bbenzai at yahoo.com  Sun Feb  7 19:02:21 2010
From: bbenzai at yahoo.com (Ben Zaiboc)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 2010 11:02:21 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Blue Brain Project
In-Reply-To: <mailman.1.1265544001.21687.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
Message-ID: <558651.23421.qm@web113616.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

Anyone not familiar with this can read about it here:
http://seedmagazine.com/content/article/out_of_the_blue/P1/

The next ten years should be interesting!

Ben Zaiboc


      


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Sun Feb  7 19:30:19 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 2010 11:30:19 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] The simplest possible conscious system
In-Reply-To: <e321aa4b1002062131i66b31688p3a8bdc8bb0279e8@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <487344.53568.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Sun, 2/7/10, Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com> wrote:

> This seems to me a good argument for the idea that all
> consciousness is that of a subject being aware of an object. 

Yes. 

> I'd have said that before, but my source regarding that particular state 
> (from Ken Wilber, I think) wasn't very specific on the matter.

Mystics including Wilber like to talk about such things as consciousness-without-an-object. I believe they're misguided.

> The vast-consciousness-without-content state does seem to
> contradict this theory, though, from what little I know about it. I've
> heard it described (probably by Ken Wilber again) as a void which is
> only aware of itself. 

Speaking only from my own experience, I can tell you that there does exist for me a state that *seems* like consciousness-without-content. I can see how those who have mystical philosophical biases might interpret that state as consciousness of the "void" or some such. I have no such mystical bias (although I once did) and I believe that, in reality, the experience to which I refer above represents only a very clear and silent state of mind. It appears typically in the moment following that during which subject-object actually does disappear -- after the transcendent moment itself -- and is easily mistaken for it. 

-gts



      


From spike66 at att.net  Sun Feb  7 19:35:34 2010
From: spike66 at att.net (spike)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 2010 11:35:34 -0800
Subject: [ExI] How not to make a thought experiment
In-Reply-To: <1608D5D4-35BB-4CCC-8E48-7B3A679037B6@bellsouth.net>
References: <684806.48339.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
	<1608D5D4-35BB-4CCC-8E48-7B3A679037B6@bellsouth.net>
Message-ID: <8AF4B8E496854465AAD96F0C0D14B279@spike>

 
	...On Behalf Of John Clark

	...I must confess to being a little disappointed in Extropians
because I seem to be the only one who sees how important Evolution is...
John K Clark  


John you speak great blammisphies!  I practically worship evolution.  Or so
I am told by the religionistas.

This is my contribution to your meme: one knowns not misery and cognitive
dissonance until one has been an avid observer of wildlife *without*
Darwin's dangerous ideas.  In my own misspent youth, not really knowing
anything about evolution, I struggled to understand how these observations
could even be possible.  They didn't talk about Darwin in the public schools
in those days, not even in the biology classes.  I listened carefully in
biology, always enjoying it, actually reading the textbook even, but I sure
do not recall any discussion of evolution.  My first real exposure to the
notion was from Carl Sagan's Cosmos, in my third year of college.  (!) One
just cannot get nature without the concept of evolution.

Those who have always assumed evolution may not realize what it is like to
be an observer of the wilderness without the knowledge of evolution.  

Learning of Darwin was like being intellectually born again, and doing it
right the second time.

spike














From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Sun Feb  7 20:07:12 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 2010 12:07:12 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability (was: The digital nature of
	brains)
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002062309j745d88eck360a2535abb85fe0@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <445777.14858.qm@web36505.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Sun, 2/7/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:

>> As I use the word "consciousness", I believe the
> amoeba has none whatsoever. This unconscious creature
> exhibits intelligent behavior but because it has no nervous
> system I doubt very seriously that it has any conscious
> experience of living. It looks for food intelligently in the
> same sense that your watch tells the time intelligently and
> in the same sense in which weak AI systems may one day have
> the intelligence needed to pass the Turing test; that is, it
> has intelligence but no consciousness.
> 
> The amoeba is not only less conscious than a human, it is
> also less intelligent. 

The amoeba has no neurons or nervous system, Stathis, so "less conscious" is an understatement. It has no consciousness at all.

-gts




      


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Sun Feb  7 20:47:20 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 2010 12:47:20 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Nolopsism
In-Reply-To: <f7bfe5741002070521r61a4d00bmec1a5786f0506c61@mail.gmail.com>
References: <mailman.1482.1265395981.462.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org> 
	<243641.74772.qm@web113601.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
	<580930c21002060808t6996b91ehb19f34a6c5767e10@mail.gmail.com> 
	<641575.48388.qm@web65616.mail.ac4.yahoo.com>
	<e321aa4b1002062154v8b44c1esfc031361f1b66c7f@mail.gmail.com> 
	<f7bfe5741002070521r61a4d00bmec1a5786f0506c61@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002071247g1f3c911ch3778521f6ddbf739@mail.gmail.com>

Aware <aware at awareresearch.com>:
> Spencer, a more coherent system of justice is possible, and "we"
> continue to move, in fits and starts, in this direction already for
> many millennia.
>
> But it's not based on abolishment of the self. ?As Pollock's paper
> shows, a sense of self is NECESSARY for situated effectiveness.
>
> Rather, it's a matter of identification of self over a GREATER sphere of agency.

Right: corporations. Total abolishment of the self would ultimately
require doing away with recognition of discrete objects entirely,
which doesn't make a lot of sense. I would want a system that treats
"selves" as legal fabrications, not one which denies their conceptual
validity.

Phew, almost said "existence" there. Shaky ground.

Aware <aware at awareresearch.com>:
> Increasing agreement on the rightness or "morality" of actions
> corresponds to the extent such actions are assessed as promoting an
> increasing context of increasingly coherent, hierarchical,
> fine-grained, evolving but present (subjective) values, via methods
> methods increasingly effective, in principle, over increasing
> (objective) scope of interaction. Lather, rinse, repeat.
>
> Yes, it's a mouthful, and I estimate it takes several hundred pages to
> unpack in order to accommodate the priors of most here.

You're correct: for me, it's more than a mouthful. You seem to be
giving a definition for "increasing agreement on the rightness or
'morality' of actions", but I can't figure out exactly how that bears
on the discussion. It wasn't a point of contention.

We seem to be making incremental progress toward Kantland. It's only a
matter of time before we come across a roaming herd of categorical
imperatives.


From kanzure at gmail.com  Sun Feb  7 20:49:15 2010
From: kanzure at gmail.com (Bryan Bishop)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 2010 14:49:15 -0600
Subject: [ExI] Blue Brain Project
In-Reply-To: <558651.23421.qm@web113616.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
References: <mailman.1.1265544001.21687.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
	<558651.23421.qm@web113616.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <55ad6af71002071249q64f8f7d2yc4017d23457856a9@mail.gmail.com>

On Sun, Feb 7, 2010 at 1:02 PM, Ben Zaiboc wrote:
> Anyone not familiar with this can read about it here:
> http://seedmagazine.com/content/article/out_of_the_blue/P1/
>
> The next ten years should be interesting!

I know I mentioned these links a few days ago, but it's worth repeating.

Noah Sutton is making a documentary:
http://thebeautifulbrain.com/2010/02/bluebrain-film-preview/

"We are very proud to present the world premiere of BLUEBRAIN ? Year
One, a documentary short which previews director Noah Hutton?s 10-year
film-in-the-making that will chronicle the progress of The Blue Brain
Project, Henry Markram?s attempt to reverse-engineer a human brain.
Enjoy the piece and let us know what you think."

There's a longer video that explains what he's up to.

The Emergence of Intelligence in the Neocortical Microcircuit
http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-2874207418572601262&ei=lghrS6GmG4jCqQLA1Yz7DA

- Bryan
http://heybryan.org/
1 512 203 0507


From stefano.vaj at gmail.com  Sun Feb  7 20:50:56 2010
From: stefano.vaj at gmail.com (Stefano Vaj)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 2010 21:50:56 +0100
Subject: [ExI] The simplest possible conscious system
In-Reply-To: <e321aa4b1002061611p1b765a95j49f62f07753130d6@mail.gmail.com>
References: <mailman.1.1265284805.25978.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
	<820642.67186.qm@web113613.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
	<580930c21002060202i4b0917f0m3d5404c7d219d8b2@mail.gmail.com>
	<e321aa4b1002061611p1b765a95j49f62f07753130d6@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <580930c21002071250u1acda46dnfab88c16064f1445@mail.gmail.com>

On 7 February 2010 01:11, Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com> wrote:
> Stefano Vaj <stefano.vaj at gmail.com>:
>> If "conscious" is taken to mean "exhibiting the same information
>> processing features of an average adult, healthy, alert, educated
>> human being" the theoretical answer for me corresponds to the question
>> "what is the simplest possible universal computer".
>
> Of course "conscious" is not taken to mean that here, nor anything
> like that, if only for the reasons pointed out by James Choate two or
> three days ago. Humans are ludicrously complex examples of
> consciousness (assuming they are conscious at all), and almost
> completely useless for finding an answer to the question.

No, this was not my point. What I meant is "if  conscious does not
mean to be entrusted  with a soul/operated by an organic brain/being
bipedal".

I have no doubt that consciousness which is the (one of the?) vague
concept(s) which we adopt to indicate human alertness can be exhibited
by *any* universal computer. That is, if reasonable performance is not
a requirement.

-- 
Stefano Vaj


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Sun Feb  7 21:05:40 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 2010 13:05:40 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002070025y4fd6be73uad53136704f17b91@mail.gmail.com>
References: <f21c22e31002050725g336cd77ak28ccc4284ba89024@mail.gmail.com> 
	<156490.82842.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
	<f21c22e31002070025y4fd6be73uad53136704f17b91@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002071305t52b0592ai40a9715b5754cbb0@mail.gmail.com>

Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com>:
> Is there anyone out there still following this thread who is confused
> by my description of the thought experiment or doesn't understand its
> rationale? Please email me off list if you prefer.

Seems pretty clear to me, as a neuron-by-neuron replacement is
precisely what I've wanted for the past two to five years. I would
advise phrasing it again, simply and concisely, because (a) what you
have in mind may have changed since you last did so, (b) I might have
overwritten your description with my own, and (c) the point on which
Gordon disagrees remains a total mystery.

Incidentally, I had a toothache last night. Not that anyone asked, but
it was an illusion and I was very frustrated that I couldn't dispel
it.

Gordon, time for the true or false game: there is a difference between
real toothaches and illusionary toothaches.

My answer is "false", and I get the impression that yours will be
"true". If so, why? How?

Is there any way to measure realness in a toothache, scientifically?

If not, is it possible to distinguish between the two through purely
subjective experience?

To both of these questions I give, of course, a decisive "no". But
maybe you mean something by the word "illusion" that I haven't yet
grasped. Currently, I am using a definition borrowing partly from
Buddhism and partly from Dungeons & Dragons. If anyone knows of
another dimension I've missed, do tell.


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Sun Feb  7 21:13:44 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 2010 13:13:44 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Nolopsism
In-Reply-To: <915E9809-F351-43BE-A6A5-10E53227BD42@GMAIL.COM>
References: <mailman.1482.1265395981.462.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org> 
	<243641.74772.qm@web113601.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
	<580930c21002060808t6996b91ehb19f34a6c5767e10@mail.gmail.com> 
	<641575.48388.qm@web65616.mail.ac4.yahoo.com>
	<e321aa4b1002062154v8b44c1esfc031361f1b66c7f@mail.gmail.com> 
	<915E9809-F351-43BE-A6A5-10E53227BD42@GMAIL.COM>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002071313v11f4f9a8y750aae92510deb11@mail.gmail.com>

JOSHUA JOB <nanite1018 at gmail.com>:
> Problem: Who do you punish? This imaginary entity that damaged the property of another imaginary entity? If you do it like that, then I don't see any difference between that and a legal system based on actual "selves." And without a victim, there is no crime. I can't see the purpose of law without individual rights as its basis (rights based on principles derived from the nature of human beings), and if you eliminate the individual, you'll have a hard time justifying anything, ultimately.

Solution: No one needs to be punished. In theory, the only
justification for legal punishment right now is to modify future
behavior on a societal scale. There are far more effective and less
draconian methods of doing this. See: Norwegian open prisons.

http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/europe/091017/norway-open-prison

There are other justifications which make punishment a much more
attractive option. Prisoners of war in ancient Rome were made to fight
as gladiators. Justification: entertainment. An eye-for-an-eye system
is self-justifying: justice for the sake of justice.

JOSHUA JOB <nanite1018 at gmail.com>:
> Corporations are entities made up of people ultimately, and they are created and owned and controlled by people. Hence a crime against a corporation is a crime against a group of people (the owners or employees). Without individuals, you can't say make laws based on happiness, or prosperity, or anything else, because all of those reference individuals and minds. And obviously "rights" go right out the window.

A measurement of prosperity need make no reference to individuals or
minds unless corporations, countries, and planets count as
individuals. You could define the Earth's prosperity as equivalent to
its biodiversity, for example, and just start tracking all the DNA. I
don't know why you would, but you could.

My argument against happiness is the same as my argument against
punishment: it is valuable only as a tool for behavioral modification,
heartless as that may sound. Look at how happiness evolved. It's just
an arbitrary reward for survival. This is the attitude with which I
regard my own happiness, and it doesn't seem to impair me in any way
practical or philosophical.

Finally: obviously "rights" don't go out the window at all! In fact,
we would only have more of them. A brand-new car would have the right
not to be crushed into a tiny cube, because such would be blatantly
wasteful and wrong. Similarly, a brand-new human would have the same
right, but a totaled junker or a corpse would not.


From aware at awareresearch.com  Sun Feb  7 21:03:42 2010
From: aware at awareresearch.com (Aware)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 2010 13:03:42 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Nolopsism
In-Reply-To: <e321aa4b1002071247g1f3c911ch3778521f6ddbf739@mail.gmail.com>
References: <mailman.1482.1265395981.462.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
	<243641.74772.qm@web113601.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
	<580930c21002060808t6996b91ehb19f34a6c5767e10@mail.gmail.com>
	<641575.48388.qm@web65616.mail.ac4.yahoo.com>
	<e321aa4b1002062154v8b44c1esfc031361f1b66c7f@mail.gmail.com>
	<f7bfe5741002070521r61a4d00bmec1a5786f0506c61@mail.gmail.com>
	<e321aa4b1002071247g1f3c911ch3778521f6ddbf739@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <f7bfe5741002071303n6ac9f65bta223c972160b68af@mail.gmail.com>

On Sun, Feb 7, 2010 at 12:47 PM, Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com> wrote:
> Aware <aware at awareresearch.com>:
>> Spencer, a more coherent system of justice is possible, and "we"
>> continue to move, in fits and starts, in this direction already for
>> many millennia.
>>
>> But it's not based on abolishment of the self. ?As Pollock's paper
>> shows, a sense of self is NECESSARY for situated effectiveness.
>>
>> Rather, it's a matter of identification of self over a GREATER sphere of agency.
>
> Right: corporations. Total abolishment of the self would ultimately
> require doing away with recognition of discrete objects entirely,
> which doesn't make a lot of sense. I would want a system that treats
> "selves" as legal fabrications, not one which denies their conceptual
> validity.
>
> Phew, almost said "existence" there. Shaky ground.
>
> Aware <aware at awareresearch.com>:
>> Increasing agreement on the rightness or "morality" of actions
>> corresponds to the extent such actions are assessed as promoting
>> an increasing context of increasingly coherent, hierarchical,
>> fine-grained, present but evolving (subjective) values, via
>> methods increasingly effective, in principle, over increasing
>> (objective) scope of interaction. Lather, rinse, repeat.
>>
>> Yes, it's a mouthful, and I estimate it takes several hundred pages to
>> unpack in order to accommodate the priors of most here.
>
> You're correct: for me, it's more than a mouthful. You seem to be
> giving a definition for "increasing agreement on the rightness or
> 'morality' of actions", but I can't figure out exactly how that bears
> on the discussion. It wasn't a point of contention.

I saw you wrote "I feel confident that a coherent system of law could
be made without the assumption that any selves exist for it to protect."

I responded to that without recognizing the sarcasm that became
obvious further down.  Sorry.


> We seem to be making incremental progress toward Kantland. It's only a
> matter of time before we come across a roaming herd of categorical
> imperatives.

I'm talking about an upgrade to Kant's Categorical Imperative.  Its
most significant weakness is its lack of evolutionary perspective.

- Jef


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Sun Feb  7 21:33:20 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 2010 13:33:20 -0800
Subject: [ExI] The simplest possible conscious system
In-Reply-To: <580930c21002071250u1acda46dnfab88c16064f1445@mail.gmail.com>
References: <mailman.1.1265284805.25978.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org> 
	<820642.67186.qm@web113613.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
	<580930c21002060202i4b0917f0m3d5404c7d219d8b2@mail.gmail.com> 
	<e321aa4b1002061611p1b765a95j49f62f07753130d6@mail.gmail.com> 
	<580930c21002071250u1acda46dnfab88c16064f1445@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002071333u48d4caf5hb8511ac36e111395@mail.gmail.com>

Stefano Vaj <stefano.vaj at gmail.com>:
> No, this was not my point. What I meant is "if ?conscious does not
> mean to be entrusted ?with a soul/operated by an organic brain/being
> bipedal".

I was thinking you meant "having thoughts, feelings, opinions, sensory
experiences, and every other feature common to the information
processing of all adult, healthy, alert, educated human beings". That
seemed extremely excessive to me, as a description for the minimum
prerequisites of consciousness, and thus the strong reaction.

This second definition of yours is deductive, not inductive, so it
doesn't tell me much: only what you think consciousness isn't, not
what it is.


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Sun Feb  7 22:24:57 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 2010 14:24:57 -0800
Subject: [ExI] How not to make a thought experiment
In-Reply-To: <1608D5D4-35BB-4CCC-8E48-7B3A679037B6@bellsouth.net>
References: <684806.48339.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
	<1608D5D4-35BB-4CCC-8E48-7B3A679037B6@bellsouth.net>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002071424u38a3e324i9847af2e4983149e@mail.gmail.com>

I am now officially arguing with John Clark. Cover your eyes,
everybody, 'cause this is gonna get real ugly, real fast.

John Clark <jonkc at bellsouth.net>:
> Since my last post?Gordon Swobe has posted 5 times.
>
> I consider myself a materialist
>
> Gordon considers himself a rationalist too, but we all know that is not the
> case.

False. I consider him a rationalist. Therefore, we do not all know
that is not the case.

Rationalism dictates that reason alone is sufficient to produce
knowledge. Gordon trusts absolutely in his powers of reason, even when
the material evidence contradicts him: the very model of a
rationalist!

> But what? If Gordon believes an amoeba acts intelligently (something I will
> not defend) then he has absolutely no reason to believe it is not conscious,
> except perhaps for a mysterious little voice in his head whispering
> otherwise.

Point one: leukocytes, such as the one in the (fantastic) video that's
been floating around here, obviously behave intelligently when it
comes to chasing down and devouring foreign bodies. It does not make
sense to say they don't. And no, I will not repeat my definition of
intelligence again!

Point two: all beliefs are mysterious little voices whispering in
someone's head. If you believe otherwise, clearly you are delusional
and/or have never read the relevant Lewis Carrol story.

http://www.ditext.com/carroll/tortoise.html

Point three: if you really must insist on a logical-sounding reason to
claim that a leukocyte might be intelligent but not conscious, I
suggest you ask Gordon for one directly rather than trying to goad him
into defending his honor. Of course this assumes you're actually
trying to further the discussion, rather than simply shouting libel
into the aether for its own sake (as I am now).

> And let me repeat for the 422 time that Gordon's ideas and Darwin's are 100%
> incompatible.

I take it you've read On the Origin of Species. I have not.

Quote a passage that contradicts Gordon's ideas, please? I have my
doubts that he says much about consciousness directly, but if you can
even come up with something IMPLICITLY incompatible I would be
impressed.

> If consciousness and intelligence are not linked them science
> has no explanation how consciousness came to be on planet Earth, and yet we
> know with absolute certainty that it did at least once and probably many
> billions of times.

Do we John? Do we know that? With absolute certainty, no less.

> People, this is not a minor point, this is a show stopper
> as far as Gordon's ideas are concerned. Charles Darwin had the single best
> idea that any human being ever had and it is at the center of all the
> biological sciences.?Either?Gordon Swobe is the greatest genius the human
> race has ever produced or the man is dead wrong.

If you say so, if you say so, and if you say so, respectively.

No one in the history of the universe has ever come anywhere close to
John Clark's astounding mastery of hyperbole. If the loudest
philosopher wins, we're done.

> I must confess to being a little disappointed in Extropians because I seem
> to be the only one who sees how important Evolution is; instead they dispute
> Gordon on some obscure point in his latest ridiculous thought experiment.

It disturbs me on a visceral level that you capitalize the E in
"evolution" like that, but I'll disregard it for the purposes of
argument.

Of course evolution is important. In general. However, it isn't the
least bit important for someone concerned with comprehending the logic
of Gordon Swobe well enough to start agreeing with him or to show him
where he went wrong.

It does not matter whether or not a given thought experiment is
ridiculous if the person who came up with it believes it isn't, and
the only way to even THEORETICALLY convince them otherwise is to pick
at the most obscure points in it. You can expect they've already
noticed the least obscure.

> Real experiments take precedence over thought experiments and planet Earth
> has been conducting one for the last 3 billion years. The results of that
> experiment are unambiguous, consciousness and intelligence MUST be linked
> and if you or me or Gordon doesn't understand exactly how that could be it
> doesn't change the fact that it is.

One: life is not an experiment. Two: the earth can not conduct
experiments. Three: I'm sorry but I can't stop myself from using a
stereotypical southern creationist voice when I read that paragraph.

Reel experamints teyk press-a-dents.

Not to a rationalist, they don't.


From stathisp at gmail.com  Sun Feb  7 22:54:47 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2010 09:54:47 +1100
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability (was: The digital nature of
	brains)
In-Reply-To: <445777.14858.qm@web36505.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <f21c22e31002062309j745d88eck360a2535abb85fe0@mail.gmail.com> 
	<445777.14858.qm@web36505.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002071454r346f278auabb77281c629a0e0@mail.gmail.com>

On 8 February 2010 07:07, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:

> The amoeba has no neurons or nervous system, Stathis, so "less conscious" is an understatement. It has no consciousness at all.

As far as you're concerned the function of the nervous system -
intelligence - which is due to the interactions between neurons bears
no essential relationship to consciousness. You believe that
consciousness is a property of certain specialised cells. That leaves
open the possibility that amoebae have these properties also, despite
their apparent lack of intelligence.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Mon Feb  8 00:08:24 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 2010 16:08:24 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Nolopsism
In-Reply-To: <f7bfe5741002071303n6ac9f65bta223c972160b68af@mail.gmail.com>
References: <mailman.1482.1265395981.462.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org> 
	<243641.74772.qm@web113601.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
	<580930c21002060808t6996b91ehb19f34a6c5767e10@mail.gmail.com> 
	<641575.48388.qm@web65616.mail.ac4.yahoo.com>
	<e321aa4b1002062154v8b44c1esfc031361f1b66c7f@mail.gmail.com> 
	<f7bfe5741002070521r61a4d00bmec1a5786f0506c61@mail.gmail.com> 
	<e321aa4b1002071247g1f3c911ch3778521f6ddbf739@mail.gmail.com> 
	<f7bfe5741002071303n6ac9f65bta223c972160b68af@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002071608t4b1a1701wefbb1f03a949b89f@mail.gmail.com>

Aware <aware at awareresearch.com>:
>Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com>:
>> You're correct: for me, it's more than a mouthful. You seem to be
>> giving a definition for "increasing agreement on the rightness or
>> 'morality' of actions", but I can't figure out exactly how that bears
>> on the discussion. It wasn't a point of contention.
>
> I saw you wrote "I feel confident that a coherent system of law could
> be made without the assumption that any selves exist for it to protect."
>
> I responded to that without recognizing the sarcasm that became
> obvious further down. ?Sorry.

Apology unnecessary, but accepted. To be fair, it was half-sarcasm. On
the Internet, I try to avoid saying things that I don't at least
partially believe are true.

Aware <aware at awareresearch.com>:
>Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com>:
>> We seem to be making incremental progress toward Kantland. It's only a
>> matter of time before we come across a roaming herd of categorical
>> imperatives.
>
> I'm talking about an upgrade to Kant's Categorical Imperative. ?Its
> most significant weakness is its lack of evolutionary perspective.

Request that you start a new thread to elaborate on that. If I
understand you correctly, which I suspect I do not, you're implying
that evolution is purpose-generating. To my mind this is a massive
teleological mistake; the evolution of life on Earth is just one
elaborate ongoing accident, not a directed effort toward better
things.

You know what humanity has evolved lately? The ability to burn fat faster.

http://www.cracked.com/blog/lose-weight-the-natural-way-by-slowly-evolving

I'm not sure how I feel about Cracked.com being the first hit for
"brown fat evolution" on Google, but there you go. We have evolved to
become less fuel-efficient. Not in exchange for higher peak power
output or anything. Just because.


From max at maxmore.com  Mon Feb  8 00:23:17 2010
From: max at maxmore.com (Max More)
Date: Sun, 07 Feb 2010 18:23:17 -0600
Subject: [ExI] Theories, medicine, and government
Message-ID: <201002080023.o180NQdN028663@andromeda.ziaspace.com>

I liked this quote from Taleb's excellent book:

"A theory is like medicine (or government): often useless, sometimes 
necessary, always self-serving, and on occasion lethal. So it needs 
to be used with care, moderation, and close adult supervision."
-- Taleb, The Black Swan, p. 285.

Max



From lacertilian at gmail.com  Mon Feb  8 00:56:24 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 2010 16:56:24 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Theories, medicine, and government
In-Reply-To: <201002080023.o180NQdN028663@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
References: <201002080023.o180NQdN028663@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002071656g641b58efq6f24ccb75c030147@mail.gmail.com>

Max More <max at maxmore.com>:
> I liked this quote from Taleb's excellent book:
>
> "A theory is like medicine (or government): often useless, sometimes
> necessary, always self-serving, and on occasion lethal. So it needs to be
> used with care, moderation, and close adult supervision."
> -- Taleb, The Black Swan, p. 285.
>
> Max

Magnificent.

This does imply that I am roughly equivalent to a morphine addict (or
senator), of course.


From max at maxmore.com  Mon Feb  8 03:19:14 2010
From: max at maxmore.com (Max More)
Date: Sun, 07 Feb 2010 21:19:14 -0600
Subject: [ExI] The Surrogates, graphic novel
Message-ID: <201002080325.o183PRUR020245@andromeda.ziaspace.com>

I have added this comment on The Surrogates to my list of "Comics of 
Transhumanist Interest" here:
<http://strategicphilosophy.blogspot.com/2009/05/comics-of-transhumanist-interest.html>


The Surrogates, by Robert Venditti & Brett Weldele 
<http://www.amazon.com/Surrogates-Graphic-Novels/dp/1891830872/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1265598580&sr=1-1> 
I found the movie mildly entertaining, but not terribly engaging or 
intellectually stimulating. The original graphic novel is a little 
more interesting. I didn't much like the illustration by Weldele, 
though it might be more to your taste (too lacking in detail for my 
liking). The strongest parts, for me, were the fictional ads for 
surrogate bodies (which seemed to have very much in common with 
Natasha Vita-More's earlier "Primo Posthuman") and related text on 
the ad campaign.

We're all extremely familiar with the idea of virtual bodies in 
virtual space. Surrogates differs from the standard by envisioning a 
world of physical surrogate bodies that often look like de-aged and 
enhanced versions of people's "real" physical bodies. The tone is 
lightly anti-transhumanist, alas. In reality, transhumanists might 
like to have such surrogate bodies, but surely they would also prefer 
to enhance their primary bodies, rather than to leave their sluggish, 
slobbish physical primaries stacked ungainly in the closet.

Max


-------------------------------------
Max More, Ph.D.
Strategic Philosopher
The Proactionary Project
Extropy Institute Founder
www.maxmore.com
max at maxmore.com
------------------------------------- 



From avantguardian2020 at yahoo.com  Mon Feb  8 03:11:54 2010
From: avantguardian2020 at yahoo.com (The Avantguardian)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 2010 19:11:54 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Nolopsism
Message-ID: <292696.68811.qm@web65611.mail.ac4.yahoo.com>



----- Original Message ----
> From: Ben Zaiboc <bbenzai at yahoo.com>
> To: extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
> Sent: Sun, February 7, 2010 3:04:36 AM
> Subject: Re: [ExI] Nolopsism

> Philosophically, it may be as you say.? Practically, though, it's not really 
> that useful because it makes no actual difference to the way we regard things 
> like fear of death, or to the law.
> 
> It's in the scientific arena that nolipsism is most useful, because it explains 
> what subjectivity actually is, and clears the nonsense and confusion out of the 
> way.

How so??Siddhartha Guatama?said that the self was an illusion some 3000 years ago only?he called it the skandha of consciousness instead of a "de se designator".?What makes nolopsism more scientifically useful than Buddhism? Are you suggesting that by sweeping consciousness under a rug, it can be scientifically ignored? I can imagine the dialog:

Chalmers: What is the neurological basis of phenomenal consciousness?

Pollock: Phenomenal consciousness doesn't actually exist. It is simply a necessary illusion of subjectivity. It allows you to think about yourself without knowing anything about yourself. Which?would be?useful?if you went on a bender and passed out?in the Stanford Library. That is, of course,?if there were a you to do the thinking and a you to to think about. Which there isn't. But human?minds weren't meant to go there, so you can pretend to exist if you want.
?
Julie Andrews [waltzing by]: Me... the name... I?call myself...?

Chalmers: Oookaaay...?So what is the neurological basis of the *illusion* of phenomenal consciousness?
?
Pollock: [glances at watch] Well would you?look at the time. It's been nice chatting but I must be going now.
?

>? We know, at least in theory, that subjectivity can be built into an 
> artificial mind, and we can finally dump the concept of the 'hard problem' in 
> the bin.

So you think that programming a computer to falsely believe itself to be conscious is easier than to program one to actually be so. Or do you think that programming a computer to use "de se" designators necessarily makes it think itself conscious? A person could get by without the use "de se" designators yet still retain a sense of self. It might sound funny, but?a person could consistently refer to themselves in the third-person by name even in their thoughts.?Stuart doesn't think that "de se" designators are particularly profound.?Stuart doesn't need them. Do you see what Stuart means??
?
> The concept of a "de se" designator explains why we don't have souls, not why we 
> shouldn't have property rights.?

Property rights are no less abstract than souls. Neither seems to have a physical basis beyond?metaphysical/philosophical fiat. Communists tend not to believe in either.
?
Stuart LaForge 


?
"Never express yourself more clearly than you think." - Niels Bohr


      



From Frankmac at ripco.com  Mon Feb  8 03:43:08 2010
From: Frankmac at ripco.com (Frank McElligott)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 2010 22:43:08 -0500
Subject: [ExI] belief in  Karma,
Message-ID: <001e01caa870$d8f5ee80$ad753644@sx28047db9d36c>

In 2005 the city of New.Orleans. was under water, I was there during that time helping out, and yes it was REALLY under water and dying a slow death. Now within 5 years from that event  that city can rejoice in their football team as a sign from the CONTROLLER, that's a  new name for you know who, that the worst is now over, and from now on everything will be on the upside instead on the slope to no where.  Now if Haiti had a football team,,,,,,,,

Bye the Bye, the sun is acting up  again with large solar flares, in the "X" range, are expected this week to peak. There are some people who believe it affects people to do strange things, and become very very fearful here on earth  Watch the stock market go crazy this week, not because of Greece, it's the sun doing the damage. The flares effect the magnetic waves and telephone communications I am told, but I am retired without a job so what do I know?

Frank
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From max at maxmore.com  Mon Feb  8 04:01:27 2010
From: max at maxmore.com (Max More)
Date: Sun, 07 Feb 2010 22:01:27 -0600
Subject: [ExI] Joy in the transcendence of the species
Message-ID: <201002080401.o1841ase025933@andromeda.ziaspace.com>

I know many of you are fascinated by the intricacies and 
peculiarities of language. Perhaps you might be motivated to help me 
figure this out:

I have long enjoyed the word "Schadenfreude", meaning pleasure 
derived from the misfortunes of others. [Note: I've enjoyed the 
*term* "schadenfreude", not the thing it refers to.] I got to 
thinking what word (if one could be coined) would mean "pleasure in 
the transcendence of the species" (i.e., transcendence of the human 
condition). It may be asking a lot of a word (even a German word) to 
do all this work, but I'd like to give it a try.

According to Wikipedia: The Buddhist concept of mudita, "sympathetic 
joy" or "happiness in another's good fortune," is cited as an example 
of the opposite of schadenfreude.

However, that doesn't do the job that I'm looking for. On a first 
stab, exclusively thinking about German, I came up with the rather 
unsatisfactory "erhabenheitschaude" which would mean (I think) joy in 
transcendence. That's part of what I'm looking for, but doesn't fit the bill.

Any thoughts?

(Please, *anything* to dilute the Searle/semantics/syntax discussion...)

Max


-------------------------------------
Max More, Ph.D.
Strategic Philosopher
The Proactionary Project
Extropy Institute Founder
www.maxmore.com
max at maxmore.com
------------------------------------- 



From hkeithhenson at gmail.com  Mon Feb  8 04:23:42 2010
From: hkeithhenson at gmail.com (Keith Henson)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 2010 21:23:42 -0700
Subject: [ExI] extropy-chat Digest, Vol 77, Issue 12
In-Reply-To: <mailman.1.1265544001.21687.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
References: <mailman.1.1265544001.21687.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
Message-ID: <d1988d2d1002072023s20342e01x5e2a4600b40dd045@mail.gmail.com>

On Sun, Feb 7, 2010 at 5:00 AM, Tom Nowell <nebathenemi at yahoo.co.uk> wrote:

> Keith's proposal relies on using a lot of organic liquids with a low vapor point.
>
> Keith, how are you proposing to trap the vapor, condense it and re-use it? If this process isn't highly efficient, you get two big problems:

Heat pipes are sealed, passive devices.  It's hard to put a number on
their efficiency besides 100%.  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heat_pipe

> 1) you need to add a lot more liquid, which costs energy to make, adding to expense and cost
> 2) you have to worry about the environmental problems when the vapor condenses somewhere else. In fact, even with a tiny amount of leakage this can become a problem. I'm not sure how much of these it would take to become toxic rather than mild irritants, but in the volumes needed to freeze glaciers there is a risk of a major spill. Seeing as places with the huge glaciers like Antarctica and Greenland have coastlines with fragile polar ecosystems, I can see this being a problem.

Propane and ammonia (two good choices) don't cause environmental
problems in the small amounts used.

> In Kim Stanley Robinson's recent trilogy of ecothrillers (40 days of rain/ 50 degrees below/ 60 days) one of the protagonists investigates geoengineering for a presidential candidate and advises him in the last book. The scheme they use for direct lowering of sea-levels is pumping sea water on to the West Antarctic where the glaciers are highly stable, and increasing glacier coverage that way.

I think you mean East Antartic but I am not sure this would be a good
idea.  The salt in seawater might cause the glaciers to soften and
slide off into the ocean.  Of course, if you are going to pump water
upwards more than a few hundred meters, it only cost 200-300 meters of
head to take the salt out with osmosis.

Interesting concept though.  To put numbers on it, the area of the
earth is ~5.1 x 10E14 square meters.  3/4 of that is water, so ~3.8
10E15 square meters.  To lower the oceans by a meter in a year would
require pumping
at 1.21 x 10E7 cubic meters per second.

12,100,000 cubic meters per second.  Hmm  The flow of the Amazon is
219,000 cubic meters per second, so it would take 55 times the flow of
the Amazon.

Pumping it up some 3000 meters to the ice sheet would take
considerable energy, P=Q*g*h*1/pump efficiency (0.9).

1.21*10E7*9.8*3000/0.9 = 396 GW.  400 one GW reactors would do the
job.  (Please check this number.)

Keith

> Tom


From spike66 at att.net  Mon Feb  8 04:34:26 2010
From: spike66 at att.net (spike)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 2010 20:34:26 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Joy in the transcendence of the species
In-Reply-To: <201002080401.o1841ase025933@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
References: <201002080401.o1841ase025933@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
Message-ID: <12C91DE16C6A47ADB3E4696EC08C4B18@spike>

 
> [mailto:extropy-chat-bounces at lists.extropy.org] On Behalf Of Max More

> ...I came up with 
> the rather unsatisfactory "erhabenheitschaude" which would 
> mean (I think) joy in transcendence. That's part of what I'm 
> looking for, but doesn't fit the bill.  Any thoughts?

Erhebungaufregung?  Approximately ~ horny for uplifting.

> 
> (Please, *anything* to dilute the Searle/semantics/syntax 
> discussion...)
> 
> Max

Hey I tried to give them Valentines Day advice.  Did they laugh at my jokes?
No!  They all seem to have slammed the whole bottle of serious pills lately.
I do commend the Searlers for at least maintaining a most civil tone
throughout the marathon discussion however.

You guys were aware that occasional lighthearted silliness is an extropian
tradition, ja?

spike


 



From aware at awareresearch.com  Mon Feb  8 04:50:41 2010
From: aware at awareresearch.com (Aware)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 2010 20:50:41 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Joy in the transcendence of the species
In-Reply-To: <12C91DE16C6A47ADB3E4696EC08C4B18@spike>
References: <201002080401.o1841ase025933@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
	<12C91DE16C6A47ADB3E4696EC08C4B18@spike>
Message-ID: <f7bfe5741002072050u67650668qe15d0e399e771e1d@mail.gmail.com>

On Sun, Feb 7, 2010 at 8:34 PM, spike <spike66 at att.net> wrote:
> You guys were aware that occasional lighthearted silliness is an extropian
> tradition, ja?

I was certainly Aware...

I suppose I could confuse those who get my position, and reinforce the
thinking of those who don't by appropriating the old Behaviorist gag
on the inaccessibility of subjective experience:

Jef: It was good for you; was it good for me?

Gordon: Don't bother me.  I have a headache...

Or maybe we could spend the next couple of months debating where one's
lap goes when one stands up.

- Jef


From nanite1018 at gmail.com  Mon Feb  8 05:10:07 2010
From: nanite1018 at gmail.com (JOSHUA JOB)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2010 00:10:07 -0500
Subject: [ExI] Nolopsism
In-Reply-To: <e321aa4b1002071313v11f4f9a8y750aae92510deb11@mail.gmail.com>
References: <mailman.1482.1265395981.462.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
	<243641.74772.qm@web113601.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
	<580930c21002060808t6996b91ehb19f34a6c5767e10@mail.gmail.com>
	<641575.48388.qm@web65616.mail.ac4.yahoo.com>
	<e321aa4b1002062154v8b44c1esfc031361f1b66c7f@mail.gmail.com>
	<915E9809-F351-43BE-A6A5-10E53227BD42@GMAIL.COM>
	<e321aa4b1002071313v11f4f9a8y750aae92510deb11@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <DF87A2FB-E8C4-423B-BB41-350E1381ABBB@GMAIL.COM>

On Feb 7, 2010, at 4:13 PM, Spencer Campbell wrote:
> Solution: No one needs to be punished. In theory, the only
> justification for legal punishment right now is to modify future
> behavior on a societal scale. There are far more effective and less
> draconian methods of doing this...
While I agree that the point of a justice system is to prevent the violation of people's rights, and whatever means are best for doing this are obviously to be preferred (such as, I suppose, open prisons, though I am wary of such a thing).
> A measurement of prosperity need make no reference to individuals or
> minds unless corporations, countries, and planets count as
> individuals... My argument against happiness is the same as my argument against
> punishment: it is valuable only as a tool for behavioral modification,
> heartless as that may sound. Look at how happiness evolved. It's just
> an arbitrary reward for survival. This is the attitude with which I
> regard my own happiness, and it doesn't seem to impair me in any way
> practical or philosophical.
Seeing as how the goal of all living organisms is to live (as any other goal leads to death and the end of all possible goals), and we are conscious entities (whatever that means in nolipsism, even if it is an imaginary thing in the imagination of an imaginary thing, haha) that need motivation to survive, and emotions, including happiness, are an important part of that. Sure, it is behavior modification, of a kind, but it is still important to human beings, at least for now (and I hope indefinitely).
> Finally: obviously "rights" don't go out the window at all! In fact,
> we would only have more of them. A brand-new car would have the right
> not to be crushed into a tiny cube, because such would be blatantly
> wasteful and wrong. Similarly, a brand-new human would have the same
> right, but a totaled junker or a corpse would not.
A car can't have rights because it isn't self-aware. It isn't even alive. It doesn't have choices, and nothing matters to it. It doesn't have the quality of being this weird self-referencing thing with a de se operator, it lacks the capacity of reason. And thus, it can't have any rights. A corpse isn't alive or rational or aware either. A brand-new human is, or at least will be in short order. Proliferating rights in the manner you suggest devalues the word and destroys its meaning, allowing evil people to appropriate it for their own ends, as they did in socialist countries all across the globe. The result? The deaths of tens of millions from starvation, disease, and brutal suppression of dissent. 

Having rights that you suggest would likely lead to chaos and that would support the rise of oppressive regimes, just as the proliferation of "rights" to jobs, health care, income, education, etc. have caused problems by creating a "need" for ever more oppressive regulations. The result? More chaos, and more regulation. Networks of rational agents generate spontaneous order through rational self-interest. I don't see how you can have any such thing as rational agents, or self-interest, without some "thing" which is an agent and has an interest in its own existence.

Even if there is no such thing as a "self", there is a thing which employs a de se operator to describe "itself", whatever "it" is, and I'm not clear on what the difference is between such an entity and a "self". It obviously has memory, reasons, and is self-aware (i.e. aware of the the thing that is speaking, thinking, etc., whatever it is). Doesn't some "thing" have to exist to employ such an operator?


Joshua Job
nanite1018 at gmail.com





From thespike at satx.rr.com  Mon Feb  8 05:10:59 2010
From: thespike at satx.rr.com (Damien Broderick)
Date: Sun, 07 Feb 2010 23:10:59 -0600
Subject: [ExI] Joy in the transcendence of the species
In-Reply-To: <f7bfe5741002072050u67650668qe15d0e399e771e1d@mail.gmail.com>
References: <201002080401.o1841ase025933@andromeda.ziaspace.com>	<12C91DE16C6A47ADB3E4696EC08C4B18@spike>
	<f7bfe5741002072050u67650668qe15d0e399e771e1d@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4B6F9CE3.1020701@satx.rr.com>

On 2/7/2010 10:50 PM, Aware wrote:

> Or maybe we could spend the next couple of months debating where one's
> lap goes when one stands up.

It goes into abeyance. Or, in the case of the herniated, into hiatus.

Damien Broderick


From max at maxmore.com  Mon Feb  8 06:33:49 2010
From: max at maxmore.com (Max More)
Date: Mon, 08 Feb 2010 00:33:49 -0600
Subject: [ExI] Joy in the transcendence of the species
Message-ID: <201002080634.o186Xxrd020842@andromeda.ziaspace.com>

spike wrote:

>Erhebungaufregung?  Approximately ~ horny for uplifting.

Young man, wash your mouth out with soap. There will be no uplifting 
of your horn in my presence! Why, the very idea.

Now, if you all can keep your bungaufregung in your pants, I'm still 
looking for a word that would combine joy + posthuman transcension + everyone.

M




From max at maxmore.com  Mon Feb  8 06:39:47 2010
From: max at maxmore.com (Max More)
Date: Mon, 08 Feb 2010 00:39:47 -0600
Subject: [ExI] Joy in the transcendence of the species
Message-ID: <201002080639.o186duCL019011@andromeda.ziaspace.com>

I just remembered a term that is close (but not quite) what I'm 
looking for: "extrosattva", which is a play on "boddisattva". See:
http://www.gregburch.net/writing/Extrosattva.htm

Max


-------------------------------------
Max More, Ph.D.
Strategic Philosopher
The Proactionary Project
Extropy Institute Founder
www.maxmore.com
max at maxmore.com
------------------------------------- 



From spike66 at att.net  Mon Feb  8 07:09:06 2010
From: spike66 at att.net (spike)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 2010 23:09:06 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Joy in the transcendence of the species
In-Reply-To: <201002080634.o186Xxrd020842@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
References: <201002080634.o186Xxrd020842@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
Message-ID: <8DEAFD88CD6D4BDEAC0B05D6DEA9AD2F@spike>

 

> ...On Behalf Of Max More
> Subject: Re: [ExI] Joy in the transcendence of the species
> 
> spike wrote:
> 
> >Erhebungaufregung?  Approximately ~ horny for uplifting.
> 
> Young man, wash your mouth out with soap...

Young?  Vas ist dieses young?

We have "dirty old man" and the "young horndog" but we need a term for those
of us who fall somewhere in the middle.


Regarding another topic on which I posted earlier today, evolution and the
fact that it isn't discussed much in the US public schools.  Is it?  Some
time ago Max complained that his US students knew so little about Darwin
that he had to waste valuable time in his philosophy lectures explaining the
basics of evolution before he could even start on the material.  Max am I
remembering it correctly?

The insight I had on this topic was given to me by one of our regulars, who
was visiting me at my house last week.  He commented that his friend had
been in NASA in the early years, but had grown discouraged, for after the
Apollo program was over, the organization was taken over by jesus freaks.

In retrospect, my own early years in a space town reflects exactly that
notion.  I never really realized that everywhere wasn't like my own home
town.  Now I know it isn't like that everywhere.

I already know you British guys get the right story, since Darwin was one of
your own.  So question please, USians, did your public school teach you
about Darwin?  Did they teach it right?

spike



From spike66 at att.net  Mon Feb  8 06:55:36 2010
From: spike66 at att.net (spike)
Date: Sun, 7 Feb 2010 22:55:36 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Joy in the transcendence of the species
In-Reply-To: <201002080639.o186duCL019011@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
References: <201002080639.o186duCL019011@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
Message-ID: <10FC50E8D8EF496F87F9E1DB26856F34@spike>

 

> -----Original Message-----
> From: extropy-chat-bounces at lists.extropy.org 
> Subject: Re: [ExI] Joy in the transcendence of the species
> 
> I just remembered a term that is close (but not quite) what 
> I'm looking for: "extrosattva", which is a play on "boddisattva". See:
> http://www.gregburch.net/writing/Extrosattva.htm
> 
> Max

So where the heck has Greg Burch been hiding out?

spike






From stefano.vaj at gmail.com  Mon Feb  8 10:48:16 2010
From: stefano.vaj at gmail.com (Stefano Vaj)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2010 11:48:16 +0100
Subject: [ExI] Nolopsism
In-Reply-To: <641575.48388.qm@web65616.mail.ac4.yahoo.com>
References: <mailman.1482.1265395981.462.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
	<243641.74772.qm@web113601.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
	<580930c21002060808t6996b91ehb19f34a6c5767e10@mail.gmail.com>
	<641575.48388.qm@web65616.mail.ac4.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <580930c21002080248t60f6e9d7ubd5d4f73275f1fcd@mail.gmail.com>

On 6 February 2010 23:41, The Avantguardian <avantguardian2020 at yahoo.com> wrote:
> Being an attorney however, I am sure you are aware of the legal can of worms nolipsism opens up. Human rights are tied to identity. If "I" don't exist, then stealing my stuff or even murdering me is a victimless crime. Doesn't make for a happy outcome in my opinion, especially for libertarians.?Probably why the authors back-pedalled from their claims in the conclusion.

Besides the fact that victimless crimes do exist in positive law, you
cannot steal from a legal entity, and yet we are well aware of the
conventional nature of concepts such as its identity, will, good
faith, responsibility, etc.

Moreover, we do *not* consider victimless crimes those affecting
unconscious human beings.

Why should it be necessary to take a stance as to some metaphysical
quality of the consciousness of human beings to regulate social life
so that harming them out of the circumstances provided for in law is a
crime?

But you are right on a point: the POV according to which only an
"essentialist humanist polipsism" can be the ground for granting us a
personhood status would be an argument to keep out other different,
albeit  persuasively exhibiting similar behaviours, entities. Say, the
great apes, or computers passing the Turing test or uploaded humans.

-- 
Stefano Vaj


From stathisp at gmail.com  Mon Feb  8 10:59:02 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2010 21:59:02 +1100
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <e321aa4b1002071305t52b0592ai40a9715b5754cbb0@mail.gmail.com>
References: <f21c22e31002050725g336cd77ak28ccc4284ba89024@mail.gmail.com> 
	<156490.82842.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
	<f21c22e31002070025y4fd6be73uad53136704f17b91@mail.gmail.com> 
	<e321aa4b1002071305t52b0592ai40a9715b5754cbb0@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002080259o45360b11k8393f623eef745e8@mail.gmail.com>

On 8 February 2010 08:05, Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com> wrote:

> Seems pretty clear to me, as a neuron-by-neuron replacement is
> precisely what I've wanted for the past two to five years. I would
> advise phrasing it again, simply and concisely, because (a) what you
> have in mind may have changed since you last did so, (b) I might have
> overwritten your description with my own, and (c) the point on which
> Gordon disagrees remains a total mystery.

The premise is that it is possible to make an artificial neuron which
behaves exactly the same as a biological neuron, but lacks
consciousness. We've been discussing computer consciousness but it
doesn't have to be a computerised neuron, we could say that it is
animated by a little demon and the conclusion from the thought
experiment remains unchanged. These zombie neurons are then put into
your head replacing normal neurons that play some important role in a
conscious process, such as visual perception or understanding of
language.

Before going further, is it perfectly clear that the behaviour of the
remaining biological parts of your brain and your overall behaviour
will remain unchanged? If not, then the artificial neuron does not
work as claimed.

OK, so your behaviour is unchanged and your thoughts are unchanged as
a result of the substitution; for if your thoughts changed, you would
be able to say "my thoughts have changed", and therefore your
behaviour would have changed. What of your consciousness? If your
consciousness changes as a result of the substitution, you would be
unable to notice a change, since again if you noticed the change you
would be able to say "I've noticed a change", and that would be a
change in your behaviour, which is impossible.

So: if your consciousness changes as a result of the substitution, you
would be unable to notice any change. You would lose all visual
perception and not only behave as if you had normal vision, but also
honestly believe that you had normal vision. Or you would lose the
ability to understand words starting with "r" but you would be able to
use these words appropriately and honestly believe that you understood
what these words meant. You would be partially zombified but you
wouldn't know it. In which case, how do you know you don't now have
zombie vision, zombie understanding or a zombie toothache? If zombie
consciousness is indistinguishable objectively *or* subjectively (i.e.
by the unzombified part of a partly zombified mind) from real
consciousness, then the claim that there is nevertheless a distinction
is meaningless.

The conclusion, therefore, is that the original premise is false: it
is not possible to make an artificial neuron which behaves exactly the
same as a biological neuron, but lacks consciousness. Either such a
neuron would not really behave like a biological neuron, or it would
behave like a biological neuron and also have the consciousness
inherent in a biological neuron. This is a statement of the
functionalist position, of which computationalism is a subset. It is
possible that computationalism is false but functionalism is still
true.

Note that the above argument assumes no theory of consciousness. Its
conclusion is just that if consciousness exists at all, whatever it
is, it is ineluctably linked to brain function.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From stefano.vaj at gmail.com  Mon Feb  8 11:18:23 2010
From: stefano.vaj at gmail.com (Stefano Vaj)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2010 12:18:23 +0100
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <264701.53414.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <f7bfe5741002061305g6ffd10dct8f0c2e1c85f10664@mail.gmail.com>
	<264701.53414.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <580930c21002080318q5c3cfda6h920b50b14ebbfe9b@mail.gmail.com>

On 6 February 2010 23:01, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
> I'll ask again: have you ever had a tooth-ache?

I for one never have, but I have had my fair share of experience of
physical pain.

Now, absolutely *nothing* in such experience ever told me that "pain"
is anything else than a word describing a computational feature,
programmed by natural selection, on the tunes of "if <damage
threatened by fire>, then <withdraw your hand>".

But perhaps it does tell that to everybody else, and I am the only
philosophical zombie in the world... :-D

-- 
Stefano Vaj


From stefano.vaj at gmail.com  Mon Feb  8 11:29:34 2010
From: stefano.vaj at gmail.com (Stefano Vaj)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2010 12:29:34 +0100
Subject: [ExI] Glacier Geoengineering
In-Reply-To: <847034.14281.qm@web113617.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
References: <mailman.1.1265112002.9179.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
	<847034.14281.qm@web113617.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <580930c21002080329q5f76a769u138e142b1965e22a@mail.gmail.com>

On 2 February 2010 16:08, Ben Zaiboc <bbenzai at yahoo.com> wrote:

> I need to ask a question here, please indulge me if the answer should be
> obvious:
>
> What's the point of sticking glaciers to their bedrock?
>

Because we can? :-)

Or, on the tunes of Sir Edmund Hilary, "because they are there"? :-)

But admittedly I have not the foggiest idea on whether we should make it a
habit...

-- 
Stefano Vaj
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From stathisp at gmail.com  Mon Feb  8 11:29:32 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2010 22:29:32 +1100
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <580930c21002080318q5c3cfda6h920b50b14ebbfe9b@mail.gmail.com>
References: <f7bfe5741002061305g6ffd10dct8f0c2e1c85f10664@mail.gmail.com> 
	<264701.53414.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
	<580930c21002080318q5c3cfda6h920b50b14ebbfe9b@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002080329j273bdb25re4f44544f3ea219b@mail.gmail.com>

On 8 February 2010 22:18, Stefano Vaj <stefano.vaj at gmail.com> wrote:
> On 6 February 2010 23:01, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
>> I'll ask again: have you ever had a tooth-ache?
>
> I for one never have, but I have had my fair share of experience of
> physical pain.
>
> Now, absolutely *nothing* in such experience ever told me that "pain"
> is anything else than a word describing a computational feature,
> programmed by natural selection, on the tunes of "if <damage
> threatened by fire>, then <withdraw your hand>".

You do know that first you withdraw your hand, through reflex, and
then experience the pain? No doubt the purpose of the pain is so that
you will remember not to do it again. But why pain; why not disgust,
or horror, or just reluctance?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From bbenzai at yahoo.com  Mon Feb  8 11:06:36 2010
From: bbenzai at yahoo.com (Ben Zaiboc)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2010 03:06:36 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <mailman.1522.1265603030.462.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
Message-ID: <711259.1066.qm@web113612.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:

> Ben Zaiboc <bbenzai at yahoo.com> wrote:

>>Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:

>>> I'll ask again: have you ever had a tooth-ache?


>> Gordon, your repeated question shows that you're either ignoring >> or not getting the point of Jef's reply.
>> If it makes no sense to you, please say so, don't just 
>> regurgitate the same question that he is replying to.

>> On the other hand, if you're simply ignoring things that you 
>> don't like reading, what's the point of continuing the 
>> conversation?


> How about you, Ben? Have you ever had a toothache? Was it a
> real toothache? Or was it just an illusion?


Ah, Ignoring, then.

Fine.
Also ironic, as you're the one who's said, more than once, "I wonder now if I can count on you for an honest discussion?"

Ben Zaiboc


      


From stefano.vaj at gmail.com  Mon Feb  8 11:39:45 2010
From: stefano.vaj at gmail.com (Stefano Vaj)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2010 12:39:45 +0100
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability (was: The digital nature of
	brains)
In-Reply-To: <445777.14858.qm@web36505.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <f21c22e31002062309j745d88eck360a2535abb85fe0@mail.gmail.com>
	<445777.14858.qm@web36505.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <580930c21002080339s52487cc2hcc656db8a99da769@mail.gmail.com>

On 7 February 2010 21:07, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:

> The amoeba has no neurons or nervous system, Stathis, so "less conscious"
> is an understatement. It has no consciousness at all.
>

This is becoming increasingly circular. Why a nervous system should produce
"consciousness", whatever it may be? And how would it be different not to
have one? Have you ever tried?

-- 
Stefano Vaj
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From stefano.vaj at gmail.com  Mon Feb  8 11:51:51 2010
From: stefano.vaj at gmail.com (Stefano Vaj)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2010 12:51:51 +0100
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002080329j273bdb25re4f44544f3ea219b@mail.gmail.com>
References: <f7bfe5741002061305g6ffd10dct8f0c2e1c85f10664@mail.gmail.com>
	<264701.53414.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
	<580930c21002080318q5c3cfda6h920b50b14ebbfe9b@mail.gmail.com>
	<f21c22e31002080329j273bdb25re4f44544f3ea219b@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <580930c21002080351l52934842xc6c3a3f5890c31c3@mail.gmail.com>

On 8 February 2010 12:29, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
> You do know that first you withdraw your hand, through reflex, and
> then experience the pain? No doubt the purpose of the pain is so that
> you will remember not to do it again.

Yes. Or no. It might even be a byproduct, what is Gould's word for
that? But I do not see how it would change my original remark.

> But why pain; why not disgust,
> or horror, or just reluctance?

By definition. Because "pain" is simply the name we give to our
reactions to the fact of being burnt, which may well be different (in
its causes, perhaps as well in its consequences or intensity) from
that generated by "horrorful" rather than "painful" experiences.

All the paradox of qualia is of course that in such perspective you
may well "feel" horror, or for that matter pleasure, when I feel pain.
You would obviously call it "pain" anyway, as long as you speak
English, and as long as your reaction thereto would be identical,
there would be no way ever to know it.

As a consequence, it would seem obvious that since "feelings
abstracted from reactions" are not part of the phenomenical reality,
their concept is only a philosophical Fata Morgana dictated by a few
centuries of dualism.

--
Stefano Vaj


From bbenzai at yahoo.com  Mon Feb  8 11:31:58 2010
From: bbenzai at yahoo.com (Ben Zaiboc)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2010 03:31:58 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] The Surrogates, graphic novel
In-Reply-To: <mailman.1522.1265603030.462.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
Message-ID: <938582.59281.qm@web113609.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

Seems to me that the story sacrifices common-sense for the sake of having a story.

That kind of technology would make the need for remote surrogate bodies unnecessary.  People would just, as Max says, upgrade their own bodies, and be cyborgs.

ben Zaiboc


      


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Mon Feb  8 12:43:45 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2010 04:43:45 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <e321aa4b1002071305t52b0592ai40a9715b5754cbb0@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <468928.31819.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Sun, 2/7/10, Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com> wrote:

> Gordon, time for the true or false game: there is a
> difference between real toothaches and illusionary toothaches.
> 
> My answer is "false", and I get the impression that yours
> will be "true". If so, why? How?

No, I answer false also. I asked that question about toothaches to point out that subjective facts exist and that consciousness exists. It makes no difference whether your toothache exists as a result of a cavity or as an effect caused by a stage-hypnotist; if you feel the pain then it exists with as much reality as does a heart attack. 

It should seem obvious that the world contains both subjective facts like toothaches and objective facts like mountains. It should seem equally obvious that consciousness exists, and that consciousness has certain qualities. The majority of people do in fact consider these things perfectly obvious. And contrary to the bafflegab promulgated by some quasi-intellectual pseudo-philosophers, on these subjects the majority of people have it exactly right.

-gts






      


From bbenzai at yahoo.com  Mon Feb  8 13:11:03 2010
From: bbenzai at yahoo.com (Ben Zaiboc)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2010 05:11:03 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Joy in the transcendence of the species
In-Reply-To: <mailman.1.1265630401.11372.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
Message-ID: <584597.9024.qm@web113602.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

Transzendenzjedenfreude

Ben Zaiboc


      


From msd001 at gmail.com  Mon Feb  8 14:42:24 2010
From: msd001 at gmail.com (Mike Dougherty)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2010 09:42:24 -0500
Subject: [ExI] The Surrogates, graphic novel
In-Reply-To: <938582.59281.qm@web113609.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
References: <mailman.1522.1265603030.462.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
	<938582.59281.qm@web113609.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <62c14241002080642j56bb72c2r969b4ff798608e69@mail.gmail.com>

On Mon, Feb 8, 2010 at 6:31 AM, Ben Zaiboc <bbenzai at yahoo.com> wrote:
> Seems to me that the story sacrifices common-sense for the sake of having a story.
>
> That kind of technology would make the need for remote surrogate bodies unnecessary. ?People would just, as Max says, upgrade their own bodies, and be cyborgs.

Sure, but the general population has a hard time understanding even
the dumbed-down parts.

I was a bit annoyed by the suddenly super-human acts of robot jumping
- as if being a robot allows a surri to violate gravity at will.  So
yes, it was Hollywood for the sake of a telling a story.

In those scenes where surri were mangled, my wife had a visceral
emotional response.  I asked her if that was because she was thinking
about the surrigates as people.  She admitted that she was.  I found
that interesting because people rarely have such reaction to a car
accident.  It's the same loss of personal property, but if the human
operator walks away the response is usually "Well at least nobody was
harmed"  - Why does a machine that looks like a person warrant the
extra attention?

I commented that the "dread camp" were effectively neo-Amish.  They
really made no sense to the culture, but provided a plot device that
was easy to understand.  I think it might have made a more interesting
story for us to imagine the clash between the embodied real world
presences and the disembodied/uploaded virtual world presences.  (the
usual competition for resource utilization/etc.)  I think Greg Egan's
"Diaspora" has a nice treatment of fleshers, gleisner robots and
citizens.  [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diaspora_(novel)]


From aware at awareresearch.com  Mon Feb  8 16:10:11 2010
From: aware at awareresearch.com (Aware)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2010 08:10:11 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Joy in the transcendence of the species
In-Reply-To: <201002080639.o186duCL019011@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
References: <201002080639.o186duCL019011@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
Message-ID: <f7bfe5741002080810g54c2cb8fh633a96efcbad2549@mail.gmail.com>

On Sun, Feb 7, 2010 at 10:39 PM, Max More <max at maxmore.com> wrote:
> I just remembered a term that is close (but not quite) what I'm looking for:
> "extrosattva", which is a play on "boddisattva". See:
> http://www.gregburch.net/writing/Extrosattva.htm

It's close, but crosses the line into the mythical.

[Re-reading Greg's essay triggered strong nostalgia for those heady
days of Extropian discussion past.]

I'll contribute for brainstorming that (Hofstadter's)
"super-rationality" encompasses much of the concept:  acting on the
basis of identification with a future context of meaning and value
greater than one's present context.  ==> superrationalist

- Jef


From natasha at natasha.cc  Mon Feb  8 16:21:02 2010
From: natasha at natasha.cc (Natasha Vita-More)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2010 10:21:02 -0600
Subject: [ExI] If anyone wants to Respond to the IEET piece re "Promblems of
	Transhumanism"
Message-ID: <53226DE6C0DE42C689797B6CFF4DE80B@DFC68LF1>

It's an informative article.  My issue with it, however, is that it seems to
be black or white and misrepreents Max.
 
 <http://ieet.org/index.php/IEET/more/3670/>
http://ieet.org/index.php/IEET/more/3670/
 

Nlogo1.tif  <http://www.natasha.cc/> Natasha Vita-More

 
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From bbenzai at yahoo.com  Mon Feb  8 16:08:51 2010
From: bbenzai at yahoo.com (Ben Zaiboc)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2010 08:08:51 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Nolipsism [was Re: Nolopsism]
In-Reply-To: <mailman.1.1265630401.11372.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
Message-ID: <57273.49114.qm@web113615.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

The Avantguardian <avantguardian2020 at yahoo.com> wrote:

> From: Ben Zaiboc <bbenzai at yahoo.com>

>> Philosophically, it may be as you say.? Practically, though, it's not really
> that useful because it makes no actual difference to the way we regard things
> like fear of death, or to the law.
>
>> It's in the scientific arena that nolipsism is most useful, because it explains
> what subjectivity actually is, and clears the nonsense and confusion out of the
> way.

> How so? Siddhartha Guatama said that the self was an illusion some 3000 years ago only he called it the skandha of consciousness instead of a "de se designator". What makes nolopsism more scientifically useful than Buddhism? Are you suggesting that by sweeping consciousness under a rug, it can be scientifically ignored? 

Buddhism says nothing about neuroscience.  Nevertheless, maybe the skandha of consciousness is just as scientifically useful as the "de se" designator.  Maybe they are the same thing.

This is not sweeping consciousness under a rug, it's subjecting it to the light of day.  Far from ignoring it, this is an attempt to explain it.  An attempt that to me, at least, makes pretty good sense.


>> We know, at least in theory, that subjectivity can be built into an
> artificial mind, and we can finally dump the concept of the 'hard problem' in
> the bin.

> So you think that programming a computer to falsely believe itself to be conscious is easier than to program one to actually be so. Or do you think that programming a computer to use "de se" designators necessarily makes it think itself conscious? A person could get by without the use "de se" designators yet still retain a sense of self. It might sound funny, but?a person could consistently refer to themselves in the third-person by name even in their thoughts.?Stuart doesn't think that "de se" designators are particularly profound.?Stuart doesn't need them. Do you see what Stuart means??


We seem to be getting different things from this paper.  I'm not at all suggesting that a computer (or robot) be programmed to 'falsely believe itself to be conscious', and neither are the authors (how would it even be possible? it would have to already be conscious in order to believe anything, so the belief wouldn't be false).  The suggestion is that a non-descriptive reflexive designator is necessary for general-purpose cognition, and that this is what "I" is.  Inasmuch as we regard "I" as the thing that is conscious, the "de se" designator is at the heart of consciousness.  This is not a 'false' consciousness, it's what consciousness is, whether it be in a robot or a human.  It's the ungrounded symbol that gives personal meaning to everything else.

By definition, A person could *not* get by without a "de se" designator yet still retain a sense of self, because it is the very essence of the sense of self.

Where is this third-person Stuart?  What location does he occupy? Not right now as in some temporary location defined by an external coordinate system, but at any time?  There's only one answer: "Here" (Stuart points to self).  Third-person Stuart has nowhere to point.  He has no self-centred coordinate system.  Only first-person Stuart can have such a thing.  If there is no self for Stuart to point to, he cannot answer the question, it means nothing to him.


>> The concept of a "de se" designator explains why we don't have souls, not why we
> shouldn't have property rights.?

> Property rights are no less abstract than souls. Neither seems to have a physical basis beyond metaphysical/philosophical fiat. Communists tend not to believe in either.

The difference is that the term "property rights" signifies, things that exist, as sets of rules, and are useful.  The term "souls" signifies only a fantasy, and is not useful.
Property rights have an effect on the world.  Even thought they aren't material things they still exist. Souls don't.


I think it's very very easy to misunderstand what is meant by "the self is an illusion".  It needs a fair bit of pondering.  For me, at least, the concept of "de se" desgignators makes it much clearer.

Ben Zaiboc


      


From thespike at satx.rr.com  Mon Feb  8 16:49:30 2010
From: thespike at satx.rr.com (Damien Broderick)
Date: Mon, 08 Feb 2010 10:49:30 -0600
Subject: [ExI] If anyone wants to Respond to the IEET piece re
 "Promblems of	Transhumanism"
In-Reply-To: <53226DE6C0DE42C689797B6CFF4DE80B@DFC68LF1>
References: <53226DE6C0DE42C689797B6CFF4DE80B@DFC68LF1>
Message-ID: <4B70409A.9070807@satx.rr.com>

On 2/8/2010 10:21 AM, Natasha Vita-More wrote:

> My issue with it, however, is that it seems to be black or white and
> misrepreents Max.

That would be this, I assume:

<A third of the respondents were unwilling to affirm the superiority of 
liberal democracy among existing political systems. Transhumanist Max 
More, for instance, looks toward a post-democratic minarchy:

     Democratic arrangements have no intrinsic value; they have value 
only to the extent that they enable us to achieve shared goals while 
protecting our freedom. Surely, as we strive to transcend the biological 
limitations of human nature, we can also improve upon monkey politics? 
(More, 2004) >

In what way does this misrepresent Max? By snipping the larger conext of 
his comment, presumably, but did he say and mean that?

Damien Broderick


From jonkc at bellsouth.net  Mon Feb  8 16:32:25 2010
From: jonkc at bellsouth.net (John Clark)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2010 11:32:25 -0500
Subject: [ExI] How not to make a thought experiment
In-Reply-To: <468928.31819.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <468928.31819.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <B57D2526-4CE7-487C-8ACD-BD06F7E04C7D@bellsouth.net>

Since my last post Gordon Swobe has posted 4 times.
> 
> It should seem obvious that the world contains both subjective facts like toothaches and objective facts like mountains. It should seem equally obvious that consciousness exists, and that consciousness has certain qualities. The majority of people do in fact consider these things perfectly obvious. And contrary to the bafflegab promulgated by some quasi-intellectual pseudo-philosophers, on these subjects the majority of people have it exactly right.

Swobe has used this straw man argument many times, and I believe he is being disingenuous. Nobody on this list, or any rational person for that matter, seriously thinks he doesn't think. True, I have heard some say that consciousness is an illusion, and yes that is a bit dumb as it's not at all clear why it's more "illusionary" than any other perfectly respectable mental phenomena, but that's not as bad as saying it doesn't exist. No sane person thinks consciousness doesn't exists, although some very silly people may say so when they try (unsuccessfully) to sound sophisticated and provocative.

 John K Clark    




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From natasha at natasha.cc  Mon Feb  8 17:00:57 2010
From: natasha at natasha.cc (Natasha Vita-More)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2010 11:00:57 -0600
Subject: [ExI] If anyone wants to Respond to the IEET piece re
	"Promblems of	Transhumanism"
In-Reply-To: <4B70409A.9070807@satx.rr.com>
References: <53226DE6C0DE42C689797B6CFF4DE80B@DFC68LF1>
	<4B70409A.9070807@satx.rr.com>
Message-ID: <4FD738C2D52E41A69BDFE397923AFDDB@DFC68LF1>

"Libertarian transhumanists like Thiel and More..."

Please read:  RU's interview with Max:
http://www.acceleratingfuture.com/people/Max-More/?interview=32 


Nlogo1.tif Natasha Vita-More

-----Original Message-----
From: extropy-chat-bounces at lists.extropy.org
[mailto:extropy-chat-bounces at lists.extropy.org] On Behalf Of Damien
Broderick
Sent: Monday, February 08, 2010 10:50 AM
To: ExI chat list
Subject: Re: [ExI] If anyone wants to Respond to the IEET piece re
"Promblems of Transhumanism"

On 2/8/2010 10:21 AM, Natasha Vita-More wrote:

> My issue with it, however, is that it seems to be black or white and 
> misrepreents Max.

That would be this, I assume:

<A third of the respondents were unwilling to affirm the superiority of
liberal democracy among existing political systems. Transhumanist Max More,
for instance, looks toward a post-democratic minarchy:

     Democratic arrangements have no intrinsic value; they have value only
to the extent that they enable us to achieve shared goals while protecting
our freedom. Surely, as we strive to transcend the biological limitations of
human nature, we can also improve upon monkey politics? 
(More, 2004) >

In what way does this misrepresent Max? By snipping the larger conext of his
comment, presumably, but did he say and mean that?

Damien Broderick
_______________________________________________
extropy-chat mailing list
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat



From ablainey at aol.com  Mon Feb  8 17:14:37 2010
From: ablainey at aol.com (ablainey at aol.com)
Date: Mon, 08 Feb 2010 12:14:37 -0500
Subject: [ExI] If anyone wants to Respond to the IEET piece re
 "Promblems of Transhumanism"
In-Reply-To: <53226DE6C0DE42C689797B6CFF4DE80B@DFC68LF1>
References: <53226DE6C0DE42C689797B6CFF4DE80B@DFC68LF1>
Message-ID: <8CC76F9532BE5FA-4614-1CE8@webmail-d042.sysops.aol.com>


 I lost interest at 'Liberal democracy' in the first paragraph.  The clue to it being bipolar to the nth degree is in the title.
Divide and conquer. NLP. Exclude all other posibility. Read it all before and living in the UK see it, hear it, read it and get shoveled it everyday.

i'll try and wade through it later. Maybe i'm wrong?

A

 


 

 

-----Original Message-----
From: Natasha Vita-More <natasha at natasha.cc>
To: 'ExI chat list' <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org>; extrobritannia at yahoogroups.com
Sent: Mon, 8 Feb 2010 16:21
Subject: [ExI] If anyone wants to Respond to the IEET piece re "Promblems of Transhumanism"


It's an informative article.  My issue with it, however, is that it seems to be black or white and misrepreents Max.
 
http://ieet.org/index.php/IEET/more/3670/

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From thespike at satx.rr.com  Mon Feb  8 17:21:11 2010
From: thespike at satx.rr.com (Damien Broderick)
Date: Mon, 08 Feb 2010 11:21:11 -0600
Subject: [ExI] If anyone wants to Respond to the IEET piece
 re	"Promblems of	Transhumanism"
In-Reply-To: <4FD738C2D52E41A69BDFE397923AFDDB@DFC68LF1>
References: <53226DE6C0DE42C689797B6CFF4DE80B@DFC68LF1>	<4B70409A.9070807@satx.rr.com>
	<4FD738C2D52E41A69BDFE397923AFDDB@DFC68LF1>
Message-ID: <4B704807.5090907@satx.rr.com>

On 2/8/2010 11:00 AM, Natasha Vita-More wrote:

> "Libertarian transhumanists like Thiel and More..."
>
> Please read:  RU's interview with Max:
> http://www.acceleratingfuture.com/people/Max-More/?interview=

That would be the following 2004 discussion:

<I am not a libertarian, unless you take a generously broad view of the 
term. I?m hardly an exception these days. Even going back a few years, a 
survey of Extropy Institute members showed that a substantial proportion 
did not describe their political views with the l-word. When it comes to 
politics and economics, a high degree of pragmatism (in the skeptical 
and empiricist sense) is healthy, and ideology is problematic.>

As far as the actual quote in James Hughe's essay goes, does it 
misrepresent Max's thinking on the topic at issue? This next quote would 
suggest that Hughe's implication of antidemocratic or top-down bias (if 
that's what he means) is wrong:

<OPEN SOCIETY: Supporting social orders that foster freedom of speech, 
freedom of action, and experimentation. Opposing authoritarian social 
control and favoring the rule of law and decentralization of power. 
Preferring bargaining over battling, and exchange over compulsion. 
Openness to improvement rather than a static utopia. [...] I find it 
both amusing and revolting to observe socialist transhumanists who 
characterize themselves as "democratic transhumanists" but use the term 
"democracy" as a cover for using governmental power to compel everyone 
to fit into their notion of ?equality.? Democracy, in the more generally 
accepted sense, is an important way of implementing the principle of 
Open Society.>

Still, Max is quoted as saying

<Democratic arrangements have no intrinsic value; they have value only
to the extent that they enable us to achieve shared goals while protecting
our freedom. Surely, as we strive to transcend the biological limitations of
human nature, we can also improve upon monkey politics? >

Damien Broderick


From natasha at natasha.cc  Mon Feb  8 17:26:05 2010
From: natasha at natasha.cc (Natasha Vita-More)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2010 11:26:05 -0600
Subject: [ExI] If anyone wants to Respond to the IEET piece
	re	"Promblems of	Transhumanism"
In-Reply-To: <4B704807.5090907@satx.rr.com>
References: <53226DE6C0DE42C689797B6CFF4DE80B@DFC68LF1>	<4B70409A.9070807@satx.rr.com><4FD738C2D52E41A69BDFE397923AFDDB@DFC68LF1>
	<4B704807.5090907@satx.rr.com>
Message-ID: <7BBCE87398FB428484B3A0D5FAACAD95@DFC68LF1>

So what?   


Nlogo1.tif Natasha Vita-More

-----Original Message-----
From: extropy-chat-bounces at lists.extropy.org
[mailto:extropy-chat-bounces at lists.extropy.org] On Behalf Of Damien
Broderick
Sent: Monday, February 08, 2010 11:21 AM
To: ExI chat list
Subject: Re: [ExI] If anyone wants to Respond to the IEET piece re
"Promblems of Transhumanism"

On 2/8/2010 11:00 AM, Natasha Vita-More wrote:

> "Libertarian transhumanists like Thiel and More..."
>
> Please read:  RU's interview with Max:
> http://www.acceleratingfuture.com/people/Max-More/?interview=

That would be the following 2004 discussion:

<I am not a libertarian, unless you take a generously broad view of the
term. I'm hardly an exception these days. Even going back a few years, a
survey of Extropy Institute members showed that a substantial proportion did
not describe their political views with the l-word. When it comes to
politics and economics, a high degree of pragmatism (in the skeptical and
empiricist sense) is healthy, and ideology is problematic.>

As far as the actual quote in James Hughe's essay goes, does it misrepresent
Max's thinking on the topic at issue? This next quote would suggest that
Hughe's implication of antidemocratic or top-down bias (if that's what he
means) is wrong:

<OPEN SOCIETY: Supporting social orders that foster freedom of speech,
freedom of action, and experimentation. Opposing authoritarian social
control and favoring the rule of law and decentralization of power. 
Preferring bargaining over battling, and exchange over compulsion. 
Openness to improvement rather than a static utopia. [...] I find it both
amusing and revolting to observe socialist transhumanists who characterize
themselves as "democratic transhumanists" but use the term "democracy" as a
cover for using governmental power to compel everyone to fit into their
notion of "equality." Democracy, in the more generally accepted sense, is an
important way of implementing the principle of Open Society.>

Still, Max is quoted as saying

<Democratic arrangements have no intrinsic value; they have value only to
the extent that they enable us to achieve shared goals while protecting our
freedom. Surely, as we strive to transcend the biological limitations of
human nature, we can also improve upon monkey politics? >

Damien Broderick
_______________________________________________
extropy-chat mailing list
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat



From thespike at satx.rr.com  Mon Feb  8 17:35:49 2010
From: thespike at satx.rr.com (Damien Broderick)
Date: Mon, 08 Feb 2010 11:35:49 -0600
Subject: [ExI] If anyone wants to Respond to the IEET
 piece	re	"Promblems of	Transhumanism"
In-Reply-To: <7BBCE87398FB428484B3A0D5FAACAD95@DFC68LF1>
References: <53226DE6C0DE42C689797B6CFF4DE80B@DFC68LF1>	<4B70409A.9070807@satx.rr.com><4FD738C2D52E41A69BDFE397923AFDDB@DFC68LF1>	<4B704807.5090907@satx.rr.com>
	<7BBCE87398FB428484B3A0D5FAACAD95@DFC68LF1>
Message-ID: <4B704B75.5010709@satx.rr.com>

On 2/8/2010 11:26 AM, Natasha Vita-More wrote:

> So what?

Eh?


From hkeithhenson at gmail.com  Mon Feb  8 17:51:34 2010
From: hkeithhenson at gmail.com (Keith Henson)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2010 10:51:34 -0700
Subject: [ExI] Refreezing the Arctic ocean
Message-ID: <d1988d2d1002080951p216e65bagc97cdf57cd01a6a6@mail.gmail.com>

On another list someone wrote

> The bigger problem right now is solar insolation during polar summers. This
> is the Arctic problem in the immediate term and a intermediate problem for
> the West Antarctic Ice Sheet. A blue water Arctic is starting, I don't want
> to use the words "chain reaction" (it's not a nuclear process), but least
> non-linear warming (oceanic).

Scaled down by a factor of 25, say a 2.5-3 inch pipe 50 feet long, the
heat pipe I analyzed would suck out 4 kW with the same delta T for the
heat exchanger.  The Arctic isn't as cold as the Antarctic, but at
least 5 months of the year it is cold enough to make this work.  A kWh
is 3600 kJ.  So such a heat pipe would freeze 4*3600/333kJ/kg, ~43 kg
of water per hour.

After 5 months, that would be ~160000 kg of ice, or 160 tonnes, or 160
cubic meters.  This would be a cylinder of ice ~16 m high by ~4
meters.  Such a slender ratio would have to be examined for stability
(sinking weight on a cable perhaps). The interior would be at -15 C,
which seems to me that it would likely last without much loss till the
next winter, but this would need to be calculated.  In 5 years the
block would be 8 meters across.

I don't know what would be the optimum heat pipe size or spacing, or
how spacing could be maintained, but this is the general idea of how
to refreeze the Arctic ocean.  What it would be doing is to raise the
effective temperature in the Arctic during the coldest part of the
year, making the radiation into space higher.

I also don't know if this is economically feasible, or even desirable
(shipping).  But this is the kind of thought that would go into an
engineering solution if anyone cared to look in this direction.

The West Antarctic Ice Sheet is made for the trick of freezing it to bedrock

>>this motion would stop if the glacier was frozen to the bedrock.
>
> Then, it's not a glacier.

It's not going to stop them moving entirely, just slow them down.  Ice
is still plastic.

(mondo snip to another post)

>> FACT: All glaciers are retreating, many already gone. Glaciers are the
>> source of the
>> majority of the world's fresh water, directly or indirectly. ...
>
> Sure, Keith compares them to farm land.

Only for the point that the area of glaciers isn't orders of magnitude
larger than the area humans have massively affected.  This is an
economic argument: if humans were really were desperate, we could
afford to pin glaciers and slow them down.

It's not just melting in sunlight.  Glaciers flow down to lower and
warmer altitudes and into the sea where they melt.  Getting dark
particulates out of the air by switching away from coal and dirty
burning engines would also help slow down melting.

>> All we can do is band-aid what we can and live with the pain,

I have been aware since the early 70s.  Dr Peter Vajk and I were
nearly thrown out of a Limits to Growth conference in 1975 for having
the gall to suggest there might be a way out of the problem.  Now, 35
years later, and perhaps too late, space based solar power is finally
getting serious attention.

They still are not taking a systems approach which tells you that
chemical exhaust velocity is not enough for low cost energy.  But the
methods,for example, air breathing part way up and laser heated
hydrogen above that, are obvious if you go back to the basic physics.

Of course, economically it only works for a large traffic model.

Keith


From thespike at satx.rr.com  Mon Feb  8 17:58:44 2010
From: thespike at satx.rr.com (Damien Broderick)
Date: Mon, 08 Feb 2010 11:58:44 -0600
Subject: [ExI] IEET piece	re "Problems of Transhumanism"
In-Reply-To: <4B704B75.5010709@satx.rr.com>
References: <53226DE6C0DE42C689797B6CFF4DE80B@DFC68LF1>	<4B70409A.9070807@satx.rr.com><4FD738C2D52E41A69BDFE397923AFDDB@DFC68LF1>	<4B704807.5090907@satx.rr.com>	<7BBCE87398FB428484B3A0D5FAACAD95@DFC68LF1>
	<4B704B75.5010709@satx.rr.com>
Message-ID: <4B7050D4.8050802@satx.rr.com>

On 2/8/2010 11:35 AM, Damien Broderick wrote:

>Natasha Vita-More :
>> So what?

> Eh?

To expand on that: Isn't what I quoted to the point of Hughes' essay, 
which starts:

<Transhumanists, like Enlightenment partisans in general, believe that 
human nature can be improved but are conflicted about whether liberal 
democracy is the best path to betterment. The liberal tradition within 
the Enlightenment has argued that individuals are best at finding their 
own interests and should be left to improve themselves in 
self-determined ways.>

BUT, he goes on below,

<The 2005 and 2007 surveys of the members of the World Transhumanist 
Association (WTA, 2005; WTA, 2007) asked, ?Although we may devise better 
political systems in the future, do you believe that multi-party 
democracies with civil liberties for individuals are the best of the 
existing political orders?? A third of the respondents were unwilling to 
affirm the superiority of liberal democracy among existing political 
systems. Transhumanist Max More, for instance, looks toward a 
post-democratic minarchy>

and follows with the quote from Max I've now cited twice, which you 
don't think is relevant (I suppose). Is it really irrelevant? Perhaps 
so. Here it is again:

<Democratic arrangements have no intrinsic value; they have value only to
the extent that they enable us to achieve shared goals while protecting our
freedom. Surely, as we strive to transcend the biological limitations of
human nature, we can also improve upon monkey politics? >

I certainly don't think that Max's comment on "monkey politics" is a 
disparagement of *democracy* but rather of tribal power plays, 
hierarchies of force and authority, etc. And his views are certainly 
inconsistent with Hughes' glib opening comment about a supposed >H 
"tendency to disparage liberal democracy in favor of the rule by dei ex 
machina and technocratic elites." But it doesn't sound like a ringing 
endorsement of the position that "liberal democracy is the best path to 
betterment," which is where Hughes started.

Damien Broderick


From max at maxmore.com  Mon Feb  8 18:18:26 2010
From: max at maxmore.com (Max More)
Date: Mon, 08 Feb 2010 12:18:26 -0600
Subject: [ExI] If anyone wants to Respond to the IEET piece
 re	"Promblems of	Transhumanism"
Message-ID: <201002081818.o18IIX6U008758@andromeda.ziaspace.com>

Damien, you seem to be suggesting ("Still, Max is quoted as saying") 
that Hughes "implication of antidemocratic or top-down bias" is 
understandable because of my statement that "Democratic arrangements 
have no intrinsic value; they have value only to the extent that they 
enable us to achieve shared goals while protecting our freedom." If 
so, I don't understand how you can say that. Saying that democratic 
arrangements (as they exist at any particular time) have no intrinsic 
value is not in the least equivalent to saying that authoritarian 
control is better. Should we not strive for something better than the 
ugly system of democracy that currently exists? Are authoritarian 
arrangements the only conceivable alternative?

Perhaps you use "democracy" far more broadly than I do. If you mean 
it such that it covers all possible non-authoritarian systems, then 
your interpretation makes sense. I prefer to restrict it to the 
systems we have seen historically, which are crude attempts to 
convert the desires of people in general into governance through 
various forms of majority voting.

Max


Damien wrote:
>As far as the actual quote in James Hughe's essay goes, does it
>misrepresent Max's thinking on the topic at issue? This next quote would
>suggest that Hughe's implication of antidemocratic or top-down bias (if
>that's what he means) is wrong:
>
><OPEN SOCIETY: Supporting social orders that foster freedom of speech,
>freedom of action, and experimentation. Opposing authoritarian social
>control and favoring the rule of law and decentralization of power.
>Preferring bargaining over battling, and exchange over compulsion.
>Openness to improvement rather than a static utopia. [...] I find it
>both amusing and revolting to observe socialist transhumanists who
>characterize themselves as "democratic transhumanists" but use the term
>"democracy" as a cover for using governmental power to compel everyone
>to fit into their notion of "equality." Democracy, in the more generally
>accepted sense, is an important way of implementing the principle of
>Open Society.>
>
>Still, Max is quoted as saying
>
><Democratic arrangements have no intrinsic value; they have value 
>only to the extent that they enable us to achieve shared goals while 
>protecting our freedom. Surely, as we strive to transcend the 
>biological limitations of human nature, we can also improve upon 
>monkey politics? >


-------------------------------------
Max More, Ph.D.
Strategic Philosopher
The Proactionary Project
Extropy Institute Founder
www.maxmore.com
max at maxmore.com
------------------------------------- 



From natasha at natasha.cc  Mon Feb  8 18:19:04 2010
From: natasha at natasha.cc (Natasha Vita-More)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2010 12:19:04 -0600
Subject: [ExI] IEET piece	re "Problems of Transhumanism"
In-Reply-To: <4B7050D4.8050802@satx.rr.com>
References: <53226DE6C0DE42C689797B6CFF4DE80B@DFC68LF1>	<4B70409A.9070807@satx.rr.com><4FD738C2D52E41A69BDFE397923AFDDB@DFC68LF1>	<4B704807.5090907@satx.rr.com>	<7BBCE87398FB428484B3A0D5FAACAD95@DFC68LF1><4B704B75.5010709@satx.rr.com>
	<4B7050D4.8050802@satx.rr.com>
Message-ID: <1A5A60391CF9407A9B10772A59F5C938@DFC68LF1>

Sorry, I was so busy working on something.  (I was just writing an article
for The Scavenger and was referencing _The Judas Mandala_ and had to go to
Amazon to get an image in case ...) 

Now to answer your post, I was simply was referring to the "libertarian
transhumanist" phrase which takes away from the value of what James' article
because this is old and worn-out.  

Nlogo1.tif Natasha Vita-More

-----Original Message-----
From: extropy-chat-bounces at lists.extropy.org
[mailto:extropy-chat-bounces at lists.extropy.org] On Behalf Of Damien
Broderick
Sent: Monday, February 08, 2010 11:59 AM
To: ExI chat list
Subject: Re: [ExI] IEET piece re "Problems of Transhumanism"

On 2/8/2010 11:35 AM, Damien Broderick wrote:

>Natasha Vita-More :
>> So what?

> Eh?

To expand on that: Isn't what I quoted to the point of Hughes' essay, which
starts:

<Transhumanists, like Enlightenment partisans in general, believe that human
nature can be improved but are conflicted about whether liberal democracy is
the best path to betterment. The liberal tradition within the Enlightenment
has argued that individuals are best at finding their own interests and
should be left to improve themselves in self-determined ways.>

BUT, he goes on below,

<The 2005 and 2007 surveys of the members of the World Transhumanist
Association (WTA, 2005; WTA, 2007) asked, "Although we may devise better
political systems in the future, do you believe that multi-party democracies
with civil liberties for individuals are the best of the existing political
orders?" A third of the respondents were unwilling to affirm the superiority
of liberal democracy among existing political systems. Transhumanist Max
More, for instance, looks toward a post-democratic minarchy>

and follows with the quote from Max I've now cited twice, which you don't
think is relevant (I suppose). Is it really irrelevant? Perhaps so. Here it
is again:

<Democratic arrangements have no intrinsic value; they have value only to
the extent that they enable us to achieve shared goals while protecting our
freedom. Surely, as we strive to transcend the biological limitations of
human nature, we can also improve upon monkey politics? >

I certainly don't think that Max's comment on "monkey politics" is a
disparagement of *democracy* but rather of tribal power plays, hierarchies
of force and authority, etc. And his views are certainly inconsistent with
Hughes' glib opening comment about a supposed >H "tendency to disparage
liberal democracy in favor of the rule by dei ex machina and technocratic
elites." But it doesn't sound like a ringing endorsement of the position
that "liberal democracy is the best path to betterment," which is where
Hughes started.

Damien Broderick
_______________________________________________
extropy-chat mailing list
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat



From ablainey at aol.com  Mon Feb  8 18:30:58 2010
From: ablainey at aol.com (ablainey at aol.com)
Date: Mon, 08 Feb 2010 13:30:58 -0500
Subject: [ExI] IEET piece re "Problems of Transhumanism"
In-Reply-To: <4B7050D4.8050802@satx.rr.com>
References: <53226DE6C0DE42C689797B6CFF4DE80B@DFC68LF1>	<4B70409A.9070807@satx.rr.com><4FD738C2D52E41A69BDFE397923AFDDB@DFC68LF1>	<4B704807.5090907@satx.rr.com>	<7BBCE87398FB428484B3A0D5FAACAD95@DFC68LF1><4B704B75.5010709@satx.rr.com>
	<4B7050D4.8050802@satx.rr.com>
Message-ID: <8CC7703FD00403A-1250-225@webmail-d042.sysops.aol.com>


 I agree Damien, Max's quote has little or nothing to do with democracy, rather the way it is played.
And now I have read the whole thing I can see I was right in my first impression.
Polarise the arguement even though the arguement itself is invalid. Since when is Liberal democracy the
opposite of totalitarianism? And how can Libertarianism be the opposite of liberal democracy, while argueing that
Libertarian transhumanists support totalitarianism ?? Neither is correct.

Contrived. Like I said, I read it before.

A




-----Original Message-----
From: Damien Broderick <thespike at satx.rr.com>
To: ExI chat list <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org>
Sent: Mon, 8 Feb 2010 17:58
Subject: Re: [ExI] IEET piece re "Problems of Transhumanism"


On 2/8/2010 11:35 AM, Damien Broderick wrote: 
 
>Natasha Vita-More : 
>> So what? 
 
> Eh? 
 
To expand on that: Isn't what I quoted to the point of Hughes' essay, which starts: 
 
<Transhumanists, like Enlightenment partisans in general, believe that human nature can be improved but are conflicted about whether liberal democracy is the best path to betterment. The liberal tradition within the Enlightenment has argued that individuals are best at finding their own interests and should be left to improve themselves in self-determined ways.> 
 
BUT, he goes on below, 
 
<The 2005 and 2007 surveys of the members of the World Transhumanist Association (WTA, 2005; WTA, 2007) asked, ?Although we may devise better political systems in the future, do you believe that multi-party democracies with civil liberties for individuals are the best of the existing political orders?? A third of the respondents were unwilling to affirm the superiority of liberal democracy among existing political systems. Transhumanist Max More, for instance, looks toward a post-democratic minarchy> 
 
and follows with the quote from Max I've now cited twice, which you don't think is relevant (I suppose). Is it really irrelevant? Perhaps so. Here it is again: 
 
<Democratic arrangements have no intrinsic value; they have value only to 
the extent that they enable us to achieve shared goals while protecting our 
freedom. Surely, as we strive to transcend the biological limitations of 
human nature, we can also improve upon monkey politics? > 
 
I certainly don't think that Max's comment on "monkey politics" is a disparagement of *democracy* but rather of tribal power plays, hierarchies of force and authority, etc. And his views are certainly inconsistent with Hughes' glib opening comment about a supposed >H "tendency to disparage liberal democracy in favor of the rule by dei ex machina and technocratic elites." But it doesn't sound like a ringing endorsement of the position that "liberal democracy is the best path to betterment," which is where Hughes started. 
 
Damien Broderick 
_______________________________________________ 
extropy-chat mailing list 
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org 
http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat 

 
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From thespike at satx.rr.com  Mon Feb  8 18:37:24 2010
From: thespike at satx.rr.com (Damien Broderick)
Date: Mon, 08 Feb 2010 12:37:24 -0600
Subject: [ExI] If anyone wants to Respond to the IEET piece re	"Problems
 of	Transhumanism"
In-Reply-To: <201002081818.o18IIX6U008758@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
References: <201002081818.o18IIX6U008758@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
Message-ID: <4B7059E4.1010402@satx.rr.com>

On 2/8/2010 12:18 PM, Max More wrote:

> Saying that democratic arrangements (as they exist at any particular
> time) have no intrinsic value is not in the least equivalent to saying
> that authoritarian control is better. Should we not strive for something
> better than the ugly system of democracy that currently exists?

Certainly; see Krugman's essay in the NYT today for a truly egregious 
example of "democracy" in inaction in the US.

> Are authoritarian arrangements the only conceivable alternative?

No, and I think I'd favor a decision structure closer to a rhizome than 
a ladder or pyramid, which is why I'm a sort of communitarian anarchist. 
(A utopian prospect, admittedly, because people have largely been conned 
into becoming--as the gibe has it--sheeple.)

But as I said a moment ago in another post, your statement doesn't sound 
like a ringing endorsement of the position that "liberal democracy is 
the best path to betterment," which is the point Hughes is making about 
 >Humanism. Where he goes from there is questionable if not absurd *as a 
generalization*--but there's certainly a technocratic, elitist tendency 
in a lot of >H discourse I've read here over the last 15 years or so.

Damien Broderick



From thespike at satx.rr.com  Mon Feb  8 18:39:08 2010
From: thespike at satx.rr.com (Damien Broderick)
Date: Mon, 08 Feb 2010 12:39:08 -0600
Subject: [ExI] IEET piece	re "Problems of Transhumanism"
In-Reply-To: <1A5A60391CF9407A9B10772A59F5C938@DFC68LF1>
References: <53226DE6C0DE42C689797B6CFF4DE80B@DFC68LF1>	<4B70409A.9070807@satx.rr.com><4FD738C2D52E41A69BDFE397923AFDDB@DFC68LF1>	<4B704807.5090907@satx.rr.com>	<7BBCE87398FB428484B3A0D5FAACAD95@DFC68LF1><4B704B75.5010709@satx.rr.com>	<4B7050D4.8050802@satx.rr.com>
	<1A5A60391CF9407A9B10772A59F5C938@DFC68LF1>
Message-ID: <4B705A4C.1000907@satx.rr.com>

On 2/8/2010 12:19 PM, Natasha Vita-More wrote:

> I was simply was referring to the "libertarian
> transhumanist" phrase which takes away from the value of what James' article
> because this is old and worn-out.

Fair enough, and Max certainly deals with that in his interview with RU.


From rpwl at lightlink.com  Mon Feb  8 18:37:59 2010
From: rpwl at lightlink.com (Richard Loosemore)
Date: Mon, 08 Feb 2010 13:37:59 -0500
Subject: [ExI] Blue Brain Project
In-Reply-To: <558651.23421.qm@web113616.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
References: <558651.23421.qm@web113616.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <4B705A07.1040209@lightlink.com>

Ben Zaiboc wrote:
> Anyone not familiar with this can read about it here:
> http://seedmagazine.com/content/article/out_of_the_blue/P1/
> 
> The next ten years should be interesting!

Or not.

Markram is NOT, as many people seem to assume, developing a biologically 
accurate model of a cortical column circuit.  He is instead developing a 
model that contains neurons that are biologically accurate, down to a 
certain level of detail, but with random connections between those 
neurons.  The statistical distribution of wires is supposed to be the 
same as that in a cortical column, but the actual wires... not so much.

So, to anyone who thinks that a randomly mode of an i86 computer chip in 
which all the wiring was replaced by random connections would be a 
fantastically interesting thing, worth spending a billion dollars to 
construct, the Blue Brain project must make you delirious with joy.

Markram's entire project, then, rests on his hope that if he builds a 
randomly wired column model, the model will "self-assemble" and do 
something interesting.  He produces no arguments for what those 
self-assembly mechanisms actually look like, nor does he demonstrate 
that his model includes those mechanisms.

Further, he ignores the possibility that the self-assembly mechanisms 
are dependent on such factors as (a) specific wiring circuits in the 
column, or (b) specific wiring in outside structures (subcortical 
mechanisms, for example) which act as drivers of the self-assembly process.

(To couch this in terms of an example, suppose the biology causes loops 
of ten neurons to be set up all over the column, with the strength of 
synapses around each loop being extremely specific (say, high, high, 
low, high, high, low, high, high, low, low).  Now suppose that the 
self-organizing capability of the system is crucially dependent on the 
presence of these loops.  Since Markram is blind to exact wiring he will 
never see the loops.  He certainly would not see the pattern of synaptic 
strengths, and he probably would never notice the physical pattern of 
the ten-neurons loops, either.)

As far as I can tell, Markram's only reason to believe that his model 
columns will self-assemble is ... well, just a hunch.

If his hunch is wrong, he will have built the world's most expensive 
white-noise generator.

Notice that so far, in the test runs he has done, his evidence that the 
model circuit actually works has all been based on a low-level 
statistical correspondence between the patterns of firing in the model 
and in the original.  Given that he went to great trouble to ensure the 
same distributions in his model, this result gives practically no 
information at all.  Markram does not hesitate to publicize these 
achievements with words that imply that his model column does actually 
"function" like a biological column.  (Going back to the i86 chip 
analogy:  would a statistically similar signal pattern in a random model 
of such a chip indicate that the random model was "functioning" like a 
normal chip?).

There are plenty of other criticisms that could be leveled at the Blue 
Brain project, but this should be enough.

Can you say "Neuroscience Star Wars Project", children?



Richard Loosemore


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Mon Feb  8 19:18:57 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2010 11:18:57 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Rights without selves (was: Nolopsism)
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002081118n5d53dd0k8dc365c11a997c29@mail.gmail.com>

JOSHUA JOB <nanite1018 at gmail.com>:
> A car can't have rights because it isn't self-aware. It isn't even alive. It doesn't have choices, and nothing matters to it. It doesn't have the quality of being this weird self-referencing thing with a de se operator, it lacks the capacity of reason. And thus, it can't have any rights. A corpse isn't alive or rational or aware either. A brand-new human is, or at least will be in short order. Proliferating rights in the manner you suggest devalues the word and destroys its meaning, allowing evil people to appropriate it for their own ends, as they did in socialist countries all across the globe. The result? The deaths of tens of millions from starvation, disease, and brutal suppression of dissent.

There are people who believe that every single thing in the universe
is technically alive. Since cars actually have the ability to burn
fuel and propel themselves, traits generally associated with animals,
they actually have a better claim to the title than most inanimate
objects. You could argue that a car isn't alive because it can't move
intentionally, and the obvious counterargument would be to point
demonstratively at a plant; but many plants lean towards the sun. I
would prefer coral polyps as an example, or, even better,
phytoplankton.

On the subject of awareness, use of "de se" designators, et cetera,
Stefano Vaj points out that unconscious human beings retain the rights
of their conscious selves. I would equate this with a house retaining
the right not to be demolished even when its residents are away.

You're correct that my position devalues and/or destroys the current
meaning of "rights", but I don't see how a fungal bloom of evil would
follow logically from that. Elaborate please?

JOSHUA JOB <nanite1018 at gmail.com>:
> Having rights that you suggest would likely lead to chaos and that would support the rise of oppressive regimes, just as the proliferation of "rights" to jobs, health care, income, education, etc. have caused problems by creating a "need" for ever more oppressive regulations. The result? More chaos, and more regulation. Networks of rational agents generate spontaneous order through rational self-interest. I don't see how you can have any such thing as rational agents, or self-interest, without some "thing" which is an agent and has an interest in its own existence.

I'm broadening the definition with the intention to make law in
general more sensible: rights prevent wrongs. It is wrong to dump
garbage in the ocean. Therefore, the ocean should have rights.

At the moment the ocean is effectively piggybacking on tortuously
ill-defined rights of humans, such as "the right to live on a planet
that isn't broken", which are not explicitly enumerated in any written
document that I'm aware of.

I'm not saying it would be more morally correct to give the ocean
rights, as though it were a living, feeling entity. I'm not even
saying it would be more intuitive. I'm saying it would be simpler and
more efficient.

JOSHUA JOB <nanite1018 at gmail.com>:
> Even if there is no such thing as a "self", there is a thing which employs a de se operator to describe "itself", whatever "it" is, and I'm not clear on what the difference is between such an entity and a "self". It obviously has memory, reasons, and is self-aware (i.e. aware of the the thing that is speaking, thinking, etc., whatever it is). Doesn't some "thing" have to exist to employ such an operator?

I don't actually think the optimal system of law would exclude the
concept of a rational agent from playing a part. For the sake of
argument, I'm simply saying it's possible, and that such a system
could be made to work just as well, in effect, as any other. It would
likely employ much less concise language to do so, so it wouldn't be
as efficient as a "de se"-enabled system with all of the same laws.

The difference between "selves" and "de se systems", if that term is
accurate, is largely a matter of abstraction. A self is highly
complex, and theoretically atomic: it persists from one moment to
another, and one can correctly attribute memory, thought,
self-awareness, and so on to it. Memory is inextricable from self. All
of the parts add up to an indivisible whole.

Conversely, a "de se" designator is just a symbol. It points to a
greater system, which we normally call a self, but that system is
composed of a great many independent parts that interact in
complicated ways. Memories are only a part of that system, and purely
optional. The symbol doesn't care: it just refers to whatever's
present at the time.

I talk about "my arm" and "my foot" in exactly the same way that I
talk about "my house" and "my computer", as though all of these things
were part of me and I would be incomplete without them. This is
obviously false for the latter two, and not-so-obviously false for the
former two. My arm is part of my self, just as surely as is my
computer, but neither are parts of me. I don't have any parts; I don't
technically exist outside of the moment in which I write this.

There's a more tenuous relationship between quoted passages and
responses in this post than I normally display. I found myself copying
and pasting paragraphs from beneath one quote to beneath another,
because they worked equally well in both places and I wanted to spread
things out a little.

So it might not sound as if I was "listening" very carefully. Sorry
about that; I actually was, but I got a bit sidetracked.

You argue against cars having rights, and claim, indirectly, that
doing so would cause a great many terrible unintended consequences.
Request that you expound on a few of those consequences. You can
choose something other than a car, if easier.


From jameschoate at austin.rr.com  Mon Feb  8 19:42:48 2010
From: jameschoate at austin.rr.com (jameschoate at austin.rr.com)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2010 19:42:48 +0000
Subject: [ExI] Blue Brain Project
Message-ID: <20100208194249.YWLBW.497187.root@hrndva-web17-z02>

There is very little actual 'suppose' in your commentary, the homeobox and related genetic affects are critical to this sort of organization. It is far from stochastic. Besides that, this model completely ignores the chemotaxis effects of development as well. 

---- Richard Loosemore <rpwl at lightlink.com> wrote: 

> Markram is NOT, as many people seem to assume, developing a biologically 
> accurate model of a cortical column circuit.  He is instead developing a 
> model that contains neurons that are biologically accurate, down to a 
> certain level of detail, but with random connections between those 
> neurons.  The statistical distribution of wires is supposed to be the 
> same as that in a cortical column, but the actual wires... not so much.

> Further, he ignores the possibility that the self-assembly mechanisms 
> are dependent on such factors as (a) specific wiring circuits in the 
> column, or (b) specific wiring in outside structures (subcortical 
> mechanisms, for example) which act as drivers of the self-assembly process.
> 
> (To couch this in terms of an example, suppose the biology causes loops 
> of ten neurons to be set up all over the column, with the strength of 
> synapses around each loop being extremely specific (say, high, high, 
> low, high, high, low, high, high, low, low).  Now suppose that the 
> self-organizing capability of the system is crucially dependent on the 
> presence of these loops.  Since Markram is blind to exact wiring he will 
> never see the loops.  He certainly would not see the pattern of synaptic 
> strengths, and he probably would never notice the physical pattern of 
> the ten-neurons loops, either.)

--
 -- -- -- --
Venimus, Vidimus, Dolavimus

jameschoate at austin.rr.com
james.choate at g.austincc.edu
james.choate at twcable.com
h: 512-657-1279
w: 512-845-8989
www.ssz.com
http://www.twine.com/twine/1128gqhxn-dwr/solar-soyuz-zaibatsu
http://www.twine.com/twine/1178v3j0v-76w/confusion-research-center

Adapt, Adopt, Improvise
 -- -- -- --


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Mon Feb  8 19:42:36 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2010 11:42:36 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <468928.31819.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <e321aa4b1002071305t52b0592ai40a9715b5754cbb0@mail.gmail.com> 
	<468928.31819.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002081142w3fdd2defh3579a59738b8a9ed@mail.gmail.com>

Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>:
> No, I answer false also. I asked that question about toothaches to point out that subjective facts exist and that consciousness exists. It makes no difference whether your toothache exists as a result of a cavity or as an effect caused by a stage-hypnotist; if you feel the pain then it exists with as much reality as does a heart attack.

I reject the notion that toothaches and heart attacks are equally
real, on the basis that inherent "reality" does indeed lie on a
spectrum rather than being binary.

Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>:
> It should seem obvious that the world contains both subjective facts like toothaches and objective facts like mountains. It should seem equally obvious that consciousness exists, and that consciousness has certain qualities. The majority of people do in fact consider these things perfectly obvious. And contrary to the bafflegab promulgated by some quasi-intellectual pseudo-philosophers, on these subjects the majority of people have it exactly right.

I feel like rejecting the notion of quasi-intellectual
pseudo-philosophers, as well, but that's really only because of how
accurately the term describes me.

I do, however, reject the notion of a mountain being an objective
fact. They're all just hills which we've decided, by a subjective
value judgement, are simply too tall to be called hills! And hills are
merely ground that's too bumpy for us to responsibly name as ground.

In fact, I'm having difficulty convincing myself that there could be
any such thing as an objective fact at all; even electrons are a
mathematical abstraction, based on our subjective interpretation of a
mountain of empirical evidence.

Note that "empirical" means "based on experience", not "inviolably
true". The difference between empirical and anecdotal is one of
degree, not kind; there is empirical evidence for the existence of
alien life. We usually call very consistent findings empirical, and
very inconsistent findings, or those with an insufficient sample size
to say either way, anecdotal.

Truth has never been found outside the laboratory, nor survived
without artificial support. It's a little like antimatter. As soon as
you turn off the containment field, things go back to being just as
they are.

Now that I think about it, the distinction between the objective and
the subjective is fallacious and misleading. Dualistic thinking at its
worst. I propose to do away with it.


From thespike at satx.rr.com  Mon Feb  8 19:47:49 2010
From: thespike at satx.rr.com (Damien Broderick)
Date: Mon, 08 Feb 2010 13:47:49 -0600
Subject: [ExI] Rights without selves (was: Nolopsism)
In-Reply-To: <e321aa4b1002081118n5d53dd0k8dc365c11a997c29@mail.gmail.com>
References: <e321aa4b1002081118n5d53dd0k8dc365c11a997c29@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4B706A65.7010403@satx.rr.com>

On 2/8/2010 1:18 PM, Spencer Campbell wrote:

> There are people who believe that every single thing in the universe
> is technically alive.

Yes, there are an awful lot of clueless idiots.

I've taken to listening to Coast to Coast while doing evening exercises, 
and my mind genuinely boggles at the sheer stupidity of its gullible, 
desperate-to-believe listeners.

Damien Broderick


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Mon Feb  8 19:47:37 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2010 11:47:37 -0800
Subject: [ExI] The Surrogates, graphic novel
In-Reply-To: <62c14241002080642j56bb72c2r969b4ff798608e69@mail.gmail.com>
References: <mailman.1522.1265603030.462.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org> 
	<938582.59281.qm@web113609.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
	<62c14241002080642j56bb72c2r969b4ff798608e69@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002081147t1749c068nb21fde1537f8d8fd@mail.gmail.com>

Mike Dougherty <msd001 at gmail.com>:
> In those scenes where surri were mangled, my wife had a visceral
> emotional response. ?I asked her if that was because she was thinking
> about the surrigates as people. ?She admitted that she was. ?I found
> that interesting because people rarely have such reaction to a car
> accident. ?It's the same loss of personal property, but if the human
> operator walks away the response is usually "Well at least nobody was
> harmed" ?- Why does a machine that looks like a person warrant the
> extra attention?

Why indeed.

Join in on the "Rights without selves" thread! It's alarmingly
relevant, car analogy and all.


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Mon Feb  8 20:01:23 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2010 12:01:23 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Joy in the transcendence of the species
In-Reply-To: <201002080401.o1841ase025933@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
References: <201002080401.o1841ase025933@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002081201u7ceccef0o391885546c9e6a92@mail.gmail.com>

Max More <max at maxmore.com>:
> I know many of you are fascinated by the intricacies and peculiarities of
> language. Perhaps you might be motivated to help me figure this out:

Yes! Me! Me!

Well, except that the one area of linguistics I actively dislike is
the art of the portmanteau.

I think the word you're thinking of would refer also to "joy in the
existence of humanity", "joy in the existence of animals", "joy in the
existence of macroscopic life", and on down the evolutionary ladder.
It would also explicitly celebrate all progress in the arts and
sciences. Joy in evolution and revolution, joy in the complexity of
life and technology past, present and future, without any distinction
made between the two.

It'd be a good word.

If you wouldn't mind, I'd be keen on arrogating it for my imaginary
language. You know, the one with a complete set of grammatical rules
but no words to speak of. The one no one, anywhere, is the least bit
interested in but me.

Not bitter!

Now if you'll excuse me, I have to go pop a few more seriousness pills.


From bbenzai at yahoo.com  Mon Feb  8 19:51:47 2010
From: bbenzai at yahoo.com (Ben Zaiboc)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2010 11:51:47 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Blue Brain Project
In-Reply-To: <mailman.1524.1265656766.462.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
Message-ID: <480152.31985.qm@web113604.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

Richard Loosemore <rpwl at lightlink.com> wrote:

> Ben Zaiboc wrote:
> > Anyone not familiar with this can read about it here:
> > http://seedmagazine.com/content/article/out_of_the_blue/P1/
> > 
> > The next ten years should be interesting!
> 
> Or not.
> 
> Markram is NOT, as many people seem to assume, developing a
> biologically 
> accurate model of a cortical column circuit.? He is
> instead developing a 
> model that contains neurons that are biologically accurate,
> down to a 
> certain level of detail, but with random connections
> between those 
> neurons.? The statistical distribution of wires is
> supposed to be the 
> same as that in a cortical column, but the actual wires...
> not so much.
...

> Markram's entire project, then, rests on his hope that if
> he builds a 
> randomly wired column model, the model will "self-assemble"
> and do 
> something interesting.? He produces no arguments for
> what those 
> self-assembly mechanisms actually look like, nor does he
> demonstrate 
> that his model includes those mechanisms.
...

> As far as I can tell, Markram's only reason to believe that
> his model 
> columns will self-assemble is ... well, just a hunch.
> 

This is pretty much what a human brain starts out as.  The brain of a baby is *massively* overconnected, and 90% of the connections get pruned away as the baby starts to learn.  Markram's reason to believe that his model columns will self assemble is that that's what they do in biological systems.

Even so.  Suppose this is not the case, suppose Markram's random interconnections fail to capture something intrinsic to the biological situation, it's still not a pointless exercise.  We are constantly mapping the connections in the brain (the connectome project), and while hand-wiring them is out of the question, we will surely extract significant statistical patterns that should help with setting up the blue brain with more successful starting patterns.

The blue brain project might not produce the results Markram hopes it will, but it can't fail to produce useful information, even if it's just "how not to build a brain".

Ben Zaiboc


      


From jonkc at bellsouth.net  Mon Feb  8 20:25:56 2010
From: jonkc at bellsouth.net (John Clark)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2010 15:25:56 -0500
Subject: [ExI] Blue Brain Project.
In-Reply-To: <558651.23421.qm@web113616.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
References: <558651.23421.qm@web113616.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <A1A20171-4B8A-46DF-BCB8-248E6ADEE0AB@bellsouth.net>

On Feb 7, 2010, Ben Zaiboc wrote:

> Anyone not familiar with this can read about it here:
> http://seedmagazine.com/content/article/out_of_the_blue/P1/
> 
> The next ten years should be interesting!

Great article, thanks Ben! sort of makes Gordon Swobe's remark "I look inside your head I see nothing even remotely resembling a digital computer " seem rather medieval. These are some of my favorite quotes :

"In ten years, this computer will be talking to us."

"Once the team is able to model a complete rat brain?that should happen in the next two years?Markram will download the simulation into a robotic rat, so that the brain has a body. He?s already talking to a Japanese company about constructing the mechanical animal. ?The only way to really know what the model is capable of is to give it legs,? he says. ?If the robotic rat just bumps into walls, then we?ve got a problem.?"

?Now we just have to scale it up.? Blue Brain scientists are confident that, at some point in the next few years, they will be able to start simulating an entire brain. ?If we build this brain right, it will do everything,? Markram says. I ask him if that includes selfconsciousness: Is it really possible to put a ghost into a machine? ?When I say everything, I mean everything,? he says, and a mischievous smile spreads across his face."

 John K Clark


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From thespike at satx.rr.com  Mon Feb  8 20:53:40 2010
From: thespike at satx.rr.com (Damien Broderick)
Date: Mon, 08 Feb 2010 14:53:40 -0600
Subject: [ExI] Blue Brain Project.
In-Reply-To: <A1A20171-4B8A-46DF-BCB8-248E6ADEE0AB@bellsouth.net>
References: <558651.23421.qm@web113616.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
	<A1A20171-4B8A-46DF-BCB8-248E6ADEE0AB@bellsouth.net>
Message-ID: <4B7079D4.1090103@satx.rr.com>

On 2/8/2010 2:25 PM, John Clark quoted:

> "Once the team is able to model a complete rat brain?that should happen
> in the next two years?Markram will download the simulation into a
> robotic rat, so that the brain has a body. He?s already talking to a
> Japanese company about constructing the mechanical animal.

A decade or more ago, Hugo de Garis was promising a robot CAM-brain 
puddytat. He lost several sponsors along the way. Anyone know if he's 
doing anything along those lines today? (No, I've never heard of 
Google--how does that work? His own site informs us excitedly of things 
due to happen in 2006 and 2007...)

Damien Broderick



From rpwl at lightlink.com  Mon Feb  8 20:59:17 2010
From: rpwl at lightlink.com (Richard Loosemore)
Date: Mon, 08 Feb 2010 15:59:17 -0500
Subject: [ExI] Blue Brain Project
In-Reply-To: <480152.31985.qm@web113604.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
References: <480152.31985.qm@web113604.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <4B707B25.1040006@lightlink.com>

Ben Zaiboc wrote:
> Richard Loosemore <rpwl at lightlink.com> wrote:
> 
>> Ben Zaiboc wrote:
>>> Anyone not familiar with this can read about it here: 
>>> http://seedmagazine.com/content/article/out_of_the_blue/P1/
>>> 
>>> The next ten years should be interesting!
>> Or not.
>> 
>> Markram is NOT, as many people seem to assume, developing a 
>> biologically accurate model of a cortical column circuit.  He is 
>> instead developing a model that contains neurons that are
>> biologically accurate, down to a certain level of detail, but with
>> random connections between those neurons.  The statistical
>> distribution of wires is supposed to be the same as that in a
>> cortical column, but the actual wires... not so much.
> ...
> 
>> Markram's entire project, then, rests on his hope that if he builds
>> a randomly wired column model, the model will "self-assemble" and
>> do something interesting.  He produces no arguments for what those
>>  self-assembly mechanisms actually look like, nor does he 
>> demonstrate that his model includes those mechanisms.
> ...
> 
>> As far as I can tell, Markram's only reason to believe that his
>> model columns will self-assemble is ... well, just a hunch.
>> 
> 
> This is pretty much what a human brain starts out as.  The brain of a
> baby is *massively* overconnected, and 90% of the connections get
> pruned away as the baby starts to learn.  Markram's reason to believe
> that his model columns will self assemble is that that's what they do
> in biological systems.

This is a non sequiteur, surely?  Just because the connections are 
pruned, it doe snot follow that they were random to begin with.


> Even so.  Suppose this is not the case, suppose Markram's random
> interconnections fail to capture something intrinsic to the
> biological situation, it's still not a pointless exercise.  We are
> constantly mapping the connections in the brain (the connectome
> project), and while hand-wiring them is out of the question, we will
> surely extract significant statistical patterns that should help with
> setting up the blue brain with more successful starting patterns.
> 
> The blue brain project might not produce the results Markram hopes it
> will, but it can't fail to produce useful information, even if it's
> just "how not to build a brain".

I wouldn't think much of a billion-dollar project, using some of the 
world's largest supercomputers, whose goal was to understand computer 
chips by modeling randomly wired versions of them, with some vague 
promises that in the future some other project will be supplying more 
accurate wiring diagrams, and with the fallback position that it would 
be "bound to produce some valuable information, even if it's just 'how 
not to build a computer'.

Collecting statistical patterns is just an excuse to burn research money 
without having to think.




Richard Loosemore


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Mon Feb  8 21:52:59 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2010 13:52:59 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <e321aa4b1002081142w3fdd2defh3579a59738b8a9ed@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <785979.10766.qm@web36505.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Mon, 2/8/10, Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com> wrote:

> I reject the notion that toothaches and heart attacks are
> equally real, on the basis that inherent "reality" does indeed lie
> on a spectrum rather than being binary.

I think it fair to say that either x is real or else x is not real. I also understand that some people here do not distinguish or care about the difference between reality and ~reality. They have medications for that. :)

> I do, however, reject the notion of a mountain being an
> objective fact. They're all just hills which we've decided, by a
> subjective value judgment, are simply too tall to be called hills!

But mountains do exist, no matter how you describe them. Yes?

> In fact, I'm having difficulty convincing myself that there
> could be any such thing as an objective fact at all

You've fallen into the hallucination. :)

>  Note that "empirical" means "based on experience", not
> "inviolably true". 

The word "empirical" needs some disambiguation.

On the one hand people mean by the word "empirical" something like "objectively existent facts in the world, which any observer can verify". But on the other hand people mean by it something like "facts which exist in the world, including for example the facts of an entity's subjective experience".

Clearly some things exist in the second sense that do no exist in the first sense. We can consider it an empirical fact that your dentist, for example, considers it true that you have a real toothache. Right?

-gts





      


From jonkc at bellsouth.net  Mon Feb  8 21:55:14 2010
From: jonkc at bellsouth.net (John Clark)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2010 16:55:14 -0500
Subject: [ExI] Blue Brain Project
In-Reply-To: <4B705A07.1040209@lightlink.com>
References: <558651.23421.qm@web113616.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
	<4B705A07.1040209@lightlink.com>
Message-ID: <4FBF0F0F-4486-4EDA-B705-CE3906028F36@bellsouth.net>

On Feb 8, 2010,  Richard Loosemore wrote:

> Markram is NOT, as many people seem to assume, developing a biologically accurate model of a cortical column circuit.  He is instead developing a model that contains neurons that are biologically accurate, down to a certain level of detail

That is a legitimate concern, and it's true we don't know everything there is to know about neurons, but we know a lot, and this is by far the best simulation of a large number of neurons ever made. And remember, most of the things that neurons do have nothing to do with thought, they are just the routine (though fabulously complex) housekeeping functions that any cell needs to do to stay alive.

> So, to anyone who thinks that a randomly mode of an i86 computer chip in which all the wiring was replaced by random connections would be a fantastically interesting thing, worth spending a billion dollars to construct, the Blue Brain project must make you delirious with joy.

But the boosters of biology are always pointing out that 3/4 of a i86 chip is a completely worthless object, while a dog with only 3 legs is not immobile, he can still limp around. Markram wants to incorporate the same robustness into a computer program, and I think he has a fighting chance of pulling it off.

> Markram's entire project, then, rests on his hope that if he builds a randomly wired column model, the model will "self-assemble" and do something interesting.

Markram says that already his simulation is acting in ways that remind him of the ways real neurons act. OK maybe he's talking Bullshit, but I'm very impressed that in his very next utterance he shows us a way to prove him wrong. He says that in the next 2 to 3 years he will be able to synthesize an entire rat brain. He also says he can link that computer model to a mechanical rat. If that robot rat moves at random then he has failed. If the mechanism moves in more interesting ways then the man is onto something.

> Further, he ignores the possibility that the self-assembly mechanisms are dependent on such factors as (a) specific wiring circuits in the column, or (b) specific wiring in outside structures (subcortical mechanisms, for example) which act as drivers of the self-assembly process. To couch this in terms of an example, suppose the biology causes loops of ten neurons to be set up all over the column, with the strength of synapses around each loop being extremely specific (say, high, high, low, high, high, low, high, high, low, low).  Now suppose that the self-organizing capability of the system is crucially dependent on the presence of these loops.  Since Markram is blind to exact wiring he will never see the loops.  He certainly would not see the pattern of synaptic strengths, and he probably would never notice the physical pattern of the ten-neurons loops, either.

My neurons are not making the proper connections. If you put a gun to my head I couldn't tell you what the hell you're talking about.

> As far as I can tell, Markram's only reason to believe that his model columns will self-assemble is ... well, just a hunch. If his hunch is wrong, he will have built the world's most expensive white-noise generator.

If he fails it will be a heroic failure, if he succeeds it will be the the most important work ever done, not just scientific work, work in general.

> On Sun  Ben Zaiboc wrote:
> 
> I know I mentioned these links a few days ago, but it's worth repeating.
> Noah Sutton is making a documentary:
> http://thebeautifulbrain.com/2010/02/bluebrain-film-preview/
> There's a longer video that explains what he's up to.
> The Emergence of Intelligence in the Neocortical Microcircuit
> http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-2874207418572601262&ei=lghrS6GmG4jCqQLA1Yz7DA

Thanks agin Ben, yet more great stuff!

 John K Clark
 


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From nanite1018 at gmail.com  Mon Feb  8 22:39:10 2010
From: nanite1018 at gmail.com (JOSHUA JOB)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2010 17:39:10 -0500
Subject: [ExI] Rights without selves (was: Nolopsism)
In-Reply-To: <e321aa4b1002081118n5d53dd0k8dc365c11a997c29@mail.gmail.com>
References: <e321aa4b1002081118n5d53dd0k8dc365c11a997c29@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <C87EDDD8-24A5-4035-ACF3-81BD8E1E087B@GMAIL.COM>

On Feb 8, 2010, at 2:18 PM, Spencer Campbell wrote:
> There are people who believe that every single thing in the universe
> is technically alive. Since cars actually have the ability to burn
> fuel and propel themselves, traits generally associated with animals,
> they actually have a better claim to the title than most inanimate
> objects. You could argue that a car isn't alive because it can't move
> intentionally, and the obvious counterargument would be to point
> demonstratively at a plant; but many plants lean towards the sun. I
> would prefer coral polyps as an example, or, even better,
> phytoplankton.
Anyone who thinks everything is alive is, as Damien said, an idiot, or I will add, severely epistemologically confused. Life also maintains homeostasis, grows, etc., things which a car does not do. Also, while rights, in my view, only apply to life, that is not a sufficient condition. The sufficient condition is that they are self-aware and rational, something cars, plants, etc. are not.
> On the subject of awareness, use of "de se" designators, et cetera,
> Stefano Vaj points out that unconscious human beings retain the rights
> of their conscious selves. I would equate this with a house retaining
> the right not to be demolished even when its residents are away.
Perhaps, though I generally view that as simply the fact that from experience we know the person still exists, and must merely be "woken up" in order to resume reasoning, etc. And damaging that physical object that that entity "resides" in will cause damage to the entity's capacity to continue to exist, and thus, is a violation of its rights (more on that in a moment).
> I'm broadening the definition with the intention to make law in
> general more sensible: rights prevent wrongs. It is wrong to dump
> garbage in the ocean. Therefore, the ocean should have rights.
For similar reasons, I argue that things which are not rational cannot have anything have personal meaning to them. The ocean does not employ de se operators, it is not self-aware, and in fact isn't even alive, so nothing can "wrong" it. I'll agree, basically, that rights prevent things from wronging other things, in a very specific sense, but since the ocean does not have any way it can be "wronged", it cannot possibly have rights.
> The difference between "selves" and "de se systems", if that term is
> accurate, is largely a matter of abstraction. A self is highly
> complex, and theoretically atomic: it persists from one moment to
> another, and one can correctly attribute memory, thought,
> self-awareness, and so on to it. Memory is inextricable from self. All
> of the parts add up to an indivisible whole.
> 
> Conversely, a "de se" designator is just a symbol. It points to a
> greater system, which we normally call a self, but that system is
> composed of a great many independent parts that interact in
> complicated ways. Memories are only a part of that system, and purely
> optional. The symbol doesn't care: it just refers to whatever's
> present at the time.
I did not find their argument convincing, because the de se operator refers to the system of which it is a part, i.e. the computational structure (the program, essentially) of their hypothetical robot, or of we human being's brains/minds. That isn't exactly physical, as it is merely a pattern. It's an abstraction of sorts, and "I" is strange in that it cannot be particularly descriptive (it leads to infinite regress, since "I" includes the meaning of "I", which.... and so on). But I have thought, for a long time now, that that is exactly what the "self" is. I understand that this is similar, at least in part, to the thesis of Hofstadter's book "I am a Strange Loop", and while I own it, I have not read it yet. I just thought I should address that point, before diving into rights.
> You argue against cars having rights, and claim, indirectly, that
> doing so would cause a great many terrible unintended consequences.
> Request that you expound on a few of those consequences. You can
> choose something other than a car, if easier.
Well, first, I say that only entities with de se operators can have things of true "value", i.e. mental representations of things of personal importance, arranged in a hierarchy which is understood conceptually. Such an entity must work in order to continue to exist (at least any entity I have ever been able to conceive). By its nature, it has to choose whether to "live" or "die" (i.e. continue to exist or cease to exist), and does so continuously in all its actions (by pursuing things that help its life or harm it). Now, by its nature as such an entity, it's standard of morality is its own life (i.e. it should do things which help it live, and not do things which harm it), since if it isn't working for its life, it will die, and cease to be able to do anything at all.

Now, critically important is that entities such as this (that is, entities that are "self-aware", rational, and operate using concepts) have to decide what is in their own interest, because obviously it's value structure is particular to it and determined by it (that is, it employs de se operators, to use language from the paper). So it is impossible, by definition, for another entity to interfere with another (i.e. forcibly prevent it from taking an action, by threatening its existence), without getting in that entity's way in trying to survive. So you cannot initiate force without interfering with a fundamental requirement for the survival of all entities like you, and thereby reject a principle upon which your own survival is based.

That is my basic view of rights. I don't see how an ocean or a car can have rights, because rights need wrongs, and wrongs need values, and values need rational conceptual entities that employ de se operators (and it needs those entities to exist in some manner).

What sort of horrible consequences would come if you gave a car rights (like the right to exist, for example)? Well, besides dumping that whole structure of rights, one, in my mind, based on logic, you lose the power of its base of logic, and rejecting logic leaves open any number of possible groundings for "rights", like faith or racism or random whim, etc. And that is bad.

But lets be concrete about it. If a car has a right to exist, then that means I can't scrap it if I don't want it (and own it). But if that is the case, that means I am forced to give it to someone else, even if I don't want to (breaching my right to control my life, because I purchased the car with my money, which I used some of my life to acquire). Moreover, let us say that a deer with big antlers jumps in front of my vehicle and I can hit the deer (and quite possibly be killed or at least gored by its antlers, its happened a good bit around where I live to other people), or I can veer off the side of the road, and hit a lamp-post which I know I will likely survive (as I have a wonderfully safe car), but my car will be completely totalled. What should I do? My car has a right to exist, but if I veer off to the side, it will be destroyed, and I will have destroyed it. I have a right to live if I can, but if I want to live, I must destroy my car.

So, do you suggest, as you do in an earlier post, that a car has a right to exist? If it does, than I would have to go gently into that good night in my hypothetical situation above (or, more likely, scream and then gurgle as I choke on my own blood). Or, if I have a right to live, and do not have to do this, then the car cannot have a right to exist. Rights are universals, they cannot be contextual, or else they aren't "rights." Everyone can have the right not to initiate force against others, as it leads to no contradictions. My car cannot have a right to exist, because it leads to a contradiction with a logically derived principle that I have a right to my life. Similarly with the ocean, trees, dirt, space shuttles, and asteroids. No inanimate object can possibly have rights, and most living organisms cannot have them either (like bacteria, sea sponges, fish, insects, etc., as they are not even conceivably entities with a conceptual faculty and de se operators).

Btw, if my argument sounds similar-ish to the Objectivist argument, it is because I am heavily influenced by Objectivism (and may, though I am not certain, end up subscribing to that view fully).

Joshua Job
nanite1018 at gmail.com





From possiblepaths2050 at gmail.com  Tue Feb  9 00:05:36 2010
From: possiblepaths2050 at gmail.com (John Grigg)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2010 17:05:36 -0700
Subject: [ExI] Joy in the transcendence of the species
In-Reply-To: <e321aa4b1002081201u7ceccef0o391885546c9e6a92@mail.gmail.com>
References: <201002080401.o1841ase025933@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
	<e321aa4b1002081201u7ceccef0o391885546c9e6a92@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <2d6187671002081605p10af2129ha5b58cd7672b0e41@mail.gmail.com>

Max More wrote:
I have long enjoyed the word "Schadenfreude", meaning pleasure derived from
the misfortunes of others. [Note: I've enjoyed the *term* "schadenfreude",
not the thing it refers to.] I got to thinking what word (if one could be
coined) would mean "pleasure in the transcendence of the species" (i.e.,
transcendence of the human condition). It may be asking a lot of a word
(even a German word) to do all this work, but I'd like to give it a try.
>>

I think of the German language as being very guttural and ugly to the the
native English speaker's ear.  But perhaps that is because I have seen so
many movies that had yelling Nazi's in them!  I recently watched the
film "Downfall" and this opinion was only reinforced (but it is a great work
of cinema).

I think the languages we should be looking at in this "coin a new
word quest" are English, Greek and Latin, among others.  How about this...

*Gaudiumhumanitastranscendia*  In other words, "joy at humanity
transcending!"

"Gaudium-humanitas-transcendia!"  I like it!  Or another possibility would
be "gaudium-humanitas-transcendere," but I think "transcendia" rolls off the
tongue better.

Taken from the Merriam-Webster online dictionary:
 Etymology: Middle English, from Latin *transcendere* to climb across,
transcend, from *trans-* + *scandere* to climb ?
Date: 14th century
>>

Max, what do you think?  Everyone else?

John Grigg  : )
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From rafal.smigrodzki at gmail.com  Tue Feb  9 00:26:22 2010
From: rafal.smigrodzki at gmail.com (Rafal Smigrodzki)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2010 19:26:22 -0500
Subject: [ExI] Personal conclusions
In-Reply-To: <e321aa4b1002061634w48eae258p79252cfc377cedab@mail.gmail.com>
References: <580930c21002040359u3141931am117614683d4f67a3@mail.gmail.com>
	<f7bfe5741002041020s7ea6e500v8105f580186028ed@mail.gmail.com>
	<e321aa4b1002061634w48eae258p79252cfc377cedab@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <7641ddc61002081626ocf720du28a01091680bb3d9@mail.gmail.com>

On Sat, Feb 6, 2010 at 7:34 PM, Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com> wrote:

>
> Considering the thread's subject, it seems safe to burn some bytes on
> personal information. So: I subscribe to panexperientialism myself.
> Either everything has subjective experience, or nothing does.

### Eh, why? Does everything have the quality of "threeness"? Maybe
there is place in this world for an infinity of qualities, such as
"being the number 3", "being a quark", or "feeling blue". Experience
is just one of an infinity of flavors that parts of reality can have,
and there is no reason to insist that all reality has it. There is
nothing really special about the human qualia, except us being
interested in them. And why wouldn't a syntax have qualia? After all,
a human brain is a formal syntax, a concatenation of symbols (synaptic
spikes, mostly) produced by chemical and electrical processes, so why
not?

Rafal


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Tue Feb  9 01:33:33 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2010 17:33:33 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <785979.10766.qm@web36505.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <e321aa4b1002081142w3fdd2defh3579a59738b8a9ed@mail.gmail.com> 
	<785979.10766.qm@web36505.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002081733x27f643b2t8eb5e3029bc73f95@mail.gmail.com>

Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>:
> I think it fair to say that either x is real or else x is not real. I also understand that some people here do not distinguish or care about the difference between reality and ~reality. They have medications for that. :)

I very nearly fall into that category.

On closer inspection, however, I go further than distinguishing
between real and ~real. I say ~real is synonymous with imaginary, but
not with non-existent; there are real things which do not exist, and
imaginary things which do.

The only trouble is, I don't categorize things consistently. Is
consciousness real or imaginary? Does it exist or not? I give
different answers at different times. Perhaps I should define my terms
better.

Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>:
> But mountains do exist, no matter how you describe them. Yes?

In the sense of large mounds of dirt and rocks, yes. I assume so.
Personally I've never stepped on an official mountain, myself.

So: mountains are real and existing. A toothache caused by a cavity is
real, whereas one caused by hypnosis is imaginary. The second
toothache certainly exists, for as long as the hypnosis lasts, but the
existence of the first toothache is highly variable: if you aren't
noticing it, it doesn't exist in that moment.

Mine is caused by clenching my teeth while I sleep. I'm not sure what
that means. Perhaps it's a complex toothache, in the algebraic sense.

Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>:
> You've fallen into the hallucination. :)

The blue pill again! Curse my deuteranomaly!

Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>:
> The word "empirical" needs some disambiguation.
>
> On the one hand people mean by the word "empirical" something like "objectively existent facts in the world, which any observer can verify". But on the other hand people mean by it something like "facts which exist in the world, including for example the facts of an entity's subjective experience".
>
> Clearly some things exist in the second sense that do no exist in the first sense. We can consider it an empirical fact that your dentist, for example, considers it true that you have a real toothache. Right?

Well, no, wrong. I haven't told my dentist. And I don't think she's
especially psychic.

For the sake of argument I'm going to pretend I'm in the worldline
where I did, though.

Right. That would invoke the second sense: my dentist's belief is
inaccessible to an outside observer, but perfectly obvious to the
dentist herself. She has empirical evidence for her own belief; that
is, she can experience it whenever she likes.

This is all rather far away from the thread subject. It seems the
original topic died off quite a while ago.


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Tue Feb  9 02:37:13 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2010 18:37:13 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Rights without selves (was: Nolopsism)
In-Reply-To: <C87EDDD8-24A5-4035-ACF3-81BD8E1E087B@GMAIL.COM>
References: <e321aa4b1002081118n5d53dd0k8dc365c11a997c29@mail.gmail.com> 
	<C87EDDD8-24A5-4035-ACF3-81BD8E1E087B@GMAIL.COM>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002081837l247bf940q423d1ba6e9e0a300@mail.gmail.com>

JOSHUA JOB <nanite1018 at gmail.com>:
> Anyone who thinks everything is alive is, as Damien said, an idiot, or I will add, severely epistemologically confused. Life also maintains homeostasis, grows, etc., things which a car does not do.

Agreed, agreed.

> Also, while rights, in my view, only apply to life, that is not a sufficient condition. The sufficient condition is that they are self-aware and rational, something cars, plants, etc. are not.

As it stands now, agreed. I've been saying that a new definition,
including unaware and irrational creatures or what have you, could be
more useful. Not certainly, but possibly. Either way I'm confident
that it would be self-consistent at the very least. and probably more
so than our current conception of ethics.

>> On the subject of awareness, use of "de se" designators, et cetera,
>> Stefano Vaj points out that unconscious human beings retain the rights
>> of their conscious selves. I would equate this with a house retaining
>> the right not to be demolished even when its residents are away.
> Perhaps, though I generally view that as simply the fact that from experience we know the person still exists, and must merely be "woken up" in order to resume reasoning, etc. And damaging that physical object that that entity "resides" in will cause damage to the entity's capacity to continue to exist, and thus, is a violation of its rights (more on that in a moment).

Thus we come to the problem of comatose patients and undesired
fetuses. Invoking the possibility of consciousness or the expectation
of future consciousness as a basis for inviolable rights leads very
quickly to some major complications in a world where we can't predict
the future with much accuracy.

> For similar reasons, I argue that things which are not rational cannot have anything have personal meaning to them. The ocean does not employ de se operators, it is not self-aware, and in fact isn't even alive, so nothing can "wrong" it. I'll agree, basically, that rights prevent things from wronging other things, in a very specific sense, but since the ocean does not have any way it can be "wronged", it cannot possibly have rights.

As I noted before: "I'm not saying it would be more morally correct to
give the ocean
rights, as though it were a living, feeling entity". A system of
rights that makes no mention of selves would necessarily describe
rights in a very diffuse sense; it would be impossible to "wrong"
something in particular, anything at all, though it would be quite
easy to commit a wrong.

"It is wrong to dump garbage in the ocean", but the ocean is not
wronged if you dump garbage in it.

>> You argue against cars having rights, and claim, indirectly, that
>> doing so would cause a great many terrible unintended consequences.
>> Request that you expound on a few of those consequences. You can
>> choose something other than a car, if easier.
(snip)
> That is my basic view of rights. I don't see how an ocean or a car can have rights, because rights need wrongs, and wrongs need values, and values need rational conceptual entities that employ de se operators (and it needs those entities to exist in some manner).

Normally I agree with you. But for now, I disagree vehemently!

Rights need wrongs: granted. Wrongs need values: granted. Values need
rational conceptual entities that employ de se operators: contested.

Laws are loaded with values, and remain loaded with the same values
long after whoever wrote them ceases to exist in any manner. It
doesn't matter where the values come from. I could write a quick
program that randomly generates grammatically correct value judgements
("it is wrong for jellyfish to vomit"), and it would naturally
instantiate a whole litany of injustices in the world.

The exigencies of survival are an equally valid source of values, and
obviously far more natural. Of course I shouldn't have to point out
that "more natural" does not automatically equal "better". It depends
entirely on how you go about determining the ultimate good. On this
list I generally go under the assumption that everyone agrees
increasing extropy is the ultimate good, and nature plays only an
incidental part there.

> What sort of horrible consequences would come if you gave a car rights (like the right to exist, for example)? Well, besides dumping that whole structure of rights, one, in my mind, based on logic, you lose the power of its base of logic, and rejecting logic leaves open any number of possible groundings for "rights", like faith or racism or random whim, etc. And that is bad.

OOH IT'S A SLIPPERY SLOPE, SOMEBODY GRAB THE SNOW TIRES.

Couldn't resist.

Logic can never serve as the basis of anything. It can only be used to
elaborate a perfectly arbitrary set of assumptions to its logical
conclusion. Faith and racism are arbitrary, but so is survival.

> But lets be concrete about it.

Let's!

> If a car has a right to exist, then that means I can't scrap it if I don't want it (and own it). But if that is the case, that means I am forced to give it to someone else, even if I don't want to (breaching my right to control my life, because I purchased the car with my money, which I used some of my life to acquire).

This seems like a perfectly sensible law, which I would not object to
instituting as-is. It's just mandatory recycling really.

> Moreover, let us say that a deer with big antlers jumps in front of my vehicle and I can hit the deer (and quite possibly be killed or at least gored by its antlers, its happened a good bit around where I live to other people), or I can veer off the side of the road, and hit a lamp-post which I know I will likely survive (as I have a wonderfully safe car), but my car will be completely totalled. What should I do? My car has a right to exist, but if I veer off to the side, it will be destroyed, and I will have destroyed it. I have a right to live if I can, but if I want to live, I must destroy my car.

You and your friend are placed in adjacent cages, with no hope of
escape except for two switches reachable only by you. One of them
releases you, but kills your friend. The other kills you, but releases
your friend. What do you do?

Logic dictates weighing the absolute value of you against the absolute
value of your friend, which is extraordinarily difficult if both of
you are typical healthy human adults. If one of you is only a car,
however, the choice should be obvious.

> So, do you suggest, as you do in an earlier post, that a car has a right to exist? If it does, than I would have to go gently into that good night in my hypothetical situation above (or, more likely, scream and then gurgle as I choke on my own blood). Or, if I have a right to live, and do not have to do this, then the car cannot have a right to exist.

Actually, I was careful to stress the difference between a brand-new
car and a complete wreck. But go on. There's something for me to
refute here, but now is not the time.

> Rights are universals, they cannot be contextual, or else they aren't "rights." Everyone can have the right not to initiate force against others, as it leads to no contradictions. My car cannot have a right to exist, because it leads to a contradiction with a logically derived principle that I have a right to my life.

Incorrect, as illustrated by the earlier case of the caged friends! In
practice, rights which are guaranteed to be universal and inviolable
are pretty much always either impossible or worthless.

The right to life is a perfect example. Someday the universe will end,
and your right will be null and void. Realistically, though, you can
expect it to be violated a good deal before it comes to that.

> Btw, if my argument sounds similar-ish to the Objectivist argument, it is because I am heavily influenced by Objectivism (and may, though I am not certain, end up subscribing to that view fully).

Ayn Rand? That explains it! Objectivism, according to the Wikipedia at
least, explicitly endorses happiness (and rational self-interest) as a
valid gauge of morality. My position is known, from an earlier post,
to be in stark contrast with this.

But that's a mere quibble; I qualify unequivocally as an ethical
subjectivist, and even border on metaphysical subjectivism at times.
I'll have to post my Napoleon argument to the list soon. This is an
argument that sparked the following statement an hour or two after I
finished it: "Yesterday I would have said yes, but this morning
Spencer shattered my objectivism".

(This is paraphrased. He actually didn't say "Spencer", he said
"Gomodo", for what I'm sure is a perfectly rational reason.)


From spike66 at att.net  Tue Feb  9 04:09:16 2010
From: spike66 at att.net (spike)
Date: Mon, 8 Feb 2010 20:09:16 -0800
Subject: [ExI] funny headlines again
In-Reply-To: <6F67645A59C7453EAF1E5DD3DDD2F70E@spike>
References: <201001270043.o0R0hbVs006730@andromeda.ziaspace.com><4B5FD28B.50707@satx.rr.com><602376332A22429C851265448732CF56@spike><8CC6DBDE4D74716-26A4-3B99@webmail-d031.sysops.aol.com><75AD3D26B9E24931B21F63C77D5043FE@spike><4100958D1881411A8A5932681CE1980A@spike>
	<6F67645A59C7453EAF1E5DD3DDD2F70E@spike>
Message-ID: <B33F141FAE2542DABE41FA46D64764CA@spike>

 
Rep. Murtha is being rembered:
 
 
 
Why the heck wouldn't spell check have caught this?  spike
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From jonkc at bellsouth.net  Tue Feb  9 06:18:54 2010
From: jonkc at bellsouth.net (John Clark)
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2010 01:18:54 -0500
Subject: [ExI] Blue Brain Project.
In-Reply-To: <4B707B25.1040006@lightlink.com>
References: <480152.31985.qm@web113604.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
	<4B707B25.1040006@lightlink.com>
Message-ID: <89E309D6-1567-4498-9094-7D2A34050E6F@bellsouth.net>

If I were God (and I just don't understand why I was never offered the job) I would offer Markram a blank check to pursue his research, but first I would ask him who he thinks is trying to do the same thing but is going about it in entirely the wrong way. If he said professor X I would then go to professor X and give him a blank check too. But first I would ask him who other than Markram he thinks is trying to do the same thing but is going about it in entirely the wrong way.

 John K Clark


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From alito at organicrobot.com  Tue Feb  9 09:49:49 2010
From: alito at organicrobot.com (Alejandro Dubrovsky)
Date: Tue, 09 Feb 2010 20:49:49 +1100
Subject: [ExI] Blue Brain Project.
In-Reply-To: <4B7079D4.1090103@satx.rr.com>
References: <558651.23421.qm@web113616.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
	<A1A20171-4B8A-46DF-BCB8-248E6ADEE0AB@bellsouth.net>
	<4B7079D4.1090103@satx.rr.com>
Message-ID: <1265708989.6916.77.camel@localhost>

On Mon, 2010-02-08 at 14:53 -0600, Damien Broderic:
> A decade or more ago, Hugo de Garis was promising a robot CAM-brain 
> puddytat. He lost several sponsors along the way. Anyone know if he's 
> doing anything along those lines today? (No, I've never heard of 
> Google--how does that work? His own site informs us excitedly of things 
> due to happen in 2006 and 2007...)
> 

By a decade ago, Robokoneko was practically dead IIRC.  

Goertzel meets with him when he goes to China, and I think they are
working together on something.  From what I gather, he's still doing
evolvable neural networks and robotics.  



From pharos at gmail.com  Tue Feb  9 10:34:21 2010
From: pharos at gmail.com (BillK)
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2010 10:34:21 +0000
Subject: [ExI] Blue Brain Project.
In-Reply-To: <1265708989.6916.77.camel@localhost>
References: <558651.23421.qm@web113616.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
	<A1A20171-4B8A-46DF-BCB8-248E6ADEE0AB@bellsouth.net>
	<4B7079D4.1090103@satx.rr.com> <1265708989.6916.77.camel@localhost>
Message-ID: <ee50357e1002090234y1c308b0av123bcdb2afbc0d2@mail.gmail.com>

On 2/9/10, Alejandro Dubrovsky wrote:
>  Goertzel meets with him when he goes to China, and I think they are
>  working together on something.  From what I gather, he's still doing
>  evolvable neural networks and robotics.
>
>

Aha! That's enough of a clue.
Search on  --  Goertzel Garis China  -- produces interesting results.

This is a presentation by Garis at the AGI-09 conference
Here, if you have PowerPoint -
<http://agi-conf.org/2009/slides/saturday/session_2/2_hugo_ab.ppt>

or here in HTML version -
<http://66.102.9.132/search?q=cache:g1Z_ty_AHhgJ:agi-conf.org/2009/slides/saturday/session_2/2_hugo_ab.ppt+Goertzel+garis+china&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk&>


BillK


From mbb386 at main.nc.us  Tue Feb  9 14:19:20 2010
From: mbb386 at main.nc.us (MB)
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2010 09:19:20 -0500 (EST)
Subject: [ExI] funny headlines again
In-Reply-To: <B33F141FAE2542DABE41FA46D64764CA@spike>
References: <201001270043.o0R0hbVs006730@andromeda.ziaspace.com><4B5FD28B.50707@satx.rr.com><602376332A22429C851265448732CF56@spike><8CC6DBDE4D74716-26A4-3B99@webmail-d031.sysops.aol.com><75AD3D26B9E24931B21F63C77D5043FE@spike><4100958D1881411A8A5932681CE1980A@spike>
	<6F67645A59C7453EAF1E5DD3DDD2F70E@spike>
	<B33F141FAE2542DABE41FA46D64764CA@spike>
Message-ID: <36057.12.77.169.53.1265725160.squirrel@www.main.nc.us>

>
> Rep. Murtha is being rembered:
>
>
>
> Why the heck wouldn't spell check have caught this?  spike
>

Perhaps someone entered "rembered" into the spellcheck dictionary additional
"correct" list... whatever that's called in their word processor.

I found this happening sometimes at my job. Very annoying.

Regards,
MB



From pharos at gmail.com  Tue Feb  9 14:28:01 2010
From: pharos at gmail.com (BillK)
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2010 14:28:01 +0000
Subject: [ExI] funny headlines again
In-Reply-To: <36057.12.77.169.53.1265725160.squirrel@www.main.nc.us>
References: <201001270043.o0R0hbVs006730@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
	<4B5FD28B.50707@satx.rr.com> <602376332A22429C851265448732CF56@spike>
	<8CC6DBDE4D74716-26A4-3B99@webmail-d031.sysops.aol.com>
	<75AD3D26B9E24931B21F63C77D5043FE@spike>
	<4100958D1881411A8A5932681CE1980A@spike>
	<6F67645A59C7453EAF1E5DD3DDD2F70E@spike>
	<B33F141FAE2542DABE41FA46D64764CA@spike>
	<36057.12.77.169.53.1265725160.squirrel@www.main.nc.us>
Message-ID: <ee50357e1002090628p352434edifd1051be8cc43745@mail.gmail.com>

On 2/9/10, MB wrote:
> Perhaps someone entered "rembered" into the spellcheck dictionary additional
>  "correct" list... whatever that's called in their word processor.
>
>  I found this happening sometimes at my job. Very annoying.
>
>


Yea, well obviously it is the opposite of 'dismembered'.

BillK


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Tue Feb  9 14:59:44 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2010 06:59:44 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002071454r346f278auabb77281c629a0e0@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <523017.75621.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Sun, 2/7/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:

>> The amoeba has no neurons or nervous system, Stathis,
>> so "less conscious" is an understatement. It has no
>> consciousness at all.
> 
> As far as you're concerned the function of the nervous
> system - intelligence - which is due to the interactions between
> neurons bears no essential relationship to consciousness. 

As I define intelligence, some of it is encoded into DNA. Every organism has some intelligence including the lowly amoeba. This hapless creature has enough intelligence to find food and replicate but it has no idea of its own existence.

> You believe that consciousness is a property of certain specialised 
> cells.

Yes. And I think you most likely believe so also, except when you have reason to argue for the imaginary mental states of amoebas to support your theory about the imaginary mental states of computers. :)

We can suppose theories of alien forms of consciousness that might exist in computers and in amoebas and in other entities that lack nervous systems, as you seem wont to do, but it seems to me that there we cross over the line from science to science-fiction.

-gts



      


From estropico at gmail.com  Tue Feb  9 16:27:50 2010
From: estropico at gmail.com (estropico)
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2010 16:27:50 +0000
Subject: [ExI] ExtroBritannia: The future of politics. Can politicians
	prepare society for the major technology challenges ahead?
	With Darren Reynolds
Message-ID: <4eaaa0d91002090827m7a6a3f49y18caf3f378a4cda8@mail.gmail.com>

The future of politics. Can politicians prepare society for the major
technology challenges ahead? With Darren Reynolds.

Venue: Room 416, Birkbeck College, Torrington Square, London WC1E 7HX
Date: Saturday 20th February 2010
Time: 2pm-4pm

About the talk:

With the rapid accelerating changes in many fields of technology and
society, there's a risk we'll wake up one morning in (say) 2015 and
realise that our politicians have failed to play their role in
anticipating and preparing for major risks and opportunities -
politicians were focusing on issues of the past, and neglecting issues
of the future.

What should we be doing, now, to change the topic of political debate,
to bring more focus on the transformative potential of emerging
technologies?

How should the role of politicians evolve, over the near future, to
improve the technological leadership of this country (and beyond)?

And what role can non-politicians play, to improve the way society
makes collective choices about the allocation of funding and
resources?

About the main speaker:

Darren Reynolds is a pro-technology campaigner and local government
councillor for the UK's Liberal Democrats. In his professional career
he has helped many public and private sector organisations to
introduce new technology and improve the way they work. Darren
believes in putting choices in the hands of ordinary people and
ensuring that tomorrow's technological developments flourish in a
balanced regulatory framework.

Darren is Chair of the Burnley Liberal Democrats.

In 1998, Darren was part of the international team of philosophers and
activists who produced the original "Transhumanist Declaration"

Opportunity for additional speakers

The meeting will also feature a number of 5-minute pitches from
audience members (agreed in advance) stating cases for specific
changes in the allocation of national budget - for example, which
areas of research deserve a larger share of funding (and which areas
deserve less).

Anyone wishing to take part in this section of the meeting should get
in touch asap.

There's no charge to attend this meeting, and everyone is welcome.

There will be plenty of opportunity to ask questions and to make comments.

Discussion will continue after the event, in a nearby pub, for those
who are able to stay.

** Why not join some of the Extrobritannia regulars for a drink and/or
light lunch beforehand, any time after 12.30pm, in The Marlborough
Arms, 36 Torrington Place, London WC1E 7HJ. To find us, look out for a
table where there's a copy of the book "Citizen Cyborg: Why Democratic
Societies Must Respond to the Redesigned Human of the Future"
displayed.

** About the venue:

Room 416 is on the fourth floor (via the lift near reception) in the
main Birkbeck College building, in Torrington Square (which is a
pedestrian-only square). Torrington Square is about 10 minutes walk
from either Russell Square or Goodge St tube stations.

www.extrobritannia.blogspot.com
www.uktranshumanistassociation.org


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Tue Feb  9 16:38:41 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2010 08:38:41 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Personal conclusions
In-Reply-To: <7641ddc61002081626ocf720du28a01091680bb3d9@mail.gmail.com>
References: <580930c21002040359u3141931am117614683d4f67a3@mail.gmail.com> 
	<f7bfe5741002041020s7ea6e500v8105f580186028ed@mail.gmail.com> 
	<e321aa4b1002061634w48eae258p79252cfc377cedab@mail.gmail.com> 
	<7641ddc61002081626ocf720du28a01091680bb3d9@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002090838u51463078p31dff29a93050fce@mail.gmail.com>

Rafal Smigrodzki <rafal.smigrodzki at gmail.com>:
> ### Eh, why? Does everything have the quality of "threeness"? Maybe
> there is place in this world for an infinity of qualities, such as
> "being the number 3", "being a quark", or "feeling blue". Experience
> is just one of an infinity of flavors that parts of reality can have,
> and there is no reason to insist that all reality has it.

The trick is that every other quality is pretty much meaningless
without the corresponding experience of that quality. The universe
doesn't recognize three, and three doesn't recognize itself. Something
else has to experience the threeness of three. Otherwise it isn't even
worth considering, regardless of any potential truth in the statement!

My reason to insist that all reality has subjective experience is
simply this: I think of myself as a machine, but I don't feel like a
machine. I feel like a conscious entity, which seems like a
fundamentally different sort of thing. So I have to resolve the
discrepancy between these two views if I want to stay sane.

There are only two options that I can think of: one is that
consciousness is an epiphenomenon, purely an illusion generated by the
underlying workings of reality. The other is that consciousness is a
real substance built into the fabric of spacetime, as atoms were
purported to be, and nucleons and quarks long after them.

I'm inclined to believe both of these things, and that they only
appear mutually exclusive to my limited mortal logic. It seems to me
that a perfectly coherent interpretation of reality could be made from
either stance, just as easily as light can be described as waves or
particles. Two ways of phrasing the same incomprehensible thing.

Supporting that idea to an extent, in a very inconvenient way, both
conceptions run into the very same problem. If consciousness is an
epiphenomenon: of what? If consciousness is a substance: what attracts
it?

The only things I see in a brain that I don't see in a stone are
intelligence and understanding, and only the latter is unique to
brains in general. Both of these are obvious epiphenomena to my mind,
which means there must be some simpler phenomenon underlying them. But
what? The ability to process information? That's only the ability to
exhibit a non-random response to stimuli, and everything in the
universe does that constantly.

Thus: panexperientialism. My hand is forced.

(Everything here is rather compressed, taking all of my personal
axioms as universal axioms. So it would be easy to disagree with. I'm
not looking to convince anyone here, just giving a window into my
worldview. The professorial cadence is an epiphenomenon of my
personality.)


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Tue Feb  9 17:04:21 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2010 09:04:21 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
Message-ID: <782068.69808.qm@web36507.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Mon, 2/8/10, Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com> wrote:

> Right. That would invoke the second sense: my dentist's
> belief is inaccessible to an outside observer, but perfectly obvious
> to the dentist herself. She has empirical evidence for her own
> belief; that is, she can experience it whenever she likes.

I want to get at the idea here that to both you and to your dentist, your toothache exists as an empirical fact of reality. Your dentist may have no interest in philosophy but she will operate on that philosophical assumption: she might ask you, "Where does it hurt, Spencer? Does it hurt more when I press here?" and so on. 

Your dentist, presumably an educated woman of science, approaches the subject of your toothache as she would any other empirical fact of reality. She does this even though neither she nor anyone else can feel the pain of your toothache. 

We should, I think, emulate that approach to the subjective mental states of others in general. Mental states really do exist as empirical facts. They differ from other empirical facts as superbowl games and gumball machines only in so much as they have subjective ontologies; instead of existing in the public domain, as it were, someone in particular must "have" them.
 
> This is all rather far away from the thread subject. 

I think it relates to the subject in that some people seem philosophically inclined to reduce the first-person mental to the third-person physical. Fearing any association with mind/matter dualism, they reject the notion of consciousness and try to explain subjective first-person facts in objective third-person terms. They imagine that if only they could derive a complete objective scientific description of a toothache, they would then know everything one can know about the subject of toothaches. But nothing in their descriptions will capture what it feels like to have one.

-gts







      


From nanite1018 at gmail.com  Tue Feb  9 19:25:42 2010
From: nanite1018 at gmail.com (JOSHUA JOB)
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2010 14:25:42 -0500
Subject: [ExI] Rights without selves (was: Nolopsism)
In-Reply-To: <e321aa4b1002081837l247bf940q423d1ba6e9e0a300@mail.gmail.com>
References: <e321aa4b1002081118n5d53dd0k8dc365c11a997c29@mail.gmail.com>
	<C87EDDD8-24A5-4035-ACF3-81BD8E1E087B@GMAIL.COM>
	<e321aa4b1002081837l247bf940q423d1ba6e9e0a300@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <60CE7310-2BE1-47BE-AE8A-9BFC69A659B4@GMAIL.COM>

> On Feb 8, 2010, at 9:37 PM, Spencer Campbell wrote:
> Thus we come to the problem of comatose patients and undesired
> fetuses. Invoking the possibility of consciousness or the expectation
> of future consciousness as a basis for inviolable rights leads very
> quickly to some major complications in a world where we can't predict
> the future with much accuracy.

A fetus is not yet a person, nor has ever been a person (as it is not nor ever has been a rational conceptual entity). So it cannot have any rights. At least until 34 weeks, they cannot possibly be regarded as people, at least from what I've read of neural development in the brain (the neocortex doesn't connect up until around then). After that it gets a little more fuzzy. As for comatose patients, if they have the capacity for brain function (i.e., they are not totally brain damaged), then they count as people, though others have to make decisions for them as that is a state which it is very difficult to recover from. If they are brain dead, then that entity no longer exists nor can it exist again (or at least, if it could, the body itself is likely irrelevant), and so no longer has rights.
> "It is wrong to dump garbage in the ocean", but the ocean is not
> wronged if you dump garbage in it.

I am saying that it cannot be wrong if it does not violate the nature of other conscious entities. The ocean cannot be wronged, only rational conceptual "self"-aware entities can be, because they are the things that can conceivably understand right and wrong. So it can't be wrong (as in, a violation of rights) to do something unless it infringes on the rights of other such entities. I argue that the only way to do this is to infringe with their ability to make decisions for themselves based on the facts of reality (so no force or fraud). Ocean dumping does not do this (unless someone owns the ocean or part of it, etc.), so it cannot be wrong, from the perspective of a discussion of rights.
> Laws are loaded with values, and remain loaded with the same values
> long after whoever wrote them ceases to exist in any manner. It
> doesn't matter where the values come from. I could write a quick
> program that randomly generates grammatically correct value judgements
> ("it is wrong for jellyfish to vomit"), and it would naturally
> instantiate a whole litany of injustices in the world. The exigencies of survival are an equally valid source of values, and obviously far more natural.

They aren't equally valid, they have a basis in reality. Statements have to be connected to reality in some way, or they mean literally nothing. "It is wrong for jellyfish to vomit" is totally disconnected with reality, as "wrong" can't be applied objectively to jellyfish vomit, but only in relation to entities for which the words "right" and "wrong" can have any meaning. Laws cease to exist (as laws) when there are no people who obey or enforce them. They apply to entities which can understand the meaning of "law." And yes, they are loaded with values, but they do not retain those values when they cease to be laws. They are, at best, a description of values from the past. But they are no longer laws, and have nothing to do with rights today (as those laws are no longer in effect).

> Of course I shouldn't have to point out
> that "more natural" does not automatically equal "better". It depends
> entirely on how you go about determining the ultimate good. On this
> list I generally go under the assumption that everyone agrees
> increasing extropy is the ultimate good, and nature plays only an
> incidental part there.

The idea of rights without selves (including rights of cars, the ocean to not be dumped in or vomited in by jellyfish) cannot possibly increase extropy. To demonstrate, I'll quote the definition of extropy from the ExI website:
"Extropy- The extent of a living or organizational system's intelligence, functional order, vitality, and capacity and drive for improvement."
By making life of rational conceptual "self"-aware entities the basis for your system of rights, you establish vitality and capacity/drive for improvement at the center of your system of rights. Along with that, you generate order (as in, spontaneous order, haha) by barring the initiation of force, and you set in place a framework that creates a strong drive for self-improvement, including intellectual improvement, in everyone in the society. Granting cars and the ocean rights has nothing to do with increasing intelligence, improving life, or increasing order or vitality of a living/organizational system. So I don't see how, in the context of extropy, one could argue that a system of rights not based on selves (and more properly, rational self-interest), could be extropic.
> OOH IT'S A SLIPPERY SLOPE, SOMEBODY GRAB THE SNOW TIRES.
> 
> Couldn't resist.
That's fine, I busted a gut at 1:30am when I read this. Tickled my funny bone, haha.
> Logic can never serve as the basis of anything. It can only be used to
> elaborate a perfectly arbitrary set of assumptions to its logical
> conclusion. Faith and racism are arbitrary, but so is survival.

True, I'm sorry. Reason is the basis, i.e. a combination of information about reality coupled with the application of logic/reason on that information. In my case, it is the nature of life, rational conceptual self-aware entities in particular, that leads to my conclusion that the only right you have is to not have force initiated against you. Everything else is in the province of personal morality (what should or shouldn't I do, what should my goals be, etc.), not essential right. That needs a self in order to work. Or at least, something equivalent, if you don't want to use "self".

> You and your friend are placed in adjacent cages, with no hope of
> escape except for two switches reachable only by you. One of them
> releases you, but kills your friend. The other kills you, but releases
> your friend. What do you do?
> ...
> Incorrect, as illustrated by the earlier case of the caged friends! In
> practice, rights which are guaranteed to be universal and inviolable
> are pretty much always either impossible or worthless.
> 
> The right to life is a perfect example. Someday the universe will end,
> and your right will be null and void. Realistically, though, you can
> expect it to be violated a good deal before it comes to that.
Okay, I did a bad example, because rights, in my view, are based on life, and if life is impossible (like two caged friends where one must die), rights don't really apply anymore (all options lead to death). And perhaps I should not have gotten concrete in the way I proposed. Somewhat more abstract would be:
I buy a car, but I don't want it after a month. In fact, I really hate it, because, say, my hypothetical girlfriend had a heart attack in it because, I don't know, she slipped over the middle line and had a good scare. Whatever. But I want it destroyed. The law prevents me from doing so. I do it anyway. Then I go to jail, for a good while, because I violated the rights of a car. To me, that makes no sense at all. The car isn't alive. I committed no wrong against it. I merely crushed it and sold it for the metal it had in it. The only way you can justify this (or, try to anyway), is if you related the destruction of the car to me harming other people (like, they didn't get to have it, though in my opinion, that isn't harm, but that's beside the point). Any "right" would have to be connected to something that can be "wronged". Without "wrongs", i.e., actions where something is wronged, you have ludicrous situations such as the above.

Moreover, you don't have a right to life. You have a right to your life. Big difference. In the one case, I have a right to never die. In the other, no one else can take my life from me. The universe isn't a person, so it can't "take" my life. I must die eventually (or do I? bum bum bum...) but I can be guaranteed the right not to be killed (unless I'm in a special life-boat type situation).

> But that's a mere quibble; I qualify unequivocally as an ethical
> subjectivist, and even border on metaphysical subjectivism at times.
> I'll have to post my Napoleon argument to the list soon. This is an
> argument that sparked the following statement an hour or two after I
> finished it: "Yesterday I would have said yes, but this morning
> Spencer shattered my objectivism".
I'd like to here it.


Joshua Job
nanite1018 at gmail.com



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From cluebcke at yahoo.com  Tue Feb  9 18:18:06 2010
From: cluebcke at yahoo.com (Christopher Luebcke)
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2010 10:18:06 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <782068.69808.qm@web36507.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <782068.69808.qm@web36507.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <275932.16385.qm@web111206.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

Hi, noob lurker (me) is unlurking.

> ...they reject the notion of consciousness and try to explain subjective first-person facts in objective third-person terms.

You'll hopefully forgive my newness to some of the topics covered in this amazing group, but is it the case that an attempt to objectively describe first-person facts requires or equates to a rejection of the notion of consciousness?

> But nothing in their descriptions will capture what it feels like to have one.

A description is intended to describe, not to emulate. A scientific description of a toothache--including the brain states involved--no more fails because it cannot transmit pain, than a blueprint of a boat fails because it does not sail across the ocean, or impose upon the reader the smell of brine and a difficulty in keeping one's balance. 

How would one capture a feeling? 


----- Original Message ----
From: Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>
To: ExI chat list <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org>
Sent: Tue, February 9, 2010 9:04:21 AM
Subject: Re: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability

--- On Mon, 2/8/10, Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com> wrote:

> Right. That would invoke the second sense: my dentist's
> belief is inaccessible to an outside observer, but perfectly obvious
> to the dentist herself. She has empirical evidence for her own
> belief; that is, she can experience it whenever she likes.

I want to get at the idea here that to both you and to your dentist, your toothache exists as an empirical fact of reality. Your dentist may have no interest in philosophy but she will operate on that philosophical assumption: she might ask you, "Where does it hurt, Spencer? Does it hurt more when I press here?" and so on. 

Your dentist, presumably an educated woman of science, approaches the subject of your toothache as she would any other empirical fact of reality. She does this even though neither she nor anyone else can feel the pain of your toothache. 

We should, I think, emulate that approach to the subjective mental states of others in general. Mental states really do exist as empirical facts. They differ from other empirical facts as superbowl games and gumball machines only in so much as they have subjective ontologies; instead of existing in the public domain, as it were, someone in particular must "have" them.

> This is all rather far away from the thread subject. 

I think it relates to the subject in that some people seem philosophically inclined to reduce the first-person mental to the third-person physical. Fearing any association with mind/matter dualism, they reject the notion of consciousness and try to explain subjective first-person facts in objective third-person terms. They imagine that if only they could derive a complete objective scientific description of a toothache, they would then know everything one can know about the subject of toothaches. But nothing in their descriptions will capture what it feels like to have one.

-gts







      
_______________________________________________
extropy-chat mailing list
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat



From scerir at libero.it  Tue Feb  9 21:09:47 2010
From: scerir at libero.it (scerir)
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2010 22:09:47 +0100 (CET)
Subject: [ExI] quantum brains
Message-ID: <15438936.1102881265749787403.JavaMail.defaultUser@defaultHost>

> But I've read arxiv papers recently arguing that photosynthesis 
> functions via entanglement, so something that basic might be operating 
> in other bio systems.
> Damien Broderick

http://arxiv.org/abs/1001.5108
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v463/n7281/full/nature08811.html
http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/cosmicvariance/2010/02/05/quantum-
photosynthesis/


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Tue Feb  9 21:27:17 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2010 13:27:17 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
Message-ID: <740405.96745.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Tue, 2/9/10, Christopher Luebcke <cluebcke at yahoo.com> wrote:

Welcome Christopher.

> You'll hopefully forgive my newness to some of the topics
> covered in this amazing group, but is it the case that an
> attempt to objectively describe first-person facts requires
> or equates to a rejection of the notion of consciousness?

I had asserted that the world contains both subjective and objective facts or states-of-affairs. The question came up about how or why subjective facts like toothaches can qualify as empirical facts.

Often when we speak of "empirical facts" we something like "objectively existent facts, verifiable by any observer". I have no objection to that use of the word, but if we understand empirical only in that limited sense then we may find ourselves dismissing real first-person subjective facts as non-empirical and thus somehow unreal or less real than other facts. I contend that the word empirical often does and should also apply to subjective first-person facts. 

There exists for example an actual fact of the matter whether or not you feel hungry at this moment. I cannot know that fact without an honest report from you, but this is no way disqualifies it from having status as a real empirical fact. The fact of your feeling hungry or not has as much reality as does anything objectively verifiable.

-gts
 




      


From spike66 at att.net  Tue Feb  9 21:44:14 2010
From: spike66 at att.net (spike)
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2010 13:44:14 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <275932.16385.qm@web111206.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
References: <782068.69808.qm@web36507.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
	<275932.16385.qm@web111206.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <CE28B63C7BF146EBA5FA377E73096188@spike>

 

> ...On Behalf Of Christopher Luebcke
> Subject: Re: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
> 
> Hi, noob lurker (me) is unlurking...


Hi Chris, welcome!  Do tell us something about you, if you wish.  Otherwise,
welcome anyway.

{8-]

spike







From cluebcke at yahoo.com  Tue Feb  9 23:27:11 2010
From: cluebcke at yahoo.com (Christopher Luebcke)
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2010 15:27:11 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <740405.96745.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <740405.96745.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <519473.46888.qm@web111205.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

Thank you for the background and the welcome.

> There exists for example an actual fact of the matter whether or not you feel hungry at this moment. I cannot know that fact without an honest report from you, but this is no way disqualifies it from having status as a real empirical fact. The fact of your feeling hungry or not has as much reality as does anything objectively verifiable.

I'm not convinced that a subject's sense of "feeling hungry" cannot be objectively verified. I can verify with perfect accuracy whether a light is red without having to experience "purple", by using instruments; in the same way I expect that it will shortly (in historical terms) be possible to verify, via real-time monitoring of the brain, whether a subject is experiencing "feeling hungry", without the observer needing to experience an identical state of hunger.

I could quite easily be wrong, of course.

----- Original Message ----
From: Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>
To: ExI chat list <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org>
Sent: Tue, February 9, 2010 1:27:17 PM
Subject: Re: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability

--- On Tue, 2/9/10, Christopher Luebcke <cluebcke at yahoo.com> wrote:

Welcome Christopher.

> You'll hopefully forgive my newness to some of the topics
> covered in this amazing group, but is it the case that an
> attempt to objectively describe first-person facts requires
> or equates to a rejection of the notion of consciousness?

I had asserted that the world contains both subjective and objective facts or states-of-affairs. The question came up about how or why subjective facts like toothaches can qualify as empirical facts.

Often when we speak of "empirical facts" we something like "objectively existent facts, verifiable by any observer". I have no objection to that use of the word, but if we understand empirical only in that limited sense then we may find ourselves dismissing real first-person subjective facts as non-empirical and thus somehow unreal or less real than other facts. I contend that the word empirical often does and should also apply to subjective first-person facts. 

There exists for example an actual fact of the matter whether or not you feel hungry at this moment. I cannot know that fact without an honest report from you, but this is no way disqualifies it from having status as a real empirical fact. The fact of your feeling hungry or not has as much reality as does anything objectively verifiable.

-gts





      
_______________________________________________
extropy-chat mailing list
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat



From cluebcke at yahoo.com  Tue Feb  9 23:36:23 2010
From: cluebcke at yahoo.com (Christopher Luebcke)
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2010 15:36:23 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <CE28B63C7BF146EBA5FA377E73096188@spike>
References: <782068.69808.qm@web36507.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
	<275932.16385.qm@web111206.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
	<CE28B63C7BF146EBA5FA377E73096188@spike>
Message-ID: <618013.65100.qm@web111215.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

Thanks Spike,

Nothing terribly interesting to tell. I'm a software developer, science and space enthusiast, and armchair philosopher (I opted not to go pro after suffering through a semester-long graduate-level course on utilitarianism). I don't often identify myself as a member of any particular group that isn't defined by biology, but broadly I have strong transhumanist leanings. I'm kinda non-committal there as I'm really just now getting deep into the subject, and I don't think I have a good enough definition of "transhumanist" to know if I fit the bill.

I'm also *very* interested in finding groups of very smart people who are working on the kinds of problems and projects that really excite me, and hanging on like a stubborn barnacle, leeching one small unit of knowledge at a time while hoping not to excessively irritate my hosts. 

Lastly, I'm deeply interested in the future and would quite like to continue to be a part of it :)

- Chris


----- Original Message ----
From: spike <spike66 at att.net>
To: ExI chat list <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org>
Sent: Tue, February 9, 2010 1:44:14 PM
Subject: Re: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability



> ...On Behalf Of Christopher Luebcke
> Subject: Re: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
> 
> Hi, noob lurker (me) is unlurking...


Hi Chris, welcome!  Do tell us something about you, if you wish.  Otherwise,
welcome anyway.

{8-]

spike





_______________________________________________
extropy-chat mailing list
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat



From jrd1415 at gmail.com  Wed Feb 10 05:28:22 2010
From: jrd1415 at gmail.com (Jeff Davis)
Date: Tue, 9 Feb 2010 22:28:22 -0700
Subject: [ExI] quantum brains
In-Reply-To: <15438936.1102881265749787403.JavaMail.defaultUser@defaultHost>
References: <15438936.1102881265749787403.JavaMail.defaultUser@defaultHost>
Message-ID: <a6a17bd41002092128s4ad443fes750afba99069ac48@mail.gmail.com>

http://arxivblog.com/?p=370

Looks like quantum effects may be ubiquitous.

On Tue, Feb 9, 2010 at 2:09 PM, scerir <scerir at libero.it> wrote:
>> But I've read arxiv papers recently arguing that photosynthesis
>> functions via entanglement, so something that basic might be operating
>> in other bio systems.
>> Damien Broderick
>
> http://arxiv.org/abs/1001.5108
> http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v463/n7281/full/nature08811.html
> http://blogs.discovermagazine.com/cosmicvariance/2010/02/05/quantum-
> photosynthesis/
> _______________________________________________
> extropy-chat mailing list
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
>


From stathisp at gmail.com  Wed Feb 10 07:18:00 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2010 18:18:00 +1100
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <523017.75621.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <f21c22e31002071454r346f278auabb77281c629a0e0@mail.gmail.com> 
	<523017.75621.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002092318v783e1e53n3698639a856db51@mail.gmail.com>

On 10 February 2010 01:59, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:

>> As far as you're concerned the function of the nervous
>> system - intelligence - which is due to the interactions between
>> neurons bears no essential relationship to consciousness.
>
> As I define intelligence, some of it is encoded into DNA. Every organism has some intelligence including the lowly amoeba. This hapless creature has enough intelligence to find food and replicate but it has no idea of its own existence.

I'm not arguing for amoeba consciousness, although I think that
consciousness and intelligence are roughly proportional to each other
and if anything has any intelligence or consciousness there must be a
gradation between the amoeba, the human and the Jupiter brain.

>> You believe that consciousness is a property of certain specialised
>> cells.
>
> Yes. And I think you most likely believe so also, except when you have reason to argue for the imaginary mental states of amoebas to support your theory about the imaginary mental states of computers. :)
>
> We can suppose theories of alien forms of consciousness that might exist in computers and in amoebas and in other entities that lack nervous systems, as you seem wont to do, but it seems to me that there we cross over the line from science to science-fiction.

The most important property of the nervous system is its ability to
process information. Brainstem functions, subcellular functions and
low level cortical functions do not manifest as intelligence nor as
consciousness. However, you believe that consciousness is only
contingently related to intelligence, and you have also implied that
the NCC is something other than the complex pattern of neural firings,
since that can be reproduced by a computer. Thus there is no logical
reason for you to insist that consciousness should be attached to
nervous systems. It could be something that is secreted by neurons not
associated in systems, or in non-neural cells.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From stathisp at gmail.com  Wed Feb 10 07:22:18 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2010 18:22:18 +1100
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <519473.46888.qm@web111205.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
References: <740405.96745.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
	<519473.46888.qm@web111205.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002092322w4b5860d6kb342dee1017622c3@mail.gmail.com>

On 10 February 2010 10:27, Christopher Luebcke <cluebcke at yahoo.com> wrote:
> Thank you for the background and the welcome.
>
>> There exists for example an actual fact of the matter whether or not you feel hungry at this moment. I cannot know that fact without an honest report from you, but this is no way disqualifies it from having status as a real empirical fact. The fact of your feeling hungry or not has as much reality as does anything objectively verifiable.
>
> I'm not convinced that a subject's sense of "feeling hungry" cannot be objectively verified. I can verify with perfect accuracy whether a light is red without having to experience "purple", by using instruments; in the same way I expect that it will shortly (in historical terms) be possible to verify, via real-time monitoring of the brain, whether a subject is experiencing "feeling hungry", without the observer needing to experience an identical state of hunger.

We can objectively verify it if we make a correlation between a
self-described mental state and a brain state, but only if we have
that sort of brain state ourselves can we guess as to what it is like.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Wed Feb 10 13:41:15 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2010 05:41:15 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002092318v783e1e53n3698639a856db51@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <557161.41950.qm@web36505.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Wed, 2/10/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:

> I'm not arguing for amoeba consciousness

But you did make such an argument: when I asked you if a digital computer had conscious understanding of a symbol by virtue of associating that symbol with an image file, you compared the computer's conscious understanding to that of an amoeba, suggesting that both amoebas and computers have a wee bit of consciousness. 

Now you seem to agree that amoebas have no consciousness. So I'll ask you again: do you agree that digital computers cannot obtain conscious understanding of symbols by virtue of associating those symbols with image data? 

> The most important property of the nervous system is its
> ability to process information. 

So they say.

> However, you believe that consciousness is only
> contingently related to intelligence,

I believe consciousness evolved because it enhances intelligence. 

> and you have also implied that the NCC is something other than the 
> complex pattern of neural firings, since that can be reproduced by a 
> computer. 

Computers can reproduce just about any pattern. But a computerized pattern of a thing does not equal the thing patterned. 

I can for example reproduce the pattern of a tree leaf on my computer. That digital leaf will not have the properties of a real leaf. No matter what natural things we simulate on a computer, the simulations will always lack the real properties of the things simulated. 

Digital simulations of things can do no more than *simulate* those things. It mystifies me that people here believe simulations of organic brains should somehow qualify for an exception to this rule. 

Neuroscientists should someday have at their disposal perfect digital simulations of brains to use as tools for doing computer-simulated brain surgeries. But according to you and some others, those digitally simulated brains will have consciousness and so might qualify as real people. This would mean medical students will have access to computer simulations of hearts to do simulated heart surgeries, but they won't have access to the same kinds of computerized tools for doing simulated brain surgeries. Those darned computer simulated brains won't sign the consent forms.

People like me will want to do the simulated surgeries anyway. The Society for the Prevention of Simulated Cruelty to Simulated Brains will oppose me.

-gts



      


From jonkc at bellsouth.net  Wed Feb 10 16:17:19 2010
From: jonkc at bellsouth.net (John Clark)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2010 11:17:19 -0500
Subject: [ExI] How not to make a thought experiment
In-Reply-To: <557161.41950.qm@web36505.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <557161.41950.qm@web36505.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <BC906E5B-BA1A-49D4-9332-0AF0B033A387@bellsouth.net>

Since my last post Gordon Swobe has posted 4 times:

> when I asked you [Stathis Papaioannou] if a digital computer had conscious understanding of a symbol by virtue of associating that symbol with an image file, you compared the computer's conscious understanding to that of an amoeba, suggesting that both amoebas and computers have a wee bit of consciousness. 

I can make guesses but there is no way I can know or will ever know if an amoeba is conscious; hell there is no way I can know if a rock is conscious, or even if Gordon Swobe is. Of course some things don't act as if they were conscious, as in people when they are sleeping; the universal rule of thumb for detecting consciousness is intelligent action, even Gordon Swobe uses this rule every day of his life and every hour of his day except when he's sleeping or debating the matter on the Extropian list.

I personally wouldn't endow the way an amoeba behaves with the grand title "intelligence", but reasonable people can differ on this matter; Swobe takes a somewhat more liberal view and thinks amoebas are intelligent. What is NOT reasonable is claiming that it is intelligent but not conscious. That is complete gibberish from an evolutionary viewpoint.  

> do you agree that digital computers cannot obtain conscious understanding of symbols by virtue of associating those symbols with image data? 

No I don't agree, and I must confess to having a certain feeling of contempt for the idea. I think contempt is the proper word for something that is not only inconsistent with the discoveries made by science but is also inconsistent with the way we live our daily lives when we are not debating on the Extropian List.

> I believe consciousness evolved because it enhances intelligence. 

And in a magnificent demonstration of doublethink Swobe also believes that a behavioral demonstration like the Turing test cannot detect consciousness. 

> Digital simulations of things can do no more than *simulate* those things.

Wow, now I see the error of my ways! It's a pity Swobe didn't say that two months and several hundred posts ago, think of the time we could have saved. Oh wait he did.

   John K Clark


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From pharos at gmail.com  Wed Feb 10 16:20:37 2010
From: pharos at gmail.com (BillK)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2010 16:20:37 +0000
Subject: [ExI] Google Buzz has arrived for Gmail users
Message-ID: <ee50357e1002100820m149f8282y2dfa1dc53fd699b7@mail.gmail.com>

Gmail users will soon notice a Buzz folder appearing next to their Inbox.
(You need to be using the newer version of Gmail, not the simpler
older version).

So far it seems to be like an instant messaging system to which you
can add pictures or videos. It has 'Friends' and 'Followers' to
organise the distribution of your Buzz messages. Messages appear
immediately, so a conversation can be maintained, or more like a
conference call with selected 'Friends'.
Google claim that their anti-spam software and their 'Don't like'
button will cut down on the amount of garbage that these social
systems usually generate.

As with all these sharing systems, you should immediately edit your
Buzz profile to make sure you are only sharing what you want to share.
 ;)

Commentators are hinting at Google trying to replace Facebook,
Twitter, etc. but we will have to wait an see how many people use it.
There are more features expected to be rolled out in the coming weeks.

More info here:
<http://www.webmonkey.com/blog/Hands_On_With_Google_Buzz_-_It_s_a_Stream_in_Your_Inbox>


BillK


From steinberg.will at gmail.com  Wed Feb 10 18:07:04 2010
From: steinberg.will at gmail.com (Will Steinberg)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2010 13:07:04 -0500
Subject: [ExI] Mary passes the test
Message-ID: <4e3a29501002101007i46d887eeqe3ce2f150dd60b86@mail.gmail.com>

Upon emerging from her room, The Scientists present Mary with two large
colored squares.  One is red, and one is blue.  I wholeheartedly believe
Mary will be able to tell which one is red.  When asked why, Mary says "I
had a feeling that's what it would look like."
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From steinberg.will at gmail.com  Wed Feb 10 18:48:57 2010
From: steinberg.will at gmail.com (Will Steinberg)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2010 13:48:57 -0500
Subject: [ExI] Mary passes the test.
Message-ID: <4e3a29501002101048t3fa58f24t9c2b5e834559afdc@mail.gmail.com>

"Mary the Color Scientist" is often used as an iron defense of the
magicalness or platonic reality of qualia.  To some, it is enough to say
that Mary learns something COMPLETELY new about the color red when she sees
it, giving the sense that, even for all fact and physicality, something is
missing until Mary sees that color.  Why is this thesis so readily
expected?  I think that qualia, however weird or outside of normal fact, is,
at heart, inextricable from those facts.  For example:

Upon emerging from her room, The Scientists present Mary with two large
colored squares.  One is red, and one is blue.  I wholeheartedly believe
Mary will be able to tell which one is red.  When asked why, Mary says "I
had a feeling that's what it would look like."

I would say that Mary, after learning about red and its neural pathways and
physical properties, is able to form some conception of the color in her
mind's eye, regardless of whether it has been presented to her, because red
is "in there" somewhere.  Here is another example:

The Scientists invent a fake color called "bread."  They teach Mary all
there is to know about red and about bread.  When asked which one is the
real color, Mary tells the scientists that it is obviously red, because her
mind is able to, unexplainable but surely, delve deeper into the
understanding of this.  My point is that there is, at least to me, something
in the facts that will, however minutely, betray the idea of redness to her.

There was recently an article in Discover about the loss of a man's mind's
eye wherein he exhibited some blindsight-like phenomena, knowing without
seeing.  I believe that, in this sense, Mary can KNOW all there is about
red, INCLUDING its qualic perception.  She still may gain something when she
sees the red, but it is, in this case, akin to brushing the dirt of a
treasure chest she has found in a hole to reveal it in its totality.  The
hole is there and some of the dirt is scraped away, and she has a very good
idea of what red is.  Seeing it merely puts her mind at ease, knowing she
was right all along.
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From max at maxmore.com  Wed Feb 10 18:48:48 2010
From: max at maxmore.com (Max More)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2010 12:48:48 -0600
Subject: [ExI] The Future of Markets
Message-ID: <201002101849.o1AIn1YP011304@andromeda.ziaspace.com>

An excellent piece by the former head of Oxford University's business school:

The Future of Markets
John Kay
20 October 2009, Wincott Foundation
http://www.johnkay.com/2009/10/20/the-future-of-markets/


-------------------------------------
Max More, Ph.D.
Strategic Philosopher
The Proactionary Project
Extropy Institute Founder
www.maxmore.com
max at maxmore.com
------------------------------------- 



From lacertilian at gmail.com  Wed Feb 10 21:07:39 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2010 13:07:39 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Rights without selves (was: Nolopsism)
In-Reply-To: <60CE7310-2BE1-47BE-AE8A-9BFC69A659B4@GMAIL.COM>
References: <e321aa4b1002081118n5d53dd0k8dc365c11a997c29@mail.gmail.com> 
	<C87EDDD8-24A5-4035-ACF3-81BD8E1E087B@GMAIL.COM>
	<e321aa4b1002081837l247bf940q423d1ba6e9e0a300@mail.gmail.com> 
	<60CE7310-2BE1-47BE-AE8A-9BFC69A659B4@GMAIL.COM>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002101307n2d7e674at630f8cbfdd38822d@mail.gmail.com>

JOSHUA JOB <nanite1018 at gmail.com>:
> A fetus is not yet a person, nor has ever been a person (as it is not nor
> ever has been a rational conceptual entity). So it cannot have any rights.
> At least until 34 weeks, they cannot possibly be regarded as people, at
> least from what I've read of neural development in the brain (the neocortex
> doesn't connect up until around then). After that it gets a little more
> fuzzy. As for comatose patients, if they have the capacity for brain
> function (i.e., they are not totally brain damaged), then they count as
> people, though others have to make decisions for them as that is a state
> which it is very difficult to recover from. If they are brain dead, then
> that entity no longer exists nor can it exist again (or at least, if it
> could, the body itself is likely irrelevant), and so no longer has rights.

You speak as though these issues have long since been resolved! In
reality, all you're giving me are opinions: facts which are currently
in contention. Not to say I don't agree with you, but we can't brush
the problem of potential consciousness under the table just because
neither of us happens to consider it a major problem. It simply
wouldn't be prudent.

> I am saying that it cannot be wrong if it does not violate the nature of
> other conscious entities. The ocean cannot be wronged, only rational
> conceptual "self"-aware entities can be, because they are the things that
> can conceivably understand right and wrong. So it can't be wrong (as in, a
> violation of rights) to do something unless it infringes on the rights of
> other such entities.

Well, I think we've taken this argument as far as it can go then.
Clearly you refuse to even entertain the idea that rights could be
anything other than personal rights. I suppose it's an issue of
semantics. What if I say cars could have an explicitly-defined correct
way to be treated, that is, could be covered by a system of
"corrects"?

Surely you would agree that, looking at a galaxy-spanning machine
devoid of anything remotely resembling rational self-aware thought, we
could arbitrarily suppose that it is "meant" to further some purpose
and from that assumption determine how well it is operating -- that
is, how correctly, or how rightly.

I'll start a new thread for the Napoleon argument later on, if I have the time.


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Wed Feb 10 21:44:15 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2010 13:44:15 -0800
Subject: [ExI] How not to make a thought experiment
In-Reply-To: <BC906E5B-BA1A-49D4-9332-0AF0B033A387@bellsouth.net>
References: <557161.41950.qm@web36505.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
	<BC906E5B-BA1A-49D4-9332-0AF0B033A387@bellsouth.net>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002101344m4577ebd5nff9995690d6bf010@mail.gmail.com>

John Clark <jonkc at bellsouth.net>:
> Gordon Swobe <gordon.swobe at yahoo.com>:
>> I believe consciousness evolved because it enhances intelligence.
>
> And in a magnificent demonstration of doublethink Swobe also believes that a
> behavioral demonstration like the Turing test cannot detect consciousness.

This is actually a very good point. I don't have clearly articulated
beliefs regarding the relationship between consciousness and
evolution, myself, but clearly Gordon does.

Two propositions and two conclusions, based on the inferred worldview
of John Clark, to be accepted, rejected, or amended by the reader as
seems appropriate:
P(a): All behavior is measurable.
P(b): Evolution influences behavior and only behavior.
C(c): If and only if consciousness is measurable, it is subject to evolution.
C(d): If consciousness is subject to evolution, it is necessarily measurable.


From spike66 at att.net  Wed Feb 10 21:57:00 2010
From: spike66 at att.net (spike)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2010 13:57:00 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Rights without selves (was: Nolopsism)
In-Reply-To: <e321aa4b1002101307n2d7e674at630f8cbfdd38822d@mail.gmail.com>
References: <e321aa4b1002081118n5d53dd0k8dc365c11a997c29@mail.gmail.com>
	<C87EDDD8-24A5-4035-ACF3-81BD8E1E087B@GMAIL.COM><e321aa4b1002081837l247bf940q423d1ba6e9e0a300@mail.gmail.com>
	<60CE7310-2BE1-47BE-AE8A-9BFC69A659B4@GMAIL.COM>
	<e321aa4b1002101307n2d7e674at630f8cbfdd38822d@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <617F6A986BE2417B92FC9A187E1A4D71@spike>

 

> ...On Behalf Of Spencer Campbell
> Subject: Re: [ExI] Rights without selves (was: Nolopsism)
> 
> JOSHUA JOB <nanite1018 at gmail.com>:
> > A fetus is not yet a person, nor has ever been a person (as 
> it is not 
> > nor ever has been a rational conceptual entity). So it 
> cannot have any rights...
> 
> You speak as though these issues have long since been 
> resolved! In reality, all you're giving me are opinions...


I used to find the most hardcore right-to-lifers and argue that my sperm
have rights.  Their ova did as well, since both types of gametes fit every
definition of "alive."  Somehow that argument never went anywhere.

{8^D

spike






From lacertilian at gmail.com  Wed Feb 10 21:54:14 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2010 13:54:14 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Mary passes the test.
In-Reply-To: <4e3a29501002101048t3fa58f24t9c2b5e834559afdc@mail.gmail.com>
References: <4e3a29501002101048t3fa58f24t9c2b5e834559afdc@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002101354i5fd82b26ga45b0f656625b548@mail.gmail.com>

Will Steinberg <steinberg.will at gmail.com>:
> The Scientists invent a fake color called "bread."? They teach Mary all
> there is to know about red and about bread.? When asked which one is the
> real color, Mary tells the scientists that it is obviously red, because her
> mind is able to, unexplainable but surely, delve deeper into the
> understanding of this.? My point is that there is, at least to me, something
> in the facts that will, however minutely, betray the idea of redness to her.

This is actually within the realm of possibility, surprisingly enough,
so your theory is subject to a certain degree of testing.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Impossible_colors

Can you imagine bluish-yellow or greenish-red?

The latter is unusually easy for me, because I'm deuteranomalous.
Without giving more than a few minutes of effort to it, I'm willing to
say that I find the former completely inconceivable.


From spike66 at att.net  Thu Feb 11 00:08:25 2010
From: spike66 at att.net (spike)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2010 16:08:25 -0800
Subject: [ExI] too funny to not pass along
In-Reply-To: <201002101849.o1AIn1YP011304@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
References: <201002101849.o1AIn1YP011304@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
Message-ID: <B8782AE741BD4B1F83E42091C19FB6D0@spike>

 

In Washington DC today, it was so cold that the flashers are describing
themselves.






From nanite1018 at gmail.com  Thu Feb 11 00:10:24 2010
From: nanite1018 at gmail.com (JOSHUA JOB)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2010 19:10:24 -0500
Subject: [ExI] Rights without selves (was: Nolopsism)
In-Reply-To: <e321aa4b1002101307n2d7e674at630f8cbfdd38822d@mail.gmail.com>
References: <e321aa4b1002081118n5d53dd0k8dc365c11a997c29@mail.gmail.com>
	<C87EDDD8-24A5-4035-ACF3-81BD8E1E087B@GMAIL.COM>
	<e321aa4b1002081837l247bf940q423d1ba6e9e0a300@mail.gmail.com>
	<60CE7310-2BE1-47BE-AE8A-9BFC69A659B4@GMAIL.COM>
	<e321aa4b1002101307n2d7e674at630f8cbfdd38822d@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <8370C045-E609-43A7-A51F-D408D15214AF@GMAIL.COM>

On Feb 10, 2010, at 4:07 PM, Spencer Campbell wrote:
> You speak as though these issues have long since been resolved! In
> reality, all you're giving me are opinions: facts which are currently
> in contention. Not to say I don't agree with you, but we can't brush
> the problem of potential consciousness under the table just because
> neither of us happens to consider it a major problem. It simply
> wouldn't be prudent.
A fetus (at least in the first 6 or 7 months) cannot be conscious (in the human meaning, not like ants), nor can a brain dead person, this has pretty much been proven. I don't see how anyone can contend that it is not the case. That's why I spoke as if it was fact.
> Well, I think we've taken this argument as far as it can go then.
> Clearly you refuse to even entertain the idea that rights could be
> anything other than personal rights. I suppose it's an issue of
> semantics. What if I say cars could have an explicitly-defined correct
> way to be treated, that is, could be covered by a system of
> "corrects"?
> 
> Surely you would agree that, looking at a galaxy-spanning machine
> devoid of anything remotely resembling rational self-aware thought, we
> could arbitrarily suppose that it is "meant" to further some purpose
> and from that assumption determine how well it is operating -- that
> is, how correctly, or how rightly.
The problem with "corrects" or your machine is that you are referencing consciousness and entities when even discussing them. I agree fully that if we were to look at some huge machine without anything resembling rational self-aware thought, we could figure out what it seems to do and determine how well it is doing it. Not a problem at all.

The problem is that "we" have to determine how well it is doing it. "We" as in us rational, self-aware entities. Without that, anywhere along the line, I can't see how you can create the idea of a "correct" or a "right" or a "purpose" or a "meaning." You've got to have someone who can actually evaluate things, or else there is no meaning, value, or purpose to anything at all. In other words, you need rational self-aware entities, or there can be no idea of meaning or purpose, and thus no rights. Without assuming selves exist (as we perceive them), I don't see how you can get anywhere. I hope I've made my point more clear (I don't think I expressed my position in this paragraph very clearly before). If I refuse to entertain the thought, it is because the thought cuts itself off at the knees, as far as I can tell, haha.


Joshua Job
nanite1018 at gmail.com





From pharos at gmail.com  Thu Feb 11 00:28:37 2010
From: pharos at gmail.com (BillK)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 00:28:37 +0000
Subject: [ExI] too funny to not pass along
In-Reply-To: <B8782AE741BD4B1F83E42091C19FB6D0@spike>
References: <201002101849.o1AIn1YP011304@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
	<B8782AE741BD4B1F83E42091C19FB6D0@spike>
Message-ID: <ee50357e1002101628n269a02e1kf5806be14f1d856a@mail.gmail.com>

On Thu, Feb 11, 2010 at 12:08 AM, wrote:
> In Washington DC today, it was so cold that the flashers are describing
> themselves.
>
>

You'll probably like this as well, then.

<http://www.climatesciencewatch.org/index.php/csw/details/why-snowstorms-freak-out-dc/>


BillK


From emlynoregan at gmail.com  Thu Feb 11 01:09:54 2010
From: emlynoregan at gmail.com (Emlyn)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 11:39:54 +1030
Subject: [ExI] google buzz
Message-ID: <710b78fc1002101709u37d9e48fl1452ee9c093afb40@mail.gmail.com>

Hi all,

I'm trolling for contacts on Google Buzz. Any gmailers want to put
their hands up as buzzers / potential buzzers?

-- 
Emlyn

http://www.productx.net - free rss to email gateway, zero signup
http://www.songsofmiseryanddespair.com - My show, Fringe 2010
http://point7.wordpress.com - My blog


From pharos at gmail.com  Thu Feb 11 01:23:15 2010
From: pharos at gmail.com (BillK)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 01:23:15 +0000
Subject: [ExI] google buzz
In-Reply-To: <710b78fc1002101709u37d9e48fl1452ee9c093afb40@mail.gmail.com>
References: <710b78fc1002101709u37d9e48fl1452ee9c093afb40@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <ee50357e1002101723l6ffe34dey7b3c7ff2ea05ef9d@mail.gmail.com>

On 2/11/10, Emlyn wrote:
>  I'm trolling for contacts on Google Buzz. Any gmailers want to put
>  their hands up as buzzers / potential buzzers?
>
>

The best way is to look in your contacts list, or on exi-chat, for
gmail addresses, then set your Buzz to 'Follow' those you would like
to hear from.

Some of them, in turn, might start 'Following' you.

This then gets into the Facebook type of etiquette problems.
If nobody wants to 'Follow' me should I feel insulted or relieved?
If you 'Un-follow' someone, does that make an enemy for life?  :)

BillK


From emlynoregan at gmail.com  Thu Feb 11 01:27:57 2010
From: emlynoregan at gmail.com (Emlyn)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 11:57:57 +1030
Subject: [ExI] google buzz
In-Reply-To: <ee50357e1002101723l6ffe34dey7b3c7ff2ea05ef9d@mail.gmail.com>
References: <710b78fc1002101709u37d9e48fl1452ee9c093afb40@mail.gmail.com>
	<ee50357e1002101723l6ffe34dey7b3c7ff2ea05ef9d@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <710b78fc1002101727q7fd1cf7eu3f1da0cc16c18848@mail.gmail.com>

On 11 February 2010 11:53, BillK <pharos at gmail.com> wrote:
> On 2/11/10, Emlyn wrote:
>> ?I'm trolling for contacts on Google Buzz. Any gmailers want to put
>> ?their hands up as buzzers / potential buzzers?
>>
>>
>
> The best way is to look in your contacts list, or on exi-chat, for
> gmail addresses, then set your Buzz to 'Follow' those you would like
> to hear from.

Yeah, gmail seems to have chosen a bunch of people from my contacts
already, I'm not really sure how/why.

>
> Some of them, in turn, might start 'Following' you.

It's more like twitter than facebook in that way; it's an asymmetrical
relationship.

>
> This then gets into the Facebook type of etiquette problems.
> If nobody wants to 'Follow' me should I feel insulted or relieved?
> If you 'Un-follow' someone, does that make an enemy for life? ?:)
>
> BillK

I don't have all that many enemies at the moment (that I know of), so
I'll risk it.

-- 
Emlyn

http://www.songsofmiseryanddespair.com - My show, Fringe 2010
http://point7.wordpress.com - My blog


From spike66 at att.net  Thu Feb 11 01:32:23 2010
From: spike66 at att.net (spike)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2010 17:32:23 -0800
Subject: [ExI] too funny to not pass along
In-Reply-To: <ee50357e1002101628n269a02e1kf5806be14f1d856a@mail.gmail.com>
References: <201002101849.o1AIn1YP011304@andromeda.ziaspace.com><B8782AE741BD4B1F83E42091C19FB6D0@spike>
	<ee50357e1002101628n269a02e1kf5806be14f1d856a@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <639A19F962994900B075B5E001256BBA@spike>

 

> ...On Behalf Of BillK
> Subject: Re: [ExI] too funny to not pass along
> 
> On Thu, Feb 11, 2010 at 12:08 AM, wrote:
> > In Washington DC today, it was so cold that the flashers are 
> > describing themselves.
> >
> >
> 
> You'll probably like this as well, then.
> 
> <http://www.climatesciencewatch.org/index.php/csw/details/why-
> snowstorms-freak-out-dc/>
> 
> 
> BillK


Thanks BillK!  The whole thing is still really bugging me: the perfect storm
in DC, the collapse of the Copenhagen conflab, the new embarrassments coming
nearly every day for the world climate experts.  I had a great niche
business ready to go, and all this is spoiling it.  I was going to be a
carbon credit provider for global warming skeptics.  Oh it would have been
fine, and I would have made a cubic buttload of money.  I could have a
special line of products, such as a square meter of land, growing something,
anything.  Then if a city slicker wanted to drive a pickup truck and someone
gave her a bunch of trash about it, she could pull out the certificate and
say "Hey, I own a farm and this is a farm truck.  Do yooou own a farm?"  

Just think of all the stuff we could sell.  Looks to me like I could earn
subsidies for growing anything carbon-intensive instead of cash crops for
instance.  It looks to me like the wheels are coming off of the inconvenient
truth at a remarkable pace.  I fear there will be no more fortunes to be
made here.

spike






From lacertilian at gmail.com  Thu Feb 11 01:31:52 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2010 17:31:52 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Rights without selves (was: Nolopsism)
In-Reply-To: <8370C045-E609-43A7-A51F-D408D15214AF@GMAIL.COM>
References: <e321aa4b1002081118n5d53dd0k8dc365c11a997c29@mail.gmail.com> 
	<C87EDDD8-24A5-4035-ACF3-81BD8E1E087B@GMAIL.COM>
	<e321aa4b1002081837l247bf940q423d1ba6e9e0a300@mail.gmail.com> 
	<60CE7310-2BE1-47BE-AE8A-9BFC69A659B4@GMAIL.COM>
	<e321aa4b1002101307n2d7e674at630f8cbfdd38822d@mail.gmail.com> 
	<8370C045-E609-43A7-A51F-D408D15214AF@GMAIL.COM>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002101731m7c770b9foe99d125e1b16b217@mail.gmail.com>

JOSHUA JOB <nanite1018 at gmail.com>:
> A fetus (at least in the first 6 or 7 months) cannot be conscious (in the human meaning, not like ants), nor can a brain dead person, this has pretty much been proven. I don't see how anyone can contend that it is not the case. That's why I spoke as if it was fact.

Nevertheless, many people make precisely that contention. It isn't an
entirely sane position, but it does imply one good point: it's pretty
much impossible to draw a precise line between conscious and
not-conscious, as indicated by your 6 or 7 months figure. Two weeks is
a huge margin of error for just about everything short of geology and
astronomy. Sometimes history and biology, depending on how far back
you go.

> The problem is that "we" have to determine how well it is doing it. "We" as in us rational, self-aware entities. Without that, anywhere along the line, I can't see how you can create the idea of a "correct" or a "right" or a "purpose" or a "meaning." You've got to have someone who can actually evaluate things, or else there is no meaning, value, or purpose to anything at all. In other words, you need rational self-aware entities, or there can be no idea of meaning or purpose, and thus no rights. Without assuming selves exist (as we perceive them), I don't see how you can get anywhere. I hope I've made my point more clear (I don't think I expressed my position in this paragraph very clearly before). If I refuse to entertain the thought, it is because the thought cuts itself off at the knees, as far as I can tell, haha.

Yes: this is the best description of your point yet, I think.
Nevertheless I still disagree. To say that judgements made by
rational, self-aware entities are more valid than those made by
mechanistic automatons is entirely arbitrary. I suppose it derives
from the claim that an internal experience of deeming something right
or wrong is somehow important, but that experience is fleeting and
currently inaccessible to all but the mind of origin.

Morality and ethics are methods of categorizing actions in the world.
Nothing more, nothing less. There isn't anything especially conscious
about categorization.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ioylPVTwvV4

That's right: coin sorting machine. No philosophical argument can
stand up in the face of a coin sorting machine.

I'll write up that Napoleon thing, now. Actually I think it will be
rather short.


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Thu Feb 11 01:52:41 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2010 17:52:41 -0800
Subject: [ExI]  The Napoleon problem
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002101752x39df586fgd53fef2ee04d9cde@mail.gmail.com>

Suppose you are a doctor in an insane asylum.

It's your typical insane asylum, all things considered, hailing from
an era before anyone thought to call such things "mental health
facilities". Electroshock treatment is the golden standard. You've
helped a good number of patients that way. One, however, has proved
challenging.

This is a man who, for at least as long as he has been capable of
speech, has firmly believed that he is Napoleon Bonaparte. He claims
to have traveled to the future during the battle of Waterloo, leaving
a time-double in his place. Naturally the time-double is a
philosophical zombie, he explains, but that is neither here nor there.

There has never been a time when the man did not believe he was
Napoleon, and today he died from complications during a drastic (and
unsuccessful) treatment.

He looked nothing like Napoleon, and hardly spoke a word of French.
When informed of these facts, he consistently shrugged them off as
absurd. He had memorized every known detail of Napoleon's life, to the
point where he might have been a better authority on the subject than
Napoleon himself ever was. His delusional belief has never wavered to
the slightest degree, and now we know for certain that it never will.

Having declared time of death, you're left with one niggling question
in the back of your mind:

Was this man Napoleon?


From nanite1018 at gmail.com  Thu Feb 11 01:54:13 2010
From: nanite1018 at gmail.com (JOSHUA JOB)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2010 20:54:13 -0500
Subject: [ExI] Rights without selves (was: Nolopsism)
In-Reply-To: <e321aa4b1002101731m7c770b9foe99d125e1b16b217@mail.gmail.com>
References: <e321aa4b1002081118n5d53dd0k8dc365c11a997c29@mail.gmail.com>
	<C87EDDD8-24A5-4035-ACF3-81BD8E1E087B@GMAIL.COM>
	<e321aa4b1002081837l247bf940q423d1ba6e9e0a300@mail.gmail.com>
	<60CE7310-2BE1-47BE-AE8A-9BFC69A659B4@GMAIL.COM>
	<e321aa4b1002101307n2d7e674at630f8cbfdd38822d@mail.gmail.com>
	<8370C045-E609-43A7-A51F-D408D15214AF@GMAIL.COM>
	<e321aa4b1002101731m7c770b9foe99d125e1b16b217@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <80F2A3B3-E11C-4DAA-89D1-A0C60092F02F@GMAIL.COM>

On Feb 10, 2010, at 8:31 PM, Spencer Campbell wrote:
> Yes: this is the best description of your point yet, I think.
> Nevertheless I still disagree. To say that judgements made by
> rational, self-aware entities are more valid than those made by
> mechanistic automatons is entirely arbitrary. I suppose it derives
> from the claim that an internal experience of deeming something right
> or wrong is somehow important, but that experience is fleeting and
> currently inaccessible to all but the mind of origin.
> 
> Morality and ethics are methods of categorizing actions in the world.
> Nothing more, nothing less. There isn't anything especially conscious
> about categorization.
Well, while morality and ethics are categorizations of actions, I think they are a special type. They are "this is good" or "this is bad." Now you need "good or bad for or to who or what?" I don't see any answer to that question besides "to 'people.'" Or, perhaps, living things. I don't see how something can be good or bad to something that doesn't have an awareness of good or bad, or even an alternative that changes anything. A car, without a person, is useless, it has no meaning, no value. It certainly doesn't value itself, since "it" is incapable of generating evaluations, and doesn't employ de se operators (which I think follows from the paper that started this all off). So it doesn't matter to the car, or anything else (because nothing can "matter" without an evaluator), whether it gets blown up, or rusts, or runs out of gas. Whereas, to life, it is really important. It determines whether it continues to exist or not. A car without evaluating entities is just a piece of matter, and matter just changes forms, it doesn't wink out of existence (I'm including energy as a form of matter).

Without something which can say "this is good or bad for/to 'me,'" I'm not sure how you would build something that can say something is good or bad in a non-arbitrary fashion. I say in a non-arbitrary fashion, because while you can build something which says "it is wrong for jellyfish to vomit", it really makes no difference to anything that a jellyfish vomits. But if you say "going and starting to kill people is bad because it hurts everyone's ability to live, including me," then you have an objective basis for that statement: your existence is threatened by people murdering each other. It actually makes a difference whether you live or die, because you can live or die, you can wink out of existence, even if the matter you are composed of is never destroyed.

I can't wait to read the Napoleon argument. I'm sure it will, at least, be interesting.


Joshua Job
nanite1018 at gmail.com





From nanite1018 at gmail.com  Thu Feb 11 02:01:36 2010
From: nanite1018 at gmail.com (JOSHUA JOB)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2010 21:01:36 -0500
Subject: [ExI] The Napoleon problem
In-Reply-To: <e321aa4b1002101752x39df586fgd53fef2ee04d9cde@mail.gmail.com>
References: <e321aa4b1002101752x39df586fgd53fef2ee04d9cde@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <5FFD48E2-0FC0-493D-AE25-88F1C3068614@GMAIL.COM>

On Feb 10, 2010, at 8:52 PM, Spencer Campbell wrote:
> Was this man Napoleon?
That was underwhelming, haha. Of course not. You have huge amounts of evidence to show he was born, him growing up, etc., and so obviously he is not actually Napoleon. He is also explicitly said not to speak French, nor look like him. Even if he had read everything Napoleon had ever written, ever word written about him, there would still be information he did not know (since obviously, every single experience he had ever had was not written down, and even if it was, there would necessarily be detail missing). So he doesn't even have all the knowledge Napoleon had. 

So while he might have believed whatever he liked, he certainly was not the man Napoleon Bonaparte, Emperor of France. He was not born at the same time, nor had all the memories and experiences of the man. An expert on him, certainly. But not the man himself.

I don't mean to sound, well, mean, but this strikes me as not a problem at all. Am I missing something?


Joshua Job
nanite1018 at gmail.com





From lacertilian at gmail.com  Thu Feb 11 02:26:58 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2010 18:26:58 -0800
Subject: [ExI] The Napoleon problem
In-Reply-To: <5FFD48E2-0FC0-493D-AE25-88F1C3068614@GMAIL.COM>
References: <e321aa4b1002101752x39df586fgd53fef2ee04d9cde@mail.gmail.com> 
	<5FFD48E2-0FC0-493D-AE25-88F1C3068614@GMAIL.COM>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002101826i203bf4e4mda7d856fe2d3d85f@mail.gmail.com>

JOSHUA JOB <nanite1018 at gmail.com>:
> I don't mean to sound, well, mean, but this strikes me as not a problem at all. Am I missing something?

Probably not. I was fifteen or something the last time I used it, and
now it seems a little trite even to me. There's always a chance,
though, so I can elaborate. It's basically an epistemological
question: how do we KNOW that he isn't Napoleon?

> You have huge amounts of evidence to show he was born, him growing up, etc., and so obviously he is not actually Napoleon.

A hole in the experiment, easily patched: of course he believes he
regressed to an embryo during the jump through time, shoving aside the
soul that otherwise would have occupied it.

Not the heart of the problem, though, either way. There is an
assumption, built in, that he and Napoleon really were different
people. No weird magic took place. Even having established that, there
is a (non-intuitive) way to view the question "is he Napoleon" so that
it has a very interestingly uncertain answer.

> He is also explicitly said not to speak French, nor look like him. Even if he had read everything Napoleon had ever written, ever word written about him, there would still be information he did not know (since obviously, every single experience he had ever had was not written down, and even if it was, there would necessarily be detail missing). So he doesn't even have all the knowledge Napoleon had.

And how, precisely, do we know he doesn't? He knows more than we know.
If anyone on Earth knew every detail of Napoleon's life, it would be
him.

> So while he might have believed whatever he liked, he certainly was not the man Napoleon Bonaparte, Emperor of France. He was not born at the same time, nor had all the memories and experiences of the man. An expert on him, certainly. But not the man himself.

It's much more likely that your knowledge of Napoleon is false than it
is that his knowledge of Napoleon is false. He is not only an expert
on Napoleon, but a super-expert; no one can answer Napoleon-related
questions with anywhere near the precision or accuracy that he can,
even if he blithely confabulates unverifiable details to do so.

So, when it comes to the question, "who is Napoleon", who are you
going to believe? You or him?

The obvious answer is you, because the man is insane. But one has to
wonder what makes this Napoleon question so fundamentally different
from every other Napoleon  question, so that no degree of knowledge
about Napoleon is the least bit helpful in answering it.


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Thu Feb 11 02:53:16 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2010 18:53:16 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Rights without selves (was: Nolopsism)
In-Reply-To: <80F2A3B3-E11C-4DAA-89D1-A0C60092F02F@GMAIL.COM>
References: <e321aa4b1002081118n5d53dd0k8dc365c11a997c29@mail.gmail.com> 
	<C87EDDD8-24A5-4035-ACF3-81BD8E1E087B@GMAIL.COM>
	<e321aa4b1002081837l247bf940q423d1ba6e9e0a300@mail.gmail.com> 
	<60CE7310-2BE1-47BE-AE8A-9BFC69A659B4@GMAIL.COM>
	<e321aa4b1002101307n2d7e674at630f8cbfdd38822d@mail.gmail.com> 
	<8370C045-E609-43A7-A51F-D408D15214AF@GMAIL.COM>
	<e321aa4b1002101731m7c770b9foe99d125e1b16b217@mail.gmail.com> 
	<80F2A3B3-E11C-4DAA-89D1-A0C60092F02F@GMAIL.COM>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002101853u7b0e12e4u95f52115cdfaedb3@mail.gmail.com>

JOSHUA JOB <nanite1018 at gmail.com>:
> Without something which can say "this is good or bad for/to 'me,'" I'm not sure how you would build something that can say something is good or bad in a non-arbitrary fashion. I say in a non-arbitrary fashion, because while you can build something which says "it is wrong for jellyfish to vomit", it really makes no difference to anything that a jellyfish vomits.

We agree.

> But if you say "going and starting to kill people is bad because it hurts everyone's ability to live, including me," then you have an objective basis for that statement: your existence is threatened by people murdering each other. It actually makes a difference whether you live or die, because you can live or die, you can wink out of existence, even if the matter you are composed of is never destroyed.

We disagree.

If it does not make a difference when a jellyfish is made to vomit,
then it does not make a difference when you are made to die. I'm going
to take the materialist route here: both of these things are just
thermodynamical processes, at root, and thus equally important in
metaphysical terms.

It is arbitrary to say that death (or anything else) is bad, no matter
how rational your basis for saying so is. To a subjectivist, an
objective basis is just a more-easily-rationalized subjective basis.
Both are imposed on reality (by us self-aware folk, if you insist);
they are not in any way inherent to reality itself, no matter how
neatly they appear to fit.

All of this becomes overwhelmingly clear when you accept the premise
that (a) you can't wink out of existence because (b) "you" don't exist
to begin with.

I hinted at an embryonic theory in an earlier post to this list. I'm
now calling it the ontological plane. There's a real-imaginary axis,
which you could also call a physical-virtual axis, and there's an
existent-nonexistent axis. My computer is real and exists; if I made
my computer emulate itself or another computer then the virtual
computer would be imaginary, but it would still exist. Among the whole
field of things possible or impossible, the vast majority are both
imaginary and nonexistent.

According to this theory, I, in the sense of my quintessential self
and not my physical manifestation, am one of the very few things that
falls in the "real but nonexistent" quadrant. There is an imaginary
symbol, "I", and that exists whenever it's invoked in my brain; but it
points to a thing, me, which doesn't.

I am regaining hope in the potential for this argument to become
productive. What I've written here is far more clear and compelling to
me, at least, than the Napoleon problem ever was.

One of us may just experience a change of mind, one of these days!

Hint hint!

(I am implying that it will be you. That is the hint.)


From spike66 at att.net  Thu Feb 11 03:01:08 2010
From: spike66 at att.net (spike)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2010 19:01:08 -0800
Subject: [ExI] google buzz
In-Reply-To: <ee50357e1002101723l6ffe34dey7b3c7ff2ea05ef9d@mail.gmail.com>
References: <710b78fc1002101709u37d9e48fl1452ee9c093afb40@mail.gmail.com>
	<ee50357e1002101723l6ffe34dey7b3c7ff2ea05ef9d@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <EB22ED43075B4B13B31C73DC722D242E@spike>

 

> -----Original Message-----
> From: extropy-chat-bounces at lists.extropy.org 
> [mailto:extropy-chat-bounces at lists.extropy.org] On Behalf Of BillK
> ...
> 
> Some of them, in turn, might start 'Following' you.
> 
> This then gets into the Facebook type of etiquette problems.
> If nobody wants to 'Follow' me should I feel insulted or relieved?
> If you 'Un-follow' someone, does that make an enemy for life?  :)
> 
> BillK

Facebook has a lot of creepy stuff like that, which is why I flatly refused
to play.  This is ME talking, Mr. Openness, the one with a G rated life and
few if any former girlfriends.  What bothered me when my wife started using
it is that you get all these requests from old acquaintances wanting to be
friends.  Well, in the meat world I never turn away anyone wanting to be
friends, never.  But in the e-world, you almost need to turn away most of
these requests, for the lack of time to write.  You might get a bunch of
people who read your online comments who you never met and are not sure you
want to.  Then if you say no or ignore their request you feel like a heel.  

These please-be-my-friend people remind me of the Strangers of America:

http://www.theonion.com/content/news/nations_strangers_decry_negative

spike





From emlynoregan at gmail.com  Thu Feb 11 03:41:53 2010
From: emlynoregan at gmail.com (Emlyn)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 14:11:53 +1030
Subject: [ExI] google buzz
In-Reply-To: <EB22ED43075B4B13B31C73DC722D242E@spike>
References: <710b78fc1002101709u37d9e48fl1452ee9c093afb40@mail.gmail.com>
	<ee50357e1002101723l6ffe34dey7b3c7ff2ea05ef9d@mail.gmail.com>
	<EB22ED43075B4B13B31C73DC722D242E@spike>
Message-ID: <710b78fc1002101941r444649c3j6f2c7262939e1e6f@mail.gmail.com>

On 11 February 2010 13:31, spike <spike66 at att.net> wrote:
>
>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: extropy-chat-bounces at lists.extropy.org
>> [mailto:extropy-chat-bounces at lists.extropy.org] On Behalf Of BillK
>> ...
>>
>> Some of them, in turn, might start 'Following' you.
>>
>> This then gets into the Facebook type of etiquette problems.
>> If nobody wants to 'Follow' me should I feel insulted or relieved?
>> If you 'Un-follow' someone, does that make an enemy for life? ?:)
>>
>> BillK
>
> Facebook has a lot of creepy stuff like that, which is why I flatly refused
> to play. ?This is ME talking, Mr. Openness, the one with a G rated life and
> few if any former girlfriends. ?What bothered me when my wife started using
> it is that you get all these requests from old acquaintances wanting to be
> friends. ?Well, in the meat world I never turn away anyone wanting to be
> friends, never. ?But in the e-world, you almost need to turn away most of
> these requests, for the lack of time to write. ?You might get a bunch of
> people who read your online comments who you never met and are not sure you
> want to. ?Then if you say no or ignore their request you feel like a heel.
>
> These please-be-my-friend people remind me of the Strangers of America:
>
> http://www.theonion.com/content/news/nations_strangers_decry_negative
>
> spike

The friending thing is odd, but it's a misnomer. "Will you be my
friend?" should be "Will you agree to form an edge between our nodes?"

As to weird unknown freaks reading your comments... how many years
have you been posting on this list????


-- 
Emlyn

http://www.songsofmiseryanddespair.com - My show, Fringe 2010
http://point7.wordpress.com - My blog


From msd001 at gmail.com  Thu Feb 11 03:45:36 2010
From: msd001 at gmail.com (Mike Dougherty)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2010 22:45:36 -0500
Subject: [ExI] google buzz
In-Reply-To: <710b78fc1002101941r444649c3j6f2c7262939e1e6f@mail.gmail.com>
References: <710b78fc1002101709u37d9e48fl1452ee9c093afb40@mail.gmail.com>
	<ee50357e1002101723l6ffe34dey7b3c7ff2ea05ef9d@mail.gmail.com>
	<EB22ED43075B4B13B31C73DC722D242E@spike>
	<710b78fc1002101941r444649c3j6f2c7262939e1e6f@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <62c14241002101945r2ca74ca2pf869cb266dafd0c2@mail.gmail.com>

On Wed, Feb 10, 2010 at 10:41 PM, Emlyn <emlynoregan at gmail.com> wrote:
> As to weird unknown freaks reading your comments... how many years
> have you been posting on this list????

what of the well known freaks reading your comments?
(you know who you are :)


From steinberg.will at gmail.com  Thu Feb 11 03:55:42 2010
From: steinberg.will at gmail.com (Will Steinberg)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2010 22:55:42 -0500
Subject: [ExI] The Napoleon problem
In-Reply-To: <e321aa4b1002101826i203bf4e4mda7d856fe2d3d85f@mail.gmail.com>
References: <e321aa4b1002101752x39df586fgd53fef2ee04d9cde@mail.gmail.com>
	<5FFD48E2-0FC0-493D-AE25-88F1C3068614@GMAIL.COM>
	<e321aa4b1002101826i203bf4e4mda7d856fe2d3d85f@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4e3a29501002101955u456edc1cuaa2154e49b49df8a@mail.gmail.com>

I think Spencer will soon tell us why our believing that the man is not
Napoleon is irreconcilable with some other belief many of us hold.
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From steinberg.will at gmail.com  Thu Feb 11 03:56:49 2010
From: steinberg.will at gmail.com (Will Steinberg)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2010 22:56:49 -0500
Subject: [ExI] The Napoleon problem
In-Reply-To: <4e3a29501002101955u456edc1cuaa2154e49b49df8a@mail.gmail.com>
References: <e321aa4b1002101752x39df586fgd53fef2ee04d9cde@mail.gmail.com>
	<5FFD48E2-0FC0-493D-AE25-88F1C3068614@GMAIL.COM>
	<e321aa4b1002101826i203bf4e4mda7d856fe2d3d85f@mail.gmail.com>
	<4e3a29501002101955u456edc1cuaa2154e49b49df8a@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4e3a29501002101956s4ad74326j1a5adf642864d6ba@mail.gmail.com>

Oh, I suppose that sort of happened.  I am ignorant.
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From spike66 at att.net  Thu Feb 11 05:05:17 2010
From: spike66 at att.net (spike)
Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2010 21:05:17 -0800
Subject: [ExI] google buzz
In-Reply-To: <62c14241002101945r2ca74ca2pf869cb266dafd0c2@mail.gmail.com>
References: <710b78fc1002101709u37d9e48fl1452ee9c093afb40@mail.gmail.com><ee50357e1002101723l6ffe34dey7b3c7ff2ea05ef9d@mail.gmail.com><EB22ED43075B4B13B31C73DC722D242E@spike><710b78fc1002101941r444649c3j6f2c7262939e1e6f@mail.gmail.com>
	<62c14241002101945r2ca74ca2pf869cb266dafd0c2@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4C147272924742F0BA9060FCF41EDA0F@spike>

 

> ...On Behalf Of Mike Dougherty
> Subject: Re: [ExI] google buzz
> 
> On Wed, Feb 10, 2010 at 10:41 PM, Emlyn <emlynoregan at gmail.com> wrote:
> > As to weird unknown freaks reading your comments... how many years 
> > have you been posting on this list????
> 
> what of the well known freaks reading your comments?
> (you know who you are :)
> _______________________________________________


Ja, well a friend is a person who knows how you really are, and likes you
anyway.

Regarding the freaks, known and unknown, who hang out on ExI-chat, I have to
admit, anyone who wants to hang out with me, I am not sure I want to hang
out with them.  It is so hard to stay away from the riff-raff when one is
riff-raff oneself.

My sister-in-law paid me the best compliment ever.  She sent me an article
from one of her many women's magazines called 100 Things That Are Getting
Better.  She said it reminded her of my outlook on life, since pretty much
everything I really care about is good and getting better all the time.

So this magazine had some stuff in there I would never have thought of, as
well as things I never heard of, such as shapewear.  What the hell is
shapewear?  That was number 2 on their list of things getting better, and I
haven't a clue what it is.  Their number 1 was floral arrangements.  Huh?
Some of the more notable comments: 3) your chances of visiting the moon.
Cool.  4) apps to help you lose weight.  OK, but my BMI would make me too
thin to qualify to be a fashion model, so let us move on.  5)  Polyester.
Something to do with shapewear perhaps?  6) TV dinners.  8) Our lungs.  They
talk about the fact that smoking is way down, which means second hand
smoking is way down.  13) catching bad guys.  Once needed a tissue sample
the size of a quarter dollar coin.  Now requires only a few cells.  14)
e-cards.  Absurd of course, no mention of e-MAIL which is how everyone
communicates now.  18) dads.  They help with the kids now.  Cool thanks for
noticing.  Four out of five children surveyed still prefer the mom, but the
father figure at least exists in their lives.  19) robots.  Agreed, cool.
20) Hillary Clinton.  Hmmm, no comment.

So OK I google, I find shapewear is girdles and such.  I haven't a clue why
this magazine thinks that is improving, or why it matters, but perhaps I
just don't understand, and I am at a total loss why this is their big number
1 on the list of things getting better.

So now, I ask you, those not involved in the Searle discussion, what things
are getting better and why?  I offer these few:  1) Computers, in every way,
2) software generally, in terms of availability, capability, stability, even
price.  3) Cars.  4) Motorcycles handle waaay better than they used to,
better and faster, even if not cheaper.  5) Phones.  6) Availability of
useful information in general, the ease of finding things out.  In
retrospect, I might move this to number one.  7) Health care: neighbor had a
heart attack, parameds here within minutes, connected her to electronic
devices to communicate with two cardiologists at Stanford Hospital.  She was
better off in the back of that ambulance than she would have been in the
most advanced hospital even just 30 yrs ago.  They gave her all the right
meds before they even started towards the ER.  Little or no permanent heart
damage.  8) The environment.  It is much cleaner than it used to be.

What are your thoughts?

spike





From stathisp at gmail.com  Thu Feb 11 11:28:56 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 22:28:56 +1100
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <557161.41950.qm@web36505.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <f21c22e31002092318v783e1e53n3698639a856db51@mail.gmail.com> 
	<557161.41950.qm@web36505.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002110328g6b0f7bc9md118abb157c99bd4@mail.gmail.com>

On 11 February 2010 00:41, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:

> Computers can reproduce just about any pattern. But a computerized pattern of a thing does not equal the thing patterned.
>
> I can for example reproduce the pattern of a tree leaf on my computer. That digital leaf will not have the properties of a real leaf. No matter what natural things we simulate on a computer, the simulations will always lack the real properties of the things simulated.
>
> Digital simulations of things can do no more than *simulate* those things. It mystifies me that people here believe simulations of organic brains should somehow qualify for an exception to this rule.

I'll only respond to this as John Clark has responded to your other points.

Would you say that a robot that seems to walk isn't really walking
because it is not identical to, and therefore lacks all of the
properties of, a human walking? The argument is not that a digital
computer is *identical* with a biological brain, otherwise it would be
a biological brain and not a digital computer. The argument is that
the computer can reproduce the consciousness of the brain if it is
able to reproduces the brain's behaviour. If it can't, you can't
explain what would happen instead, and your solution is to advise that
I change the question to one more to your liking.

> Neuroscientists should someday have at their disposal perfect digital simulations of brains to use as tools for doing computer-simulated brain surgeries. But according to you and some others, those digitally simulated brains will have consciousness and so might qualify as real people. This would mean medical students will have access to computer simulations of hearts to do simulated heart surgeries, but they won't have access to the same kinds of computerized tools for doing simulated brain surgeries. Those darned computer simulated brains won't sign the consent forms.
>
> People like me will want to do the simulated surgeries anyway. The Society for the Prevention of Simulated Cruelty to Simulated Brains will oppose me.

What if a race of robots landed on Earth and decided to do cruel
experiments on humans, on the assumption that mere organic matter
couldn't have a mind or feelings, despite behaving as if it did?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Thu Feb 11 14:06:43 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 06:06:43 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002110328g6b0f7bc9md118abb157c99bd4@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <896407.10281.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Thu, 2/11/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:

> Would you say that a robot that seems to walk isn't really
> walking because it is not identical to, and therefore lacks all of
> the properties of, a human walking? 

My point here concerns digital simulations of brains, not robots.

> The argument is that the computer can reproduce the consciousness of the 
> brain if it is able to reproduces the brain's behaviour. 

Characters in video games behave as if they have consciousness. Seems to me that digitally simulated brains will also behave as if they have consciousness, but that they will have no more consciousness than do those characters in video games. 

I don't play video games myself but I've known children who did. They often spoke of the characters in their video games as if those characters really existed as consciousness entities. Then they matured.

-gts




      


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Thu Feb 11 14:37:35 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 06:37:35 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] evolution of consciousness
In-Reply-To: <e321aa4b1002101344m4577ebd5nff9995690d6bf010@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <967863.26874.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Wed, 2/10/10, Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com> wrote:

> This is actually a very good point. I don't have clearly
> articulate beliefs regarding the relationship between consciousness
> and evolution, myself, but clearly Gordon does.

I think consciousness aids and enhances intelligence, something like the way a flashlight helps one move about in the dark. 

Unconscious animals like amoebas exhibit a low level of intelligent behavior. Those instinctive behaviors are encoded by DNA. In higher organisms we see nervous systems, and we see how the resulting consciousness increases the intelligence and flexibility of the organisms.

It seems probable to me that conscious intelligence involves less biological overhead than instinctive unconscious intelligence, especially when considering complex behaviors such as social behaviors. Perhaps nature selected it for that reason only. 

-gts




      


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Thu Feb 11 15:10:29 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 07:10:29 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Mary passes the test.
Message-ID: <155252.92470.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Wed, 2/10/10, Will Steinberg <steinberg.will at gmail.com> wrote:

> "Mary the Color Scientist" is
> often used as an iron defense of the magicalness or platonic
> reality of qualia.? To some, it is enough to say that Mary
> learns something COMPLETELY new about the color red when she
> sees it, giving the sense that, even for all fact and
> physicality, something is missing until Mary sees that
> color.? Why is this thesis so readily expected?? I think
> that qualia, however weird or outside of normal fact, is, at
> heart, inextricable from those facts.? For example:
> 
> 
> Upon emerging from her room, The Scientists present Mary
> with two large colored squares.? One is red, and one is blue.? I
> wholeheartedly believe Mary will be able to tell which one is red.? 
> When asked why, Mary says "I had a feeling that's what it would
> look like."
> 
> I would say that Mary, after learning about red and its
> neural pathways and physical properties, is able to form
> some conception of the color in her mind's eye,
> regardless of whether it has been presented to her, because
> red is "in there" somewhere.? 

This is very interesting, Will. Most curious to me is that you seem to want to refute a supposed argument for what you call the "platonic reality of quaila", but you do so with an argument that Plato himself would likely agree with. Plato taught that we never learn anything important that we don't already in some sense know, just as Mary in your story in some sense knows the color of red before seeing it.

The Greek word for "truth" is "aletheia" which one can translate literally as "un-forgetting" or "remembering".

-gts




      


From bbenzai at yahoo.com  Thu Feb 11 16:54:05 2010
From: bbenzai at yahoo.com (Ben Zaiboc)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 08:54:05 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Film Script!
In-Reply-To: <mailman.1.1265889603.29249.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
Message-ID: <547545.73654.qm@web113605.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote in a thread that shall remain nameless:

> What if a race of robots landed on Earth and decided to do
> cruel
> experiments on humans, on the assumption that mere organic
> matter
> couldn't have a mind or feelings, despite behaving as if it
> did?

Yay, Film script!  It has everything to be a successful 'thinking persons' sf film that is nevertheless popular:  The alien robots are advanced AIs (not too advanced of course, or they wouldn't bother invading), plenty of peril, gore and and anguish, maybe nanotech dissection devices that they use to slice and dice and otherwise torture the hapless philosophical zombie humans, in an attempt to find out how we can function, when we clearly possess just an organic simulation of 'real' consciousness.

The hero could be a dashing scientist who uses the awesome power of his human brain to save the pretty young lab assistant who is secretly in love with him, when he notices the power lead coming from the flying saucer...

Yes, it's just The War of the Worlds/Independence Day all over again, but with a philosophical twist.  It could end by leaving you wondering:  Are we actually the zombies, and have we just unplugged the only *really* conscious beings in the universe???

Oh, yes, we could widen the audience demographic by having the pretty young lab assistant be a transsexual.  And throw in a couple of lesbian bishops, only one of whom survives the alien robots' grisly experiments, which incidentally turn her into an atheist.

This could be bigger than "Plan 9 from Outer Space"!

Ben Zaiboc


      


From jonkc at bellsouth.net  Thu Feb 11 17:00:32 2010
From: jonkc at bellsouth.net (John Clark)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 12:00:32 -0500
Subject: [ExI] How not to make a thought experiment
In-Reply-To: <967863.26874.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <967863.26874.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <3B7B32F3-20F4-4ABA-A20E-7837B734CCFF@bellsouth.net>

Since my last post Gordon Swobe has posted 3 times.

> I think consciousness aids and enhances intelligence, something like the way a flashlight helps one move about in the dark. 

I've said this many many times before but that doesn't prevent it from being true, despite believing the above, in a magnificent demonstration of doublethink, Swobe also believes that a behavioral demonstration like the Turing test cannot detect consciousness. 

> It seems probable to me that conscious intelligence involves less biological overhead than instinctive unconscious intelligence

Then the logical implication is crystal clear, its harder to make an unconscious intelligence than a conscious intelligence. So if you encounter an intelligent machine your default assumption should be that it is conscious. 

> especially when considering complex behaviors such as social behaviors. Perhaps nature selected it for that reason only.

So if Swobe met a robot with greater social intelligence than he has would he consider it conscious? No of course he would not because, because,.... well just because.

Actually that is what Swobe would say today but I don't think that's what would really happen. If someone ever met up with such a machine I think it would understand us so well, better than we understand ourselves, that it could convince anyone to believe in anything and could quite literally charm the pants off us. As Swobe points out, even today characters in video games seem to be conscious to some, a robot with a Jupiter Brain would convince even the most sophisticated among us. We would believe the robot was conscious even if we couldn't prove it. I have the same belief regarding Gordon Swobe and the same lack of a proof.

 John K Clark


> 
> 

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From natasha at natasha.cc  Thu Feb 11 17:29:54 2010
From: natasha at natasha.cc (Natasha Vita-More)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 11:29:54 -0600
Subject: [ExI] Blue Brain Project.
In-Reply-To: <4B7079D4.1090103@satx.rr.com>
References: <558651.23421.qm@web113616.mail.gq1.yahoo.com><A1A20171-4B8A-46DF-BCB8-248E6ADEE0AB@bellsouth.net>
	<4B7079D4.1090103@satx.rr.com>
Message-ID: <9B95A2D531B8453685C11772840F74F6@DFC68LF1>

Yes.  This is from a month or so ago:

http://www.thoughtware.tv/videos/watch/4651-China-Radio-International-Interv
iew-cri-Vita-more-De-Garis

I think he explains what he is up to in this show.

Nlogo1.tif Natasha Vita-More

-----Original Message-----
From: extropy-chat-bounces at lists.extropy.org
[mailto:extropy-chat-bounces at lists.extropy.org] On Behalf Of Damien
Broderick
Sent: Monday, February 08, 2010 2:54 PM
To: ExI chat list
Subject: Re: [ExI] Blue Brain Project.

On 2/8/2010 2:25 PM, John Clark quoted:

> "Once the team is able to model a complete rat brain-that should 
> happen in the next two years-Markram will download the simulation into 
> a robotic rat, so that the brain has a body. He's already talking to a 
> Japanese company about constructing the mechanical animal.

A decade or more ago, Hugo de Garis was promising a robot CAM-brain
puddytat. He lost several sponsors along the way. Anyone know if he's doing
anything along those lines today? (No, I've never heard of Google--how does
that work? His own site informs us excitedly of things due to happen in 2006
and 2007...)

Damien Broderick

_______________________________________________
extropy-chat mailing list
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat



From thespike at satx.rr.com  Thu Feb 11 18:01:03 2010
From: thespike at satx.rr.com (Damien Broderick)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 12:01:03 -0600
Subject: [ExI]  Film Script!
Message-ID: <4B7445DF.3040800@satx.rr.com>

Stathis wrote:

> What if a race of robots landed on Earth and decided to do
> cruel experiments on humans, on the assumption that mere organic
> matter couldn't have a mind or feelings, despite behaving as if it
> did?

This is one of the drivers in my two linked novels GODPLAYERS and 
K-MACHINES. The AIs despise humans as nothing more than organic 
number-crunchers, insufficiently passionate.

Damien Broderick


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Thu Feb 11 18:38:13 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 10:38:13 -0800
Subject: [ExI] The Napoleon problem
In-Reply-To: <4e3a29501002101956s4ad74326j1a5adf642864d6ba@mail.gmail.com>
References: <e321aa4b1002101752x39df586fgd53fef2ee04d9cde@mail.gmail.com> 
	<5FFD48E2-0FC0-493D-AE25-88F1C3068614@GMAIL.COM>
	<e321aa4b1002101826i203bf4e4mda7d856fe2d3d85f@mail.gmail.com> 
	<4e3a29501002101955u456edc1cuaa2154e49b49df8a@mail.gmail.com> 
	<4e3a29501002101956s4ad74326j1a5adf642864d6ba@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002111038i4907df95ne2dd6cc8e78462a4@mail.gmail.com>

Will Steinberg <steinberg.will at gmail.com>:
>I think Spencer will soon tell us why our believing that the man is not Napoleon is irreconcilable with some other belief many of us hold.
(later)
> Oh, I suppose that sort of happened.? I am ignorant.

Aren't we all, Will?

Aren't we all.

(I'm not sure I find my own argument strong enough to warrant the word
"irreconcilable" coming up, but I am proud nonetheless that it did.)


From steinberg.will at gmail.com  Thu Feb 11 19:05:43 2010
From: steinberg.will at gmail.com (Will Steinberg)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 14:05:43 -0500
Subject: [ExI] Very long lifespans and accompanying mental milieus
Message-ID: <4e3a29501002111105o3ac9433ax703bde1d0b653f6f@mail.gmail.com>

When human lifespans lengthen, new mental paradigms are born.  This tends to
occur when sufficiently large amounts of the population reach a certain age
as to be common.  For example, humans of the past would have a hard time
understanding both the jaded, crotchety old man and the freaking-out fifty
year old, simply by virtue that anyone who lived to be this old was usually
revered for their luck.  Very old people, when there were not a lot of very
old people, were Methuselahs.  But as medicine advanced, being these ages
has become increasingly more common, and as the uniqueness associated with
these ages has disappeared, a slew of mental crises have developed.  Now,
some, as in the case of the elderly, are physiological--an old man is cranky
because he is arthritic or forgetful.  Yet there are aspects of aging that
cannot be associated in this manner, and instead lie completely in the
mental realm.  The mid-life crisis is and example of a phenomenon that is
distinctly new.

In the next fifty or so years (and I hope this is overestimating,) there is
a good chance that human lifespans will lengthen significantly, perhaps
going so far as to double.  Now, many of us simply think to ourselves: "More
time to think!  More time to work!"  But who knows what happens when the
metaprograms of the brain reshuffle connections for far longer than nature
"intended"?  Though it is fine, for now, to treat ourselves as having
overcome nature and evolution, we must remember that consciousness and
intelligence were successful for producing offspring, which are produced
relatively early in life, and have far less of a connection to the later
years.

Is this problem one of value?  What if, at one hundred and fifty years of
age, man is suddenly compelled to end his life?  What if longer life will
dictate to us the most obvious example of human pathos--that, for all we
love about ourselves, the buck stops for the brain sooner than we might have
hoped?  It seems in this case that the recent discussions on mental being
that have overwhelmed the list are indeed incredibly important, if only for
the fact that knowledge of the mental processes of humans must be understood
in order to design even better processes that don't hit a wall after
extended periods of time.

This is Transhumanism, not in the often-held idea of letting "humanness"
transcend our current physical limitations, but in scrapping many aspects of
that humanness entirely in favor of something unfathomable and better.
There is a good chance that we will, at some point, be faced with the
problem that the confusing tangle of yarn in our heads produced by evolution
is simply not good enough to deal with whatever comes next.  And then what?
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From max at maxmore.com  Thu Feb 11 19:13:29 2010
From: max at maxmore.com (Max More)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 13:13:29 -0600
Subject: [ExI] Very long lifespans and accompanying mental milieus
Message-ID: <201002111913.o1BJDeuf001898@andromeda.ziaspace.com>

Will Steinberg wrote:
>The mid-life crisis is and example of a phenomenon that is distinctly new.

But how real is it? Just because it's become such a familiar phrase 
doesn't mean it's particularly correct. I recently came across some 
doubts, for instance:

Mid-Life Crisis: An Outdated Myth?

http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,584133,00.html

Max





From steinberg.will at gmail.com  Thu Feb 11 20:16:48 2010
From: steinberg.will at gmail.com (Will Steinberg)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 15:16:48 -0500
Subject: [ExI] Very long lifespans and accompanying mental milieus
In-Reply-To: <201002111913.o1BJDeuf001898@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
References: <201002111913.o1BJDeuf001898@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
Message-ID: <4e3a29501002111216j5b2c85b4j2777468c3ac61d96@mail.gmail.com>

Well then you may recast my argument, filling in
"mid-life-sense-of-pride-and-fulfillment" for "mid-life crisis;" it's still
something that people a few centuries ago would not understand very well.  I
still think we will surely face unprecedented places of the mind as
lifespans grow longer.
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From lacertilian at gmail.com  Thu Feb 11 21:25:02 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 13:25:02 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <896407.10281.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <f21c22e31002110328g6b0f7bc9md118abb157c99bd4@mail.gmail.com> 
	<896407.10281.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002111325h463801e1yb73fdcbf004a9576@mail.gmail.com>

Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>:
> Characters in video games behave as if they have consciousness.

No, they don't. Not even close. Not even REMOTELY close. To someone
who actually grew up playing video games, this is a completely
outrageous statement that can hardly even be addressed for how absurd
it is.

All I have to do to refute you is point at the most sophisticated
simulation of humanity ever to appear in a computer game, and say,
look. Look at it. It can only converse by following a script, and
beyond that it has no apparent reaction to anything short of being
shot.

Half-Life 2 famously had a mind-bogglingly realistic cast and
immersive world. Basically, this means that the "people" in it would
turn their heads to look at you if you stood within a defined radius
of them. They also had excellent pre-programmed facial expressions to
go with their dialogue, recorded from actual human beings.

Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>:
> I don't play video games myself but I've known children who did. They often spoke of the characters in their video games as if those characters really existed as consciousness entities. Then they matured.

Exactly the same argument applies to characters in movies.

Right now, the game industry is passing through a movie phase. The
latest and greatest games, at the height of technology, are just
interactive stories. Allowing for a branching storyline, including
more than one possible ending, is to this day considered the absolute
cutting edge of the medium. It's been that way for decades.

This is pretty much the reason I no longer keep up with the high-end
games. If you are making money, you are not making games; you are
making movies, and I don't much care for movies.

Gordon, if you are unable to imagine any simulation of life more
sophisticated than that in a computer game (or, much worse, a console
game), then you are not qualified to participate in this discussion.
Please tell me this is not the case.


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Thu Feb 11 21:40:58 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 13:40:58 -0800
Subject: [ExI] evolution of consciousness
In-Reply-To: <967863.26874.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <e321aa4b1002101344m4577ebd5nff9995690d6bf010@mail.gmail.com> 
	<967863.26874.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002111340i278fab89qfe19924f6e41bcb8@mail.gmail.com>

Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>:
> Unconscious animals like amoebas exhibit a low level of intelligent behavior. Those instinctive behaviors are encoded by DNA. In higher organisms we see nervous systems, and we see how the resulting consciousness increases the intelligence and flexibility of the organisms.

Much like how a laptop is more flexible than a PDA, which in turn is
more flexible than a pocket calculator. We are, to a substantially
greater extent than any other animal, general-purpose information
processors.

This does not relate to consciousness in any clear way.

The only roughly coherent theory behind the evolution of
consciousness, in my mind, is embedded within Pollock and Ismael's
paper on nolipsism. It goes: "we are conscious because we use de se
designators, and we use de se designators so that we can function
intelligently in every possible situation".

I don't like it, and I don't know if I agree with it, when it comes to
the question of subjective experience. I don't see why de se
designators should be special, among other symbols, in that particular
way. Even so, it's as close as I can come to explaining the
evolutionary origins of consciousness.

Great for explaining the illusory nature of the self, not so great for
explaining the illusory nature of consciousness -- since consciousness
is not an illusion. It might be made of illusions, sure, but it isn't
one itself. We can measure it. I'm not sure how we can measure it, but
if it's favored by evolution then we must necessarily be able to.


From stathisp at gmail.com  Thu Feb 11 21:43:31 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2010 08:43:31 +1100
Subject: [ExI] evolution of consciousness
In-Reply-To: <967863.26874.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <e321aa4b1002101344m4577ebd5nff9995690d6bf010@mail.gmail.com> 
	<967863.26874.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002111343x49ca3353q3ca0372c62d86cdb@mail.gmail.com>

On 12 February 2010 01:37, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
> --- On Wed, 2/10/10, Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> This is actually a very good point. I don't have clearly
>> articulate beliefs regarding the relationship between consciousness
>> and evolution, myself, but clearly Gordon does.
>
> I think consciousness aids and enhances intelligence, something like the way a flashlight helps one move about in the dark.
>
> Unconscious animals like amoebas exhibit a low level of intelligent behavior. Those instinctive behaviors are encoded by DNA. In higher organisms we see nervous systems, and we see how the resulting consciousness increases the intelligence and flexibility of the organisms.
>
> It seems probable to me that conscious intelligence involves less biological overhead than instinctive unconscious intelligence, especially when considering complex behaviors such as social behaviors. Perhaps nature selected it for that reason only.

But you have clearly stated that consciousness plays no role in
behaviour, since you agree that the brain's behaviour can be emulated
by a computer and the computer will be unconscious. The computer
doesn't have to be tricked up to behave as if it's conscious: all you
need do is follow the structural and functional relationships of the
brain, and the intelligence will emerge without (you claim) any of the
consciousness.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From stathisp at gmail.com  Thu Feb 11 21:48:01 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2010 08:48:01 +1100
Subject: [ExI] evolution of consciousness
In-Reply-To: <e321aa4b1002111340i278fab89qfe19924f6e41bcb8@mail.gmail.com>
References: <e321aa4b1002101344m4577ebd5nff9995690d6bf010@mail.gmail.com> 
	<967863.26874.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
	<e321aa4b1002111340i278fab89qfe19924f6e41bcb8@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002111348i75a60c89o192f7ad3091650ab@mail.gmail.com>

On 12 February 2010 08:40, Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com> wrote:

> Great for explaining the illusory nature of the self, not so great for
> explaining the illusory nature of consciousness -- since consciousness
> is not an illusion. It might be made of illusions, sure, but it isn't
> one itself. We can measure it. I'm not sure how we can measure it, but
> if it's favored by evolution then we must necessarily be able to.

The idea is that it *isn't* favoured by evolution: it is a necessary
side-effect of intelligence, as walking is a necessary side-effect of
putting one foot in front of the other in a coordinated fashion.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Thu Feb 11 21:53:22 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 13:53:22 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Film Script!
In-Reply-To: <547545.73654.qm@web113605.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
References: <mailman.1.1265889603.29249.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org> 
	<547545.73654.qm@web113605.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002111353u35c6915sd2673184f08da395@mail.gmail.com>

Ben Zaiboc <bbenzai at yahoo.com>:
> (a whole bunch of brilliant nonsense)

Yes. Yes! Maybe run two perspectives through the thing, so that we're
following both an organic human hero and a robotic alien antihero. There can
be a scene where the two of them enter into an interminable Socratic
dialogue!

"Why are you trying to kill us?!"

"What are you talking about? We can't kill you. You aren't even real."

"Of course we're real! We have qualia and everything!"

"No, you are only predisposed to claim that you do. You don't actually know
what qualia are. If you did, you would be able to tell me what it is like to
be swept by a ten millisecond pulse of electromagnetic radiation in the five
to six gigahertz spectrum."

"Five to... wait, gigahertz? I can't see anything below four hundred
terahertz!"

"Exactly."

Then, a gun fight.

(The guns should shoot explosions instead of bullets.)
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From thespike at satx.rr.com  Thu Feb 11 22:26:49 2010
From: thespike at satx.rr.com (Damien Broderick)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 16:26:49 -0600
Subject: [ExI] Film Script!
In-Reply-To: <e321aa4b1002111353u35c6915sd2673184f08da395@mail.gmail.com>
References: <mailman.1.1265889603.29249.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
	<547545.73654.qm@web113605.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
	<e321aa4b1002111353u35c6915sd2673184f08da395@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4B748429.5050404@satx.rr.com>

On 2/11/2010 3:53 PM, Spencer Campbell wrote:
> Ben Zaiboc <bbenzai at yahoo.com <mailto:bbenzai at yahoo.com>>:
>  > (a whole bunch of brilliant nonsense)
>
> Yes. Yes! Maybe run two perspectives through the thing, so that we're
> following both an organic human hero and a robotic alien antihero. There
> can be a scene where the two of them enter into an interminable Socratic
> dialogue!

Oh, sort of like this?

Lune steps carefully, keeping her balance with outstretched arms. On 
every side, matted kelp and seaweed coat the sluggish surface of the 
ocean between the trapped hulks that have drifted here across hundreds, 
thousands of kilometers, fetching up at the still center of an 
indefinitely slow vortex on a cognate world of oceans seized by locking 
land masses. Other spoiled vessels hang trapped in the feral 
vegetation?s embrace, moving slightly, rocking against each other?s 
hulls with low, grinding vibrations and deep clangs, scarcely audible, 
like the booming of whales. This ruined ship, the Argyle, must have 
dangled here in the jaws of the sea for at least a century and a half.

?I can?t do this any longer,? she says. ?I won?t.?

?How touching.? The K-machine wears a heavy yellow canvas mariner?s coat 
and black rubber boots, leaning against the stump of Argyle?s fractured 
main mast. Broken spars and fragments of a fallen sail and tangled 
rigging cling about it. ?You love him.?

The timber planks beneath her foot are pulpy, sagging with every careful 
step she takes. The ocean has invaded the vessel from within, seeping 
upward through the wood, rusting and corroding the iron work, without 
yet swallowing it down into the depths. Perhaps that fate is certain, 
but it has been delayed for many decades by the matted pelagic 
vegetation flattening the surface of the water, locking all these 
marooned vessels into a graveyard without burial. Lune grimaces. The 
setting is the perfect preference of the thing that regards her approach 
with deep, gratified irony.

?Yes. I do love him. I did not expect??

?Because he brought you back from death. This is not love, it?s supine 
and self-interested gratitude. Get over it.?

?You would have been quite happy to sacrifice my life to extinguish his.?

?Your life, like everyone?s life, is illusory. Is this not what you 
believe and argue, philosopher? The Schmidhuber ontology, the blasphemy 
that computation is the basis of reality??

She stares at the thing with disgust and a certain enduring fright that 
she has known since childhood, when it first made itself known to her. 
The K-machine possesses power over her, in a measure she does not truly 
understand. Perhaps it and its kin had slaughtered her parents. Or 
perhaps, as it argues, that destruction had been, instead, and wickedly, 
the work of cold humans themselves, intent upon creating their own hell 
world. The Ensemble instructors had evaded that issue whenever she?d 
attempted, as an acolyte, to raise it.

?If life is illusory,? she says, ?I lose nothing by living it in the way 
that I choose. I?m done with you.? But still she stands there.

The thing reaches forth an arm and hand made all of black metal, 
tenderly strokes her cheek. A kind of joyous revulsion rises within her. 
A memory from just beyond infancy: a figure all in black, shielded 
against the foul fumes rising to the shattered surface from the piled 
dead in the concrete caverns below. Dark-clad arms plucking her up, 
carrying her to safety, her pulse roaring, her terrified childish voice 
locked in her throat. Septimus, or one of his assistants, she sometimes 
thinks. Or perhaps, as it claims, this thing slouching at ease before 
her, or one of its kindred. It is a salvation she can hardly regret, 
either way, and yet she detests its memory. She waits stock-still as the 
thing draws a line down her face, withdraws.


From thespike at satx.rr.com  Thu Feb 11 23:16:17 2010
From: thespike at satx.rr.com (Damien Broderick)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 17:16:17 -0600
Subject: [ExI] skyhook elevator
Message-ID: <4B748FC1.8090001@satx.rr.com>

It occurs to me (can't recall ever seeing this discussed, although it 
must be an ancient sub-topic of skyhook dynamics) that as your elevator 
climbs or is a shoved up the thread, you'd not only be pressed against 
the floor but also against the west wall. Maybe you wouldn't notice if 
the trip took a couple of days, but you're going from rest to 11,000 
km/hr. Is that especially noticeable? What say the space gurus?

Damien Broderick


From ablainey at aol.com  Thu Feb 11 23:33:53 2010
From: ablainey at aol.com (ablainey at aol.com)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 18:33:53 -0500
Subject: [ExI] Very long lifespans and accompanying mental milieus
In-Reply-To: <4e3a29501002111105o3ac9433ax703bde1d0b653f6f@mail.gmail.com>
References: <4e3a29501002111105o3ac9433ax703bde1d0b653f6f@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <8CC7989CE4091C7-607C-1543@webmail-d011.sysops.aol.com>


 Odd I was mulling this very issue over this afternoon while thinking about going to the dentist. I was wondering how I would cope with being imortal if the rigours of age still catch up with you. 
Not the grey hair, wrinkled skin and other signs of a long life. More the niggles like tooth ache from a dogy crown. Back ache from that slipped disc. Arthritis, migraines, bad eye sight and all 
the other things that detract from lifes quality.
Alzhiemers and other degenerative diseases would have been unheard of a couple fo hundred years ago. No one ever lived long enough to develope them.
It makes me wonder what new ailments we will discover? Perhaps the equivelent of a mid life crisis every 50 years due to bicentenial cell regeneration? who knows.

 


 

 

-----Original Message-----
From: Will Steinberg <steinberg.will at gmail.com>
To: ExI chat list <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org>
Sent: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 19:05
Subject: [ExI] Very long lifespans and accompanying mental milieus


When human lifespans lengthen, new mental paradigms are born.  This tends to occur when sufficiently large amounts of the population reach a certain age as to be common.  For example, humans of the past would have a hard time understanding both the jaded, crotchety old man and the freaking-out fifty year old, simply by virtue that anyone who lived to be this old was usually revered for their luck.  Very old people, when there were not a lot of very old people, were Methuselahs.  But as medicine advanced, being these ages has become increasingly more common, and as the uniqueness associated with these ages has disappeared, a slew of mental crises have developed.  Now, some, as in the case of the elderly, are physiological--an old man is cranky because he is arthritic or forgetful.  Yet there are aspects of aging that cannot be associated in this manner, and instead lie completely in the mental realm.  The mid-life crisis is and example of a phenomenon that is distinctly new.

In the next fifty or so years (and I hope this is overestimating,) there is a good chance that human lifespans will lengthen significantly, perhaps going so far as to double.  Now, many of us simply think to ourselves: "More time to think!  More time to work!"  But who knows what happens when the metaprograms of the brain reshuffle connections for far longer than nature "intended"?  Though it is fine, for now, to treat ourselves as having overcome nature and evolution, we must remember that consciousness and intelligence were successful for producing offspring, which are produced relatively early in life, and have far less of a connection to the later years.  

Is this problem one of value?  What if, at one hundred and fifty years of age, man is suddenly compelled to end his life?  What if longer life will dictate to us the most obvious example of human pathos--that, for all we love about ourselves, the buck stops for the brain sooner than we might have hoped?  It seems in this case that the recent discussions on mental being that have overwhelmed the list are indeed incredibly important, if only for the fact that knowledge of the mental processes of humans must be understood in order to design even better processes that don't hit a wall after extended periods of time.

This is Transhumanism, not in the often-held idea of letting "humanness" transcend our current physical limitations, but in scrapping many aspects of that humanness entirely in favor of something unfathomable and better.  There is a good chance that we will, at some point, be faced with the problem that the confusing tangle of yarn in our heads produced by evolution is simply not good enough to deal with whatever comes next.  And then what?

 
_______________________________________________
extropy-chat mailing list
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat

 
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From lacertilian at gmail.com  Thu Feb 11 23:33:56 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 15:33:56 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Very long lifespans and accompanying mental milieus
In-Reply-To: <4e3a29501002111105o3ac9433ax703bde1d0b653f6f@mail.gmail.com>
References: <4e3a29501002111105o3ac9433ax703bde1d0b653f6f@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002111533v69c7d247j4b79bfca76ee4624@mail.gmail.com>

Will Steinberg <steinberg.will at gmail.com>:
> There is a good chance that we will, at some point, be faced with the
> problem that the confusing tangle of yarn in our heads produced by evolution
> is simply not good enough to deal with whatever comes next.? And then what?

I would argue that we hit that point somewhere between five and ten
thousand years ago. We've been flying by the seat of our pants ever
since, racing to evolve the next big species before we utterly destroy
ourselves in the process (along with everything else on Earth that
wasn't smart enough to be so stupid).

So, yes: what's the solution? I don't think we're close enough to
cerebral engineering for that to enter into the discussion as a
serious possibility. Before we can really address the hardware
problems, I think we have to work out the software problems.

The history of religion is basically equivalent to the history of
operating systems. I use Linux myself, and I don't identify with any
named belief system, including atheism, for precisely the same reason.

Actually I want to stop using Linux as soon as possible. Too many
stratified layers of ad-hoc compatibility. Have to write my own
computer architecture from scratch, at some point. I simply can't be
genuinely comfortable until then!

Let's say someone invents a religion that is scientifically proven to
improve the health, intelligence, and emotional stability of its
believers, but it assumes the existence of demonstrably false
supernatural phenomena. Let's also say that it comes with an effective
method of hypnosis to induce the required delusions. Would you
convert?

Another take on it: someone invents a novel surgical procedure,
crossing the wires in your skull in just such a way that you become a
more effective transhuman being. Would you sign up for it? How long
would you wait, before having it done, to see if there are any
unexpected side effects in the early adopters?

Both of these are within the realm of possibility right now, though I
have my doubts about how effective that hypnosis would be. Either one
could come up within the next five years.

In the former case, I might even be the one to design the
calculatedly-misleading metaphysics!


From pharos at gmail.com  Thu Feb 11 23:55:59 2010
From: pharos at gmail.com (BillK)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 23:55:59 +0000
Subject: [ExI] Very long lifespans and accompanying mental milieus
In-Reply-To: <4e3a29501002111216j5b2c85b4j2777468c3ac61d96@mail.gmail.com>
References: <201002111913.o1BJDeuf001898@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
	<4e3a29501002111216j5b2c85b4j2777468c3ac61d96@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <ee50357e1002111555v733fac84m3e5812bb8be47c08@mail.gmail.com>

2010/2/11 Will Steinberg :
> Well then you may recast my argument, filling in
> "mid-life-sense-of-pride-and-fulfillment" for "mid-life crisis;" it's still
> something that people a few centuries ago would not understand very well.? I
> still think we will surely face unprecedented places of the mind as
> lifespans grow longer.
>
>


I have the feeling that extended lifespans will make people more risk averse.

If you know that the only thing that is likely to kill you in the next
200 years is an accident then it seems likely that avoiding dangerous
situations will become prevalent.

Wars were popular when nobody was likely to live beyond 30 or 40 years anyway.

But a risk averse society .....  Everyone driving golf carts
surrounded by air bags, no dangerous sports, health and safety
regulations everywhere, no motorcycles, etc, I'm sure you can think of
more possibilities.

BillK


From msd001 at gmail.com  Fri Feb 12 00:32:35 2010
From: msd001 at gmail.com (Mike Dougherty)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 19:32:35 -0500
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <896407.10281.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <f21c22e31002110328g6b0f7bc9md118abb157c99bd4@mail.gmail.com>
	<896407.10281.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <62c14241002111632m53d7fdafvd57cdf9b8f325006@mail.gmail.com>

On Thu, Feb 11, 2010 at 9:06 AM, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
> Characters in video games behave as if they have consciousness. Seems to me that digitally simulated brains will also behave as if they have consciousness, but that they will have no more consciousness than do those characters in video games.
>
> I don't play video games myself but I've known children who did. They often spoke of the characters in their video games as if those characters really existed as consciousness entities. Then they matured.

Really?

It still amazes me that anyone continues to engage these discussions with you.

You comment about children and maturity speaks more to me about the
loss of creative imagination and the subjugation of young minds to the
expectation of "growing up" and abandoning 'childish things'

Has anyone you've discussed this with finally admitted their ideas
were wrong and adopted whole cloth your understanding of this issue?
There may be a reason for that.


From steinberg.will at gmail.com  Fri Feb 12 00:38:54 2010
From: steinberg.will at gmail.com (Will Steinberg)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 19:38:54 -0500
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <62c14241002111632m53d7fdafvd57cdf9b8f325006@mail.gmail.com>
References: <f21c22e31002110328g6b0f7bc9md118abb157c99bd4@mail.gmail.com>
	<896407.10281.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
	<62c14241002111632m53d7fdafvd57cdf9b8f325006@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4e3a29501002111638s71abe067va2e2b213b5ef708f@mail.gmail.com>

In stride with what Mike just said, could we perhaps (since most of us seem
to agree) discuss the actually important notions of semiotics and
computability, instead of more pointless antiswobian banter?  Nobody is
going to budge, I promise.  Unstoppable force, immovable post sort of
thing.
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From msd001 at gmail.com  Fri Feb 12 00:39:59 2010
From: msd001 at gmail.com (Mike Dougherty)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 19:39:59 -0500
Subject: [ExI] Very long lifespans and accompanying mental milieus
In-Reply-To: <ee50357e1002111555v733fac84m3e5812bb8be47c08@mail.gmail.com>
References: <201002111913.o1BJDeuf001898@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
	<4e3a29501002111216j5b2c85b4j2777468c3ac61d96@mail.gmail.com>
	<ee50357e1002111555v733fac84m3e5812bb8be47c08@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <62c14241002111639w6d7bb9fg75780778fcb41453@mail.gmail.com>

On Thu, Feb 11, 2010 at 6:55 PM, BillK <pharos at gmail.com> wrote:
> But a risk averse society ..... ?Everyone driving golf carts
> surrounded by air bags, no dangerous sports, health and safety
> regulations everywhere, no motorcycles, etc, I'm sure you can think of
> more possibilities.

Driving?  what kind of reckless madman are you?  there are so many
mechanical failures that could give rise to your untimely death.
Better to move into a comfortably controlled cell at the Life Facility
to ensure your biological computing substrate is ideally maintained
while you flit safely about the many virtual worlds of experience
coming soon(tm).


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Fri Feb 12 00:53:17 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 16:53:17 -0800
Subject: [ExI] evolution of consciousness
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002111348i75a60c89o192f7ad3091650ab@mail.gmail.com>
References: <e321aa4b1002101344m4577ebd5nff9995690d6bf010@mail.gmail.com> 
	<967863.26874.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
	<e321aa4b1002111340i278fab89qfe19924f6e41bcb8@mail.gmail.com> 
	<f21c22e31002111348i75a60c89o192f7ad3091650ab@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002111653l49e58ec0uab72f174e296038e@mail.gmail.com>

Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com>:
>Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com>:
>>... if [consciousness is] favored by evolution then we must necessarily be able to [measure it].
>
> The idea is that it *isn't* favoured by evolution: it is a necessary
> side-effect of intelligence, as walking is a necessary side-effect of
> putting one foot in front of the other in a coordinated fashion.

If that's the case, I once again run straight into the realm of
panpsychism due to the fact it is impossible to create an absolutely
unintelligent system.

Even rocks are good at staying on the ground.

So I'm inclined to believe you.

Yeah. There's not a lot I can contribute to this thread. I have no
evidence before me indicating that human-level consciousness is an
evolutionary inevitability, by any measure, so I don't have a lot to
go on.


From stathisp at gmail.com  Fri Feb 12 00:53:44 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2010 11:53:44 +1100
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <896407.10281.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <f21c22e31002110328g6b0f7bc9md118abb157c99bd4@mail.gmail.com> 
	<896407.10281.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002111653k675180fg8bd63455533a03a9@mail.gmail.com>

On 12 February 2010 01:06, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
> --- On Thu, 2/11/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Would you say that a robot that seems to walk isn't really
>> walking because it is not identical to, and therefore lacks all of
>> the properties of, a human walking?
>
> My point here concerns digital simulations of brains, not robots.
>
>> The argument is that the computer can reproduce the consciousness of the
>> brain if it is able to reproduces the brain's behaviour.
>
> Characters in video games behave as if they have consciousness. Seems to me that digitally simulated brains will also behave as if they have consciousness, but that they will have no more consciousness than do those characters in video games.
>
> I don't play video games myself but I've known children who did. They often spoke of the characters in their video games as if those characters really existed as consciousness entities. Then they matured.

Characters in video games do certain things such as shoot other
characters. If they were connected to a robot arm and camera, they
might be able to shoot real people, really dead. So it is not a valid
objection to say that because the simulation is not identical with the
original, it cannot do anything that the original can do. You have to
show that consciousness is beyond the power of a simulation to
reproduce, not that a computer differs from a brain, which no-one is
disputing.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Fri Feb 12 00:59:52 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 16:59:52 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <e321aa4b1002111325h463801e1yb73fdcbf004a9576@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <769806.60768.qm@web36505.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Thu, 2/11/10, Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com> wrote:

>> I don't play video games myself but I've known
>> children who did. They often spoke of the characters in
>> their video games as if those characters really existed as
>> conscious entities. Then they matured.
> 
> Exactly the same argument applies to characters in movies.

Yes indeed. The characters you see on the silver screen, or on your TV screen or on your computer monitor, have no more consciousness than do the characters you see in video games and comic books. And they have no more consciousness than will the characters we might one day create with perfect digital simulations of humans and their brains.

Such digital simulations of humans will exist only as mere hi-tech movies of real or imaginary people, as mere models of real or imaginary people, as mere animations of real or imaginary people, as mere caricatures of real or imaginary people, as mere descriptions of real or imaginary people. 

No matter whether we create those simulations with real or imaginary persons in mind, the simulations themselves will have no more reality than does Fred Flintstone. 

Yabadabadoo.

-gts




      


From spike66 at att.net  Fri Feb 12 00:48:16 2010
From: spike66 at att.net (spike)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 16:48:16 -0800
Subject: [ExI] skyhook elevator
In-Reply-To: <4B748FC1.8090001@satx.rr.com>
References: <4B748FC1.8090001@satx.rr.com>
Message-ID: <FBAEFD5DF4A34C068FB56DE52D1E89D9@spike>



> ...On Behalf Of Damien Broderick
> Subject: [ExI] skyhook elevator
> 
> It occurs to me (can't recall ever seeing this discussed, 
> although it must be an ancient sub-topic of skyhook dynamics) 
> that as your elevator climbs or is a shoved up the thread, 
> you'd not only be pressed against the floor but also against 
> the west wall. Maybe you wouldn't notice if the trip took a 
> couple of days, but you're going from rest to 11,000 km/hr. 
> Is that especially noticeable? What say the space gurus?
> 
> Damien Broderick


Coriolis effect sounds like what you are describing, and it would be durn
near negligible.  I will calculate it if you wish.  To give you an idea by
using only numbers in my head and single digit BOTECs, geo is about 36000 km
from the surface as I recall so add 6300 km earth radius and that's close
enough to about 40,000 km so the circumference of the orbit is about 6 and
some change times that, so 250000 km in 24 hrs, so you accelerate to 10000
km per hour or about 3 km per second or so.  

How long do you guess it would take to haul you up to GEO?  An few hours?
Lets say 10.  To accelerate 3 km per second eastward in 10 hrs would be
about 0.1 meters per second, or 100th of a G.  The elevator passengers would
scarcely notice.

It is proportional of course.  If you theorize they get there in 1 hour,
then the coriolis component is about a tenth of a G, but if they get all the
way to GEO in an hour, there is some serious upward velocity involved.

spike 



From possiblepaths2050 at gmail.com  Fri Feb 12 01:19:08 2010
From: possiblepaths2050 at gmail.com (John Grigg)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 18:19:08 -0700
Subject: [ExI] Very long lifespans and accompanying mental milieus
In-Reply-To: <62c14241002111639w6d7bb9fg75780778fcb41453@mail.gmail.com>
References: <201002111913.o1BJDeuf001898@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
	<4e3a29501002111216j5b2c85b4j2777468c3ac61d96@mail.gmail.com>
	<ee50357e1002111555v733fac84m3e5812bb8be47c08@mail.gmail.com>
	<62c14241002111639w6d7bb9fg75780778fcb41453@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <2d6187671002111719v4cd08365v5ab279243d0306f2@mail.gmail.com>

BillK wrote:
If you know that the only thing that is likely to kill you in the next
200 years is an accident then it seems likely that avoiding dangerous
situations will become prevalent.
>>>

I imagine a society somewhat along the lines of Larry Niven's alien species
known as the puppeteers, who go to extremes to protect their lives.  But
because of this humans prize their advanced and nearly
full-proof technology!

He continues:
Wars were popular when nobody was likely to live beyond 30 or 40 years
anyway.
>>>

But war will be fought largely with machines and a strong military will be
even more a product of lots of bright and highly educated humans (and of
course also supersmart AI's!).  I do always envision humanity taking part in
battlefield "up-close" operations.  But the "human" infantryman/special
forces of the future will be hugely enhanced to survive and succeed! lol
Joining the military will be strictly voluntary (to avoid social disruption
that would dwarf the Vietnam protests), but be seen as vastly more "daring
and macho" than it is now.  Of course I still see political tyrannies (and
even some democracies) playing mind/meme games with their young people to
try to get them to throw their indefinite lives away in largely pointless
wars.  But it won't be near as easy to convince, as it is now.

He continues:
But a risk averse society .....  Everyone driving golf carts
surrounded by air bags, no dangerous sports, health and safety
regulations everywhere, no motorcycles, etc, I'm sure you can think of more
possibilities.
>>>

I think we will see a society of extremes at both ends of the personal
safety spectrum.  "Mature" nanotech clothes & bodies that can save us from
most tragedies that now take lives by the millions will be utterly
commonplace, but at the same there will be the nearly suicidally daring and
bored people, who will risk their lives by engaging in extremely dangerous
sports and "leisure pursuits."

John Grigg
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From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Fri Feb 12 01:49:42 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 17:49:42 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002111653k675180fg8bd63455533a03a9@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <840800.79193.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Thu, 2/11/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:

>> I don't play video games myself but I've known
>> children who did. They often spoke of the characters in
>> their video games as if those characters really existed as
>> conscious entities. Then they matured.
> 
> Characters in video games do certain things such as shoot
> other characters. If they were connected to a robot arm and
> camera, they might be able to shoot real people, really dead. 

No sir. The supposed lawyer for such a character in such a video game has a good defense: his client could not have shot anyone because his client does not exist except in someone's overly vivid imagination.

The sensible people on the jury will find that a mixed-up child or perhaps a philosophically-challenged adult used a hi-tech weapon disguised as a computer game to shoot a real person.

-gts




      


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Fri Feb 12 01:26:44 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 17:26:44 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] evolution of consciousness
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002111343x49ca3353q3ca0372c62d86cdb@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <438778.21885.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Thu, 2/11/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:

> But you have clearly stated that consciousness plays no
> role in behaviour...

I can hardly believe you wrote that. I spent hours explaining to you why and how I reject epiphenomenalism. 

>... since you agree that the brain's behaviour can be emulated
> by a computer and the computer will be unconscious. 

I argued that we can program an artificial brain to act as if it has consciousness and that said artificial brain will still lack consciousness. This is not the same as arguing that consciousness plays no role in human behavior!

By the way what exactly do you mean by "behavior of brains", anyway? 

When I refer to the brain's behavior I usually mean observable behavior of the organism it controls, behavior such as acts of speech.

-gts




      


From steinberg.will at gmail.com  Fri Feb 12 02:14:49 2010
From: steinberg.will at gmail.com (Will Steinberg)
Date: Thu, 11 Feb 2010 21:14:49 -0500
Subject: [ExI] evolution of consciousness
In-Reply-To: <438778.21885.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <f21c22e31002111343x49ca3353q3ca0372c62d86cdb@mail.gmail.com>
	<438778.21885.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <4e3a29501002111814u37d41ae4w7790eae6edbfec9d@mail.gmail.com>

>
> I don't see why de se
> designators should be special, among other symbols, in that particular
> way.


 Not necessarily special, just useful up to a point.  One can see conscious
systems providing at least SOME benefit to organisms, perhaps in order to
make decisions affecting the self in the future, understanding how "I" fits
into its surroundings.  If conscious systems were developing at the same
time as or as a cause/effect of social systems, it is again simple to see
how awareness of the self to make decisions in the future in SOCIAL
situations would in turn, INCREASE SURVIVAL CHANCES.  Any social animal
which is able to modify the self and plan for the self in order to set up
ideal conditions for mating will have an advantage in mating.  Intelligence
would also be important, a separate property that enhanced the organization
and quality of actions.  Having high levels of both would lead to decisions
that both pertained more intimately in the self than other animals, and also
were of a higher quality and thus more likely to succeed.  Since both
systems as simple notions are easy enough to see emerging in very small
ways, the existence of both would lead to a greater number of animals with
slightly higher amounts of both, etc, etc.  This would explain why
intelligence seems highly correlated with consciousness, with most animals
who show signs of self-awareness (many birds, many primates, dolphins,
elephants) also performing well in social situations, problem-solving and
memory situations, and even having creative functions through crude art.
Sociability, insight and creativity are essential components of a blanket
intelligence (street smarts, school smarts, art smarts) and seem to
correlate with consciousness.  This could be both a product of an
epi-evolutionary dual helpfulness and the fact that awareness of the self
will actually improve the magnitudes of all three.
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From stathisp at gmail.com  Fri Feb 12 02:22:47 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2010 13:22:47 +1100
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <840800.79193.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <f21c22e31002111653k675180fg8bd63455533a03a9@mail.gmail.com> 
	<840800.79193.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002111822t75a3af04j4a44ae56db2a0186@mail.gmail.com>

On 12 February 2010 12:49, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
> --- On Thu, 2/11/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>>> I don't play video games myself but I've known
>>> children who did. They often spoke of the characters in
>>> their video games as if those characters really existed as
>>> conscious entities. Then they matured.
>>
>> Characters in video games do certain things such as shoot
>> other characters. If they were connected to a robot arm and
>> camera, they might be able to shoot real people, really dead.
>
> No sir. The supposed lawyer for such a character in such a video game has a good defense: his client could not have shot anyone because his client does not exist except in someone's overly vivid imagination.
>
> The sensible people on the jury will find that a mixed-up child or perhaps a philosophically-challenged adult used a hi-tech weapon disguised as a computer game to shoot a real person.

I was simply pointing out that the shooting would be a REAL shooting
resulting in a REAL death, even though the character is simulated.
Whether the character understood what it was doing is a different
question, but in general you cannot use the argument that it was a
simulation to preclude this possibility, because the claim that, a
priori, a simulation cannot have ANY property of the thing it is
simulating is obviously ridiculous.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From stathisp at gmail.com  Fri Feb 12 02:52:47 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2010 13:52:47 +1100
Subject: [ExI] evolution of consciousness
In-Reply-To: <438778.21885.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <f21c22e31002111343x49ca3353q3ca0372c62d86cdb@mail.gmail.com> 
	<438778.21885.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002111852g292ec3bdq5718c2d6d8ac8d21@mail.gmail.com>

On 12 February 2010 12:26, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
> --- On Thu, 2/11/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> But you have clearly stated that consciousness plays no
>> role in behaviour...
>
> I can hardly believe you wrote that. I spent hours explaining to you why and how I reject epiphenomenalism.
>
>>... since you agree that the brain's behaviour can be emulated
>> by a computer and the computer will be unconscious.
>
> I argued that we can program an artificial brain to act as if it has consciousness and that said artificial brain will still lack consciousness. This is not the same as arguing that consciousness plays no role in human behavior!
>
> By the way what exactly do you mean by "behavior of brains", anyway?
>
> When I refer to the brain's behavior I usually mean observable behavior of the organism it controls, behavior such as acts of speech.

A computer model of the brain is made that controls a body, i.e. a
robot. The robot will behave exactly like a human. Moreover, it will
behave exactly like a human due to an isomorphism between the
structure and function of the brain and the structure and function of
the computer model, since that is what a model is. Now, you claim that
this robot would lack consciousness. This means that there is nothing
about the intelligent behaviour of the human that is affected by
consciousness. For if consciousness were a separate thing that
affected behaviour, there would be some deficit in behaviour if you
reproduced the functional relationship between brain components while
leaving out the consciousness. Therefore, consciousness must be
epiphenomenal. You might have said that you rejected epiphenomenalism,
but you cannot do so consistently.

The only way you can consistently maintain your position that
computers can't reproduce consciousness is to say that they can't
reproduce intelligence either. If you don't agree with this you must
explain why I am wrong when I point out the self-contradictions that
zombies would lead to, and you simply avoid doing this, which is no
way to comport yourself in a philosophical debate. I asked if the
thought experiments I proposed were clear to everyone else and no-one
contacted me to say that they were not.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From thespike at satx.rr.com  Fri Feb 12 06:07:47 2010
From: thespike at satx.rr.com (Damien Broderick)
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2010 00:07:47 -0600
Subject: [ExI] better self-transcendence through selective brain damage
Message-ID: <4B74F033.702@satx.rr.com>

Links to Spirituality Found in the Brain

By LiveScience.com Staff

Scientists have identified areas of the brain that, when damaged, lead 
to greater spirituality. The findings hint at the roots of spiritual and 
religious attitudes, the researchers say.

The study, published in the Feb. 11 issue of the journal Neuron, 
involves a personality trait called self-transcendence, which is a 
somewhat vague measure of spiritual feeling, thinking, and behaviors. 
Self-transcendence "reflects a decreased sense of self and an ability to 
identify one's self as an integral part of the universe as a whole," the 
researchers explain.

Before and after surgery, the scientists surveyed patients who had brain 
tumors removed. The surveys generate self-transcendence scores.

Selective damage to the left and right posterior parietal regions of the 
brain induced a specific increase in self-transcendence, or ST, the 
surveys showed.

"Our symptom-lesion mapping study is the first demonstration of a 
causative link between brain functioning and ST," said Dr. Cosimo Urgesi 
from the University of Udine in Italy. "Damage to posterior parietal 
areas induced unusually fast changes of a stable personality dimension 
related to transcendental self-referential awareness. Thus, 
dysfunctional parietal neural activity may underpin altered spiritual 
and religious attitudes and behaviors."

Previous neuroimaging studies had linked activity within a large network 
in the brain that connects the frontal, parietal, and temporal cortexes 
with spiritual experiences, "but information on the causative link 
between such a network and spirituality is lacking," explains lead study 
author, Urgesi said.

One study, reported in 2008, suggested that the brain's right parietal 
lobe defines "Me," and people with less active Me-Definers are more 
likely to lead spiritual lives.

The finding could lead to new strategies for treating some forms of 
mental illness.

"If a stable personality trait like ST can undergo fast changes as a 
consequence of brain lesions, it would indicate that at least some 
personality dimensions may be modified by influencing neural activity in 
specific areas," said Dr. Salvatore M. Aglioti from Sapienza University 
of Rome. "Perhaps novel approaches aimed at modulating neural activity 
might ultimately pave the way to new treatments of personality disorders."


From stefano.vaj at gmail.com  Fri Feb 12 13:12:10 2010
From: stefano.vaj at gmail.com (Stefano Vaj)
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2010 14:12:10 +0100
Subject: [ExI] Rights without selves (was: Nolopsism)
In-Reply-To: <60CE7310-2BE1-47BE-AE8A-9BFC69A659B4@GMAIL.COM>
References: <e321aa4b1002081118n5d53dd0k8dc365c11a997c29@mail.gmail.com>
	<C87EDDD8-24A5-4035-ACF3-81BD8E1E087B@GMAIL.COM>
	<e321aa4b1002081837l247bf940q423d1ba6e9e0a300@mail.gmail.com>
	<60CE7310-2BE1-47BE-AE8A-9BFC69A659B4@GMAIL.COM>
Message-ID: <580930c21002120512u4aafa7c7kdf8f5f14e77d5fcd@mail.gmail.com>

2010/2/9 JOSHUA JOB <nanite1018 at gmail.com>:
> A fetus is not yet a person, nor has ever been a person (as it is not nor
> ever has been a rational conceptual entity). So it cannot have any rights.

Legally wrong. A fetus can inherit, for instance, in a number of
circumstances, at least in continental jurisdictions. Even though its
capacity is restricted, the same applies to legal entities, for
instance. Or even to adult humans (say, a life prisoner).

> I am saying that it cannot be wrong if it does not violate the nature of
> other conscious entities. The ocean cannot be wronged, only rational
> conceptual "self"-aware entities can be, because they are the things that
> can conceivably understand right and wrong.

Let say somebody cannot conceivably understand right and wrong (say,
out of certified "moral folly", or whatever the psychiatric terms may
be in English). Does it stop being a natural person under existing
laws? No. Do great apes with a greater ability to distinguish right
and wrong than, say, a human infant or a severely mentally handicapped
human being, have rights? Again no, at least for the time being.

In legal terms, a person is what you say it is. Thus, I would not
start from personhood to deduce rights, but rather from rights
provided for by a legal system, on the basis of value judgments, to
infer the personhood status they involve.

-- 
Stefano Vaj


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Fri Feb 12 13:41:46 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2010 05:41:46 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002111822t75a3af04j4a44ae56db2a0186@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <957422.65114.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Thu, 2/11/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:

>> The sensible people on the jury will find that a
>> mixed-up child or perhaps a philosophically-challenged adult
>> used a hi-tech weapon disguised as a computer game to shoot
>> a real person.

>... the claim that, a priori, a simulation cannot have ANY property of 
> the thing it is simulating is obviously ridiculous.

Is it? In the incident you describe, only a *depiction* of a shooter exists in the game, and depictions of people have no reality. Or to put it another way: they have the same kind of reality, and the same legal standing, as photographs and drawings and other depictions of people.

The human game-developer or the human game-player will go to prison or to a psychiatric facility for the criminally insane. The simulated shooter in the game will never know or care; he has no real existence.

-gts




      


From bbenzai at yahoo.com  Fri Feb 12 14:50:33 2010
From: bbenzai at yahoo.com (Ben Zaiboc)
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2010 06:50:33 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] better self-transcendence through selective brain damage
In-Reply-To: <mailman.1.1265976001.11244.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
Message-ID: <226303.69206.qm@web113612.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

Damien Broderick <thespike at satx.rr.com> informed us:

> Links to Spirituality Found in the Brain
...
 
> The finding could lead to new strategies for treating some
> forms of 
> mental illness.
> 
...

> "Perhaps novel approaches aimed at modulating
> neural activity 
> might ultimately pave the way to new treatments of
> personality disorders."


Wow.  Could it be?  Might we find a cure for religion?

Ben Zaiboc


      


From stathisp at gmail.com  Fri Feb 12 15:25:39 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 2010 02:25:39 +1100
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <957422.65114.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <f21c22e31002111822t75a3af04j4a44ae56db2a0186@mail.gmail.com> 
	<957422.65114.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002120725h279e1a8dk8c06f6251b937622@mail.gmail.com>

On 13 February 2010 00:41, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
> --- On Thu, 2/11/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>>> The sensible people on the jury will find that a
>>> mixed-up child or perhaps a philosophically-challenged adult
>>> used a hi-tech weapon disguised as a computer game to shoot
>>> a real person.
>
>>... the claim that, a priori, a simulation cannot have ANY property of
>> the thing it is simulating is obviously ridiculous.
>
> Is it? In the incident you describe, only a *depiction* of a shooter exists in the game, and depictions of people have no reality. Or to put it another way: they have the same kind of reality, and the same legal standing, as photographs and drawings and other depictions of people.
>
> The human game-developer or the human game-player will go to prison or to a psychiatric facility for the criminally insane. The simulated shooter in the game will never know or care; he has no real existence.

I'll say it again: the claim that, a priori, a simulation cannot have
ANY property of the thing it is simulating is obviously ridiculous.

This does not entail that a simulation will necessarily have ALL the
properties of the thing being simulated. For example, if a simulation
of a human is as intelligent and conscious as a real human that does
not mean it will weigh the same and smell the same as a real human.



-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From stathisp at gmail.com  Fri Feb 12 15:41:05 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 2010 02:41:05 +1100
Subject: [ExI] better self-transcendence through selective brain damage
In-Reply-To: <226303.69206.qm@web113612.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
References: <mailman.1.1265976001.11244.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org> 
	<226303.69206.qm@web113612.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002120741h5b0ca5e0wfd5b660f23dbe871@mail.gmail.com>

On 13 February 2010 01:50, Ben Zaiboc <bbenzai at yahoo.com> wrote:

> Wow. ?Could it be? ?Might we find a cure for religion?

In psychiatry patients with religious delusions are very common, but
occasionally there is doubt as to whether they are really psychotic.
The only decent diagnostic test we have for this problem is a
therapeutic trial of an antipsychotic medication. If the religious
ideas go away then almost certainly they were part of a psychosis: the
test has a very low false positive rate. It's harder to interpret the
test if the religious ideas do not go away, since about 20-30% of
patients with clearly psychotic symptoms and 100% of patients who are
just religious do not respond to medication. In other words,
reasonably effective treatments are available at present for the crazy
but not for the merely gullible.


--
Stathis Papaioannou


From pharos at gmail.com  Fri Feb 12 15:57:25 2010
From: pharos at gmail.com (BillK)
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2010 15:57:25 +0000
Subject: [ExI] better self-transcendence through selective brain damage
In-Reply-To: <226303.69206.qm@web113612.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
References: <mailman.1.1265976001.11244.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
	<226303.69206.qm@web113612.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <ee50357e1002120757m20247203l24231161d3dae6e7@mail.gmail.com>

On Fri, Feb 12, 2010 at 2:50 PM, Ben Zaiboc  wrote:
> Wow. ?Could it be? ?Might we find a cure for religion?
>
>

Sounds like the opposite to me.
Damage certain parts of the brain and you get transcendental experiences.

Once the technique is formalized, religious sects have the ability to
guarantee profound religious experiences to their members.

We just stick a wire in ... here.....
"Ohhhhh Gawd" ........
and another follower is reborn.

BillK


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Fri Feb 12 16:25:34 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2010 08:25:34 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
Message-ID: <964516.40828.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

"Depiction" seems like the perfect word for conveying my meaning.
------
Main Entry: de?pict
Pronunciation: \di-?pikt, d?-\
Function: transitive verb
Etymology: Latin depictus, past participle of depingere, from de- + pingere to paint ? more at paint
Date: 15th century

1 : to represent by or as if by a picture <a mural depicting a famous battle>
2 : describe 
------

If and when we develop the technology to create complete digital simulations of people, we will then have only the capacity to perfectly depict people in digital form. Those digital depictions of people will only *represent* the real or imaginary people they depict. They will have the same reality status as do less sophisticated kinds of depictions, e.g., digital photographs, digital paintings, digital drawings and digital cartoons.

It seems to me that no matter how hi-tech and life-like our depictions become, there will always exist an important difference between the depiction of the thing and the thing depicted. Some people will however become so mesmerized by the life-like realism of the digital depictions that they will conflate the depictions with the real or imaginary things they depict. They will forget the difference between the photographs of people and the people in the photographs.

-gts






      


From aware at awareresearch.com  Fri Feb 12 16:15:32 2010
From: aware at awareresearch.com (Aware)
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2010 08:15:32 -0800
Subject: [ExI] better self-transcendence through selective brain damage
In-Reply-To: <4B74F033.702@satx.rr.com>
References: <4B74F033.702@satx.rr.com>
Message-ID: <f7bfe5741002120815t4eda133ey4b8866740bc52cd@mail.gmail.com>

On Thu, Feb 11, 2010 at 10:07 PM, Damien Broderick <thespike at satx.rr.com> wrote:
> Links to Spirituality Found in the Brain
>
> By LiveScience.com Staff
>
> Scientists have identified areas of the brain that, when damaged, lead to
> greater spirituality. The findings hint at the roots of spiritual and
> religious attitudes, the researchers say.
>
> The study, published in the Feb. 11 issue of the journal Neuron, involves a
> personality trait called self-transcendence, which is a somewhat vague
> measure of spiritual feeling, thinking, and behaviors. Self-transcendence
> "reflects a decreased sense of self and an ability to identify one's self as
> an integral part of the universe as a whole," the researchers explain.

It's probably worth pointing out, despite a high probability of being
misunderstood, that these experiences of "spirituality" and
"self-transcendence" and other phenomena such as great joy or bliss
orient one's thinking in a manner virtually opposite and certain to
exclude that of Zen enlightenment (which never claims to be religious
or spiritual.)  Such misconceived expectations are key impediments to
those who aim to attain a *coherent* understanding of the relationship
of the observer to the observed (even, and especially, when the
observer IS the observed.)

Zen awakening is accompanied by none of these phenomena, and quite
likely only by a laugh or smile at the realization of how simple and
how close it was all along.

"Before I had studied Zen for thirty years, I saw mountains as
mountains, and waters as waters. When I arrived at a more intimate
knowledge, I came to the point where I saw that mountains are not
mountains, and waters are not waters. But now that I have got its very
substance I am at rest. For it's just that I see mountains once again
as mountains, and waters once again as waters."
? Ch'uan Teng Lu
The Way of Zen, p126

- Jef

- Jef


From thespike at satx.rr.com  Fri Feb 12 17:10:08 2010
From: thespike at satx.rr.com (Damien Broderick)
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2010 11:10:08 -0600
Subject: [ExI] Rights without selves (was: Nolopsism)
In-Reply-To: <580930c21002120512u4aafa7c7kdf8f5f14e77d5fcd@mail.gmail.com>
References: <e321aa4b1002081118n5d53dd0k8dc365c11a997c29@mail.gmail.com>	<C87EDDD8-24A5-4035-ACF3-81BD8E1E087B@GMAIL.COM>	<e321aa4b1002081837l247bf940q423d1ba6e9e0a300@mail.gmail.com>	<60CE7310-2BE1-47BE-AE8A-9BFC69A659B4@GMAIL.COM>
	<580930c21002120512u4aafa7c7kdf8f5f14e77d5fcd@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4B758B70.3040101@satx.rr.com>

On 2/12/2010 7:12 AM, Stefano Vaj wrote:

> A fetus can inherit, for instance, in a number of
> circumstances, at least in continental jurisdictions.

Would that apply to a frozen embryo? If a billionaire had an embryo put 
on ice with the expectation of having it implanted later (perhaps in a 
host mother) and then died, could an estate be locked up for decades 
while the small mass of cells hung changelessly inside a Dewer?

Damien Broderick


From jonkc at bellsouth.net  Fri Feb 12 17:24:53 2010
From: jonkc at bellsouth.net (John Clark)
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2010 12:24:53 -0500
Subject: [ExI] How not to make a thought experiment
In-Reply-To: <438778.21885.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <438778.21885.qm@web36508.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <1136ABC5-0122-4736-ACC2-6DF2006A8A24@bellsouth.net>

Since my last post Gordon Swobe has posted 5 times.
> 
>> But you have clearly stated that consciousness plays no
>> role in behaviour...
> 
> I can hardly believe you [Stathis Papaioannou] wrote that. I spent hours explaining to you why and how I reject epiphenomenalism.

I can hardly believe Swobe is surprised that Stathis doesn't understand his position, I don't believe that Swobe himself understands his position. Consciousness effects behavior enough for evolution to produce it but not enough for the Turing Test to detect it. Nuts.
> 
> I argued that we can program an artificial brain to act as if it has consciousness and that said artificial brain will still lack consciousness.

Even his contradictions are contradictory. We are intelligent and we are conscious, I am anyway; if the 2 are separate then consciousness must just be tacked on, a sort of consciousness circuit. But Evolution has absolutely no reason to develop a consciousness circuit.

> This is not the same as arguing that consciousness plays no role in human behavior!

And yet in his next breath Swobe will tell us that consciousness plays no role in the Turing Test!

> No matter whether we create those simulations with real or imaginary persons in mind, the simulations themselves will have no more reality than does Fred Flintstone. 

Fred Flintstone certainly isn't real as I am real and probably isn't real as Gordon Swobe is real, but one can't help from wondering why he used that as an example rather than, say, "Krotchly Q Kumberbun". Presumedly it's because one meme has enough reality to allow for communication while the other has so little reality that his readers wouldn't even know what he's referring to or the point he's trying to make.

> there will always exist an important difference between the depiction of the thing and the thing depicted.

But not if the "thing" in question is not a thing at all and is in fact not even a noun.

> Those digital depictions of people will only *represent* the real or imaginary people they depict.

Wow, now I see the error of my ways! It's a pity Swobe didn't say that two months and several hundred posts ago, think of the time we could have saved. Oh wait he did.

 John K Clark 



> 


> 
> -gts
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> extropy-chat mailing list
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat

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From pharos at gmail.com  Fri Feb 12 18:59:00 2010
From: pharos at gmail.com (BillK)
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2010 18:59:00 +0000
Subject: [ExI] Rights without selves (was: Nolopsism)
In-Reply-To: <4B758B70.3040101@satx.rr.com>
References: <e321aa4b1002081118n5d53dd0k8dc365c11a997c29@mail.gmail.com>
	<C87EDDD8-24A5-4035-ACF3-81BD8E1E087B@GMAIL.COM>
	<e321aa4b1002081837l247bf940q423d1ba6e9e0a300@mail.gmail.com>
	<60CE7310-2BE1-47BE-AE8A-9BFC69A659B4@GMAIL.COM>
	<580930c21002120512u4aafa7c7kdf8f5f14e77d5fcd@mail.gmail.com>
	<4B758B70.3040101@satx.rr.com>
Message-ID: <ee50357e1002121059q549e6069re5b026ebad7bef4e@mail.gmail.com>

On Fri, Feb 12, 2010 at 5:10 PM, Damien Broderick wrote:
> Would that apply to a frozen embryo? If a billionaire had an embryo put on
> ice with the expectation of having it implanted later (perhaps in a host
> mother) and then died, could an estate be locked up for decades while the
> small mass of cells hung changelessly inside a Dewer?
>
>

I think it is safe to say that the law has not yet decided on that
possibility.  :)

Inheritance law differs greatly between countries. For example, in
some jurisdictions females cannot inherit.

Strictly speaking, a fetus has no inheritance rights.
(Controversial - you are getting into the abortion debate here).

After-birth children (or posthumous children) born after the death of
the parents can inherit and have rights after they are born live.
Some laws say that the child has to be born within the gestation
period following the death of the father. (i.e. frozen embryos not
considered).

If an estate was waiting on a birth to see if a child could inherit,
then a trustee would be appointed to look after the estate.

Presumably this could also be done for a frozen embryo, but I think it
would be unlikely. An embryo might never be implanted and a live baby
produced, so it only has a conditional chance of life. And there might
be twenty or thirty frozen embryos. Could the first inherit, when more
might arrive later? And if a woman freezes her eggs, she could produce
many half-siblings who would also have inheritance rights.

It all sounds too complicated to me. If I was a lawyer, I'd say forget
about frozen embryos and eggs inheriting.


BillK


From stefano.vaj at gmail.com  Fri Feb 12 19:04:33 2010
From: stefano.vaj at gmail.com (Stefano Vaj)
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2010 20:04:33 +0100
Subject: [ExI] Rights without selves (was: Nolopsism)
In-Reply-To: <4B758B70.3040101@satx.rr.com>
References: <e321aa4b1002081118n5d53dd0k8dc365c11a997c29@mail.gmail.com>
	<C87EDDD8-24A5-4035-ACF3-81BD8E1E087B@GMAIL.COM>
	<e321aa4b1002081837l247bf940q423d1ba6e9e0a300@mail.gmail.com>
	<60CE7310-2BE1-47BE-AE8A-9BFC69A659B4@GMAIL.COM>
	<580930c21002120512u4aafa7c7kdf8f5f14e77d5fcd@mail.gmail.com>
	<4B758B70.3040101@satx.rr.com>
Message-ID: <580930c21002121104u40de5b2uf47fb432bbdd55c2@mail.gmail.com>

On 12 February 2010 18:10, Damien Broderick <thespike at satx.rr.com> wrote:
> On 2/12/2010 7:12 AM, Stefano Vaj wrote:
>
>> A fetus can inherit, for instance, in a number of
>> circumstances, at least in continental jurisdictions.
>
> Would that apply to a frozen embryo? If a billionaire had an embryo put on
> ice with the expectation of having it implanted later (perhaps in a host
> mother) and then died, could an estate be locked up for decades while the
> small mass of cells hung changelessly inside a Dewer?

The common wisdom is that only an in situ embryo can be considered as
a subject. You cannot for instance have a special attorney appointed
to protect the interest of an egg.

You can however make a not-yet-conceived child your conditional heir...

-- 
Stefano Vaj


From spike66 at att.net  Fri Feb 12 19:34:37 2010
From: spike66 at att.net (spike)
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2010 11:34:37 -0800
Subject: [ExI] better self-transcendence through selective brain damage
In-Reply-To: <ee50357e1002120757m20247203l24231161d3dae6e7@mail.gmail.com>
References: <mailman.1.1265976001.11244.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org><226303.69206.qm@web113612.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
	<ee50357e1002120757m20247203l24231161d3dae6e7@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <FD93D5CE3D3645A298693B63EB507D6A@spike>


> Subject: Re: [ExI] better self-transcendence through 
> selective brain damage
> 
> On Fri, Feb 12, 2010 at 2:50 PM, Ben Zaiboc  wrote:

> > Wow. ?Could it be? ?Might we find a cure for religion?

There would be very little demand for a cure for religion.  Just the
opposite, the market would be in stimulating that part of the brain to
induce a religious experience.  

Ohhh my, just thinking of the money to be made here makes by butt hurt.
It's a good hurt.

Do let me be perfectly clear on that last commentary: I do not wish to be
anything like L. Ron, who had more or less the same idea, along with his
countless predecessors down thru the ages.  These charlatans made money from
religion unethically, deceptively.  The way we would do this is to market
absolutely truthfully: as a service for those who are atheists but want
euphoric religious experiences.  We would make it clear right up front that
this is not about some random deity, and we do not solicit donations.  The
client must supply her own random deity.  We arrange communication with that
or them.  

This idea is rather more analogous to the office of a chiropractor, except
without all the odd notions of aligning to body to focus energy and
releasing tension and all that.  This would be absolutely truthful: we
discovered the part of the brain that is responsible for the epiphany
phenomenon, and we think we can cause one in you.  A hundred bucks, hop in
the chair.

spike


 




From hkeithhenson at gmail.com  Fri Feb 12 19:36:07 2010
From: hkeithhenson at gmail.com (Keith Henson)
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2010 12:36:07 -0700
Subject: [ExI] skyhook elevator
Message-ID: <d1988d2d1002121136l273f7547nbd75d812c09fd663@mail.gmail.com>

On Fri, Feb 12, 2010 at 5:00 AM,  "spike" <spike66 at att.net> wrote:

>> ...On Behalf Of Damien Broderick
>> Subject: [ExI] skyhook elevator
>>
>> It occurs to me (can't recall ever seeing this discussed,
>> although it must be an ancient sub-topic of skyhook dynamics)
>> that as your elevator climbs or is a shoved up the thread,
>> you'd not only be pressed against the floor but also against
>> the west wall. Maybe you wouldn't notice if the trip took a
>> couple of days, but you're going from rest to 11,000 km/hr.
>> Is that especially noticeable? What say the space gurus?
>>
>> Damien Broderick
>
>
> Coriolis effect sounds like what you are describing, and it would be durn
> near negligible. ?I will calculate it if you wish. ?To give you an idea by
> using only numbers in my head and single digit BOTECs, geo is about 36000 km
> from the surface as I recall so add 6300 km earth radius and that's close
> enough to about 40,000 km so the circumference of the orbit is about 6 and
> some change times that, so 250000 km in 24 hrs, so you accelerate to 10000
> km per hour or about 3 km per second or so.
>
> How long do you guess it would take to haul you up to GEO? ?An few hours?
> Lets say 10. ?To accelerate 3 km per second eastward in 10 hrs would be
> about 0.1 meters per second, or 100th of a G. ?The elevator passengers would
> scarcely notice.
>
> It is proportional of course. ?If you theorize they get there in 1 hour,
> then the coriolis component is about a tenth of a G, but if they get all the
> way to GEO in an hour, there is some serious upward velocity involved.
>
> spike

Spike got it right.

Some years ago I spent some effort on this in the context of a story
and wrote a paper for an ESA conference from that work.

I analyzed a driven endless loop cable moving about 1000 mph--which
will get you to GEO in 22 hours.

Lifting 100 tons per hour it took 1.5 GW.

While the Coriolis effect isn't noticeable to a passenger, it provides
plenty of force to keep the up and down cables well separated.

The acceleration to 3 km/sec at GEO (from under 1/2 km/sec on the
surface) is "free."  The cable leans west from the rotation to the
east and extracts energy from the rotation of the earth slowing the
earth down by an extremely small amount.

Importing more than you are exporting would have the opposite effect.

People opposing to extracting rotational energy from the earth could
use the slogan "Conserve Angular Momentum!"

Keith

PS.  Lunar elevators really can be made of dental floss.


From cluebcke at yahoo.com  Fri Feb 12 18:28:47 2010
From: cluebcke at yahoo.com (Christopher Luebcke)
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2010 10:28:47 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] skyhook elevator
In-Reply-To: <FBAEFD5DF4A34C068FB56DE52D1E89D9@spike>
References: <4B748FC1.8090001@satx.rr.com>
	<FBAEFD5DF4A34C068FB56DE52D1E89D9@spike>
Message-ID: <887255.3523.qm@web111208.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

> How long do you guess it would take to haul you up to GEO?  An few hours?Lets say 10. 

>From what I've read it'll be closer to 3 days. Even that view could get tiresome after three days on the bus.



----- Original Message ----
From: spike <spike66 at att.net>
To: ExI chat list <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org>
Sent: Thu, February 11, 2010 4:48:16 PM
Subject: Re: [ExI] skyhook elevator



> ...On Behalf Of Damien Broderick
> Subject: [ExI] skyhook elevator
> 
> It occurs to me (can't recall ever seeing this discussed, 
> although it must be an ancient sub-topic of skyhook dynamics) 
> that as your elevator climbs or is a shoved up the thread, 
> you'd not only be pressed against the floor but also against 
> the west wall. Maybe you wouldn't notice if the trip took a 
> couple of days, but you're going from rest to 11,000 km/hr. 
> Is that especially noticeable? What say the space gurus?
> 
> Damien Broderick


Coriolis effect sounds like what you are describing, and it would be durn
near negligible.  I will calculate it if you wish.  To give you an idea by
using only numbers in my head and single digit BOTECs, geo is about 36000 km
from the surface as I recall so add 6300 km earth radius and that's close
enough to about 40,000 km so the circumference of the orbit is about 6 and
some change times that, so 250000 km in 24 hrs, so you accelerate to 10000
km per hour or about 3 km per second or so.  

How long do you guess it would take to haul you up to GEO?  An few hours?
Lets say 10.  To accelerate 3 km per second eastward in 10 hrs would be
about 0.1 meters per second, or 100th of a G.  The elevator passengers would
scarcely notice.

It is proportional of course.  If you theorize they get there in 1 hour,
then the coriolis component is about a tenth of a G, but if they get all the
way to GEO in an hour, there is some serious upward velocity involved.

spike 

_______________________________________________
extropy-chat mailing list
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat



From spike66 at att.net  Fri Feb 12 19:56:25 2010
From: spike66 at att.net (spike)
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2010 11:56:25 -0800
Subject: [ExI] better self-transcendence through selective brain damage
In-Reply-To: <FD93D5CE3D3645A298693B63EB507D6A@spike>
References: <mailman.1.1265976001.11244.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org><226303.69206.qm@web113612.mail.gq1.yahoo.com><ee50357e1002120757m20247203l24231161d3dae6e7@mail.gmail.com>
	<FD93D5CE3D3645A298693B63EB507D6A@spike>
Message-ID: <7A7A0CB2766A4C879426F3F66CD94F0C@spike>

> ...On Behalf Of spike
...
> 
> ...I do not wish to be anything like L. Ron...made money from religion 
> unethically, deceptively.  The way we would do this is to 
> market absolutely truthfully: as a service for those who are 
> atheists but want euphoric religious experiences... spike

Just after I hit send, I recognized the fatal flaw in this argument.  Did
you spot it?  There are areas of our lives in which we have come so
accustomed to spin and outright deception that we do not even know what the
truth sounds like.  If told the actual truth, we naturally assume some kind
of deception.  Analogy: consider a case where a cop says "Move along
citizens, there is nothing to see here."

Citizens:  Where?

Cop: Here.

Citizens:  What?

Cop: Nothing.

Citizens:  But there is nothing here!

Cop:  Exactly, just what I said.

Citizens:  All right, so what's the catch, officer?...  etc.

Religion and love are two areas where the actual truth is really never
uttered, or if so it fails so spectacularly that it isn't attempted a second
time.  If we could stimulate the religion center of the brain, and tell the
client or patient *exactly* what is being done, and why, and the expected
outcome, that would represent a true scientific and ethical breakthrough.

spike



From lacertilian at gmail.com  Fri Feb 12 21:05:44 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2010 13:05:44 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <4e3a29501002111638s71abe067va2e2b213b5ef708f@mail.gmail.com>
References: <f21c22e31002110328g6b0f7bc9md118abb157c99bd4@mail.gmail.com> 
	<896407.10281.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
	<62c14241002111632m53d7fdafvd57cdf9b8f325006@mail.gmail.com> 
	<4e3a29501002111638s71abe067va2e2b213b5ef708f@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002121305p7a1576d5k53d4d27bc1eba143@mail.gmail.com>

Will Steinberg <steinberg.will at gmail.com>:
> In stride with what Mike just said, could we perhaps (since most of us seem
> to agree) discuss the actually important notions of semiotics and
> computability, instead of more pointless antiswobian banter?

Apparently not.

Being the guy who started the thread to begin with, I would
theoretically be all over such a discussion. I already said all I
could in my first post, though. If anyone else wants to revive that
line of reasoning, I would certainly be with them.

(From what I recall, I was mainly talking about the inextricability of
any one branch of semiotics, say semantics, from any other, such as
syntax.)


From spike66 at att.net  Fri Feb 12 21:39:02 2010
From: spike66 at att.net (spike)
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2010 13:39:02 -0800
Subject: [ExI] better self-transcendence through selective brain damage
In-Reply-To: <7A7A0CB2766A4C879426F3F66CD94F0C@spike>
References: <mailman.1.1265976001.11244.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org><226303.69206.qm@web113612.mail.gq1.yahoo.com><ee50357e1002120757m20247203l24231161d3dae6e7@mail.gmail.com><FD93D5CE3D3645A298693B63EB507D6A@spike>
	<7A7A0CB2766A4C879426F3F66CD94F0C@spike>
Message-ID: <87670FEF1360437981B4B84931C5FF94@spike>

> ...On Behalf Of spike
> Subject: Re: [ExI] better self-transcendence through selective brain
damage
> 
> > ...On Behalf Of spike
> ...
> There are areas of our lives in 
> which we have come so accustomed to spin and outright 
> deception that we do not even know what the truth sounds 
> like... Religion and love are two areas where the actual truth is 
> really never uttered... spike


For instance, imagine giving your sweetheart a Valentine that says:

Sweetheart, the depth of my love for you is equal to that which is induced
by several milligrams of endorphine-precursor pheromones which are
responsible for this class of emotions in humans.  I mean it from the bottom
of my brain.

This message might be technically "true" however your ass is technically
"dead meat."  Your sperm will never get the opportunity to express their
right to life in this manner.

Getting back to religion, I am intrigued by the notion of being able to
advertise something like

Faith-R-Us:  We do not believe your religion, but for a modest fee, we can
help you believe in it with ever greater fervor.   

spike



From eric at m056832107.syzygy.com  Fri Feb 12 22:10:46 2010
From: eric at m056832107.syzygy.com (Eric Messick)
Date: 12 Feb 2010 22:10:46 -0000
Subject: [ExI] better self-transcendence through selective brain damage
In-Reply-To: <87670FEF1360437981B4B84931C5FF94@spike>
References: <mailman.1.1265976001.11244.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org><226303.69206.qm@web113612.mail.gq1.yahoo.com><ee50357e1002120757m20247203l24231161d3dae6e7@mail.gmail.com><FD93D5CE3D3645A298693B63EB507D6A@spike>
	<7A7A0CB2766A4C879426F3F66CD94F0C@spike>
	<87670FEF1360437981B4B84931C5FF94@spike>
Message-ID: <20100212221046.5.qmail@syzygy.com>

Spike writes:
>For instance, imagine giving your sweetheart a Valentine that says:
>
>Sweetheart, the depth of my love for you is equal to that which is induced
>by several milligrams of endorphine-precursor pheromones which are
>responsible for this class of emotions in humans.  I mean it from the bottom
>of my brain.

Once again, xkcd has this covered, with a comic about overly
scientific valentines:

http://xkcd.com/701/

-eric


From spike66 at att.net  Fri Feb 12 22:28:47 2010
From: spike66 at att.net (spike)
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2010 14:28:47 -0800
Subject: [ExI] better self-transcendence through selective brain damage
References: <mailman.1.1265976001.11244.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org><226303.69206.qm@web113612.mail.gq1.yahoo.com><ee50357e1002120757m20247203l24231161d3dae6e7@mail.gmail.com><FD93D5CE3D3645A298693B63EB507D6A@spike>
	<7A7A0CB2766A4C879426F3F66CD94F0C@spike> 
Message-ID: <0752CA13909A46049BF86B410F43711C@spike>


> ... 
> Getting back to religion, I am intrigued by the notion of 
> being able to advertise something like
> 
> Faith-R-Us:  We do not believe your religion, but for a 
> modest fee, we can help you believe in it with ever greater fervor.   
> 
> spike 

Last reply to my own comment, the I need to run, and will be away for a few.


It is clear that entire religions can be built around some particular
psychological phenomenon.  Two examples, much of that sector of modern
christianity that has the notion of born-again-ism can be explained by the
poorly understood phenomenon sometimes called the epiphany experience.  The
Apostle Paul may have been describing it in the book of Acts chapter 9:

http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Acts+9&version=kjv

Modern science recognizes the phenomenon of de javu as a signal path
abnormality that causes the brain to perceive information coming from the
senses as coming from the memory.  The Hindu religion explains de javu by
theorizing shadow memories from previous lives.  Monte Python take:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QWKdokcvM7A

It looks to me like if we find how to stimulate the right neural centers in
the brain, we should be able to induce any religious experience we want,
while being perfectly honest, scientific and ethical about it.  

And make a cubic buttload of money of course.

spike





From cluebcke at yahoo.com  Fri Feb 12 21:24:31 2010
From: cluebcke at yahoo.com (Christopher Luebcke)
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2010 13:24:31 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Newbie Question: Consciousness and Intelligence
Message-ID: <780009.58882.qm@web111203.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

I was wondering, given the lively back and forth I've seen on this list, whether the participants are agreed on the meanings of the terms "consciousness" and "intelligence". For example, were someone to posit that you cannot have consciousness without intelligence, are the meanings of those two terms widely agreed on? 

I don't mean to be presumptuous and the question is not intended to be sarcastic or ironic, but I have wondered, reading the ongoing debates about matters such as whether a computer (or a computer program) can have "intelligence" or "consciousness", whether the people debating various aspects of those questions are actually in agreement on the terms.

If there are commonly-agreed-upon definitions of these terms, I'd appreciate it if somebody could provide me references. If not...well, that might explain the apparent imperviousness of certain positions to apparently well-formed critiques.

Regards,
Chris Luebcke


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Fri Feb 12 22:42:13 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2010 14:42:13 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Newbie Question: Consciousness and Intelligence
In-Reply-To: <780009.58882.qm@web111203.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
References: <780009.58882.qm@web111203.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002121442l19243b23ua3a0b3815fe55bcb@mail.gmail.com>

Christopher Luebcke <cluebcke at yahoo.com>:
> I was wondering, given the lively back and forth I've seen on this list, whether the participants are agreed on the meanings of the terms "consciousness" and "intelligence".

I've been bandying about my own personal definition of intelligence,
at least, for something on the order of two weeks. Below is a segment
of one of my posts from eight days ago. It is startlingly apropos.

Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com>:
> Stefano Vaj <stefano.vaj at gmail.com>:
>> ... very poorly defined Aristotelic essences would per se exist
>> corresponding to the symbols "mind", "consciousness", "intelligence" ...
>
> Actually, I gave a fairly rigorous definition for intelligence in an
> earlier message. I've refined it since then:
>
> The intelligence of a given system is inversely proportional to the
> average action (time * work) which must be expended before the system
> achieves a given purpose, assuming that it began in a state as far
> away as possible from that purpose.
>
> (As I said before, this definition won't work unless you assume an
> arbitrary purpose for the system in question. Purposes are roughly
> equivalent to attractors here, but the system may itself be part of a
> larger system, like us. Humans are tricky: the easiest solution is to
> say they swap purposes many times a day, which means their measured
> intelligence would change depending on what they're currently doing.
> Which is consistent with observed reality.)
>
> I can't give similarly precise definitions for "mind" or
> consciousness, and I wouldn't be able to describe the latter at all.
> Tentatively, I think consciousness is devoid of measurable qualities.
> This would make it impossible to prove its existence, which to my mind
> is a pretty solid argument for its nonexistence. Nevertheless, we talk
> about it all the time, throughout history and in every culture. So
> even if it doesn't exist, it seems reasonable to assume that it is at
> least meaningful to think about.


From ablainey at aol.com  Sat Feb 13 02:43:27 2010
From: ablainey at aol.com (ablainey at aol.com)
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2010 21:43:27 -0500
Subject: [ExI] Newbie Question: Consciousness and Intelligence
In-Reply-To: <e321aa4b1002121442l19243b23ua3a0b3815fe55bcb@mail.gmail.com>
References: <780009.58882.qm@web111203.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
	<e321aa4b1002121442l19243b23ua3a0b3815fe55bcb@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <8CC7A6D7452E660-E28-6F3C@webmail-d019.sysops.aol.com>


 hmm, my own person 'vox pop' definition of Inteligence is simple.
Given two know facts inteligence allows for a third derived fact to be created/known.
The level of inteligence can be measured by how far apart the initial facts are, also the leap to and level of confidence in this third fact.

 Conciousness can party be defined by the self awareness of the above.

For this 'Fact' is flexible and can be thought of in literal terms or as sensory input.


 

 

-----Original Message-----
From: Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com>
To: ExI chat list <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org>
Sent: Fri, 12 Feb 2010 22:42
Subject: Re: [ExI] Newbie Question: Consciousness and Intelligence


Christopher Luebcke <cluebcke at yahoo.com>:
> I was wondering, given the lively back and forth I've seen on this list, 
whether the participants are agreed on the meanings of the terms "consciousness" 
and "intelligence".

I've been bandying about my own personal definition of intelligence,
at least, for something on the order of two weeks. Below is a segment
of one of my posts from eight days ago. It is startlingly apropos.

Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com>:
> Stefano Vaj <stefano.vaj at gmail.com>:
>> ... very poorly defined Aristotelic essences would per se exist
>> corresponding to the symbols "mind", "consciousness", "intelligence" ...
>
> Actually, I gave a fairly rigorous definition for intelligence in an
> earlier message. I've refined it since then:
>
> The intelligence of a given system is inversely proportional to the
> average action (time * work) which must be expended before the system
> achieves a given purpose, assuming that it began in a state as far
> away as possible from that purpose.
>
> (As I said before, this definition won't work unless you assume an
> arbitrary purpose for the system in question. Purposes are roughly
> equivalent to attractors here, but the system may itself be part of a
> larger system, like us. Humans are tricky: the easiest solution is to
> say they swap purposes many times a day, which means their measured
> intelligence would change depending on what they're currently doing.
> Which is consistent with observed reality.)
>
> I can't give similarly precise definitions for "mind" or
> consciousness, and I wouldn't be able to describe the latter at all.
> Tentatively, I think consciousness is devoid of measurable qualities.
> This would make it impossible to prove its existence, which to my mind
> is a pretty solid argument for its nonexistence. Nevertheless, we talk
> about it all the time, throughout history and in every culture. So
> even if it doesn't exist, it seems reasonable to assume that it is at
> least meaningful to think about.
_______________________________________________
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From kanzure at gmail.com  Sat Feb 13 03:42:56 2010
From: kanzure at gmail.com (Bryan Bishop)
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2010 21:42:56 -0600
Subject: [ExI] Fwd: [Comp-neuro] Blue Brain is hiring a Postdoctoral
	Researcher in Neuron Modeling
In-Reply-To: <ADD9C636-450F-44E3-B1CF-CD777A22A5F7@epfl.ch>
References: <ADD9C636-450F-44E3-B1CF-CD777A22A5F7@epfl.ch>
Message-ID: <55ad6af71002121942ka96f000yae310cd06dce8a74@mail.gmail.com>

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Sean Hill <sean.hill at epfl.ch>
Date: Fri, Feb 12, 2010 at 6:06 AM
Subject: [Comp-neuro] Blue Brain is hiring a Postdoctoral Researcher in
Neuron Modeling
To: comp-neuro at neuroinf.org


Job Description: Postdoctoral Researcher in Neuron Modeling

The Blue Brain Project, headquartered in Lausanne, Switzerland, is an
international research venture to reverse-engineer the brain and enable
next-generation fundamental and medical research through simulation. BBP is
now seeking for immediate hire a



Postdoctoral Researcher in Neuron Modeling,



for immediate hire, to strengthen the project?s computational neuroscience
team and to prepare it for the next steps of growth.

The primary objective for this position is to contribute to the ongoing
large-scale detailed neuron modeling and validation efforts and to advance
the model generation and validation of the full diversity of neuron
electrical properties and dendritic integration. Scientific leadership is
expected to cosupervise computational neuroscience students and the software
expertise to interface with the technical teams. The position will involve a
close interaction between the electrophysiology lab and computer
simulations.



Detailed Requirements:

?            PhD in the field of computational neuroscience

?            expert knowledge in NEURON and multi-compartment
conductance-based modeling

?            expert knowledge in whole cell electrophysiology, ion channel
experiments and models

?            expert knowledge in Python and Matlab

?            profound knowledge of model specification languages such as
NeuroML

?            profound knowledge in other programming languages (C++) and
parallel computing is of advantage

?             ?can-do? attitude for pragmatic prototypes that accompany the
global model building and validation strategy

?            co-supervision of PhD students

?            fluent written and spoken English



What we offer:

?           An internationally visible and rising project successfully
connecting the demanding challenges of research with industry-strength
solutions

?           Supervision of research projects and publication opportunities

?           A young, dynamic, inter-disciplinary, and international working
environment
Competitive salary

Interested applicants please send CV, 3 references and a statement of
research interests to:
Felix Schuermann (felix.schuermann at epfl.ch)

--

*Sean Hill, Ph.D.*
*Blue Brain Project *
*Project Manager for Computational Neuroscience*
*
*
Brain Mind Institute
*EPFL - Station 15*
*CH-1015 Lausanne*
*Switzerland*
*Tel +41 21 693.96 78*
*Fax +41 21 693.18 00*
*
*
*sean.hill at epfl.ch* <sean.hill at epfl.ch>
*
*
*
**
**
*


_______________________________________________
Comp-neuro mailing list
Comp-neuro at neuroinf.org
http://www.neuroinf.org/mailman/listinfo/comp-neuro




-- 
- Bryan
http://heybryan.org/
1 512 203 0507
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From dharris at livelib.com  Sat Feb 13 10:37:28 2010
From: dharris at livelib.com (David C. Harris)
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 2010 02:37:28 -0800
Subject: [ExI] better self-transcendence through selective brain damage
In-Reply-To: <0752CA13909A46049BF86B410F43711C@spike>
References: <mailman.1.1265976001.11244.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org><226303.69206.qm@web113612.mail.gq1.yahoo.com><ee50357e1002120757m20247203l24231161d3dae6e7@mail.gmail.com><FD93D5CE3D3645A298693B63EB507D6A@spike>	<7A7A0CB2766A4C879426F3F66CD94F0C@spike>
	<0752CA13909A46049BF86B410F43711C@spike>
Message-ID: <4B7680E8.8070702@livelib.com>

spike wrote:
>
>  we should be able to induce any religious experience we want,
> while being perfectly honest, scientific and ethical about it.  
>
> And make a cubic buttload of money of course.
>   
I trust you meant "a boatload of money"?  Much more pleasant way to 
carry the stuff.

   - David


From cluebcke at yahoo.com  Fri Feb 12 22:25:33 2010
From: cluebcke at yahoo.com (Christopher Luebcke)
Date: Fri, 12 Feb 2010 14:25:33 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] better self-transcendence through selective brain damage
In-Reply-To: <87670FEF1360437981B4B84931C5FF94@spike>
References: <mailman.1.1265976001.11244.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org><226303.69206.qm@web113612.mail.gq1.yahoo.com><ee50357e1002120757m20247203l24231161d3dae6e7@mail.gmail.com><FD93D5CE3D3645A298693B63EB507D6A@spike>
	<7A7A0CB2766A4C879426F3F66CD94F0C@spike>
	<87670FEF1360437981B4B84931C5FF94@spike>
Message-ID: <811542.89157.qm@web111209.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

> Faith-R-Us:  We do not believe your religion, but for a modest fee, we canhelp you believe in it with ever greater fervor. 

Could there be something in the contract where the customer agrees to refrain from voting until the effect wears off?



----- Original Message ----
From: spike <spike66 at att.net>
To: ExI chat list <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org>
Sent: Fri, February 12, 2010 1:39:02 PM
Subject: Re: [ExI] better self-transcendence through selective brain damage

> ...On Behalf Of spike
> Subject: Re: [ExI] better self-transcendence through selective brain
damage
> 
> > ...On Behalf Of spike
> ...
> There are areas of our lives in 
> which we have come so accustomed to spin and outright 
> deception that we do not even know what the truth sounds 
> like... Religion and love are two areas where the actual truth is 
> really never uttered... spike


For instance, imagine giving your sweetheart a Valentine that says:

Sweetheart, the depth of my love for you is equal to that which is induced
by several milligrams of endorphine-precursor pheromones which are
responsible for this class of emotions in humans.  I mean it from the bottom
of my brain.

This message might be technically "true" however your ass is technically
"dead meat."  Your sperm will never get the opportunity to express their
right to life in this manner.

Getting back to religion, I am intrigued by the notion of being able to
advertise something like

Faith-R-Us:  We do not believe your religion, but for a modest fee, we can
help you believe in it with ever greater fervor.  

spike

_______________________________________________
extropy-chat mailing list
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat



From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Sat Feb 13 18:42:05 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 2010 10:42:05 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] evolution of consciousness
Message-ID: <810447.49620.qm@web36507.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Thu, 2/11/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:

> A computer model of the brain is made that controls a body,
> i.e. a robot. The robot will behave exactly like a human.

Such a robot may be made, yes.

> Moreover, it will behave exactly like a human due to an isomorphism 
> between the structure and function of the brain and the structure and
> function of the computer model, since that is what a model is. Now, you
> claim that this robot would lack consciousness. 

I never made that claim. In fact I don't recall that you and I ever discussed robots until now. I suppose that you've made this claim above on my behalf.

> This means that there is nothing about the intelligent behaviour of the 
> human that is affected by consciousness. For if consciousness were a 
> separate thing that affected behaviour, there would be some deficit in
> behaviour if you reproduced the functional relationship between brain
> components while leaving out the consciousness. Therefore, consciousness
> must be epiphenomenal. You might have said that you rejected
> epiphenomenalism, but you cannot do so consistently.

No, I reject epiphenomenalism consistently. In the *actual* thought experiment that you proposed, in which the human patient presented with a lesion in Wernicke's area causing a semantic deficit and in which the surgeon used p-peurons, the patient DID suffer from a deficit after the surgery. And that deficit was due precisely to the fact that he would lack the experience of his own understanding, which would in turn affect his behavior. I.e., epiphenomenalism is false. This is why I stated multiple times that the surgeon would need to keep working until he finally would get the patient's behavior right. In the end his patient would pass the turing test yet still have no conscious understanding of words.


> The only way you can consistently maintain your position
> that computers can't reproduce consciousness is to say that they
> can't reproduce intelligence either. 

Not so.

> If you don't agree with this you must explain why I am wrong when I 
> point out the self-contradictions that zombies would lead to, and you 
> simply avoid doing this, 

I just don't see the contradictions that you see, Stathis. 

Let me ask you this: your general position seems to be that weak AI is false; that if weak AI is possible then strong AI must also be possible, because the distinction between weak and strong is false and anything that passes the Turing must have strong AI. Is that your position?


-gts



      


From stefano.vaj at gmail.com  Sat Feb 13 19:52:58 2010
From: stefano.vaj at gmail.com (Stefano Vaj)
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 2010 20:52:58 +0100
Subject: [ExI] Newbie Question: Consciousness and Intelligence
In-Reply-To: <780009.58882.qm@web111203.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
References: <780009.58882.qm@web111203.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <580930c21002131152t392ef477y5765a2cb90b278ce@mail.gmail.com>

On 12 February 2010 22:24, Christopher Luebcke <cluebcke at yahoo.com> wrote:
> I was wondering, given the lively back and forth I've seen on this list, whether the participants are agreed on the meanings of the terms "consciousness" and "intelligence". For example, were someone to posit that you cannot have consciousness without intelligence, are the meanings of those two terms widely agreed on?

I do not think so. This may be the crux of the problem. Intelligence
comes easier (btw, even stupid people are sometimes conscious...).
Consciousness would be easy enough as well but only as long as you do
not charge it with some transcendental meaning having to do with
self-perception of the self, etc.

-- 
Stefano Vaj


From nebathenemi at yahoo.co.uk  Sat Feb 13 20:34:13 2010
From: nebathenemi at yahoo.co.uk (Tom Nowell)
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 2010 20:34:13 +0000 (GMT)
Subject: [ExI] Glacier Geoengineering
In-Reply-To: <mailman.1549.1265935145.462.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
Message-ID: <324067.57495.qm@web27005.mail.ukl.yahoo.com>

Keith put numbers on pumping ocean water on to the East Antarctic plateau as follows:

Interesting concept though.  To put numbers on it, the area of the
earth is ~5.1 x 10E14 square meters.  3/4 of that is water, so ~3.8
10E15 square meters.  To lower the oceans by a meter in a year would
require pumping
at 1.21 x 10E7 cubic meters per second.

12,100,000 cubic meters per second.  Hmm  The flow of the Amazon is
219,000 cubic meters per second, so it would take 55 times the flow of
the Amazon.

Pumping it up some 3000 meters to the ice sheet would take
considerable energy, P=Q*g*h*1/pump efficiency (0.9).

1.21*10E7*9.8*3000/0.9 = 396 GW.  400 one GW reactors would do the
job.  (Please check this number.)

Keith

First, a quick double-check - wikipedia reckons ~3.61 x 10E14 square meters of earth's surface is ocean, so pretty close to Keith's figure. I just plugged 3.61E14 / (60x60x24x365) to get 11,447,235 cubic meters per second, so within about 5% of Keith's figure. So, even with pumps converting 90% of energy going in to potential energy of the water, we're looking in the 350-400GW/yr range to do one meter/year.
 
But, do we really need to pump a whole meter in year? 1993 to 2003 had an average sea level rise of 3.1mm/year. The IPCC estimates 
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/spms3.html
come out at from 1.1m to 6.4m higher in 2090-99 compared to 1980-99. So, say we start planning now and are ready to start the pumping in ten years - 2020. Then we need to do 1.1m to 6.4m over 80 years. Let's say 4m as a middling figure - then instead of 400GW for 4 years, we can do 20GW over 80 years.

 Sure, the power plants will need rebuilding more than once. I'm assuming we're going with nuclear to avoid shipping large quantities of fuel to the antarctic, and to keep it soot-free and low carbon (don't want to accelerate that antarctic coastal glacier breakup!). UK nuclear plants built since the 1970s have expected operating lives of 30-40 years
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf84.html

If we're being optimistic and following Sizewell B, you're getting 1.1Gw for 40 years, but a couple of reactors on that table are "running at 70% indefinitely" so instead of 18 of these needing replacing once, we'll probably need 25 replacing once or twice. This will cost many tens of billions, but should keep pace with ocean sea level rise and avoid the risk of losing places like London, New York, most of the Netherlands (worth a lot in terms of real estate) and the human misery of trying to resettle tens of millions from Bangladesh and low-lieing areas around the Indian Ocean.

Tom (enjoying geoengineering chat as a change from philosophical musings)


      


From jrd1415 at gmail.com  Sat Feb 13 21:02:48 2010
From: jrd1415 at gmail.com (Jeff Davis)
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 2010 14:02:48 -0700
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <964516.40828.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <964516.40828.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <a6a17bd41002131302h7aae45e8y77f4bdb25d4d7758@mail.gmail.com>

I think maybe I've figured out where Gordon is coming from, so I'll
attempt an explanation.  Also, I find myself in agreement with him,
partly.  I think a substantial portion of the problem other posters
have had with Gordon stems from an INCOMPLETE understanding of and
consequently an INCOMPLETE addressing of his thesis.

I'm gonna try to not get all flowery and elaborate here, just semi-
sort of bare bones.

Gordon says he rejects the concept of mind-body dualism.  Rather, he
asserts a timeworn philosophical alternative, that of an inseparable
unity, a mind-body unity if you will.  Then when others propose a
simulation of mind, Gordon objects, seeming to me, and logically, to
be saying you can't get a faithful recreation of mind if you leave out
the body part.

The recent comments regarding amoeba consciousness and the nature of
pain, combined with a years-long backlog of free-floating yet related
bits finally coalesced for me into an epiphany.  And so I have come to
agree with Gordon, partly.

All the talk of neuron by neuron replacements is fine as far as it
goes, but Gordon is reasonable in rejecting this -- though I wish he
would have explained himself better -- based on the principle of
incompleteness.  Half a thing is not the thing.

The 'body' part is missing.  To faithfully reproduce the
mind/persona/organism you have to reproduce the whole body, all the
somatic cells, neural and non, with their particular and varied
influences on the persona.

At this point I will state, without elaboration, that I have come to
believe that consciousness arises at the cellular level, and that any
variant of consciousness in a highly complex multi-cellular organisms
-- in particular, it's penultimate form in humans, of cognitive
ability and an awareness self and universe -- arises from a
combination of somatic and cerebral consciousness.  To make things
worse -- again without elaboration -- it is difficult for me to avoid
the further conclusion that the bulk of the phenomenon of
consciousness comes from the contribution of the somatic cells.  To
soften this seemingly outrageous assertion -- that the God-like nature
of man ...

"What a piece of work is a man, how noble in reason, how infinite in
faculties; in form and moving how express and admirable, in action how
like an angel, in apprehension how like a god: the beauty of the
world, the paragon of animals!

...is more about the influence of gut, bone, blood, and sinew, than
brain -- let me remind that the mammalian brain with all its glorious
capability is a relatively recent add-on to the ancient partnership of
sensory apparatus and the less glamorous support soma.

That said, returning to the idea of an authentic simulation, I believe
if the simulation includes the somatic contribution, thus
comprehensively simulating both mind and body, that there is no reason
the simulation won't fully and faithfully remanifest the original
mind-body persona.

What do you think Gordon?  Does this work for you, or no?

Now I'll elaborate a little on how I got here.

Some previously unconnected bits.

Years ago,  I chanced to wonder what it must be like to be a liver
cell; to live in a world where all the glory was reserved for
'elitest' neural tissue.  Cells are cells, and logically should be
equal.  Some conundrum there.

I used to visualize the human body devoid of all but neural tissue --
remember the old plastic educational toy, the visible man?  I would
think of this -- the brain and the neural filigree extending out from
it -- as the "real" person, and would demote the remainder to a lower
order, mechanistic, almost lifeless status.  Same conundrum as above,
but unrecognized at the time.

Then I chanced upon Paul Pietsch's "Shufflebrain"

http://www.indiana.edu/~pietsch/home.html

where the author writes of memory and seemingly-deliberative behavior
in single-celled organisms.   From this I concluded that information
processing need not be the exclusive province of multicellular neural
tissue.

Then Nova or the National Geographic channel produced a program about
the microscopic world.  They advertised it with a bit of video showing
living paramecium, about three or four seconds worth.  I never saw the
program, but I saw that video clip five or six times, and it had a
huge impact.  A paramecium swims along, impressively vigorous and
vital in its movement, then it stops for a moment, deliberates
(processes information?) and then heads off in a different direction.
Call me a fool, call it anthropomorphic projection, but I swear I saw
deliberation and intentionality.  The scene I saw was a scene of life,
and life is recognizable from just these features.

Then Jef Albright posted re Nolopsism

http://oscarhome.soc-sci.arizona.edu/ftp/PAPERS/Nolipsism.pdf

where, on page three (lucky, since
I haven't read the whole thing yet) the author, speaking of mental
events, writes:

"...having or feeling a pain is identified with a neurological event,
but the pain itself is distinct from the having of the pain ? it is
not an event."

It was at this point that Gordon mentioned amoebas and pain, and all
the bits fell into place.

That pain is a scream from the distant somatic cells, conveyed by
neural tissue, yes, but an example of the tangible distant
assertiveness of non-neural tissue under assault.

But this new notion of an active somatic consciousness had further
implications.  Biology is ***EVOLVED***.  The evolutionary process
takes place in an environment where ***ALL*** extant physical
mechanisms are at play.  So three and a half billion years ago, when
bacterial life first appeared, any quirk of physical mechanism and
morphology which might afford a selection advantage, would have been
evolutionarily selected and genetically preserved.  It is on this
basis that I conclude that deliberation (information processing) and
intentionality emerged very early in biological evolution because of
its clear survival advantage.  Emerged in bacteria probably, and then
over the next 3 billion years was subject to further refinement,
because evolution never sleeps.  Then eukaryotic cells emerged, single
cells at first -- amoeba and paramecium -- followed, as we know, by
the Cambrian explosion.  Which led to macroscopic multi-cellular
organisms  -- humans among them -- creatures composed of the
descendants of those first single cell creatures, and bringing with
them the advantages of cellular consciousness, even further refined by
the unstinting influence of evolution.

Enough embarrassment for one day.

Best, Jeff Davis

 "Everything's hard till you know how to do it."
                         Ray Charles


From stefano.vaj at gmail.com  Sat Feb 13 21:15:48 2010
From: stefano.vaj at gmail.com (Stefano Vaj)
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 2010 22:15:48 +0100
Subject: [ExI] If anyone wants to Respond to the IEET piece re
	"Promblems of Transhumanism"
In-Reply-To: <201002081818.o18IIX6U008758@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
References: <201002081818.o18IIX6U008758@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
Message-ID: <580930c21002131315u676a38f1y9f019fbe33850291@mail.gmail.com>

On 8 February 2010 19:18, Max More <max at maxmore.com> wrote:
> Damien, you seem to be suggesting ("Still, Max is quoted as saying") that
> Hughes "implication of antidemocratic or top-down bias" is understandable
> because of my statement that "Democratic arrangements have no intrinsic
> value; they have value only to the extent that they enable us to achieve
> shared goals while protecting our freedom." If so, I don't understand how
> you can say that. Saying that democratic arrangements (as they exist at any
> particular time) have no intrinsic value is not in the least equivalent to
> saying that authoritarian control is better. Should we not strive for
> something better than the ugly system of democracy that currently exists?
> Are authoritarian arrangements the only conceivable alternative?

I have another remark. How comes that self-declared technoprogressives
and socialists find themselves aligned to a ritual, mechanical defence
of what Marx used to call the "board of directors of the bourgeoisie"?
:-)

Speaking of democracy more in general, a feel-good concept which has
been used in so many different meanings, I am personally rather fond
of the concept of "popular sovereignty", or rather "sovereignties",
firstly in terms of collective self-determination (a principle having
much to do with transhumanism, IMHO), secondly as it suggests that we
have the freedom to adopt the norms and legal systems of our choice,
rather than having simply to recognise or enforcing  a set of
universal and eternal laws, thirdly because it implies political
pluralism (meaning a radical wariness of dreams of world governments
of any kind which would be entitled to ignore the willingness or not
of a community to participate in them).

All in all, this also sounds as the best bet of transhumanism,
including in terms of "national Darwinism" which would strongly
discourage the implementation of neoluddite policies even by
governments who might be ideologically tempted by them.

-- 
Stefano Vaj


From stefano.vaj at gmail.com  Sat Feb 13 21:23:29 2010
From: stefano.vaj at gmail.com (Stefano Vaj)
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 2010 22:23:29 +0100
Subject: [ExI] If anyone wants to Respond to the IEET piece re "Problems
	of Transhumanism"
In-Reply-To: <4B7059E4.1010402@satx.rr.com>
References: <201002081818.o18IIX6U008758@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
	<4B7059E4.1010402@satx.rr.com>
Message-ID: <580930c21002131323j13c21d41ma0f41cf3e9da4b7c@mail.gmail.com>

On 8 February 2010 19:37, Damien Broderick <thespike at satx.rr.com> wrote:
> But as I said a moment ago in another post, your statement doesn't sound
> like a ringing endorsement of the position that "liberal democracy is the
> best path to betterment," which is the point Hughes is making about
>>Humanism. Where he goes from there is questionable if not absurd *as a
> generalization*--but there's certainly a technocratic, elitist tendency in a
> lot of >H discourse I've read here over the last 15 years or so.

One could contend, exactly from what I have always taken as James
Hughes' position,  that "liberal democracy" *is* an ?litist system,
only one where the circulation of the ?lites is very slow and limited,
and where the selection criteria thereof is very debatable... :-)

-- 
Stefano Vaj


From stathisp at gmail.com  Sat Feb 13 21:49:08 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Sun, 14 Feb 2010 08:49:08 +1100
Subject: [ExI] evolution of consciousness
In-Reply-To: <810447.49620.qm@web36507.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <810447.49620.qm@web36507.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002131349r779078b1y2168e7a0e83e040@mail.gmail.com>

On 14 February 2010 05:42, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
> --- On Thu, 2/11/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> A computer model of the brain is made that controls a body,
>> i.e. a robot. The robot will behave exactly like a human.
>
> Such a robot may be made, yes.
>
>> Moreover, it will behave exactly like a human due to an isomorphism
>> between the structure and function of the brain and the structure and
>> function of the computer model, since that is what a model is. Now, you
>> claim that this robot would lack consciousness.
>
> I never made that claim. In fact I don't recall that you and I ever discussed robots until now. I suppose that you've made this claim above on my behalf.

You posted a link to a site that purported to show that not even a
robot which had input from the real world would have understanding.
Have you changed your mind about this?

>> This means that there is nothing about the intelligent behaviour of the
>> human that is affected by consciousness. For if consciousness were a
>> separate thing that affected behaviour, there would be some deficit in
>> behaviour if you reproduced the functional relationship between brain
>> components while leaving out the consciousness. Therefore, consciousness
>> must be epiphenomenal. You might have said that you rejected
>> epiphenomenalism, but you cannot do so consistently.
>
> No, I reject epiphenomenalism consistently. In the *actual* thought experiment that you proposed, in which the human patient presented with a lesion in Wernicke's area causing a semantic deficit and in which the surgeon used p-peurons, the patient DID suffer from a deficit after the surgery. And that deficit was due precisely to the fact that he would lack the experience of his own understanding, which would in turn affect his behavior. I.e., epiphenomenalism is false. This is why I stated multiple times that the surgeon would need to keep working until he finally would get the patient's behavior right. In the end his patient would pass the turing test yet still have no conscious understanding of words.

The patient COULD NOT suffer from a deficit after the surgery.
Otherwise you would be saying that both P and ~P are true, where P =
"the p-neurons exactly reproduce the I/O behaviour of the biological
neurons".

>> The only way you can consistently maintain your position
>> that computers can't reproduce consciousness is to say that they
>> can't reproduce intelligence either.
>
> Not so.
>
>> If you don't agree with this you must explain why I am wrong when I
>> point out the self-contradictions that zombies would lead to, and you
>> simply avoid doing this,
>
> I just don't see the contradictions that you see, Stathis.
>
> Let me ask you this: your general position seems to be that weak AI is false; that if weak AI is possible then strong AI must also be possible, because the distinction between weak and strong is false and anything that passes the Turing must have strong AI. Is that your position?

Yes.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Sat Feb 13 21:23:34 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 2010 13:23:34 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Newbie Question: Consciousness and Intelligence
In-Reply-To: <580930c21002131152t392ef477y5765a2cb90b278ce@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <405824.5794.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Sat, 2/13/10, Stefano Vaj <stefano.vaj at gmail.com> wrote:

>> I was wondering, given the lively back and forth I've
>> seen on this list, whether the participants are agreed on
>> the meanings of the terms "consciousness" and
>> "intelligence". 

> I do not think so. This may be the crux of the problem.

I think you have a point there. 

I wonder for example why some people here have trouble with my observation that amoebas (and most organisms on earth) have intelligence but no consciousness. 

It seems to me obvious that amoebas and other single-celled organisms have some intelligence: they can find food and procreate and so on. But because they lack nervous systems, it looks to me like these simple creatures live out their entire lives unconsciously. 


-gts


      


From stathisp at gmail.com  Sat Feb 13 22:04:12 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Sun, 14 Feb 2010 09:04:12 +1100
Subject: [ExI] Newbie Question: Consciousness and Intelligence
In-Reply-To: <405824.5794.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <580930c21002131152t392ef477y5765a2cb90b278ce@mail.gmail.com> 
	<405824.5794.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002131404s592adb42j9a01984af794dcd2@mail.gmail.com>

On 14 February 2010 08:23, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:

> It seems to me obvious that amoebas and other single-celled organisms have some intelligence: they can find food and procreate and so on. But because they lack nervous systems, it looks to me like these simple creatures live out their entire lives unconsciously.

What about flatworms?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From thespike at satx.rr.com  Sat Feb 13 22:08:58 2010
From: thespike at satx.rr.com (Damien Broderick)
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 2010 16:08:58 -0600
Subject: [ExI] Newbie Question: Consciousness and Intelligence
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002131404s592adb42j9a01984af794dcd2@mail.gmail.com>
References: <580930c21002131152t392ef477y5765a2cb90b278ce@mail.gmail.com>
	<405824.5794.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
	<f21c22e31002131404s592adb42j9a01984af794dcd2@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4B7722FA.6050100@satx.rr.com>

On 2/13/2010 4:04 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

> What about flatworms?

They have a very one-dimensional consciousness.


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Sat Feb 13 22:15:33 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 2010 14:15:33 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <a6a17bd41002131302h7aae45e8y77f4bdb25d4d7758@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <23758.31471.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Sat, 2/13/10, Jeff Davis <jrd1415 at gmail.com> wrote:

> Gordon says he rejects the concept of mind-body dualism.? Rather, he 
> asserts a timeworn philosophical alternative,  that of an inseparable 
> unity, a mind-body unity if you will.? 

Yes.

> Then when others propose a simulation of mind, Gordon objects, seeming 
> to me, and logically, to be saying you can't get a faithful recreation 
> of mind if you leave out the body part.

Yes.

> And so I have come to agree with Gordon, partly.

Be careful. My views haven't helped me win any popularity contests. :)

> All the talk of neuron by neuron replacements is fine as
> far as it goes, but Gordon is reasonable in rejecting this -- though
> I wish he would have explained himself better -- based on the
> principle of incompleteness.? Half a thing is not the thing.
> 
> The 'body' part is missing.? To faithfully reproduce
> the  mind/persona/organism you have to reproduce the whole body,
> all the somatic cells, neural and non, with their particular and
> varied influences on the persona.

Yes. I think we cannot extract the mind from the nervous system. In my view the mind exists as a *high-level physical feature* of the nervous system. Of interest to extropians, the mind does not exist as something separate from the brain, like software running on hardware. I see the human brain/mind as all hardware.

Now at this point some people will think: "How could the mind exist as a physical feature of anything? Can't we make a real distinction between the mental and the physical?" Most people think this way, including even many philosophical materialists who claim not to. But it's only the dualistic voice of Descartes speaking to us from beyond the grave. We are his intellectual descendants. 

I finally shook off that Cartesian illusion and now the world makes a lot more sense. Unfortunately this world-view does not fit well with the extropian vision of uploading and so on. Oh well.


> That said, returning to the idea of an authentic
> simulation, I believe if the simulation includes the somatic 
> contribution, thus comprehensively simulating both mind and body, that 
> there is no reason the simulation won't fully and faithfully remanifest 
> the original mind-body persona.
> 
> What do you think Gordon?? Does this work for you, or
> no?

I think we basically agree, though I need to know more what you mean by "somatic contribution". As I stated at the outset, I have no objection to strong AI per se. I just don't think it can happen on the dualistic software/hardware model. I wonder also if what you've described here even qualifies as anything I would call a simulation.

Thanks for the thoughtful post, Jeff. 

-gts



      


From stefano.vaj at gmail.com  Sat Feb 13 22:40:57 2010
From: stefano.vaj at gmail.com (Stefano Vaj)
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 2010 23:40:57 +0100
Subject: [ExI] Newbie Question: Consciousness and Intelligence
In-Reply-To: <4B7722FA.6050100@satx.rr.com>
References: <580930c21002131152t392ef477y5765a2cb90b278ce@mail.gmail.com>
	<405824.5794.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
	<f21c22e31002131404s592adb42j9a01984af794dcd2@mail.gmail.com>
	<4B7722FA.6050100@satx.rr.com>
Message-ID: <580930c21002131440h6e465c19l914d43d89343e96f@mail.gmail.com>

On 13 February 2010 23:08, Damien Broderick <thespike at satx.rr.com> wrote:
> On 2/13/2010 4:04 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>> What about flatworms?
>
> They have a very one-dimensional consciousness.

"Flat"worms... Shouldn't it be bi-dimensional? ;-)


-- 
Stefano Vaj


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Sat Feb 13 22:42:06 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 2010 14:42:06 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Newbie Question: Consciousness and Intelligence
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002131404s592adb42j9a01984af794dcd2@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <158383.1762.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Sat, 2/13/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:

> What about flatworms?

I can't know what it's like to be a flatworm, assuming there is something it is like to be one, but clearly full-scale consciousness begins to appear somewhere on the evolutionary scale from flatworms to humans.

I feel comfortable saying 1) humans have consciousness, 2) some other organisms with highly developed nervous systems almost certainly have consciousness (chimps, etc) and 3) simple organisms that completely lack nervous systems do not have it. 

-gts



      


From stathisp at gmail.com  Sat Feb 13 22:49:34 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Sun, 14 Feb 2010 09:49:34 +1100
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <23758.31471.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <a6a17bd41002131302h7aae45e8y77f4bdb25d4d7758@mail.gmail.com> 
	<23758.31471.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002131449k7032ba06k5199ee1126f4f6e2@mail.gmail.com>

On 14 February 2010 09:15, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:

> Yes. I think we cannot extract the mind from the nervous system. In my view the mind exists as a *high-level physical feature* of the nervous system. Of interest to extropians, the mind does not exist as something separate from the brain, like software running on hardware. I see the human brain/mind as all hardware.

Software exists separately from hardware in the same way as an
architectural drawing exists separately from the building it depicts.

> Now at this point some people will think: "How could the mind exist as a physical feature of anything? Can't we make a real distinction between the mental and the physical?" Most people think this way, including even many philosophical materialists who claim not to. But it's only the dualistic voice of Descartes speaking to us from beyond the grave. We are his intellectual descendants.
>
> I finally shook off that Cartesian illusion and now the world makes a lot more sense. Unfortunately this world-view does not fit well with the extropian vision of uploading and so on. Oh well.

There is no real distinction between software and hardware. When you
program a computer you make actual physical changes to it, and the
"software" is just a scheme that you have in mind to help you make the
right physical changes so that the hardware does what you want it to
do. The computer is just dumb matter which has no understanding
whatsoever of the program, the programmer, its own design, the
existence of the world or anything else. Its parts follow the laws of
physics but even this they don't understand: they just do it. Exactly
the same is true of human brains. But when the hardware is set up just
right, in a brain or a computer, it behaves in an intelligent manner,
and intelligence from the point of view of the system displaying it is
consciousness.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From thespike at satx.rr.com  Sat Feb 13 22:53:20 2010
From: thespike at satx.rr.com (Damien Broderick)
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 2010 16:53:20 -0600
Subject: [ExI] Newbie Question: Consciousness and Intelligence
In-Reply-To: <580930c21002131440h6e465c19l914d43d89343e96f@mail.gmail.com>
References: <580930c21002131152t392ef477y5765a2cb90b278ce@mail.gmail.com>	<405824.5794.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>	<f21c22e31002131404s592adb42j9a01984af794dcd2@mail.gmail.com>	<4B7722FA.6050100@satx.rr.com>
	<580930c21002131440h6e465c19l914d43d89343e96f@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4B772D60.2060204@satx.rr.com>

On 2/13/2010 4:40 PM, Stefano Vaj wrote:

>> They have a very one-dimensional consciousness.
>
> "Flat"worms... Shouldn't it be bi-dimensional? ;-)

Only just. Not enough for semantics, though, merely syntax, poor little 
syntagmatic things.


From stathisp at gmail.com  Sat Feb 13 22:57:55 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Sun, 14 Feb 2010 09:57:55 +1100
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <a6a17bd41002131302h7aae45e8y77f4bdb25d4d7758@mail.gmail.com>
References: <964516.40828.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
	<a6a17bd41002131302h7aae45e8y77f4bdb25d4d7758@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002131457j5f722146k863833316bd9aa3c@mail.gmail.com>

On 14 February 2010 08:02, Jeff Davis <jrd1415 at gmail.com> wrote:

> All the talk of neuron by neuron replacements is fine as far as it
> goes, but Gordon is reasonable in rejecting this -- though I wish he
> would have explained himself better -- based on the principle of
> incompleteness. ?Half a thing is not the thing.

But half a thing may still perform the function of the thing.

> The 'body' part is missing. ?To faithfully reproduce the
> mind/persona/organism you have to reproduce the whole body, all the
> somatic cells, neural and non, with their particular and varied
> influences on the persona.
>
> At this point I will state, without elaboration, that I have come to
> believe that consciousness arises at the cellular level, and that any
> variant of consciousness in a highly complex multi-cellular organisms
> -- in particular, it's penultimate form in humans, of cognitive
> ability and an awareness self and universe -- arises from a
> combination of somatic and cerebral consciousness. ?To make things
> worse -- again without elaboration -- it is difficult for me to avoid
> the further conclusion that the bulk of the phenomenon of
> consciousness comes from the contribution of the somatic cells. ?To
> soften this seemingly outrageous assertion -- that the God-like nature
> of man ...
>
> "What a piece of work is a man, how noble in reason, how infinite in
> faculties; in form and moving how express and admirable, in action how
> like an angel, in apprehension how like a god: the beauty of the
> world, the paragon of animals!
>
> ...is more about the influence of gut, bone, blood, and sinew, than
> brain -- let me remind that the mammalian brain with all its glorious
> capability is a relatively recent add-on to the ancient partnership of
> sensory apparatus and the less glamorous support soma.

Then there would be a problem with the consciousness of people who
have lost limbs or various internal organs.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From stathisp at gmail.com  Sat Feb 13 23:01:21 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Sun, 14 Feb 2010 10:01:21 +1100
Subject: [ExI] Newbie Question: Consciousness and Intelligence
In-Reply-To: <158383.1762.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <f21c22e31002131404s592adb42j9a01984af794dcd2@mail.gmail.com> 
	<158383.1762.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002131501i28d11133ld28a302d39f90f37@mail.gmail.com>

On 14 February 2010 09:42, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
> --- On Sat, 2/13/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> What about flatworms?
>
> I can't know what it's like to be a flatworm, assuming there is something it is like to be one, but clearly full-scale consciousness begins to appear somewhere on the evolutionary scale from flatworms to humans.
>
> I feel comfortable saying 1) humans have consciousness, 2) some other organisms with highly developed nervous systems almost certainly have consciousness (chimps, etc) and 3) simple organisms that completely lack nervous systems do not have it.

It's the same with computers. There aren't any yet which match the
processing ability of a mouse brain, let alone that of a chimp or
human.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Sat Feb 13 23:21:36 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 2010 15:21:36 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002131449k7032ba06k5199ee1126f4f6e2@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <620471.11317.qm@web36505.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Sat, 2/13/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:

> There is no real distinction between software and hardware.
> When you program a computer you make actual physical changes to it,
> and the "software" is just a scheme that you have in mind to help
> you make the right physical changes so that the hardware does what you
> want it to do. 

Okay, I'll go along with that.

> The computer is just dumb matter which has no understanding
> whatsoever of the program, the programmer, its own design,
> the existence of the world or anything else. 

Right, that's what I've been trying to tell you! :)

> Its parts follow the laws of physics but even this they don't 
> understand: they just do it. 

Right. Your logic looks perfect so far.

> Exactly the same is true of human brains. 

I can't speak for you, but it sure seems like my brain has conscious understanding of things. And according to your logic above, computers do not have this understanding. So then if computers don't have it, but my brain does, then logic forces me to conclude that my brain does not equal a computer. 

-gts




      


From stefano.vaj at gmail.com  Sat Feb 13 23:58:54 2010
From: stefano.vaj at gmail.com (Stefano Vaj)
Date: Sun, 14 Feb 2010 00:58:54 +0100
Subject: [ExI] Newbie Question: Consciousness and Intelligence
In-Reply-To: <158383.1762.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <f21c22e31002131404s592adb42j9a01984af794dcd2@mail.gmail.com>
	<158383.1762.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <580930c21002131558m9e6df01w7fb9dbc96ffbe339@mail.gmail.com>

On 13 February 2010 23:42, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
> --- On Sat, 2/13/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
>> What about flatworms?
>
> I can't know what it's like to be a flatworm

Nor can you know what it is like to be a woman, a chinese, an
octuagenarian, or for that matter an identical twin of yourself.

What you can tell, however, is that they are in principle able to
succeed in a Turing test. ;-)

Do you really need to make further assumptions as to hypothetical
non-phenomenical features shared by them but not by other entities who
may be able to pass it just as well?

I am not trying to persuade you, as others seem unrelently to be
doing, that a computer can be "conscious". I am simply insisting that
any such immaterial feature that can be "projected" on other living
organisms, or on the restricted subset thereof represented by alert,
non-infant, educated, Turing-test qualified human beings can be with
identical plausibility projected on anything else exhibiting a good
enough analogy of the interactions you can have with them.

-- 
Stefano Vaj


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Sun Feb 14 00:02:02 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 2010 16:02:02 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Newbie Question: Consciousness and Intelligence
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002131501i28d11133ld28a302d39f90f37@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <789829.39304.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Sat, 2/13/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:

> > I feel comfortable saying 1) humans have
> consciousness, 2) some other organisms with highly developed
> nervous systems almost certainly have consciousness (chimps,
> etc) and 3) simple organisms that completely lack nervous
> systems do not have it.
> 
> It's the same with computers. There aren't any yet which
> match the processing ability of a mouse brain, let alone that of a
> chimp or human.

If and when someone builds a human-like nervous system in a box with sense organs, I'll call that box conscious but I won't call it a digital computer. Neither will you, because it won't be one.

-gts


      


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Sun Feb 14 00:37:47 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 2010 16:37:47 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Newbie Question: Consciousness and Intelligence
In-Reply-To: <580930c21002131558m9e6df01w7fb9dbc96ffbe339@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <502441.97360.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Sat, 2/13/10, Stefano Vaj <stefano.vaj at gmail.com> wrote:

>> I can't know what it's like to be a flatworm
> 
> Nor can you know what it is like to be a woman, a chinese,
> an octuagenarian, or for that matter an identical twin of
> yourself.

Actually I can infer a great deal about what it's like to be them. I see that they have nervous systems very much like mine, eyes and skin and noses and ears very much like mine, and so on, and from these biological facts *in combination* with their intelligent communications I can know with near certainty that they have consciousness very much like mine. 

I cannot do the same for flatworms or computers or amoebas.
 
> Do you really need to make further assumptions as to
> hypothetical non-phenomenical features shared by them but not by other
> entities who may be able to pass it just as well?

As you probably know by now if you've read my posts, I think the Turing test will give false positives for certain computers that we may develop in the not too distant future.

By "false positives" I mean that weak AI computers will pass the test, but that the test does not measure the existence of consciousness or subjective experience or intentionality; it does not and cannot test for strong AI. The Turing test will give false positives for strong AI.
 
> I am simply insisting that any such immaterial feature that can be 
> "projected" on other living organisms, or on the restricted subset 
> thereof represented by alert, non-infant, educated, Turing-test 
> qualified human beings can be with identical plausibility projected on 
> anything else exhibiting a good enough analogy of the interactions you 
> can have with them.

Again, the Turing test does not measure the strong AI attributes that concern me. 

It is true that I "project" consciousness onto other humans but I don't do this based solely on their ability to pass the Turing test or on their interactions with me. As above, I do it based also on their physiology.

-gts



      


From jrd1415 at gmail.com  Sun Feb 14 00:38:48 2010
From: jrd1415 at gmail.com (Jeff Davis)
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 2010 17:38:48 -0700
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002131457j5f722146k863833316bd9aa3c@mail.gmail.com>
References: <964516.40828.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
	<a6a17bd41002131302h7aae45e8y77f4bdb25d4d7758@mail.gmail.com>
	<f21c22e31002131457j5f722146k863833316bd9aa3c@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <a6a17bd41002131638i6fa4d65fwbd17e29e6b943c9a@mail.gmail.com>

On Sat, Feb 13, 2010 at 3:57 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
> On 14 February 2010 08:02, Jeff Davis <jrd1415 at gmail.com> wrote:

>> ?Half a thing is not the thing.

> But half a thing may still perform the function of the thing.

If the nature of the half thing is profoundly different from that of
the whole, the nature of its performance may also be radically
altered/diminished.

>> ...the God-like nature of man is more about the influence
>> of gut, bone, blood, and sinew, than brain...

> Then there would be a problem with the
> consciousness of people who
> have lost limbs or various internal organs.

Regarding the loss of limbs, kidney, gall bladder, stomach, lengths of
intestine, a lung, etc....  I agree the persona and consciousness
appear unaltered.  That said, I have heard of people who lose a
portion of their visual field, but are unaware of the alteration in
their consciousness.  However, that may be the result of brain damage,
not somatic damage.

But mostly I was thinking of basic human impulses and feelings:
hunger and the urge to feed, the reproductive impulse,
acquisitiveness(greed?), the various behaviors arising from the
instinct for survival: fight or flight, fear, anger, hatred,
dominance, submission, anxiety, depression, shock.  These things are
primitive, and certainly pre-date the features of mammalian (ie
higher) brain function.  I view these impulses as the foundation AND
BULK of animal and human behavior, and gut-centered, with higher-level
mental activity a more recent development.  I wonder if feelings in
the gut aren't in fact real -- like pain -- and our awareness of them
just an additional fact, a mental fact.

So what would consciousness be, what would a mind be without this
foundational context built up over three and a half billion years?
That's why I think the gut (soma) may be critical in defining mind.

But, to be honest with you, I feel way out on a limb here.

Best, Jeff Davis

 "Everything's hard till you know how to do it."
                         Ray Charles


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Sun Feb 14 00:49:20 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Sat, 13 Feb 2010 16:49:20 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002131449k7032ba06k5199ee1126f4f6e2@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <431764.52879.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Sat, 2/13/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:

> But when the hardware is set up just right, in a brain or a computer, it 
> behaves in an intelligent manner, and intelligence from the point of view 
> of the system displaying it is consciousness.

My watch tells the time intelligently. Does it therefore have consciousness from its "point of view"? I don't think so. I don't think my watch has a point of view. But then maybe it isn't set up right. :)

-gts




      


From stefano.vaj at gmail.com  Sun Feb 14 01:17:13 2010
From: stefano.vaj at gmail.com (Stefano Vaj)
Date: Sun, 14 Feb 2010 02:17:13 +0100
Subject: [ExI] Newbie Question: Consciousness and Intelligence
In-Reply-To: <502441.97360.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <580930c21002131558m9e6df01w7fb9dbc96ffbe339@mail.gmail.com>
	<502441.97360.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <580930c21002131717j6f50fa59k1e39bbe3cb0aee3b@mail.gmail.com>

On 14 February 2010 01:37, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
> It is true that I "project" consciousness onto other humans but I don't do this based solely on their ability to pass the Turing test or on their interactions with me. As above, I do it based also on their physiology.

If the ghost of one's wife, or her upload on a digital computer,
manages to persuade somebody that she is his wife, one will identify
her as his wife, irrespective of the physiology, if any,

Sociologically there is nothing else to say.

Sure, somebody may refuse his conclusion for philosophical and
ultimately arbitrary reasons, on the same basis that he may contend
that she is not the same person anymore after seven years, because in
average all her atoms have been replaced after such a perod. But this
would end up being nothing else than a very idiosincratic POV.

-- 
Stefano Vaj


From stathisp at gmail.com  Sun Feb 14 03:30:22 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Sun, 14 Feb 2010 14:30:22 +1100
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <a6a17bd41002131638i6fa4d65fwbd17e29e6b943c9a@mail.gmail.com>
References: <964516.40828.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
	<a6a17bd41002131302h7aae45e8y77f4bdb25d4d7758@mail.gmail.com> 
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On 14 February 2010 11:38, Jeff Davis <jrd1415 at gmail.com> wrote:
> On Sat, Feb 13, 2010 at 3:57 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
>> On 14 February 2010 08:02, Jeff Davis <jrd1415 at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>>> ?Half a thing is not the thing.
>
>> But half a thing may still perform the function of the thing.
>
> If the nature of the half thing is profoundly different from that of
> the whole, the nature of its performance may also be radically
> altered/diminished.

Yes it may, but it depends on what the function is. An artificial
joint is not *identical* with a natural joint, but it can function
just as well.

>>> ...the God-like nature of man is more about the influence
>>> of gut, bone, blood, and sinew, than brain...
>
>> Then there would be a problem with the
>> consciousness of people who
>> have lost limbs or various internal organs.
>
> Regarding the loss of limbs, kidney, gall bladder, stomach, lengths of
> intestine, a lung, etc.... ?I agree the persona and consciousness
> appear unaltered. ?That said, I have heard of people who lose a
> portion of their visual field, but are unaware of the alteration in
> their consciousness. ?However, that may be the result of brain damage,
> not somatic damage.

Some patients with damage to the visual cortex are completely blind
but insist that they can see normally, even while they stagger around
bumping into things. They are not lying or even "in denial", they
honestly believe it. That is, they are delusional, and this is an
example of a type of delusional disorder called anosognosia (meaning
inability to recognise that you have an illness). Interestingly, it
usually doesn't happen if the lesion is in the eye or optic nerve.

> But mostly I was thinking of basic human impulses and feelings:
> hunger and the urge to feed, the reproductive impulse,
> acquisitiveness(greed?), the various behaviors arising from the
> instinct for survival: fight or flight, fear, anger, hatred,
> dominance, submission, anxiety, depression, shock. ?These things are
> primitive, and certainly pre-date the features of mammalian (ie
> higher) brain function. ?I view these impulses as the foundation AND
> BULK of animal and human behavior, and gut-centered, with higher-level
> mental activity a more recent development. ?I wonder if feelings in
> the gut aren't in fact real -- like pain -- and our awareness of them
> just an additional fact, a mental fact.
>
> So what would consciousness be, what would a mind be without this
> foundational context built up over three and a half billion years?
> That's why I think the gut (soma) may be critical in defining mind.
>
> But, to be honest with you, I feel way out on a limb here.

There is no doubt that many of our feelings are based in the body, but
they are *felt* in the brain. If you could reproduce the inputs the
brain receives from the body, you would reproduce the associated
feelings.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From stathisp at gmail.com  Sun Feb 14 03:41:45 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Sun, 14 Feb 2010 14:41:45 +1100
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <431764.52879.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <f21c22e31002131449k7032ba06k5199ee1126f4f6e2@mail.gmail.com> 
	<431764.52879.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002131941v6c153922pc52b6735149ca72e@mail.gmail.com>

On 14 February 2010 11:49, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
> --- On Sat, 2/13/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> But when the hardware is set up just right, in a brain or a computer, it
>> behaves in an intelligent manner, and intelligence from the point of view
>> of the system displaying it is consciousness.
>
> My watch tells the time intelligently. Does it therefore have consciousness from its "point of view"? I don't think so. I don't think my watch has a point of view. But then maybe it isn't set up right. :)

The watch performs the function of telling the time just fine. It
simulates a sundial or hour glass in this respect. However, when a
human tells the time there are thousands of extra nuances which a
watch just doesn't have. So the watch tells the time, but it doesn't
understand the concept of of time. Comparing a watch with a human is
like comparing a nematode with a human, only more so. What would you
say to the non-organic alien visitors who make the case that since a
nematode is not conscious, neither can a human be conscious, since
basically a human is just a more complex nematode?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From stathisp at gmail.com  Sun Feb 14 05:41:33 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Sun, 14 Feb 2010 16:41:33 +1100
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <620471.11317.qm@web36505.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <f21c22e31002131449k7032ba06k5199ee1126f4f6e2@mail.gmail.com> 
	<620471.11317.qm@web36505.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002132141q2dbd4555p5d646d65cd20a4ab@mail.gmail.com>

On 14 February 2010 10:21, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
> --- On Sat, 2/13/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> There is no real distinction between software and hardware.
>> When you program a computer you make actual physical changes to it,
>> and the "software" is just a scheme that you have in mind to help
>> you make the right physical changes so that the hardware does what you
>> want it to do.
>
> Okay, I'll go along with that.
>
>> The computer is just dumb matter which has no understanding
>> whatsoever of the program, the programmer, its own design,
>> the existence of the world or anything else.
>
> Right, that's what I've been trying to tell you! :)
>
>> Its parts follow the laws of physics but even this they don't
>> understand: they just do it.
>
> Right. Your logic looks perfect so far.
>
>> Exactly the same is true of human brains.
>
> I can't speak for you, but it sure seems like my brain has conscious understanding of things. And according to your logic above, computers do not have this understanding. So then if computers don't have it, but my brain does, then logic forces me to conclude that my brain does not equal a computer.

Your brain, when it is working properly, has understanding as an
emergent property of the system, even though the matter in your brain,
each individual neuron, is completely stupid. The Chinese Room thought
experiment should make that clear to you. Since it doesn't, I have
proposed a variation in which your neurons *do* have an understanding
of their own basic tasks, but still no understanding of the big
picture. You haven't responded to this.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From stathisp at gmail.com  Sun Feb 14 06:17:11 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Sun, 14 Feb 2010 17:17:11 +1100
Subject: [ExI] Newbie Question: Consciousness and Intelligence
In-Reply-To: <789829.39304.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <f21c22e31002131501i28d11133ld28a302d39f90f37@mail.gmail.com> 
	<789829.39304.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002132217g1133ea0ftf2b49c203bccfc9f@mail.gmail.com>

On 14 February 2010 11:02, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
> --- On Sat, 2/13/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> > I feel comfortable saying 1) humans have
>> consciousness, 2) some other organisms with highly developed
>> nervous systems almost certainly have consciousness (chimps,
>> etc) and 3) simple organisms that completely lack nervous
>> systems do not have it.
>>
>> It's the same with computers. There aren't any yet which
>> match the processing ability of a mouse brain, let alone that of a
>> chimp or human.
>
> If and when someone builds a human-like nervous system in a box with sense organs, I'll call that box conscious but I won't call it a digital computer. Neither will you, because it won't be one.

That's what is being attempted by Henry Markram's group. They may
fail, but probably only because they are taking shortcuts in the
modelling in order to reduce by orders of magnitude the required
amount of processing. If they model a complete mouse brain, connect it
to a mouse avatar or robot mouse, and it displays mouselike behaviour,
that would be indication at the very least that that any separate
mouse consciousness can only be epiphenomenal. As John Clark keeps
reminding us, it would then be very difficult to explain how
consciousness could have evolved.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From bbenzai at yahoo.com  Sun Feb 14 09:39:30 2010
From: bbenzai at yahoo.com (Ben Zaiboc)
Date: Sun, 14 Feb 2010 01:39:30 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <mailman.1564.1266110168.462.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
Message-ID: <783130.46814.qm@web113618.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

Jeff Davis <jrd1415 at gmail.com> wrote:

> But mostly I was thinking of basic human impulses and
> feelings:
> hunger and the urge to feed, the reproductive impulse,
> acquisitiveness(greed?), the various behaviors arising from
> the
> instinct for survival: fight or flight, fear, anger,
> hatred,
> dominance, submission, anxiety, depression, shock.?
> These things are
> primitive, and certainly pre-date the features of mammalian
> (ie
> higher) brain function.? I view these impulses as the
> foundation AND
> BULK of animal and human behavior, and gut-centered, with
> higher-level
> mental activity a more recent development.? I wonder
> if feelings in
> the gut aren't in fact real -- like pain -- and our
> awareness of them
> just an additional fact, a mental fact.
> 
> So what would consciousness be, what would a mind be
> without this
> foundational context built up over three and a half billion
> years?
> That's why I think the gut (soma) may be critical in
> defining mind.
> 
> But, to be honest with you, I feel way out on a limb here.
> 


I wouldn't argue with this view in principle, but would point out that the contribution of the actual body parts involved (actual gut tissue, muscles, etc.) is likely to be very very small.  What's almost certainly more important is the maps in the brain that represent these body parts, and they could be hooked up to 'fake' body parts that produce the same signals with no loss of, or change in, any mental functions, as long as the fake parts behaved in a manner consistent with the real equivalent (produced hunger signals when blood glucose is low, etc.)

I definitely agree that the lower brain functions, to do with somatic sensing and control and emotional states, are probably a vital component in any attempt to build an artificial mind, and this seems to be largely neglected by the AI community.  Maybe actual sex just isn't as sexy for them as maze-navigation!

Ben Zaiboc


      


From bbenzai at yahoo.com  Sun Feb 14 13:41:48 2010
From: bbenzai at yahoo.com (Ben Zaiboc)
Date: Sun, 14 Feb 2010 05:41:48 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Newbie Question: Consciousness and Intelligence
In-Reply-To: <mailman.1.1266148801.17046.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
Message-ID: <348836.89645.qm@web113619.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com>

> On 14 February 2010 11:02, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>

> > If and when someone builds a human-like nervous system
> in a box with sense organs, I'll call that box conscious but
> I won't call it a digital computer. Neither will you,
> because it won't be one.
> 
> That's what is being attempted by Henry Markram's group.
> They may
> fail, but probably only because they are taking shortcuts
> in the
> modelling in order to reduce by orders of magnitude the
> required
> amount of processing. If they model a complete mouse brain,
> connect it
> to a mouse avatar or robot mouse, and it displays mouselike
> behaviour,
> that would be indication at the very least that that any
> separate
> mouse consciousness can only be epiphenomenal. As John
> Clark keeps
> reminding us, it would then be very difficult to explain
> how
> consciousness could have evolved.

Ah, but don't you see Stathis?
Blue Brain is a *digital computer*.  Therefore it can't possibly produce consciousness, because, you know, because it's *digital*.
And digital computers can't produce consciousness.
QED.

Ben Zaiboc


      


From hkeithhenson at gmail.com  Sun Feb 14 14:45:48 2010
From: hkeithhenson at gmail.com (Keith Henson)
Date: Sun, 14 Feb 2010 07:45:48 -0700
Subject: [ExI] extropy-chat Digest, Vol 77, Issue 26
In-Reply-To: <mailman.1.1266148801.17046.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
References: <mailman.1.1266148801.17046.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
Message-ID: <d1988d2d1002140645x3386a176nb4eff3a751b4f226@mail.gmail.com>

> On 14 February 2010 11:38, Jeff Davis <jrd1415 at gmail.com> wrote:

> Regarding the loss of limbs, kidney, gall bladder, stomach, lengths of
> intestine, a lung, etc.... ?I agree the persona and consciousness
> appear unaltered.

In a brain transplant operation, you want to be the donor.

Keith


From msd001 at gmail.com  Sun Feb 14 18:20:33 2010
From: msd001 at gmail.com (Mike Dougherty)
Date: Sun, 14 Feb 2010 13:20:33 -0500
Subject: [ExI] Newbie Question: Consciousness and Intelligence
In-Reply-To: <348836.89645.qm@web113619.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
References: <mailman.1.1266148801.17046.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
	<348836.89645.qm@web113619.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <62c14241002141020g2278ddb5r5ee36d550b5567b@mail.gmail.com>

On Sun, Feb 14, 2010 at 8:41 AM, Ben Zaiboc <bbenzai at yahoo.com> wrote:
> Ah, but don't you see Stathis?
> Blue Brain is a *digital computer*. ?Therefore it can't possibly produce consciousness, because, you know, because it's *digital*.
> And digital computers can't produce consciousness.

Digital computers produce discrete consciousness.

Quantum computers produce indeterminate consciousness until observed.


From jonkc at bellsouth.net  Sun Feb 14 18:28:33 2010
From: jonkc at bellsouth.net (John Clark)
Date: Sun, 14 Feb 2010 13:28:33 -0500
Subject: [ExI] How not to make a thought experiment
In-Reply-To: <405824.5794.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <405824.5794.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <5F9A9DFE-77FA-44C4-B8AE-53B5496EB99C@bellsouth.net>

Since my last post Gordon Swobe has posted 8 times.

> I wonder for example why some people here have trouble with my observation that amoebas (and most organisms on earth) have intelligence but no consciousness. 

The answer is that unlike Swobe some people on this list have knowledge about how Evolution works and realize that intelligence without consciousness is biological gibberish. The also know its rather dumb to talk about observing consciousness.

> In my view the mind exists as a *high-level physical feature* of the nervous system.

Rather like "fast" is a high-level feature of a racing car.

> the mind does not exist as something separate from the brain

Fast is separate from a racing car.

> Can't we make a real distinction between the mental and the physical?

Yes.

> Most people think this way, including even many philosophical materialists who claim not to. But it's only the dualistic voice of Descartes speaking to us from beyond the grave. We are his intellectual descendants. I finally shook off that Cartesian illusion and now the world makes a lot more sense.

I have not observed Swobe shaking off any of his illusions, Cartesian or otherwise; and just like anybody else continues to use both the words "mind" and "brain", and in his usage he carefully distinguishes between the two. Swobe would never say "he had an operation to remove a mind tumor" or "I have changed my brain" but if he really wasn't a dualist he should be comfortable with both those sentences.   

> I feel comfortable saying 1) humans have consciousness

I am quite certain that Swobe is NOT comfortable in saying that all humans are conscious, just humans that act intelligently. I am quite certain Swobe doesn't think sleeping people are conscious, or people in a deep coma, or dead people. 

> the Turing test does not measure the strong AI attributes that concern me. 

Nothing can measure "strong AI", not the Turing Test not Evolution and not even Gordon Swobe; and if you can't measure something Science has no use for it, although religion might.

> It is true that I "project" consciousness onto other humans but I don't do this based solely on their ability to pass the Turing test or on their interactions with me. As above, I do it based also on their physiology.

So before Gordon Swobe learned physiology in college he thought he was the only conscious being in the universe, but that changed when he learned physiology even though he freely and frequently tells us that neither he nor anybody else has any idea how consciousness is produced. Interestingly just a century ago when almost no physiology was known nobody thought other minds existed, and even today most are ignorant on the subject so they must believe they are alone too. 

 John K Clark



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From lacertilian at gmail.com  Sun Feb 14 20:18:55 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Sun, 14 Feb 2010 12:18:55 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
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Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com>:
> Software exists separately from hardware in the same way as an
> architectural drawing exists separately from the building it depicts.

When I read this, a billion neurons in unison screeched "NOOO!!"
inside my skull. It was an interesting experience. Now that it's over,
I find myself with a whole litany of much more verbose corrections and
objections. I feel I must share.

One: software does not exist separately from the underlying hardware.
It is epiphenomenal, which in my terminology is synonymous with
virtual and imaginary, meaning that it relies on a more real substrate
to support its existence. When you pull the plug, the hardware only
gets quieter; the software ceases to exist.

Two: a blueprint is hardware, not software, unless it is encoded on a
hard drive and displayed on a monitor. Even in this case, there is no
relationship between the blueprint and the building except in the
imagination of a mind considering the two of them. Demolishing the
building has no effect whatsoever on the blueprint, except perhaps to
increase the number of people giving it wistful looks.

Three: in stark contrast to Gordon's views, I believe that software is
capable of (and is in practice) far more than the mere depiction of
things. A blueprint depicts a building, but a structural simulation
instantiates an actual virtual building that obeys its own laws of
physics (which, we hope, are similar to our own). There is a
surprisingly subtle difference between these two things.

A virtual building has no more relationship to the building it
emulates than does a blueprint of that building. However, unlike the
blueprint, the virtual building really is a building. You could put
little virtual people in it if you wanted (and if you could figure out
how to make virtual people to begin with).

It's a difficult conclusion to convey because I didn't arrive at it
through wholly rational means. As shorthand, I might refer to the two
things as a depiction and a simulation. A depiction can only be
related to what it depicts by a third party, which might be identical
with the thing depicted (as in the case of looking at a picture of
myself). A simulation has no such inherent limitation; it can relate
itself to what it simulates, just as I can relate myself to a person
whom I am doing a rather good impression of.

This has nothing at all to do with whether or not simulator and
simulated are identical. Obviously, they are not. Even a perfect
simulation of a mind is not that mind. However, it would be *a* mind;
it would be able to do everything that a mind can be expected to do,
and be everything a mind could possibly be. Including conscious.

I was careful to say "mind" instead of "brain", here. We could make a
virtual brain that does everything a real brain does, but it would
probably be a waste of processing power: there isn't much sense in
granting the ability to be squished, unless you want specifically to
perform various questionably-ethical stress tests on your imaginary
brain construct.


From jrd1415 at gmail.com  Sun Feb 14 22:25:00 2010
From: jrd1415 at gmail.com (Jeff Davis)
Date: Sun, 14 Feb 2010 15:25:00 -0700
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <783130.46814.qm@web113618.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
References: <mailman.1564.1266110168.462.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
	<783130.46814.qm@web113618.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <a6a17bd41002141425q38aa8582o1662fa2fdd066b61@mail.gmail.com>

On Sun, Feb 14, 2010 at 2:39 AM, Ben Zaiboc <bbenzai at yahoo.com> wrote:

> What's almost certainly more important is the maps in the brain that represent these body parts, and they could be hooked up to 'fake' body parts that produce the same signals with no loss of, or change in, any mental functions, as long as the fake parts behaved in a manner consistent with the real equivalent (produced hunger signals when blood glucose is low, etc.)

Yes.  This solves the original problem -- which came about, as I see
it, due to incompleteness in defining the problem, and a consequent
incompleteness in the simulation -- by completing the simulation.

Best, Jeff Davis

 "Everything's hard till you know how to do it."
                         Ray Charles


From emlynoregan at gmail.com  Mon Feb 15 00:26:31 2010
From: emlynoregan at gmail.com (Emlyn)
Date: Mon, 15 Feb 2010 10:56:31 +1030
Subject: [ExI] better self-transcendence through selective brain damage
In-Reply-To: <20100212221046.5.qmail@syzygy.com>
References: <mailman.1.1265976001.11244.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
	<226303.69206.qm@web113612.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
	<ee50357e1002120757m20247203l24231161d3dae6e7@mail.gmail.com>
	<FD93D5CE3D3645A298693B63EB507D6A@spike>
	<7A7A0CB2766A4C879426F3F66CD94F0C@spike>
	<87670FEF1360437981B4B84931C5FF94@spike>
	<20100212221046.5.qmail@syzygy.com>
Message-ID: <710b78fc1002141626o4f8673f3x61c387388126f17b@mail.gmail.com>

On 13 February 2010 08:40, Eric Messick <eric at m056832107.syzygy.com> wrote:
> Spike writes:
>>For instance, imagine giving your sweetheart a Valentine that says:
>>
>>Sweetheart, the depth of my love for you is equal to that which is induced
>>by several milligrams of endorphine-precursor pheromones which are
>>responsible for this class of emotions in humans. ?I mean it from the bottom
>>of my brain.
>
> Once again, xkcd has this covered, with a comic about overly
> scientific valentines:
>
> http://xkcd.com/701/
>
> -eric

I was listening to a physicist being interviewed on This American Life
recently. He was talking about how he and his girlfriend, in the very
early stages of their relationship, were talking about how great it
was that they were in love and that they had found each other. IIRC,
she asked him if he thought she was the only woman for him, and he
considered it and said "I think you're 1 in 100,000". Apparently this
started their first fight. Hell of a time for the rational machinery
to kick in :-)

-- 
Emlyn

http://www.songsofmiseryanddespair.com - My show, Fringe 2010
http://point7.wordpress.com - My blog


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Mon Feb 15 00:46:53 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Sun, 14 Feb 2010 16:46:53 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Newbie Question: Consciousness and Intelligence
In-Reply-To: <580930c21002131717j6f50fa59k1e39bbe3cb0aee3b@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <409052.58624.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Sat, 2/13/10, Stefano Vaj <stefano.vaj at gmail.com> wrote:

>> It is true that I "project" consciousness onto other
>> humans but I don't do this based solely on their ability to
>> pass the Turing test or on their interactions with me. As
>> above, I do it based also on their physiology.
> 
> If the ghost of one's wife, or her upload on a digital
> computer, manages to persuade somebody that she is his wife, one will
> identify her as his wife, irrespective of the physiology, if any,

It seems to me a digital simulation of a person, i.e., an upload existent on a computer, will have no more reality than does a digital movie of that person on a computer today. Depictions of things, digital or otherwise, do not equal the things they depict no matter how complete and realistic the depiction.

This does not preclude the possibility that a complete digital description of a person might serve as a reliable blueprint for reconstructing that person in material form, but I see that as a separate question. 

> Sure, somebody may refuse his conclusion for philosophical
> and ultimately arbitrary reasons

Come the singularity, some people will lose their grips on reality and find themselves believing such absurdities as that digital depictions of people have real mental states. A few lonely philosophers of my stripe will try in vain to restore their sanity. :)

-gts


      


From thespike at satx.rr.com  Mon Feb 15 00:49:09 2010
From: thespike at satx.rr.com (Damien Broderick)
Date: Sun, 14 Feb 2010 18:49:09 -0600
Subject: [ExI] Valentine's probability factor
In-Reply-To: <710b78fc1002141626o4f8673f3x61c387388126f17b@mail.gmail.com>
References: <mailman.1.1265976001.11244.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>	<226303.69206.qm@web113612.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>	<ee50357e1002120757m20247203l24231161d3dae6e7@mail.gmail.com>	<FD93D5CE3D3645A298693B63EB507D6A@spike>	<7A7A0CB2766A4C879426F3F66CD94F0C@spike>	<87670FEF1360437981B4B84931C5FF94@spike>	<20100212221046.5.qmail@syzygy.com>
	<710b78fc1002141626o4f8673f3x61c387388126f17b@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4B789A05.8030806@satx.rr.com>

On 2/14/2010 6:26 PM, Emlyn wrote:

> she asked him if he thought she was the only woman for him, and he
> considered it and said "I think you're 1 in 100,000". Apparently this
> started their first fight. Hell of a time for the rational machinery
> to kick in :-)

Nah, it's a perfect test of compatibility with others (the 1 in 100K or 
fewer of them) of like mind. Barbara and I were boggled at the apparent 
unlikelihood of our having found each other (and we talked about this 
right from the start)--which would have been wildly unlikely before the 
internet, ExI, affordable international travel, etc. Suddenly we had the 
whole English speaking population of the planet to trawl through--rather 
than the workplace, university, church, club, etc--presorted by handy 
detectors for IQ, personality type, unusual interests, etc.

Damien Broderick


From x at extropica.org  Mon Feb 15 00:28:06 2010
From: x at extropica.org (x at extropica.org)
Date: Sun, 14 Feb 2010 16:28:06 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <a6a17bd41002141425q38aa8582o1662fa2fdd066b61@mail.gmail.com>
References: <mailman.1564.1266110168.462.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
	<783130.46814.qm@web113618.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
	<a6a17bd41002141425q38aa8582o1662fa2fdd066b61@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <f7bfe5741002141628q6d5260fcgce9424ffc16e6734@mail.gmail.com>

On Sun, Feb 14, 2010 at 2:25 PM, Jeff Davis <jrd1415 at gmail.com> wrote:
> On Sun, Feb 14, 2010 at 2:39 AM, Ben Zaiboc <bbenzai at yahoo.com> wrote:
>
>> What's almost certainly more important is the maps in the brain that represent these body parts, and they could be hooked up to 'fake' body parts that produce the same signals with no loss of, or change in, any mental functions, as long as the fake parts behaved in a manner consistent with the real equivalent (produced hunger signals when blood glucose is low, etc.)
>
> Yes. ?This solves the original problem -- which came about, as I see
> it, due to incompleteness in defining the problem, and a consequent
> incompleteness in the simulation -- by completing the simulation.

Seems to me your extension makes no qualitative difference in regard
to the issue at hand.  You already had much of the machinery, and you
added some you realized you left out.  Still nowhere in any formal
description of that machinery, no matter how carefully you look, will
you find any actual "meaning." You''ll find only patterns of stimulus
and response, syntactically complete, semantically vacant.

I.
You're missing the basic systems-theoretic understanding that the
behavior of any system is meaningful only within the context of it's
environment of interaction.  Take the "whole human", e.g. a
description of everything within the boundaries of the skin, and
execute its syntax and you won't get human-like behavior--unless you
also provide (simulate) a suitable environment of interaction.

II.
Now ahead and simulate the human, within an appropriate environment.
You'll get human-like behavior, indistinguishable in principle from
the real thing.  Now you're back to the very correct point of Searle's
Chinese Room Argument:  There is no "meaning" to be found anywhere in
the system, no matter how precise your simulation.

Now Daniel Dennett or Thomas Metzinger or John Pollock (when feeling
bold enough to say it) or Siddh?rtha Gautama, or Jef will say "Of
course.  The "consciousness" you seek is a function of the observer,
and you've removed the observer role from the system under
observation.  There is no *essential* consciousness.  Never had it,
never will.  The very suggestion is incoherent: it can't be defined."

The logic of the CRA is correct.  But it reasons from a flawed
premise: That the human organism has this somehow ontologically
special thing called "consciousness."

So restart the music, and the merry-go-round.  I'm surprised no one's
mentioned the Giant Look Up Table yet.

- Jef


From olga.bourlin at gmail.com  Mon Feb 15 01:11:06 2010
From: olga.bourlin at gmail.com (Olga Bourlin)
Date: Sun, 14 Feb 2010 17:11:06 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Valentine's probability factor
In-Reply-To: <4B789A05.8030806@satx.rr.com>
References: <mailman.1.1265976001.11244.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
	<226303.69206.qm@web113612.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
	<ee50357e1002120757m20247203l24231161d3dae6e7@mail.gmail.com>
	<FD93D5CE3D3645A298693B63EB507D6A@spike>
	<7A7A0CB2766A4C879426F3F66CD94F0C@spike>
	<87670FEF1360437981B4B84931C5FF94@spike>
	<20100212221046.5.qmail@syzygy.com>
	<710b78fc1002141626o4f8673f3x61c387388126f17b@mail.gmail.com>
	<4B789A05.8030806@satx.rr.com>
Message-ID: <e65701211002141711k336c18cfua02d5b54515455c0@mail.gmail.com>

On Sun, Feb 14, 2010 at 4:49 PM, Damien Broderick <thespike at satx.rr.com> wrote:
> On 2/14/2010 6:26 PM, Emlyn wrote:
>
>> she asked him if he thought she was the only woman for him, and he
>> considered it and said "I think you're 1 in 100,000". Apparently this
>> started their first fight. Hell of a time for the rational machinery
>> to kick in :-)
>
> Nah, it's a perfect test of compatibility with others (the 1 in 100K or
> fewer of them) of like mind. Barbara and I were boggled at the apparent
> unlikelihood of our having found each other (and we talked about this right
> from the start)--which would have been wildly unlikely before the internet,
> ExI, affordable international travel, etc. Suddenly we had the whole English
> speaking population of the planet to trawl through--rather than the
> workplace, university, church, club, etc--presorted by handy detectors for
> IQ, personality type, unusual interests, etc.
>
> Damien Broderick

Me, three! (... even though Patrick and I met just a few years before
the Internet swept into our homes)

I was born in Nanking, China - my husband was born in Roscrea,
Ireland.  We met in Kansas City (attending a Free Inquiry magazine
convention in 1991), and now reside in the emerald city of Seattle.  I
am neither young nor impressionable, but find myself amazed anew each
day at the improbable event of Patrick and me having found each other.

Olga


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Mon Feb 15 01:25:45 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Sun, 14 Feb 2010 17:25:45 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002131941v6c153922pc52b6735149ca72e@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <744080.66241.qm@web36507.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Sat, 2/13/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:

> The watch performs the function of telling the time just
> fine. It simulates a sundial or hour glass in this respect. However,
> when a human tells the time there are thousands of extra nuances
> which a watch just doesn't have. So the watch tells the time, but
> it doesn't understand the concept of of time. Comparing a watch with a
> human is like comparing a nematode with a human, only more so. 

I compare my watch to a computer, not to a human. My digital watch has intelligence in the same sense as does my digital computer, and in the same sense as does the most powerful digital computer conceivable. 

I think you want me to believe that my watch has a small amount of consciousness by virtue of it having a small amount of intelligence. But I don't think that makes even a small amount of sense. It seems to me that my watch has no consciousness whatsoever, and that to say otherwise is to conflate science with science-fiction.

> What would you say to the non-organic alien visitors who make the case
> that since a nematode is not conscious, neither can a human be
> conscious, since basically a human is just a more complex nematode?

You beg the question of non-organic consciousness. As far as we know, "non-organic alien visitors" amounts to a completely meaningless concept. 

As for nematodes, I have no idea whether their primitive nervous systems support what I mean by consciousness. I doubt it but I don't know. I classify them in the gray area between unconscious amoebas and conscious humans. 

-gts


      


From aware at awareresearch.com  Mon Feb 15 01:30:16 2010
From: aware at awareresearch.com (Aware)
Date: Sun, 14 Feb 2010 17:30:16 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Valentine's probability factor
In-Reply-To: <4B789A05.8030806@satx.rr.com>
References: <mailman.1.1265976001.11244.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
	<226303.69206.qm@web113612.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
	<ee50357e1002120757m20247203l24231161d3dae6e7@mail.gmail.com>
	<FD93D5CE3D3645A298693B63EB507D6A@spike>
	<7A7A0CB2766A4C879426F3F66CD94F0C@spike>
	<87670FEF1360437981B4B84931C5FF94@spike>
	<20100212221046.5.qmail@syzygy.com>
	<710b78fc1002141626o4f8673f3x61c387388126f17b@mail.gmail.com>
	<4B789A05.8030806@satx.rr.com>
Message-ID: <f7bfe5741002141730p67d0a459j1d8beaeeb96e9e98@mail.gmail.com>

On Sun, Feb 14, 2010 at 4:49 PM, Damien Broderick <thespike at satx.rr.com> wrote:
> On 2/14/2010 6:26 PM, Emlyn wrote:
>
>> she asked him if he thought she was the only woman for him, and he
>> considered it and said "I think you're 1 in 100,000". Apparently this
>> started their first fight. Hell of a time for the rational machinery
>> to kick in :-)
>
> Nah, it's a perfect test of compatibility with others (the 1 in 100K or
> fewer of them) of like mind. Barbara and I were boggled at the apparent
> unlikelihood of our having found each other (and we talked about this right
> from the start)--which would have been wildly unlikely before the internet,
> ExI, affordable international travel, etc. Suddenly we had the whole English
> speaking population of the planet to trawl through--rather than the
> workplace, university, church, club, etc--presorted by handy detectors for
> IQ, personality type, unusual interests, etc.

Happily works for me and Lizbeth.  We found each other through an
online matching service.  I was her #1 match and she was my #2 match.
It may have been in our favor that we both answered the profile
questions honestly and in detail. :-)


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Mon Feb 15 01:54:22 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Sun, 14 Feb 2010 17:54:22 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <f7bfe5741002141628q6d5260fcgce9424ffc16e6734@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <896902.79613.qm@web36507.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Sun, 2/14/10, x at extropica.org <x at extropica.org> wrote:

> The logic of the CRA is correct.? But it reasons from
> a flawed premise: That the human organism has this somehow
> ontologically special thing called "consciousness."

It does not matter whether you believe in some "special thing called 'consciousness." Call it what you will, or call it nothing at all. 

It matters only that you understand that the man cannot grok the symbols by virtue of manipulating them according to the rules of syntax specified in the program. 

-gts


      


From ablainey at aol.com  Mon Feb 15 02:15:04 2010
From: ablainey at aol.com (ablainey at aol.com)
Date: Sun, 14 Feb 2010 21:15:04 -0500
Subject: [ExI] Valentine's probability factor
In-Reply-To: <4B789A05.8030806@satx.rr.com>
References: <mailman.1.1265976001.11244.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>	<226303.69206.qm@web113612.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>	<ee50357e1002120757m20247203l24231161d3dae6e7@mail.gmail.com>	<FD93D5CE3D3645A298693B63EB507D6A@spike>	<7A7A0CB2766A4C879426F3F66CD94F0C@spike>	<87670FEF1360437981B4B84931C5FF94@spike>	<20100212221046.5.qmail@syzygy.com><710b78fc1002141626o4f8673f3x61c387388126f17b@mail.gmail.com>
	<4B789A05.8030806@satx.rr.com>
Message-ID: <8CC7BFBD25C775F-108C-BD05@webmail-d073.sysops.aol.com>


 I just grabbed my wife backside in a crowded Pub. The fact that I didn't get a slap preved it was true love and that was 17 years ago.
We were very different people back then and we have both changed so much since. We still like very different things but are fundamentally
similar and we are still together.
Go figure?!?

If you get the basic compatability right it will work regardless of matching up your likes and dislikes.

 


 

 

-----Original Message-----
From: Damien Broderick <thespike at satx.rr.com>


 
Nah, it's a perfect test of compatibility with others (the 1 in 100K or fewer of them) of like mind. Barbara and I were boggled at the apparent unlikelihood of our having found each other (and we talked about this right from the start)--which would have been wildly unlikely before the internet, ExI, affordable international travel, etc. Suddenly we had the whole English speaking population of the planet to trawl through--rather than the workplace, university, church, club, etc--presorted by handy detectors for IQ, personality type, unusual interests, etc. 
 
Damien Broderick 


 
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From stathisp at gmail.com  Mon Feb 15 09:28:24 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Mon, 15 Feb 2010 20:28:24 +1100
Subject: [ExI] Newbie Question: Consciousness and Intelligence
In-Reply-To: <409052.58624.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <580930c21002131717j6f50fa59k1e39bbe3cb0aee3b@mail.gmail.com> 
	<409052.58624.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002150128p2a82afc0i60ec6f02aea4b72c@mail.gmail.com>

On 15 February 2010 11:46, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:

> It seems to me a digital simulation of a person, i.e., an upload existent on a computer, will have no more reality than does a digital movie of that person on a computer today. Depictions of things, digital or otherwise, do not equal the things they depict no matter how complete and realistic the depiction.
>
> This does not preclude the possibility that a complete digital description of a person might serve as a reliable blueprint for reconstructing that person in material form, but I see that as a separate question.
>
>> Sure, somebody may refuse his conclusion for philosophical
>> and ultimately arbitrary reasons
>
> Come the singularity, some people will lose their grips on reality and find themselves believing such absurdities as that digital depictions of people have real mental states. A few lonely philosophers of my stripe will try in vain to restore their sanity. :)

You keep repeating this as a fact but you don't explain why a digital
depiction of a person won't have real mental status. A pile of bricks
can duplicate the mass of a person; a car can duplicate the speed of a
person; an artificial joint can duplicate the function of a human's
joint. These devices are all very different from the the thing they
are copying. Why should the mind resist copying in anything other than
the original substrate?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From stathisp at gmail.com  Mon Feb 15 09:43:57 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Mon, 15 Feb 2010 20:43:57 +1100
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <744080.66241.qm@web36507.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <f21c22e31002131941v6c153922pc52b6735149ca72e@mail.gmail.com> 
	<744080.66241.qm@web36507.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002150143l7cce44f7i90e24325a0b2325a@mail.gmail.com>

On 15 February 2010 12:25, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
> --- On Sat, 2/13/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> The watch performs the function of telling the time just
>> fine. It simulates a sundial or hour glass in this respect. However,
>> when a human tells the time there are thousands of extra nuances
>> which a watch just doesn't have. So the watch tells the time, but
>> it doesn't understand the concept of of time. Comparing a watch with a
>> human is like comparing a nematode with a human, only more so.
>
> I compare my watch to a computer, not to a human. My digital watch has intelligence in the same sense as does my digital computer, and in the same sense as does the most powerful digital computer conceivable.
>
> I think you want me to believe that my watch has a small amount of consciousness by virtue of it having a small amount of intelligence. But I don't think that makes even a small amount of sense. It seems to me that my watch has no consciousness whatsoever, and that to say otherwise is to conflate science with science-fiction.

If you don't have a problem with a continuous increase in intelligence
and consciousness between a nematode and a human, then why do you have
a problem with a continuous increase in intelligence and consciousness
between a watch and an AI of the future?

>> What would you say to the non-organic alien visitors who make the case
>> that since a nematode is not conscious, neither can a human be
>> conscious, since basically a human is just a more complex nematode?
>
> You beg the question of non-organic consciousness. As far as we know, "non-organic alien visitors" amounts to a completely meaningless concept.

What??

> As for nematodes, I have no idea whether their primitive nervous systems support what I mean by consciousness. I doubt it but I don't know. I classify them in the gray area between unconscious amoebas and conscious humans.

At some point, either gradually or abruptly, consciousness will happen
in the transition from nematode to human or watch to AI.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Mon Feb 15 13:49:20 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Mon, 15 Feb 2010 05:49:20 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Newbie Question: Consciousness and Intelligence
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002150128p2a82afc0i60ec6f02aea4b72c@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <930797.89044.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Mon, 2/15/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:

> You keep repeating this as a fact but you don't explain why
> a digital depiction of a person won't have real mental status. 

If I make a jpeg of you with my digital camera, that digital depiction of you will have no mental states. If I make a digital movie of you on my webcam, that digital depiction of you will have no mental states. A complete three-dimensional animated digital depiction of you made with futuristic digital simulation technology will amount to just another kind of depiction of you, and so it will likewise have no mental states. 

It does not matter whether we create our depictions of things on the walls of caves or on computers. Depictions of things do not equal the things they depict.

-gts



      


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Mon Feb 15 15:28:29 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Mon, 15 Feb 2010 07:28:29 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002150143l7cce44f7i90e24325a0b2325a@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <153083.39349.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Mon, 2/15/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:

>> I think you want me to believe that my watch has a
>> small amount of consciousness by virtue of it having a small
>> amount of intelligence. But I don't think that makes even a
>> small amount of sense. It seems to me that my watch has no
>> consciousness whatsoever, and that to say otherwise is to
>> conflate science with science-fiction.
> 
> If you don't have a problem with a continuous increase in
> intelligence and consciousness between a nematode and a human, then why
> do you have a problem with a continuous increase in intelligence and
> consciousness between a watch and an AI of the future?

I know a priori that the human nervous system supports consciousness. I cannot say anything like that about my watch or about computers without stepping outside the bounds of science to science-fiction.

>> You beg the question of non-organic consciousness. As
>> far as we know, "non-organic alien visitors" amounts to a
>> completely meaningless concept.
> 
> What??

You ask what I would say to non-organic alien visitors, and I suppose you assume those non-organic alien visitors have consciousness. But non-organic consciousness is what is at issue here. 

>> As for nematodes, I have no idea whether their
>> primitive nervous systems support what I mean by
>> consciousness. I doubt it but I don't know. I classify them
>> in the gray area between unconscious amoebas and conscious
>> humans.
> 
> At some point, either gradually or abruptly, consciousness
> will happen in the transition from nematode to human or watch to AI.

I consider it a scientific fact that consciousness arises between the nematode to the human. But only in science-fiction does consciousness happen in digital watches or digital computers.

-gts


      


From natasha at natasha.cc  Mon Feb 15 15:12:52 2010
From: natasha at natasha.cc (Natasha Vita-More)
Date: Mon, 15 Feb 2010 09:12:52 -0600
Subject: [ExI] Valentine's probability factor
In-Reply-To: <8CC7BFBD25C775F-108C-BD05@webmail-d073.sysops.aol.com>
References: <mailman.1.1265976001.11244.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>	<226303.69206.qm@web113612.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>	<ee50357e1002120757m20247203l24231161d3dae6e7@mail.gmail.com>	<FD93D5CE3D3645A298693B63EB507D6A@spike>	<7A7A0CB2766A4C879426F3F66CD94F0C@spike>	<87670FEF1360437981B4B84931C5FF94@spike>	<20100212221046.5.qmail@syzygy.com><710b78fc1002141626o4f8673f3x61c387388126f17b@mail.gmail.com><4B789A05.8030806@satx.rr.com>
	<8CC7BFBD25C775F-108C-BD05@webmail-d073.sysops.aol.com>
Message-ID: <CD2577C91F7A4E6394EBF4AEF112F0DE@DFC68LF1>

Emlyn, Damien, Olga, Aware, Ablainey -- all such beautiful stories!
 

Nlogo1.tif  <http://www.natasha.cc/> Natasha Vita-More

 

  _____  

From: extropy-chat-bounces at lists.extropy.org
[mailto:extropy-chat-bounces at lists.extropy.org] On Behalf Of
ablainey at aol.com
Sent: Sunday, February 14, 2010 8:15 PM
To: extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
Subject: Re: [ExI] Valentine's probability factor


I just grabbed my wife backside in a crowded Pub. The fact that I didn't get
a slap preved it was true love and that was 17 years ago.
We were very different people back then and we have both changed so much
since. We still like very different things but are fundamentally
similar and we are still together.
Go figure?!?

If you get the basic compatability right it will work regardless of matching
up your likes and dislikes.




-----Original Message-----
From: Damien Broderick <thespike at satx.rr.com>


 
Nah, it's a perfect test of compatibility with others (the 1 in 100K or
fewer of them) of like mind. Barbara and I were boggled at the apparent
unlikelihood of our having found each other (and we talked about this right
from the start)--which would have been wildly unlikely before the internet,
ExI, affordable international travel, etc. Suddenly we had the whole English
speaking population of the planet to trawl through--rather than the
workplace, university, church, club, etc--presorted by handy detectors for
IQ, personality type, unusual interests, etc. 
 
Damien Broderick 


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From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Mon Feb 15 16:10:30 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Mon, 15 Feb 2010 08:10:30 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <466012.12578.qm@web111205.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <963975.24812.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Mon, 2/15/10, Christopher Luebcke <cluebcke at yahoo.com> wrote:

> If my understanding of the CRA is
> correct (it may not be), it seems to me that Searle is
> arguing that because one component of the system does not
> understand the symbols, the system doesn't understand the
> symbols. This to me is akin to claiming that because my
> fingers do not understand the words they are currently
> typing out, neither do I.

Searle speaks for himself:

My response to the systems theory is quite simple: let the individual internalize all of these elements of the system. He memorizes the rules in the ledger and the data banks of Chinese symbols, and he does all the calculations in his head. The individual then incorporates the entire system. There isn't anything at all to the system that he does not encompass. We can even get rid of the room and suppose he works outdoors. All the same, he understands nothing of the Chinese, and a fortiori neither does the system, because there isn't anything in the system that isn't in him. If he doesn't understand, then there is no way the system could understand because the system is just a part of him.

Actually I feel somewhat embarrassed to give even this answer to the systems theory because the theory seems to me so implausible to start with. The idea is that while a person doesn't understand Chinese, somehow the conjunction of that person and bits of paper might understand Chinese. It is not easy for me to imagine how someone who was not in the grip of an ideology would find the idea at all plausible. 

http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/OldArchive/bbs.searle2.html

-gts


      


From cluebcke at yahoo.com  Mon Feb 15 07:54:13 2010
From: cluebcke at yahoo.com (Christopher Luebcke)
Date: Sun, 14 Feb 2010 23:54:13 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Newbie Question: Consciousness and Intelligence
In-Reply-To: <409052.58624.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <409052.58624.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <841756.99168.qm@web111212.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

Thanks for all the responses to my queries. At least among the respondents, it seems that there are not sufficiently-agreed-upon definitions of "consciousness" or "intelligence" (nor, I suspect, of "mind") for truly effective communication to take place. Moreover, it seems that there is wide disagreement over how "intelligence" and "consciousness" are related to one another.

I am no cognitive scientist, biologist or psychologist (or any sort of useful -ist) and I wouldn't be nearly so bold as to propose definitions of these terms that I think are "correct". I would, however, humbly suggest that if the application of these terms is important, yet their definitions are not agreed-upon, it may be that the definitions can be decomposed into small enough constituent parts that a fruitful conversation could be had about the genesis, relationship, importance and reproducibility of those constituents.

It does seem, from what I've read, that there is no consensus definition of "intelligence" or "consciousness" even among the experts in these fields. Assuming that is the case, then the definitions could vary so widely that the statements

  Intelligence cannot exist without consciousness

and

  Intelligence can exist without consciousness

could in fact both be true, because the persons making these statements could have divergent enough definitions for "intelligence" and "consciousness" that the two statements, inflated to replace the terms in question with their intended meanings, might not be contradictory.

I won't be quite so humble as to not give my two cents, though, which are essentially that if it can't be detected or measured, it's not fruitful to have a debate about anything empirical relating to it. In the can-be-measured category I believe we can place "intelligence", as the various definitions, while divergent, do seem to share an empirical bent. In the can't-be-measured category I suspect we'll find "consciousness"--though we may well find that several of the things we're thinking of when we say "consciousness" can in fact be measured or detected.

Cheers,
Chris


From cluebcke at yahoo.com  Mon Feb 15 08:13:50 2010
From: cluebcke at yahoo.com (Christopher Luebcke)
Date: Mon, 15 Feb 2010 00:13:50 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <896902.79613.qm@web36507.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <896902.79613.qm@web36507.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <466012.12578.qm@web111205.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

If my understanding of the CRA is correct (it may not be), it seems to me that Searle is arguing that because one component of the system does not understand the symbols, the system doesn't understand the symbols. This to me is akin to claiming that because my fingers do not understand the words they are currently typing out, neither do I.

If a system is said to understand symbols, it does not follow that all components of the system understand the symbols. My pinky finger, or a particular neuron, or a transistor, or a man in a room following orders about moving squiggly cards around, need not understand symbols for the system they compose a part of to understand symbols. It is the system as whole that is said to understand symbols, not necessarily any of the parts.

As a demonstration of my point, I ask you to simply modify the CBA a bit. You place a Chinese-speaking person in the room, and don't provide him any of the rules. He executes the test perfectly. Surely you don't then draw the conclusion that the room does indeed understand symbols, do you?

(It is also, I think, far from clear that such a system as the CBA could be executed by a finite set of discrete rules.)

As a final note, forgive me for repeatedly saying "understanding symbols", but while imperfect, I think it'll be less prone to misunderstandings due to ambiguity than "intelligence" or "consciousness".


----- Original Message ----
From: Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>
To: ExI chat list <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org>
Sent: Sun, February 14, 2010 5:54:22 PM
Subject: Re: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability

--- On Sun, 2/14/10, x at extropica.org <x at extropica.org> wrote:

> The logic of the CRA is correct.  But it reasons from
> a flawed premise: That the human organism has this somehow
> ontologically special thing called "consciousness."

It does not matter whether you believe in some "special thing called 'consciousness." Call it what you will, or call it nothing at all. 

It matters only that you understand that the man cannot grok the symbols by virtue of manipulating them according to the rules of syntax specified in the program. 

-gts


      
_______________________________________________
extropy-chat mailing list
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat



From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Mon Feb 15 18:10:21 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Mon, 15 Feb 2010 10:10:21 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] glutamine and life-extension
Message-ID: <505300.77015.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

Stathis,

All this talk of neurons reminds me of a paper I wrote circa 1999: 

Glutamine Based Growth Hormone Releasing Products: A Bad Idea?
http://www.newtreatments.org/loadlocal.php?hid=974

My article above created a surprising amount of controversy among life-extensionists. I closed down my website, but recently found my paper republished on the site above without my permission. 

Thought you might find it interesting given your profession and the general theme.

-gts





      


From avantguardian2020 at yahoo.com  Mon Feb 15 18:12:14 2010
From: avantguardian2020 at yahoo.com (The Avantguardian)
Date: Mon, 15 Feb 2010 10:12:14 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Newbie Question: Consciousness and Intelligence
Message-ID: <955672.41841.qm@web65607.mail.ac4.yahoo.com>


----- Original Message ----
> From: Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com>
> To: gordon.swobe at yahoo.com; ExI chat list <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org>
> Sent: Sat, February 13, 2010 2:04:12 PM
> Subject: Re: [ExI] Newbie Question: Consciousness and Intelligence
> 
> On 14 February 2010 08:23, Gordon Swobe <> ymailto="mailto:gts_2000 at yahoo.com" 
> href="mailto:gts_2000 at yahoo.com">gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:

> 
> It seems to me obvious that amoebas and other single-celled organisms have some 
> intelligence: they can find food and procreate and so on. But because they lack 
> nervous systems, it looks to me like these simple creatures live out their 
> entire lives unconsciously.

Intelligence and consciousness?are not independent phenomenon. I tend to view consciousness as awareness. When somebody is anesthetised, they become unconscious because they lack awareness of external or internal phenomena. In so far as an amoeba is?more aware of?its environment than an deeply?anesthetised human, I would say it does have a small measure of consciousness. If one puts a drop of acid on the skin of an anesthetised person that person would not react. If I put a droplet of acid on a microscope slide adjacent to an amoeba, the amoeba would run as fast and as far is its little pseudopodia could carry it.
?
Ameobae do have sensory apparatus and they do process sensory information. Their senses are not as rich as that of people, being mostly chemical receptors and the like, but the same could be said of a single neuron. Indeed an amoeba is probably more intelligent/conscious than an individual neuron. Why??I would bet an amoeba could?survive in someone's?brain longer than a neuron could survive?in a pond.
?
At what point does intelligence lead to consciousness??That is like asking, "at?what temperature does something get hot?" It's completely relative. For a person whose body temperature is 37 degrees Centigrade, boiling water is hot. But a person is hotter relative to the rings of saturn than boiling water is relative to a person. I am starting to think that a similar argument could be used for intelligence and consciousness. And consequently zombies are bogus.

> What about flatworms?

They are capable learning. That has been demonstrated.
?
http://www.mnstate.edu/wisenden/reprint%20pdfs/2001%20planaria%20An%20Beh%2062%20761-766.pdf
?
Incidently, I don't think consciousness is either an evolutionary "spandrel"?or simply an epiphenomenon. Women pointedly do choose mates who *pay attention* to them. As such natural selection does assess?consciousness as a fitness function?via sexual selection if not by the more primitive fitness function of figuring out that one is being stalked by a predator.?

Stuart LaForge 


"Never express yourself more clearly than you think." - Niels Bohr 


      



From cluebcke at yahoo.com  Mon Feb 15 16:47:22 2010
From: cluebcke at yahoo.com (Christopher Luebcke)
Date: Mon, 15 Feb 2010 08:47:22 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <963975.24812.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <963975.24812.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <752079.20710.qm@web111202.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

I've just read the entirety of Searle's response to the systems argument (thank you for the link), and near as I can tell, it is that the system as a whole is not intelligent because, unlike the man, it doesn't really understand the symbols. Yet determining whether a given system understands symbols ought to be what we're finding out, not what we presume prior to beginning the experiment.

Double-quoting Searle:

"All the same, he understands nothing of the Chinese, and a fortiori neither does the system, because there isn't anything in the system that isn't in him"

Again, how one determines whether a system--a man, a room, a man in a room (or a savant in the woods)--"understands symbols" is crucial to the point, yet I find nothing in what I've read so far where Searle sets out the criteria by which he makes this judgement. It seems to me that Searle is rather making an a priori argument, believing that he (and we) all know ahead of time that the system comprised of the man and the rules is not intelligent, and then scoffs at any suggestion that it might be.

My response to the quote above is twofold:

1. I believe that understanding symbols is a process, not a state, and therefore to talk about what things comprise a system isn't nearly so useful as to talk about what it is they're doing
2. I believe that it is fruitless to debate whether a system understands symbols without having a common agreement on
   a. What it means to "understand symbols"
   b. How we measure or detect whether a system (a man, a room, a computer) can understand symbols

To me the problem is fundamentally empirical.


----- Original Message ----
From: Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>
To: ExI chat list <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org>
Sent: Mon, February 15, 2010 8:10:30 AM
Subject: Re: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability

--- On Mon, 2/15/10, Christopher Luebcke <cluebcke at yahoo.com> wrote:

> If my understanding of the CRA is
> correct (it may not be), it seems to me that Searle is
> arguing that because one component of the system does not
> understand the symbols, the system doesn't understand the
> symbols. This to me is akin to claiming that because my
> fingers do not understand the words they are currently
> typing out, neither do I.

Searle speaks for himself:

My response to the systems theory is quite simple: let the individual internalize all of these elements of the system. He memorizes the rules in the ledger and the data banks of Chinese symbols, and he does all the calculations in his head. The individual then incorporates the entire system. There isn't anything at all to the system that he does not encompass. We can even get rid of the room and suppose he works outdoors. All the same, he understands nothing of the Chinese, and a fortiori neither does the system, because there isn't anything in the system that isn't in him. If he doesn't understand, then there is no way the system could understand because the system is just a part of him.

Actually I feel somewhat embarrassed to give even this answer to the systems theory because the theory seems to me so implausible to start with. The idea is that while a person doesn't understand Chinese, somehow the conjunction of that person and bits of paper might understand Chinese. It is not easy for me to imagine how someone who was not in the grip of an ideology would find the idea at all plausible. 

http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/OldArchive/bbs.searle2.html

-gts


      
_______________________________________________
extropy-chat mailing list
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat



From lacertilian at gmail.com  Mon Feb 15 18:43:11 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Mon, 15 Feb 2010 10:43:11 -0800
Subject: [ExI] The alleged existence of consciousness (was: Semiotics and
	Computability)
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002151043h2f018f65i4a794dba0a2551f0@mail.gmail.com>

Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>:
> I know a priori that the human nervous system supports consciousness. I cannot say anything like that about my watch or about computers without stepping outside the bounds of science to science-fiction.
(snip)
> I consider it a scientific fact that consciousness arises between the nematode to the human. But only in science-fiction does consciousness happen in digital watches or digital computers.

Well, clearly you are wrong to consider that a scientific fact.
Science is based on experiments, not on reason. A priori knowledge has
no scientific validity.

If you're going to bring the scientific method into this, then the
burden is on you to provide an experiment which tests for the
existence of consciousness. The Chinese Room does nothing like this.
The Turing test at least looks like it does, but you have stated
repeatedly that it will give false positives when exposed to a weak
AI.

The way I see it, Gordon, you have only two choices: stay within the
realm of a priori reason and logic, wherein intuition and subjective
experience may be invoked as compelling pieces of evidence; or take
the argument into a purely scientific frontier, wherein only objective
measurements count for anything.

Treating the two with a mix-and-match attitude is disingenuous at
best, fallacious at worst. A little bit is unavoidable, but it
disappoints me to see you doing so in such a flagrantly shameless way.


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Mon Feb 15 18:54:11 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Mon, 15 Feb 2010 10:54:11 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Newbie Question: Consciousness and Intelligence
In-Reply-To: <955672.41841.qm@web65607.mail.ac4.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <877779.10984.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Mon, 2/15/10, The Avantguardian <avantguardian2020 at yahoo.com> wrote:

> I tend to view consciousness as awareness. 

You might recall that you and I actually discussed this very subject here a number of years ago, and that we agreed there exists a sense in which amoebas and similar organisms have awareness. We made a distinction then, or at least I did, between the awareness of amoebas and the kind of consciousness that I refer to here several years later.

Consciousness, as I mean it today, entails the ability to have conscious intentional states. That is, it entails the ability to have something consciously "in mind" as opposed to merely having the ability to respond intelligently to the environment in the way that amoebas do. So far as we know, intentionality so defined requires a nervous system and most likely a well-developed brain, both of which amoebas lack. So then either amoebas have no consciousness, so defined, or else they have mysterious nervous systems that we cannot see or understand.

-gts




      


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Mon Feb 15 20:04:18 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Mon, 15 Feb 2010 12:04:18 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Newbie Question: Consciousness and Intelligence
In-Reply-To: <877779.10984.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <955672.41841.qm@web65607.mail.ac4.yahoo.com>
	<877779.10984.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002151204q28b808bara49bc139fc94f409@mail.gmail.com>

Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>:
> Consciousness, as I mean it today, entails the ability to have conscious intentional states.

I'll note for the record that I now have the concept of
"consciousness" clear enough in my mind to state, confidently, that
consciousness, intelligence, and intentionality are all completely
different things.

Artificial systems could be made to possess any one in absence of the other two.

However, I am by now convinced that it is not even theoretically
possible to scientifically confirm that a given system has
consciousness. This leads to the inevitable conclusion that
consciousness does not exist, by my definition: anything which exists
can potentially influence everything else that exists. All things in
existence can, *by definition*,  be measured.

So, I create new conscious systems all the time. Pretty much every
time I make use of a toilet. I defy any of you to prove otherwise.

I've even started a separate thread for it!


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Mon Feb 15 20:12:32 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Mon, 15 Feb 2010 12:12:32 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] The alleged existence of consciousness
In-Reply-To: <e321aa4b1002151043h2f018f65i4a794dba0a2551f0@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <275598.51562.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Mon, 2/15/10, Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com> wrote:

> If you're going to bring the scientific method into this,
> then the burden is on you to provide an experiment which tests for
> the existence of consciousness. 

Can you see these words, Spencer? If so then you have what I mean by consciousness. 

-gts



      


From sparge at gmail.com  Mon Feb 15 20:16:08 2010
From: sparge at gmail.com (Dave Sill)
Date: Mon, 15 Feb 2010 15:16:08 -0500
Subject: [ExI] Newbie Question: Consciousness and Intelligence
In-Reply-To: <e321aa4b1002151204q28b808bara49bc139fc94f409@mail.gmail.com>
References: <955672.41841.qm@web65607.mail.ac4.yahoo.com>
	<877779.10984.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com> 
	<e321aa4b1002151204q28b808bara49bc139fc94f409@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <ffd22f9d1002151216r636eee73r457fd37ee5e5e255@mail.gmail.com>

On Mon, Feb 15, 2010 at 3:04 PM, Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> However, I am by now convinced that it is not even theoretically
> possible to scientifically confirm that a given system has
> consciousness. This leads to the inevitable conclusion that
> consciousness does not exist, by my definition: anything which exists
> can potentially influence everything else that exists. All things in
> existence can, *by definition*, ?be measured.

Wow, what an excellent way to create interminable threads--just start
using your own definitions for common terms.

-Dave


From scerir at libero.it  Mon Feb 15 20:37:37 2010
From: scerir at libero.it (scerir)
Date: Mon, 15 Feb 2010 21:37:37 +0100 (CET)
Subject: [ExI] QET
Message-ID: <8885036.1601541266266257004.JavaMail.defaultUser@defaultHost>

Masahiro Hotta (Tohoku University, Japan) has come up with an exotic idea. Why 
not use the known quantum principles to teleport energy? The idea is not so 
simple and not so sound, but more or less this process of teleportation seems 
to involve making a measurement on one particle (of an entangled pair of 
particles), which would inject quantum energy into the system, then it seems to 
involve making a measurement on the second and distant particle (of the 
entangled pair), and this would extract the original energy, while retaining 
relativistic causality and conservation of energy.
http://www.technologyreview.com/blog/arxiv/24759/
http://arxiv.org/abs/0908.2674
http://arxiv.org/abs/0911.3430
http://arxiv.org/abs/1002.0200

No idea about this specific process of dr. Hotta. But it seems to me that the 
strange nature of quantum mechanical phenomena, and in particular quantum non-
locality and quantum non-separability, could be easily extended - at least 
heuristically - to different contexts (i.e. gravitational fields) to get new 
and relevant results (i.e. non-local gravitational fields). See i.e. Adrian 
Kent here http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0507045


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Mon Feb 15 20:38:00 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Mon, 15 Feb 2010 12:38:00 -0800
Subject: [ExI] The alleged existence of consciousness
In-Reply-To: <275598.51562.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <e321aa4b1002151043h2f018f65i4a794dba0a2551f0@mail.gmail.com> 
	<275598.51562.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002151238l6570a4b0v1d84f219e9cdfe8c@mail.gmail.com>

Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>:
> Can you see these words, Spencer? If so then you have what I mean by consciousness.

Great! Now, how do I know that you do?


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Mon Feb 15 20:49:20 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Mon, 15 Feb 2010 12:49:20 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] The alleged existence of consciousness
In-Reply-To: <e321aa4b1002151238l6570a4b0v1d84f219e9cdfe8c@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <431085.67926.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Mon, 2/15/10, Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com> wrote:

>> Can you see these words, Spencer? If so then you have
>< what I mean by consciousness.
> 
> Great! Now, how do I know that you do?

Sorry, I forgot to mention that nothing in the universe aside from you has consciousness. 

-gts


      


From steinberg.will at gmail.com  Mon Feb 15 21:15:21 2010
From: steinberg.will at gmail.com (Will Steinberg)
Date: Mon, 15 Feb 2010 16:15:21 -0500
Subject: [ExI] The alleged existence of consciousness
In-Reply-To: <431085.67926.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <e321aa4b1002151238l6570a4b0v1d84f219e9cdfe8c@mail.gmail.com>
	<431085.67926.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <4e3a29501002151315o33b97318w676b530f396ad850@mail.gmail.com>

I don't really understand what some of you think with regards to
consciousness.  "Is consciousness real?" is a bunk question.  Some people
take physicality and extend it into the notion of consciousness not being
real, which I don't understand.  If consciousness is not real, what would it
be like if it were real?  If real is being aware of something, I am surely
aware of my own awareness.  Even in the event of the mind's total
epiphenominalism, our being able to differentiate between consciousness and
unconsciousness means that some physical factor is changing, GIVEN
PHYSICALISM.  Consciousness, whether of discrete or indiscrete locus,
whether of a quantum or classical nature, is an observation based on
physical or mathematical factors.

The axiom of consciousness can be seen as on par with the anthropic
principle or the fact that we can know G is true without proving it; it is
unprovable because the means of proof lie outside the system.  Proof is
based on awareness of observation, and consciousness IS awareness.  It is
our G, as has been supposed by a few forward-minded folk.

When you ask for a proof of consciousness, you validate the existence of it
in your question.  I suggest rephrasing it in the manner you mean, which
seems to boil down to "is any sort of dualism real?", an important question
but not the same one.
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From jonkc at bellsouth.net  Mon Feb 15 20:56:01 2010
From: jonkc at bellsouth.net (John Clark)
Date: Mon, 15 Feb 2010 15:56:01 -0500
Subject: [ExI] How not to make a thought experiment
In-Reply-To: <409052.58624.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <409052.58624.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <B1725113-CEC1-4927-AA44-A67F7FD4EAC7@bellsouth.net>

Since my last post Gordon Swobe has posted 10 times.
> 
> Come the singularity, some people will lose their grips on reality and find themselves believing such absurdities as that digital depictions of people have real mental states. A few lonely philosophers of my stripe will try in vain to restore their sanity.

As far as the future is concerned it really doesn't matter if Swobe's ideas are right or wrong, either way they're as dead as the Dodo. Even if he's 100% right and I am 100% wrong people with my ideas will have vastly more influence than people like him because we will not be held back by superstitious ideas about "THE ORIGINAL". So it's pedal to the metal upgrading, Jupiter brain ahead. Swobe just won't be  able to keep up with the electronic competition. Only a few axons in the brain can send signals as fast as 100 meters per second, non-myelinated axon's are only able to go about 1 meter per second. Light moves at 300,000,000 meters per second.

Perhaps after the singularity the more conservative and superstitious among us could still survive in some little backwater somewhere, like the Amish do today, but I doubt it.

> I think you want me to believe that my watch has a small amount of consciousness by virtue of it having a small amount of intelligence. But I don't think that makes even a small amount of sense. It seems to me that my watch has no consciousness

I'm not surprised Swobe can't make sense of it all, nothing in the Biological sciences makes any sense without Evolution, and he has shown a profound ignorance not only of that theory but of the fossil record in general. Evolution found it far harder to come up with intelligence than consciousness, the brain structures that produce the basic emotions we share with many other animals and are many hundreds of millions of years old, while the higher brain structures that produce language, mathematics and abstract thought in general, things that make humans unique, are less than a million years old and possibly much less. Swobe does not use his higher brain structures to think with and prefers to think with his gut; but many animals have an intestinal tract and to my knowledge none of them are particularly good philosophers.

> Consciousness, as I mean it today, entails the ability to have conscious intentional states. That is, it entails the ability to have something consciously "in mind"

So consciousness means the ability to be conscious, that is to say the ability to consciously think about stuff. Thank you so much for those words of wisdom!
  
> If I make a jpeg of you with my digital camera, that digital depiction of you will have no mental states.

Swobe may very well be right in this particular instance, but it illustrates the useless nature of the grotesque exercises he gives the grandiose name "thought experiment". Swobe has no way to directly measure the mental states even of his fellow human beings much less that of a digital camera; and yet over the last few months he has made grand pronouncements about the mental states of literally hundreds of things. To add insult to injury the mental state of things is exactly what he's trying to prove; he just doesn't understand that saying X has no consciousness is not the same as proving X has no consciousness.

> The idea is that while a person doesn't understand Chinese, somehow the conjunction of that person and bits of paper might understand Chinese. It is not easy for me to imagine how someone who was not in the grip of an ideology would find the idea at all plausible. 

Swobe admits, and if fact seems delighted by the fact, that he has absolutely no idea what causes consciousness; nevertheless he thinks he can always determine a priori what has consciousness and what does not, and it has nothing to do with the way they behave. The conjunction of a person with bits of paper might display intelligence, in fact there is no doubt that it could, but it could never be conscious because, because, well just because; but Swobe thinks 3 pounds of grey goo being conscious  is perfectly logical. Can Swobe explain why one thing is ridiculous and the other logical? Nope, it's just that he's accustomed to one and not the other. That's it. 

> Depictions of things, digital or otherwise, do not equal the things they depict

Wow, now I see the error of my ways! It's a pity Swobe didn't say that two months and several hundred posts ago, think of the time we could have saved. Oh wait he did.

> the man cannot grok the symbols by virtue of manipulating them according to the rules of syntax 


> Wow, now I see the error of my ways! It's a pity Swobe didn't say that two months and several hundred posts ago, think of the time we could have saved. Oh wait he did.

> Depictions of things do not equal the things they depict.

Wow, now I see the error of my ways! It's a pity Swobe didn't say that two months and several hundred posts ago, think of the time we could have saved. Oh wait he did.

 John K Clark
 
> 


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From lacertilian at gmail.com  Mon Feb 15 21:45:48 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Mon, 15 Feb 2010 13:45:48 -0800
Subject: [ExI] The alleged existence of consciousness
In-Reply-To: <4e3a29501002151315o33b97318w676b530f396ad850@mail.gmail.com>
References: <e321aa4b1002151238l6570a4b0v1d84f219e9cdfe8c@mail.gmail.com> 
	<431085.67926.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
	<4e3a29501002151315o33b97318w676b530f396ad850@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002151345g1d57950aj90144291c8faf565@mail.gmail.com>

2010/2/15 Will Steinberg <steinberg.will at gmail.com>:
> When you ask for a proof of consciousness, you validate the existence of it
> in your question.? I suggest rephrasing it in the manner you mean, which
> seems to boil down to "is any sort of dualism real?", an important question
> but not the same one.

But I don't mean it in that manner! I'm not asking for proof that
consciousness exists *at all*. I'm asking for proof that consciousness
exists *in a given system*.

So, thought experiment.

I'm going to jump in a box, and then ask you to prove that the box
contains consciousness. Can you? Can anyone?

(Obviously, if you jump in the box instead, I can not. But perhaps
this only means that I make a bad metrologist.)


From stefano.vaj at gmail.com  Mon Feb 15 22:02:50 2010
From: stefano.vaj at gmail.com (Stefano Vaj)
Date: Mon, 15 Feb 2010 23:02:50 +0100
Subject: [ExI] The alleged existence of consciousness
In-Reply-To: <275598.51562.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <e321aa4b1002151043h2f018f65i4a794dba0a2551f0@mail.gmail.com>
	<275598.51562.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <580930c21002151402r6b60b32es4188cb333aac8c61@mail.gmail.com>

On 15 February 2010 21:12, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
> Can you see these words, Spencer? If so then you have what I mean by consciousness.

Come on. Any trivial detector can differentiate black words on a white
background. The burden of proof regards the ineffable difference that
one would make regarding one's own perception (and other entities he
cares to project on such difference).

-- 
Stefano Vaj


From stefano.vaj at gmail.com  Mon Feb 15 22:12:15 2010
From: stefano.vaj at gmail.com (Stefano Vaj)
Date: Mon, 15 Feb 2010 23:12:15 +0100
Subject: [ExI] The alleged existence of consciousness (was: Semiotics
	and Computability)
In-Reply-To: <e321aa4b1002151043h2f018f65i4a794dba0a2551f0@mail.gmail.com>
References: <e321aa4b1002151043h2f018f65i4a794dba0a2551f0@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <580930c21002151412s6465c9bbnf596dc063b010a4a@mail.gmail.com>

On 15 February 2010 19:43, Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com> wrote:
> If you're going to bring the scientific method into this, then the
> burden is on you to provide an experiment which tests for the
> existence of consciousness.

This is an unreasonable demand. The scientific method cannot offer
evidence of something which in somebody's view s not phenomenical by
definition, but is an a priori of his worldview.

-- 
Stefano Vaj


From steinberg.will at gmail.com  Mon Feb 15 22:28:16 2010
From: steinberg.will at gmail.com (Will Steinberg)
Date: Mon, 15 Feb 2010 17:28:16 -0500
Subject: [ExI] The alleged existence of consciousness
In-Reply-To: <580930c21002151402r6b60b32es4188cb333aac8c61@mail.gmail.com>
References: <e321aa4b1002151043h2f018f65i4a794dba0a2551f0@mail.gmail.com>
	<275598.51562.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
	<580930c21002151402r6b60b32es4188cb333aac8c61@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4e3a29501002151428t5d0bd99coa29a9495e2e3bc6e@mail.gmail.com>

Sorry, I assumed by Gordon's response that the argument was about its true
existence.  But it would seem that, since behavioral observation cannot
prove zombism, one needs to know the mental structure or emergent properties
leading to consciousness, which leaves us in the same place in the same
question of "What is consciousness?", though I'm sure there exist some tests
that happen to have scores that correlate very strongly with consciousness.
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From stefano.vaj at gmail.com  Tue Feb 16 00:24:20 2010
From: stefano.vaj at gmail.com (Stefano Vaj)
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2010 01:24:20 +0100
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002131941v6c153922pc52b6735149ca72e@mail.gmail.com>
References: <f21c22e31002131449k7032ba06k5199ee1126f4f6e2@mail.gmail.com>
	<431764.52879.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
	<f21c22e31002131941v6c153922pc52b6735149ca72e@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <580930c21002151624m41cefb81x57ce57745c46560c@mail.gmail.com>

On 14 February 2010 04:41, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
> The watch performs the function of telling the time just fine. It
> simulates a sundial or hour glass in this respect.

Why, you should know by now that this does not mean that it emulates
the qualia of a sundial or hour glass... :-D

-- 
Stefano Vaj


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Tue Feb 16 01:09:29 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Mon, 15 Feb 2010 17:09:29 -0800
Subject: [ExI] The alleged existence of consciousness (was: Semiotics
	and Computability)
In-Reply-To: <580930c21002151412s6465c9bbnf596dc063b010a4a@mail.gmail.com>
References: <e321aa4b1002151043h2f018f65i4a794dba0a2551f0@mail.gmail.com> 
	<580930c21002151412s6465c9bbnf596dc063b010a4a@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002151709i7d877836uf1d920daae05c599@mail.gmail.com>

Stefano Vaj <stefano.vaj at gmail.com>:
> On 15 February 2010 19:43, Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com> wrote:
> > If you're going to bring the scientific method into this, then the
> > burden is on you to provide an experiment which tests for the
> > existence of consciousness.
>
> This is an unreasonable demand. The scientific method cannot offer
> evidence of something which in somebody's view s not phenomenical by
> definition, but is an a priori of his worldview.

For reference, the remark that spurred this reaction from me was:

Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>:
> I consider it a scientific fact that consciousness arises between the nematode to the human.

To demand that a person provide a scientific basis for what they
themselves consider a scientific fact is the very definition* of
reasonableness!

If he had said "objective fact" instead, I would only have been very
dubious about it. It's very close to synonymous, but just fuzzy enough
to avoid the fundamental error made by conflating "scientific" with,
say, "inarguable".

In case it isn't clear: the fact in question is not objective,
scientific, or inarguable. Certainly not inarguable. Not on
Extropy-Chat, at least.

*No not really. I'm being... metaphorical! Yeah, let's go with that.


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Tue Feb 16 01:36:11 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Mon, 15 Feb 2010 17:36:11 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] The alleged existence of consciousness
In-Reply-To: <e321aa4b1002151709i7d877836uf1d920daae05c599@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <742345.22234.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

To deny the existence of consciousness one must deny one's own awareness of one's own experience. Some muddled thinkers try to do this. I find it hard to take them seriously. 

-gts




      


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Tue Feb 16 02:01:36 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Mon, 15 Feb 2010 18:01:36 -0800
Subject: [ExI] The alleged existence of consciousness
In-Reply-To: <742345.22234.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <e321aa4b1002151709i7d877836uf1d920daae05c599@mail.gmail.com> 
	<742345.22234.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002151801n790f4fd7y9f010314fda5899@mail.gmail.com>

Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>:
> To deny the existence of consciousness one must deny one's own awareness of one's own experience. Some muddled thinkers try to do this. I find it hard to take them seriously.

To deny consciousness in general, yes. To deny a specific case of
consciousness, no. We've been over this!

I can't deny that I myself am conscious (according to Pollock). Such
would be irresponsible at best. However, I can easily deny that my
computer is conscious; maybe not as easily as Searle, but still pretty
easily. By exactly the same token, I can deny that you (the reader)
are conscious.

For this thread only, consider me a solipsist. I hold that only
Spencer Campbell brains are capable of sustaining consciousness. I
grant that other human brains are similar to Spencer Campbell brains,
in precisely the same way that a correctly-programmed digital computer
is similar to SC brains, but I reject the notion that they generate
even the most rudimentary of subjective experiences.

What logic could you possibly bring to bear on a person with this set
of beliefs?

Call me irrational if you will, but you can't call me illogical.
Solipsism is a self-consistent position. I don't want it to be, so I
would appreciate it if someone could show me otherwise, but I am
presently convinced that it is.

Have I gone over my eight-post limit today? I should start keeping
track of that.


From avantguardian2020 at yahoo.com  Tue Feb 16 03:45:04 2010
From: avantguardian2020 at yahoo.com (The Avantguardian)
Date: Mon, 15 Feb 2010 19:45:04 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] The alleged existence of consciousness
In-Reply-To: <e321aa4b1002151801n790f4fd7y9f010314fda5899@mail.gmail.com>
References: <e321aa4b1002151709i7d877836uf1d920daae05c599@mail.gmail.com>
	<742345.22234.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
	<e321aa4b1002151801n790f4fd7y9f010314fda5899@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <948496.39262.qm@web65615.mail.ac4.yahoo.com>


----- Original Message ----
> From: Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com>
> To: ExI chat list <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org>
> Sent: Mon, February 15, 2010 6:01:36 PM
> Subject: Re: [ExI] The alleged existence of consciousness
> 

I can't deny that I myself 
> am conscious (according to Pollock). Such
would be irresponsible at best. 
> However, I can easily deny that my
computer is conscious; maybe not as easily 
> as Searle, but still pretty
easily. By exactly the same token, I can deny 
> that you (the reader)
are conscious.

Since you seem to buying into Descartes' "evil daemon" argument, allow me to play the devil's advocate. You?could deny the consciousness of other beings, but it?is extraordinarily difficult?to do, because it?goes against your survival instincts. You?may *claim* that you are the only conscious person in existence but?I *dare* you to act on that belief even for a single day. You will find yourself reacting to and anticipating the actions of?people around you, no matter how hard you try.?If you are brave enough to scientifically test your hypothesis, the easiest experiment to see if someone else is conscious or not is to pinch them. I guarantee you will get some data on which to base your conclusion.

For this thread only, consider me 
> a solipsist. I hold that only
Spencer Campbell brains are capable of 
> sustaining consciousness. I
grant that other human brains are similar to 
> Spencer Campbell brains,
in precisely the same way that a 
> correctly-programmed digital computer
is similar to SC brains, but I reject 
> the notion that they generate
even the most rudimentary of subjective 
> experiences.

From worm to man, *pain* is?possibly the?most rudimentary of subjective experiences. Therefore I challenge you to cause pinch every creature you meet for just a single day and you will have your answer.

What logic could you possibly bring to bear on a person with 
> this set
of beliefs?

The logic of pain. That which reacts to pain *must* have the subjective experience of pain because there?can be?no such thing as objective pain or objective suffering of any kind for that matter.

> Call me irrational if you will, but you can't 
> call me illogical.
Solipsism is a self-consistent position. I don't want it 
> to be, so I
would appreciate it if someone could show me otherwise, but I 
> am
presently convinced that it is.

It is a hypocritical position where a person's?arguments and a person's actions are in contradiction.

Have I gone over my eight-post 
> limit today? I should start keeping
track of 
> that.

You need not answer me until you have performed your experiment or chickened out of it. ;-)


Stuart LaForge 


"Never express yourself more clearly than you think." - Niels Bohr 


      



From cluebcke at yahoo.com  Mon Feb 15 20:22:42 2010
From: cluebcke at yahoo.com (Christopher Luebcke)
Date: Mon, 15 Feb 2010 12:22:42 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] The alleged existence of consciousness
In-Reply-To: <275598.51562.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <275598.51562.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <330027.14333.qm@web111201.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

The question, I believe, is how you determine that somebody (or something) else is "conscious", not how you determine that you yourself are.

If there isn't a reproducible, agreed-upon method for determining the truth of the statement "System X is conscious", then can there be any point in having a conversation about it?

In other words, don't tell me how to detemine ifI'm conscious; tell me how to determine that you are.





----- Original Message ----
From: Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>
To: ExI chat list <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org>
Sent: Mon, February 15, 2010 12:12:32 PM
Subject: Re: [ExI] The alleged existence of consciousness

--- On Mon, 2/15/10, Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com> wrote:

> If you're going to bring the scientific method into this,
> then the burden is on you to provide an experiment which tests for
> the existence of consciousness. 

Can you see these words, Spencer? If so then you have what I mean by consciousness. 

-gts



      
_______________________________________________
extropy-chat mailing list
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat



From cluebcke at yahoo.com  Tue Feb 16 02:58:50 2010
From: cluebcke at yahoo.com (Christopher Luebcke)
Date: Mon, 15 Feb 2010 18:58:50 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] The alleged existence of consciousness (was: Semiotics
	and Computability)
In-Reply-To: <e321aa4b1002151709i7d877836uf1d920daae05c599@mail.gmail.com>
References: <e321aa4b1002151043h2f018f65i4a794dba0a2551f0@mail.gmail.com>
	<580930c21002151412s6465c9bbnf596dc063b010a4a@mail.gmail.com>
	<e321aa4b1002151709i7d877836uf1d920daae05c599@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <361849.34294.qm@web111207.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

Indeed, if it's a scientific fact that consciousness arises between the nematode and the human, then consciousness must be detectable.

If not, then there are some very nonstandard versions of the terms "scientific" and/or "fact" in play.


----- Original Message ----
From: Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com>
To: ExI chat list <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org>
Sent: Mon, February 15, 2010 5:09:29 PM
Subject: Re: [ExI] The alleged existence of consciousness (was: Semiotics and Computability)

Stefano Vaj <stefano.vaj at gmail.com>:
> On 15 February 2010 19:43, Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com> wrote:
> > If you're going to bring the scientific method into this, then the
> > burden is on you to provide an experiment which tests for the
> > existence of consciousness.
>
> This is an unreasonable demand. The scientific method cannot offer
> evidence of something which in somebody's view s not phenomenical by
> definition, but is an a priori of his worldview.

For reference, the remark that spurred this reaction from me was:

Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>:
> I consider it a scientific fact that consciousness arises between the nematode to the human.

To demand that a person provide a scientific basis for what they
themselves consider a scientific fact is the very definition* of
reasonableness!

If he had said "objective fact" instead, I would only have been very
dubious about it. It's very close to synonymous, but just fuzzy enough
to avoid the fundamental error made by conflating "scientific" with,
say, "inarguable".

In case it isn't clear: the fact in question is not objective,
scientific, or inarguable. Certainly not inarguable. Not on
Extropy-Chat, at least.

*No not really. I'm being... metaphorical! Yeah, let's go with that.
_______________________________________________
extropy-chat mailing list
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat



From jonkc at bellsouth.net  Tue Feb 16 06:29:45 2010
From: jonkc at bellsouth.net (John Clark)
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2010 01:29:45 -0500
Subject: [ExI] How not to make a thought experiment
In-Reply-To: <5F9A9DFE-77FA-44C4-B8AE-53B5496EB99C@bellsouth.net>
References: <405824.5794.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
	<5F9A9DFE-77FA-44C4-B8AE-53B5496EB99C@bellsouth.net>
Message-ID: <FC40B674-4D47-47F4-AA06-A85431ECFE48@bellsouth.net>

Since my last post Gordon Swobe has posted 11 times.
> 
> Come the singularity, some people will lose their grips on reality and find themselves believing such absurdities as that digital depictions of people have real mental states. A few lonely philosophers of my stripe will try in vain to restore their sanity.

As far as the future is concerned it really doesn't matter if Swobe's ideas are right or wrong, either way they're as dead as the Dodo. Even if he's 100% right and I am 100% wrong people with my ideas will have vastly more influence than people like him because we will not be held back by superstitious ideas about "THE ORIGINAL". So it's pedal to the metal upgrading, Jupiter brain ahead. Swobe just won't be  able to keep up with the electronic competition. Only a few axons in the brain can send signals as fast as 100 meters per second, non-myelinated axon's are only able to go about 1 meter per second. Light moves at 300,000,000 meters per second.

Perhaps after the singularity the more conservative and superstitious among us could still survive in some little backwater somewhere, like the Amish do today, but I doubt it.

> I think you want me to believe that my watch has a small amount of consciousness by virtue of it having a small amount of intelligence. But I don't think that makes even a small amount of sense. It seems to me that my watch has no consciousness

I'm not surprised Swobe can't make sense of it all, nothing in the Biological sciences makes any sense without Evolution, and he has shown a profound ignorance not only of that theory but of the fossil record in general. Evolution found it far harder to come up with intelligence than consciousness, the brain structures that produce the basic emotions we share with many other animals and are many hundreds of millions of years old, while the higher brain structures that produce language, mathematics and abstract thought in general, things that make humans unique, are less than a million years old and possibly much less. Swobe does not use his higher brain structures to think with and prefers to think with his gut; but many animals have an intestinal tract and to my knowledge none of them are particularly good philosophers.

> Consciousness, as I mean it today, entails the ability to have conscious intentional states. That is, it entails the ability to have something consciously "in mind"

So consciousness means the ability to be conscious, that is to say the ability to consciously think about stuff. Thank you so much for those words of wisdom!
  
> If I make a jpeg of you with my digital camera, that digital depiction of you will have no mental states.

Swobe may very well be right in this particular instance, but it illustrates the useless nature of the grotesque exercises he gives the grandiose name "thought experiment". Swobe has no way to directly measure the mental states even of his fellow human beings much less that of a digital camera; and yet over the last few months he has made grand pronouncements about the mental states of literally hundreds of things. To add insult to injury the mental state of things is exactly what he's trying to prove; he just doesn't understand that saying X has no consciousness is not the same as proving X has no consciousness.

> The idea is that while a person doesn't understand Chinese, somehow the conjunction of that person and bits of paper might understand Chinese. It is not easy for me to imagine how someone who was not in the grip of an ideology would find the idea at all plausible. 

Swobe admits, and if fact seems delighted by the fact, that he has absolutely no idea what causes consciousness; nevertheless he thinks he can always determine a priori what has consciousness and what does not, and it has nothing to do with the way they behave. The conjunction of a person with bits of paper might display intelligence, in fact there is no doubt that it could, but it could never be conscious because, because, well just because; but Swobe thinks 3 pounds of grey goo being conscious  is perfectly logical. Can Swobe explain why one thing is ridiculous and the other logical? Nope, it's just that he's accustomed to one and not the other. That's it. 

> Depictions of things, digital or otherwise, do not equal the things they depict

Wow, now I see the error of my ways! It's a pity Swobe didn't say that two months and several hundred posts ago, think of the time we could have saved. Oh wait he did.

> the man cannot grok the symbols by virtue of manipulating them according to the rules of syntax 


> Wow, now I see the error of my ways! It's a pity Swobe didn't say that two months and several hundred posts ago, think of the time we could have saved. Oh wait he did.

> Depictions of things do not equal the things they depict.

Wow, now I see the error of my ways! It's a pity Swobe didn't say that two months and several hundred posts ago, think of the time we could have saved. Oh wait he did.

 John K Clark
 
> 

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From stathisp at gmail.com  Tue Feb 16 08:35:54 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2010 19:35:54 +1100
Subject: [ExI] glutamine and life-extension
In-Reply-To: <505300.77015.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <505300.77015.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002160035y3af693afk88a7294d49ebd2fb@mail.gmail.com>

On 16 February 2010 05:10, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
> Stathis,
>
> All this talk of neurons reminds me of a paper I wrote circa 1999:
>
> Glutamine Based Growth Hormone Releasing Products: A Bad Idea?
> http://www.newtreatments.org/loadlocal.php?hid=974
>
> My article above created a surprising amount of controversy among life-extensionists. I closed down my website, but recently found my paper republished on the site above without my permission.
>
> Thought you might find it interesting given your profession and the general theme.

Thank-you for this, it is not something I knew much about. It's
important to know about the *negative* effects of any treatment, and
this is often overlooked by those into non-conventional medicine. Of
course, it is sometimes overlooked by those prescribing conventional
treatments as well. Nevertheless, my bias is to follow conventional
medicine, and only rarely does conventional medicine consider that
there is enough evidence to recommend treatments with dietary
supplements. A common response to this is that medical professionals
are unduly influenced by drug companies, and there may be some truth
to that, but I work in the public health system where there is an
explicit emphasis on using the cheapest effective treatment: amino
acids in bulk are very cheap compared to most drugs, and they would be
used if there were good evidence for their efficacy. The other point
to make is that much of what doctors do is longevity treatment, even
if it isn't seen as that. Preventing heart disease, diabetes, cancer,
dementia etc. is equivalent to preventing the patient from getting
physiologically old and decrepit and dying early.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From stathisp at gmail.com  Tue Feb 16 10:56:12 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2010 21:56:12 +1100
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <963975.24812.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <466012.12578.qm@web111205.mail.gq1.yahoo.com> 
	<963975.24812.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002160256h1ed0cc8cv43ae0b2044314824@mail.gmail.com>

On 16 February 2010 03:10, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
> --- On Mon, 2/15/10, Christopher Luebcke <cluebcke at yahoo.com> wrote:
>
>> If my understanding of the CRA is
>> correct (it may not be), it seems to me that Searle is
>> arguing that because one component of the system does not
>> understand the symbols, the system doesn't understand the
>> symbols. This to me is akin to claiming that because my
>> fingers do not understand the words they are currently
>> typing out, neither do I.
>
> Searle speaks for himself:
>
> My response to the systems theory is quite simple: let the individual internalize all of these elements of the system. He memorizes the rules in the ledger and the data banks of Chinese symbols, and he does all the calculations in his head. The individual then incorporates the entire system. There isn't anything at all to the system that he does not encompass. We can even get rid of the room and suppose he works outdoors. All the same, he understands nothing of the Chinese, and a fortiori neither does the system, because there isn't anything in the system that isn't in him. If he doesn't understand, then there is no way the system could understand because the system is just a part of him.
>
> Actually I feel somewhat embarrassed to give even this answer to the systems theory because the theory seems to me so implausible to start with. The idea is that while a person doesn't understand Chinese, somehow the conjunction of that person and bits of paper might understand Chinese. It is not easy for me to imagine how someone who was not in the grip of an ideology would find the idea at all plausible.
>
> http://www.bbsonline.org/Preprints/OldArchive/bbs.searle2.html

I have proposed the example of a brain which has enough intelligence
to know what the neurons are doing: "neuron no. 15,576,456,757 in the
left parietal lobe fires in response to noradrenaline, then breaks
down the noradrenaline by means of MAO and COMT", and so on, for every
brain event. That would be the equivalent of the man in the CR: there
is understanding of the low level events, but no understanding of the
high level intelligent behaviour which these events give rise to. Do
you see how there might be *two* intelligences here, a high level and
a low level one, with neither necessarily being aware of the other?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From stathisp at gmail.com  Tue Feb 16 11:09:22 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2010 22:09:22 +1100
Subject: [ExI] Newbie Question: Consciousness and Intelligence
In-Reply-To: <930797.89044.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <f21c22e31002150128p2a82afc0i60ec6f02aea4b72c@mail.gmail.com> 
	<930797.89044.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002160309y57f0a56bp6c987eeb7ba54357@mail.gmail.com>

On 16 February 2010 00:49, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
> --- On Mon, 2/15/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> You keep repeating this as a fact but you don't explain why
>> a digital depiction of a person won't have real mental status.
>
> If I make a jpeg of you with my digital camera, that digital depiction of you will have no mental states. If I make a digital movie of you on my webcam, that digital depiction of you will have no mental states. A complete three-dimensional animated digital depiction of you made with futuristic digital simulation technology will amount to just another kind of depiction of you, and so it will likewise have no mental states.
>
> It does not matter whether we create our depictions of things on the walls of caves or on computers. Depictions of things do not equal the things they depict.

But the picture has some *properties* of the thing it represents. A
statue has other properties, and a computer simulation has other
properties still. There is no reason why, unique among all the
properties that a human has, "mind" should not be duplicable in
anything other than the original substrate.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From stathisp at gmail.com  Tue Feb 16 11:30:26 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2010 22:30:26 +1100
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <153083.39349.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <f21c22e31002150143l7cce44f7i90e24325a0b2325a@mail.gmail.com> 
	<153083.39349.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002160330he3be3f0y822d32f98cf546ac@mail.gmail.com>

On 16 February 2010 02:28, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:

>>> You beg the question of non-organic consciousness. As
>>> far as we know, "non-organic alien visitors" amounts to a
>>> completely meaningless concept.
>>
>> What??
>
> You ask what I would say to non-organic alien visitors, and I suppose you assume those non-organic alien visitors have consciousness. But non-organic consciousness is what is at issue here.

I thought you said before that you did not rule the possibility of
non-organic consciousness. If the aliens had clockwork brains, you
might allow that they are conscious, but not if they have digital
computers as brains. Of course, their technology might be so weird
that you would be unable to tell what was clockwork and what was a
digital computer, especially if there was a mixture of the two.
Nevertheless, even if they are zombies, you can still have a
discussion with them once you have figured out each other's language.
The aliens would insist that they were conscious, and question whether
you were conscious. What could you say to them to convince them
otherwise?

>>> As for nematodes, I have no idea whether their
>>> primitive nervous systems support what I mean by
>>> consciousness. I doubt it but I don't know. I classify them
>>> in the gray area between unconscious amoebas and conscious
>>> humans.
>>
>> At some point, either gradually or abruptly, consciousness
>> will happen in the transition from nematode to human or watch to AI.
>
> I consider it a scientific fact that consciousness arises between the nematode to the human. But only in science-fiction does consciousness happen in digital watches or digital computers.

I guess you mean that you know that you're conscious - that is your
empirical evidence. But the alien visitors would say the same, and
there is no test you could do on them (or they on you) to prove
consciousness. If they presented you with an argument purporting to
prove that organic matter can't have a mind you would dismiss it out
of hand, no matter how clever it was; and similarly they would dismiss
any of your arguments purporting to show that they cannot be
conscious.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From stefano.vaj at gmail.com  Tue Feb 16 12:27:04 2010
From: stefano.vaj at gmail.com (Stefano Vaj)
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2010 13:27:04 +0100
Subject: [ExI] The alleged existence of consciousness
In-Reply-To: <742345.22234.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <e321aa4b1002151709i7d877836uf1d920daae05c599@mail.gmail.com>
	<742345.22234.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <580930c21002160427m18cd353es7e757faf68e8bf77@mail.gmail.com>

On 16 February 2010 02:36, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
> To deny the existence of consciousness one must deny one's own awareness of one's own experience. Some muddled thinkers try to do this. I find it hard to take them seriously.

OK, this is your mantra. But the argument that since nobody denies the
existence of, say, "entrepreneurial spirit", or the "spirit of the old
days", we have to infer that spirits fluctuate around us is not very
compelling.

Consciousness is a perfectly useful concept to describe the set of
phenomena leading us to conclude, e.g., that the perpetrator had not
actually knocked unconscious when the crime was committed. Its
"entification" is however a Platonic petition of principle, similar to
that maintaining that "Evil exists" in the sense of of a horned
monster living very deeply underground. Entia non sunt multiplicanda
sine necessitate.

-- 
Stefano Vaj


From stefano.vaj at gmail.com  Tue Feb 16 12:34:50 2010
From: stefano.vaj at gmail.com (Stefano Vaj)
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2010 13:34:50 +0100
Subject: [ExI] The alleged existence of consciousness
In-Reply-To: <330027.14333.qm@web111201.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
References: <275598.51562.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
	<330027.14333.qm@web111201.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <580930c21002160434n3e8bfa0cm21b709ed15eae54f@mail.gmail.com>

On 15 February 2010 21:22, Christopher Luebcke <cluebcke at yahoo.com> wrote:
> The question, I believe, is how you determine that somebody (or something) else is "conscious", not how you determine that you yourself are.

I would go a little farther.

Consciousness is a social construct even when it refers to oneself
(and, btw, social constructs *do* exist, simply they are not
homunculi).

And a-priori evidence does not really cut it otherwise. Somebody can
well be persuaded to be conscious, and even be subvocalising on the
subject, e.g., while dreaming, having a near-death experience, or
being under some drugs, even though in fact he or she is not.

-- 
Stefano Vaj


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Tue Feb 16 12:45:56 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2010 04:45:56 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002160256h1ed0cc8cv43ae0b2044314824@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <534964.96008.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Tue, 2/16/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:

> I have proposed the example of a brain which has enough
> intelligence to know what the neurons are doing: "neuron no.
> 15,576,456,757 in the left parietal lobe fires in response to 
> noradrenaline, then breaks down the noradrenaline by means of MAO and 
> COMT", and so on, for every brain event. That would be the equivalent of 
> the man in the CR: there is understanding of the low level events, but no
> understanding of the high level intelligent behaviour which these events 
> give rise to. Do you see how there might be *two* intelligences here, a 
> high level and a low level one, with neither necessarily being aware of
> the other?

Doesn't matter. If you cannot see yourself understanding the symbols as either the man considered as the program (IN the room or AS a neuron) or as the man considered as the system (AS the room or AS a brain) then Searle has proved his point.

And it seems he has proved his point to you, but that you want nevertheless to fabricate some imaginary way around the conclusion. These attempts of yours amount to saying "Suppose that even though Searle is right that the man cannot understand the symbols either as the program or as the system, pink unicorns on the moon do nevertheless understand the symbols." :)

-gts


      


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Tue Feb 16 13:20:00 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2010 05:20:00 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] The alleged existence of consciousness
In-Reply-To: <580930c21002160434n3e8bfa0cm21b709ed15eae54f@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <801240.98026.qm@web36505.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Tue, 2/16/10, Stefano Vaj <stefano.vaj at gmail.com> wrote:

> Consciousness is a social construct...

A social construct? Is digestion a social construct?

Seems to me consciousness amounts to just another biological process like digestion. The brain does this thing called consciousness when in the awake state or in the state of sleep+dreaming. It stops doing it temporarily after physical shocks such as blows to the head, or when in the presence of too much alcohol, or when it sleeps but does not dream. It stops for the last time at death. 

-gts



      


From stathisp at gmail.com  Tue Feb 16 13:54:27 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 00:54:27 +1100
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <534964.96008.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <f21c22e31002160256h1ed0cc8cv43ae0b2044314824@mail.gmail.com> 
	<534964.96008.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002160554v6690dccbne1ebcaf3c7ecef96@mail.gmail.com>

On 16 February 2010 23:45, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
> --- On Tue, 2/16/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> I have proposed the example of a brain which has enough
>> intelligence to know what the neurons are doing: "neuron no.
>> 15,576,456,757 in the left parietal lobe fires in response to
>> noradrenaline, then breaks down the noradrenaline by means of MAO and
>> COMT", and so on, for every brain event. That would be the equivalent of
>> the man in the CR: there is understanding of the low level events, but no
>> understanding of the high level intelligent behaviour which these events
>> give rise to. Do you see how there might be *two* intelligences here, a
>> high level and a low level one, with neither necessarily being aware of
>> the other?
>
> Doesn't matter. If you cannot see yourself understanding the symbols as either the man considered as the program (IN the room or AS a neuron) or as the man considered as the system (AS the room or AS a brain) then Searle has proved his point.
>
> And it seems he has proved his point to you, but that you want nevertheless to fabricate some imaginary way around the conclusion. These attempts of yours amount to saying "Suppose that even though Searle is right that the man cannot understand the symbols either as the program or as the system, pink unicorns on the moon do nevertheless understand the symbols." :)

I think you have missed the point: even though we agree that the man
who internalises the room has no understanding, this does *not* mean
that the system has no understanding. The man's intelligence is only a
component of the system even if the man internalises the room.

As a general comment, it is normal in philosophical debate to set up a
sometimes complex argument, thought experiment etc. in order to prove
a point which the parties disagree on. I might think that the whole
CRA and the idea it purports to prove is ridiculous, but it's bad form
to just dismiss an argument like that. Instead, I have to pick it
apart, show where there are hidden assumptions, or think of a
variation which leads to the opposite conclusion. This sometimes leads
to the pursuit of what you may consider is a minor technical point,
while you are eager to return to restating what you consider is the
big picture. But it is important to pursue these apparently minor
technical points, since if they fall, the whole argument falls. That
does not necessarily mean the initial proposition was wrong, but it
does mean that the particular argument chosen to support it is wrong,
and cannot be used any more.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From stathisp at gmail.com  Tue Feb 16 13:57:53 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 00:57:53 +1100
Subject: [ExI] The alleged existence of consciousness
In-Reply-To: <801240.98026.qm@web36505.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <580930c21002160434n3e8bfa0cm21b709ed15eae54f@mail.gmail.com> 
	<801240.98026.qm@web36505.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002160557q2b7e8791p9509af590a35c98d@mail.gmail.com>

On 17 February 2010 00:20, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
> --- On Tue, 2/16/10, Stefano Vaj <stefano.vaj at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Consciousness is a social construct...
>
> A social construct? Is digestion a social construct?
>
> Seems to me consciousness amounts to just another biological process like digestion. The brain does this thing called consciousness when in the awake state or in the state of sleep+dreaming. It stops doing it temporarily after physical shocks such as blows to the head, or when in the presence of too much alcohol, or when it sleeps but does not dream. It stops for the last time at death.

But digestion is nothing over and above the chemical breakdown of food
in the gut. Similarly, consciousness is nothing over and above the
enacting of intelligent behaviour.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From sparge at gmail.com  Tue Feb 16 15:03:09 2010
From: sparge at gmail.com (Dave Sill)
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2010 10:03:09 -0500
Subject: [ExI] glutamine and life-extension
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002160035y3af693afk88a7294d49ebd2fb@mail.gmail.com>
References: <505300.77015.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
	<f21c22e31002160035y3af693afk88a7294d49ebd2fb@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <ffd22f9d1002160703u3841cc34g9e9ada68ba8f687c@mail.gmail.com>

On Tue, Feb 16, 2010 at 3:35 AM, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
> ... Nevertheless, my bias is to follow conventional
> medicine, and only rarely does conventional medicine consider that
> there is enough evidence to recommend treatments with dietary
> supplements. A common response to this is that medical professionals
> are unduly influenced by drug companies, and there may be some truth
> to that, but I work in the public health system where there is an
> explicit emphasis on using the cheapest effective treatment: amino
> acids in bulk are very cheap compared to most drugs, and they would be
> used if there were good evidence for their efficacy.

So who is motivated to research therapeutic effects of cheap
supplements? Drug companies are motivated by the profit potential of a
new, exclusive drug. There are no big payoffs in researching cheap
supplements.

-Dave


From cluebcke at yahoo.com  Tue Feb 16 16:15:31 2010
From: cluebcke at yahoo.com (Christopher Luebcke)
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2010 08:15:31 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <534964.96008.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <534964.96008.qm@web36503.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <782982.71028.qm@web111207.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

Gordon, if I may ask directly: How do you determine whether someone, or something, besides yourself is conscious?


----- Original Message ----
From: Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>
To: ExI chat list <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org>
Sent: Tue, February 16, 2010 4:45:56 AM
Subject: Re: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability

--- On Tue, 2/16/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:

> I have proposed the example of a brain which has enough
> intelligence to know what the neurons are doing: "neuron no.
> 15,576,456,757 in the left parietal lobe fires in response to 
> noradrenaline, then breaks down the noradrenaline by means of MAO and 
> COMT", and so on, for every brain event. That would be the equivalent of 
> the man in the CR: there is understanding of the low level events, but no
> understanding of the high level intelligent behaviour which these events 
> give rise to. Do you see how there might be *two* intelligences here, a 
> high level and a low level one, with neither necessarily being aware of
> the other?

Doesn't matter. If you cannot see yourself understanding the symbols as either the man considered as the program (IN the room or AS a neuron) or as the man considered as the system (AS the room or AS a brain) then Searle has proved his point.

And it seems he has proved his point to you, but that you want nevertheless to fabricate some imaginary way around the conclusion. These attempts of yours amount to saying "Suppose that even though Searle is right that the man cannot understand the symbols either as the program or as the system, pink unicorns on the moon do nevertheless understand the symbols." :)

-gts


      
_______________________________________________
extropy-chat mailing list
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat



From jonkc at bellsouth.net  Tue Feb 16 16:27:11 2010
From: jonkc at bellsouth.net (John Clark)
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2010 11:27:11 -0500
Subject: [ExI] How not to make a thought experiment
In-Reply-To: <801240.98026.qm@web36505.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <801240.98026.qm@web36505.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <4CE641C3-70EE-4B6C-AA81-0EEBA87A36DC@bellsouth.net>

Since my last post Gordon Swobe has posted 2 times.
> 
> Seems to me consciousness amounts to just another biological process like digestion.

No, Swobe is incorrect even about what things seem like to him. Swobe can explain how digestion came to occur on planet Earth but he has no explanation how consciousness did. I have an explanation for both, but then unlike Swobe I think intelligent behavior implies consciousness. Swobe says he believes in Evolution but the fact that he thinks intelligence and consciousness are separate things and yet Evolution produced them both is clear proof that the man has no comprehension how that vitally important process works.

> If you cannot see yourself understanding the symbols as either the man considered as the program (IN the room or AS a neuron) or as the man considered as the system (AS the room or AS a brain) then Searle has proved his point.


True, I can not see myself understanding those Chinese symbols, but I can't see myself manipulating them to produce intelligent output either; perhaps something could do that but whatever it is it wouldn't be human.

> These attempts of yours amount to saying "Suppose that even though Searle is right that the man cannot understand the symbols either as the program or as the system, pink unicorns on the moon do nevertheless understand the symbols."

This shows that not only does Swobe misunderstand Evolution he doesn't understand understanding either. Swobe seems obsessed in determining the exact spacial coordinates of consciousness, which makes about as much sense as demanding to know where fast is, or the number eleven.

 John K Clark 





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From stefano.vaj at gmail.com  Tue Feb 16 17:13:51 2010
From: stefano.vaj at gmail.com (Stefano Vaj)
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2010 18:13:51 +0100
Subject: [ExI] The alleged existence of consciousness (was: Semiotics
	and Computability)
In-Reply-To: <e321aa4b1002151709i7d877836uf1d920daae05c599@mail.gmail.com>
References: <e321aa4b1002151043h2f018f65i4a794dba0a2551f0@mail.gmail.com>
	<580930c21002151412s6465c9bbnf596dc063b010a4a@mail.gmail.com>
	<e321aa4b1002151709i7d877836uf1d920daae05c599@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <580930c21002160913l51d29a10sab21e88db547a5fe@mail.gmail.com>

On 16 February 2010 02:09, Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com> wrote:
> Stefano Vaj <stefano.vaj at gmail.com>:
>> This is an unreasonable demand. The scientific method cannot offer
>> evidence of something which in somebody's view s not phenomenical by
>> definition, but is an a priori of his worldview.
>
> For reference, the remark that spurred this reaction from me was:
>
> Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>:
>> I consider it a scientific fact that consciousness arises between the nematode to the human.
>
> To demand that a person provide a scientific basis for what they
> themselves consider a scientific fact is the very definition* of
> reasonableness!

I did not write "unfair", I said "unreasonable". If somebody were to
tell you "I consider it a fact that Allah exists", would you take his
at his own word? :-)

-- 
Stefano Vaj


From max at maxmore.com  Tue Feb 16 17:50:20 2010
From: max at maxmore.com (Max More)
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2010 11:50:20 -0600
Subject: [ExI] Phil Jones acknowledging that climate science isn't settled
Message-ID: <201002161818.o1GIIWkS006446@andromeda.ziaspace.com>

Interesting:

Phil Jones momentous Q&A with BBC reopens the ?science is settled? issues
emperor is, if not naked, scantily clad, vindicating key skeptic arguments
http://wattsupwiththat.com/2010/02/14/phil-jones-momentous-qa-with-bbc-reopens-the-science-is-settled-issues/

Columnist Indur Goklany summarizes:

Specifically, the Q-and-As confirm what many skeptics have long suspected:
Neither the rate nor magnitude of recent warming is exceptional.
There was no significant warming from 1998-2009. 
According to the IPCC we should have seen a 
global temperature increase of at least 0.2?C per decade.
The IPCC models may have overestimated the 
climate sensitivity for greenhouse gases, 
underestimated natural variability, or both.
This also suggests that there is a systematic 
upward bias in the impacts estimates based on 
these models just from this factor alone.
The logic behind attribution of current warming 
to well-mixed man-made greenhouse gases is faulty.
The science is not settled, however unsettling that might be.
There is a tendency in the IPCC reports to leave 
out inconvenient findings, especially in the 
part(s) most likely to be read by policy makers.


Compare the above to the "orthodox" view:
http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2010/02/daily-mangle/



-------------------------------------
Max More, Ph.D.
Strategic Philosopher
The Proactionary Project
Extropy Institute Founder
www.maxmore.com
max at maxmore.com
------------------------------------- 



From lacertilian at gmail.com  Tue Feb 16 19:07:46 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2010 11:07:46 -0800
Subject: [ExI] The alleged existence of consciousness
In-Reply-To: <948496.39262.qm@web65615.mail.ac4.yahoo.com>
References: <e321aa4b1002151709i7d877836uf1d920daae05c599@mail.gmail.com> 
	<742345.22234.qm@web36504.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
	<e321aa4b1002151801n790f4fd7y9f010314fda5899@mail.gmail.com> 
	<948496.39262.qm@web65615.mail.ac4.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002161107q6fff5f65sdb3d91439307cd21@mail.gmail.com>

The Avantguardian <avantguardian2020 at yahoo.com>:
>Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com>:
>> What logic could you possibly bring to bear on a person with
>> this set of beliefs?
>
> The logic of pain. That which reacts to pain *must* have the subjective experience of pain because there?can be?no such thing as objective pain or objective suffering of any kind for that matter.

The ouch-test! Okay, I'll play your little game.

First, it's obvious that false negatives are possible. Even if a
reaction to pinching implies consciousness, it does not follow that no
reaction implies no consciousness. If I concentrate on it, I can
ignore a pinch of virtually any intensity.

Even so, it's still scientifically useful in theory. Let's try it out
on a Furby!

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aPgfP5UO8o8

Furbies do not appear to be capable of pain. Perhaps if we programmed
one to scream in agony and gave it a linear actuator so that it can
propel itself away, whenever touched? These sedentary, polysensuously
perverse monstrosities are clearly unconscious; yet with the addition
of just a few strong negative reactions, we could turn one into the
perfect consciousness generator.

Too sarcastic?

You see my point, anyway. It's trivially easy to reproduce the outward
appearance of pain without the corresponding subjective experience.

Consciousness does not imply a reaction to pinching.

A reaction to pinching does not imply consciousness.

Thank you, try again!

The Avantguardian <avantguardian2020 at yahoo.com>:
> It is a hypocritical position where a person's?arguments and a person's actions are in contradiction.

Granted.

Hypocrisy does not imply falsehood, you'll note.

The Avantguardian <avantguardian2020 at yahoo.com>:
> You need not answer me until you have performed your experiment or chickened out of it. ;-)

That's okay, I have time!

I'll note that your test would work if we had rayguns that shoot pure
ionized pain, but sadly qualia have not yet been weaponized. C'est la
vie.


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Tue Feb 16 20:28:40 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2010 12:28:40 -0800
Subject: [ExI] The alleged existence of consciousness (was: Semiotics
	and Computability)
In-Reply-To: <580930c21002160913l51d29a10sab21e88db547a5fe@mail.gmail.com>
References: <e321aa4b1002151043h2f018f65i4a794dba0a2551f0@mail.gmail.com> 
	<580930c21002151412s6465c9bbnf596dc063b010a4a@mail.gmail.com> 
	<e321aa4b1002151709i7d877836uf1d920daae05c599@mail.gmail.com> 
	<580930c21002160913l51d29a10sab21e88db547a5fe@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002161228u9661a25vfbecbeb12865049e@mail.gmail.com>

Stefano Vaj <stefano.vaj at gmail.com>:
> Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com>:
>> To demand that a person provide a scientific basis for what they
>> themselves consider a scientific fact is the very definition* of
>> reasonableness!
>
> I did not write "unfair", I said "unreasonable". If somebody were to
> tell you "I consider it a fact that Allah exists", would you take his
> at his own word? :-)

I would. I find it completely believable that someone would consider
it a fact that Allah exists, and I have no objections to the phrasing.
I don't agree with them, personally, but I have no reason to call
their belief logically invalid.

The word "unreasonable" means something like "lacking reason", or
"irrational". Of course I had some reason to make my ultimatum,
otherwise I wouldn't have done so, and if I'm being irrational then
I'm not even sane enough to see it.

To insist on correct usage of terminology, when that terminology is
being twisted just to lend false credibility to a statement, seems
perfectly rational to me. I think it was a well-reasoned position, but
you could conceivably convince me otherwise; I can be reasoned with. I
am nothing if not reasonable.

OH WAIT A SMILEY FACE

I didn't need to deliver a stern dissertation at all! Your criticism
was a mere jibe, some harmless japery, all in good fun. Ha ha. Ha.


From cluebcke at yahoo.com  Tue Feb 16 20:52:35 2010
From: cluebcke at yahoo.com (Christopher Luebcke)
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2010 12:52:35 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Phil Jones acknowledging that climate science isn't
	settled
In-Reply-To: <201002161818.o1GIIWkS006446@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
References: <201002161818.o1GIIWkS006446@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
Message-ID: <354088.25240.qm@web111202.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

I'll continue to rely mainly on what peer-reviewed science has to say on the matter, not the IPCC or the BBC. 

I do find it sad that suddenly, after months of having his character shat upon, there's a great rush to take something Phil Jones has said as unquestioningly accurate.


----- Original Message ----
From: Max More <max at maxmore.com>
To: Extropy-Chat <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org>
Sent: Tue, February 16, 2010 9:50:20 AM
Subject: [ExI] Phil Jones acknowledging that climate science isn't settled

Interesting:

Phil Jones momentous Q&A with BBC reopens the ?science is settled? issues
emperor is, if not naked, scantily clad, vindicating key skeptic arguments
http://wattsupwiththat.com/2010/02/14/phil-jones-momentous-qa-with-bbc-reopens-the-science-is-settled-issues/

Columnist Indur Goklany summarizes:

Specifically, the Q-and-As confirm what many skeptics have long suspected:
Neither the rate nor magnitude of recent warming is exceptional.
There was no significant warming from 1998-2009. According to the IPCC we should have seen a global temperature increase of at least 0.2?C per decade.
The IPCC models may have overestimated the climate sensitivity for greenhouse gases, underestimated natural variability, or both.
This also suggests that there is a systematic upward bias in the impacts estimates based on these models just from this factor alone.
The logic behind attribution of current warming to well-mixed man-made greenhouse gases is faulty.
The science is not settled, however unsettling that might be.
There is a tendency in the IPCC reports to leave out inconvenient findings, especially in the part(s) most likely to be read by policy makers.


Compare the above to the "orthodox" view:
http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2010/02/daily-mangle/



-------------------------------------
Max More, Ph.D.
Strategic Philosopher
The Proactionary Project
Extropy Institute Founder
www.maxmore.com
max at maxmore.com
------------------------------------- 
_______________________________________________
extropy-chat mailing list
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat



From bbenzai at yahoo.com  Tue Feb 16 20:36:57 2010
From: bbenzai at yahoo.com (Ben Zaiboc)
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2010 12:36:57 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <mailman.1.1266235201.14510.extropy-chat@lists.extropy.org>
Message-ID: <916006.14487.qm@web113610.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

Jef wrote:

> The logic of the CRA is correct.  But it reasons from a flawed
> premise: That the human organism has this somehow ontologically
> special thing called "consciousness."

> So restart the music, and the merry-go-round.  I'm surprised no one's
> mentioned the Giant Look Up Table yet.


I was thinking about this very thing (even though I said I'd no longer discuss the dread CRA), and I disagree that the logic is correct.  It suffers from a fundamental flaw, as I see it:  the (usually unquestioned) assumption that it's possible, even in principle, to have a set of rules that can answer any possible question about a set of data (the 'story'), in a consistently sensible fashion, without having any 'understanding'.

Searle just casually tosses this assertion out as though it was obvious that it was possible, when it seems to me to be so unlikely that it's a simply outrageous assumption.  Before anyone uses it in an argument, they need to demonstrate that it's possible.  Without doing this, any argument based on it is totally invalid.

If you think about it, we actually use this principle to actually test for understanding of a subject.  We put people through exams where they're supposed to demonstrate their understanding by answering questions.  If the questions are good ones (difficult to anticipate, posing a variety of different problems, etc.), and the answers are good ones (clearly stating how to solve the problems posed), we conclude that the person has demonstrated understanding of the subject.  Our education system pretty much depends on this.  So why on earth would anyone suggest that exactly the same setup - asking questions about a set of data, and seeing if the answers are correct and consistent - could be used in an argument to claim that understanding is absent?

Absurd.

Ben 


      


From max at maxmore.com  Tue Feb 16 21:11:23 2010
From: max at maxmore.com (Max More)
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2010 15:11:23 -0600
Subject: [ExI] Phil Jones acknowledging that climate science isn'tsettled
Message-ID: <201002162111.o1GLBY3S004345@andromeda.ziaspace.com>


>I'll continue to rely mainly on what peer-reviewed science has to 
>say on the matter, not the IPCC or the BBC.

The peer-reviewed science (which, as has been clear for some time, is 
not always a guarantee of accuracy), does not all agree. So that 
doesn't settle the issue.

>I do find it sad that suddenly, after months of having his character 
>shat upon, there's a great rush to take something Phil Jones has 
>said as unquestioningly accurate.

Which of the things Jones is saying do you think are inaccurate?

What I thought was a little encouraging was some small sign of 
uncertainty from one of those representing apparent certainty 
concerning a matter revolving around unreliable models. Perhaps, one 
day, more economists and risk managers will also become a little more 
modest and less dogmatic regarding their clearly non-scientific discipline.

Max



From stathisp at gmail.com  Tue Feb 16 21:38:12 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 08:38:12 +1100
Subject: [ExI] glutamine and life-extension
In-Reply-To: <ffd22f9d1002160703u3841cc34g9e9ada68ba8f687c@mail.gmail.com>
References: <505300.77015.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
	<f21c22e31002160035y3af693afk88a7294d49ebd2fb@mail.gmail.com> 
	<ffd22f9d1002160703u3841cc34g9e9ada68ba8f687c@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002161338i1ae91e4amca76b2a8e46271f4@mail.gmail.com>

On 17 February 2010 02:03, Dave Sill <sparge at gmail.com> wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 16, 2010 at 3:35 AM, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
>> ... Nevertheless, my bias is to follow conventional
>> medicine, and only rarely does conventional medicine consider that
>> there is enough evidence to recommend treatments with dietary
>> supplements. A common response to this is that medical professionals
>> are unduly influenced by drug companies, and there may be some truth
>> to that, but I work in the public health system where there is an
>> explicit emphasis on using the cheapest effective treatment: amino
>> acids in bulk are very cheap compared to most drugs, and they would be
>> used if there were good evidence for their efficacy.
>
> So who is motivated to research therapeutic effects of cheap
> supplements? Drug companies are motivated by the profit potential of a
> new, exclusive drug. There are no big payoffs in researching cheap
> supplements.

Medical researchers, usually publicly or not-for-profit funded.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From cluebcke at yahoo.com  Tue Feb 16 22:25:00 2010
From: cluebcke at yahoo.com (Christopher Luebcke)
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2010 14:25:00 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Phil Jones acknowledging that climate science isn'tsettled
In-Reply-To: <201002162111.o1GLBY3S004345@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
References: <201002162111.o1GLBY3S004345@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
Message-ID: <412543.58639.qm@web111214.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

> The peer-reviewed science (which, as has been clear for some time, is not always a guarantee of accuracy), does not all agree. So that doesn't settle the issue.

No, but almost all of it supports the positions that the Earth has been warming over the last century, that the warming has primarily been caused by mankind's introduction of greenhouse gasses into the atmosphere, and that this warming trend will continue, with projected results over the next 100 years ranging, roughly, from pretty bad to catastrophic in terms of human suffering.

Naturally there are scientists who take a minority view of this, but the number of qualified climatologists taking the minority view is quite small. This does not mean that they are incorrect, but they're likely to be. I feel the same way about this as I do about the Big Bang theory and its modest, dwindling competitor, plasma cosmology.

> Which of the things Jones is saying do you think are inaccurate?

I'm actually not deeply interested in what Phil Jones has to say on the matter, outside (once again) of his scientific work. I just find it sadly ironic, and a dark reflection on the petty, fiercely partisan, politicized nature of what should in fact be a sober, scientific discussion, that a man accused (in the court of political opinion) of fraud should suddenly be taken at his word by those same accusers, when that word apparently agrees with their position.

I'm not, of course, accusing you (Max) of doing so. But the whole affair just saddens me.

> What I thought was a little encouraging was some small sign of uncertainty from one of those representing apparent certainty concerning a matter revolving around unreliable models. Perhaps, one day, more economists and risk managers will also become a little more modest and less dogmatic regarding their clearly non-scientific discipline.

I don't disagree, and from what I've read Phil Jones is somewhat less than the perfect scientist. 

But the whole swirl of activity around this indicates a personalization of the subject of AGW to Phil Jones, or CRU, when in fact there are thousands of scientists, thousands of peer-reviewed papers, and dozens if not hundreds of organizations working on this problem. The AGW-denying crowd's recent focus on Phil Jones reminds me of nothing so much as creationists' pathological obsession with, and hatred of, Charles Darwin (and I find little surprise that the two groups share a large intersection).


----- Original Message ----
From: Max More <max at maxmore.com>
To: Extropy-Chat <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org>
Sent: Tue, February 16, 2010 1:11:23 PM
Subject: Re: [ExI] Phil Jones acknowledging that climate science isn'tsettled


> I'll continue to rely mainly on what peer-reviewed science has to say on the matter, not the IPCC or the BBC.

The peer-reviewed science (which, as has been clear for some time, is not always a guarantee of accuracy), does not all agree. So that doesn't settle the issue.

> I do find it sad that suddenly, after months of having his character shat upon, there's a great rush to take something Phil Jones has said as unquestioningly accurate.

Which of the things Jones is saying do you think are inaccurate?

What I thought was a little encouraging was some small sign of uncertainty from one of those representing apparent certainty concerning a matter revolving around unreliable models. Perhaps, one day, more economists and risk managers will also become a little more modest and less dogmatic regarding their clearly non-scientific discipline.

Max

_______________________________________________
extropy-chat mailing list
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat



From max at maxmore.com  Wed Feb 17 01:03:24 2010
From: max at maxmore.com (Max More)
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2010 19:03:24 -0600
Subject: [ExI] Shifting demand suggests a future of endless oil
Message-ID: <201002170103.o1H13W90026666@andromeda.ziaspace.com>

MSNBC, which is usually home to the usual catastrophist messages, has 
a story that reflects information that's been around for a while, 
suggesting a non-disastrous energy shift ahead:

Shifting demand suggests a future of endless oil
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34770285/ns/business-oil_and_energy/

And another hopeful sign (although I'm no fan of any kind of 
government subsidy -- I'd rather reduce artificially-imposed costs on 
nuclear energy):

Obama renews commitment to nuclear energy

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/35421517/ns/business-oil_and_energy/

Max



From sparge at gmail.com  Wed Feb 17 01:13:51 2010
From: sparge at gmail.com (Dave Sill)
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2010 20:13:51 -0500
Subject: [ExI] glutamine and life-extension
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002161338i1ae91e4amca76b2a8e46271f4@mail.gmail.com>
References: <505300.77015.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
	<f21c22e31002160035y3af693afk88a7294d49ebd2fb@mail.gmail.com> 
	<ffd22f9d1002160703u3841cc34g9e9ada68ba8f687c@mail.gmail.com> 
	<f21c22e31002161338i1ae91e4amca76b2a8e46271f4@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <ffd22f9d1002161713u47a37965s61d4ddd464f0ea23@mail.gmail.com>

On Tue, Feb 16, 2010 at 4:38 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
> On 17 February 2010 02:03, Dave Sill <sparge at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> So who is motivated to research therapeutic effects of cheap
>> supplements? Drug companies are motivated by the profit potential of a
>> new, exclusive drug. There are no big payoffs in researching cheap
>> supplements.
>
> Medical researchers, usually publicly or not-for-profit funded.

That was sort of a rhetorical question, but since you answered it, I
have to point out that there are multiple orders of magnitude of
difference in funding between public/non-profit and for-profit. The
drug companies are frantically inventing new stuff, spending billions
on R&D. Compare that to what's spent on supplement research.

I think it's highly likely that there are effective therapeutic uses
of supplements that aren't being investigated due to lack of funding.

-Dave


From stathisp at gmail.com  Wed Feb 17 01:29:47 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 12:29:47 +1100
Subject: [ExI] glutamine and life-extension
In-Reply-To: <ffd22f9d1002161713u47a37965s61d4ddd464f0ea23@mail.gmail.com>
References: <505300.77015.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
	<f21c22e31002160035y3af693afk88a7294d49ebd2fb@mail.gmail.com> 
	<ffd22f9d1002160703u3841cc34g9e9ada68ba8f687c@mail.gmail.com> 
	<f21c22e31002161338i1ae91e4amca76b2a8e46271f4@mail.gmail.com> 
	<ffd22f9d1002161713u47a37965s61d4ddd464f0ea23@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002161729r6614a613ub5199544ffcdaa70@mail.gmail.com>

On 17 February 2010 12:13, Dave Sill <sparge at gmail.com> wrote:
> On Tue, Feb 16, 2010 at 4:38 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
>> On 17 February 2010 02:03, Dave Sill <sparge at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> So who is motivated to research therapeutic effects of cheap
>>> supplements? Drug companies are motivated by the profit potential of a
>>> new, exclusive drug. There are no big payoffs in researching cheap
>>> supplements.
>>
>> Medical researchers, usually publicly or not-for-profit funded.
>
> That was sort of a rhetorical question, but since you answered it, I
> have to point out that there are multiple orders of magnitude of
> difference in funding between public/non-profit and for-profit. The
> drug companies are frantically inventing new stuff, spending billions
> on R&D. Compare that to what's spent on supplement research.
>
> I think it's highly likely that there are effective therapeutic uses
> of supplements that aren't being investigated due to lack of funding.

I can't easily find actual figures but I think in the world as a whole
most medical research is publicly funded. The purpose of publicly
funded research is to discover things that are interesting or useful,
which is not always the same as discovering things that can be sold
for a lot of money. Drug companies generally won't spend money
researching dietary supplements or doing basic research because they
have nothing to gain from it, even though society does. If public
researchers do not think it is worthwhile investigating something then
it is probably because they think it is unlikely it will yield useful
results.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From sparge at gmail.com  Wed Feb 17 02:08:10 2010
From: sparge at gmail.com (Dave Sill)
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2010 21:08:10 -0500
Subject: [ExI] glutamine and life-extension
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002161729r6614a613ub5199544ffcdaa70@mail.gmail.com>
References: <505300.77015.qm@web36506.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
	<f21c22e31002160035y3af693afk88a7294d49ebd2fb@mail.gmail.com> 
	<ffd22f9d1002160703u3841cc34g9e9ada68ba8f687c@mail.gmail.com> 
	<f21c22e31002161338i1ae91e4amca76b2a8e46271f4@mail.gmail.com> 
	<ffd22f9d1002161713u47a37965s61d4ddd464f0ea23@mail.gmail.com> 
	<f21c22e31002161729r6614a613ub5199544ffcdaa70@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <ffd22f9d1002161808q2dae731aj449ddc22a596fc13@mail.gmail.com>

On Tue, Feb 16, 2010 at 8:29 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> I can't easily find actual figures but I think in the world as a whole
> most medical research is publicly funded.

Most *medical* research? Maybe. Most *drug* research? No way.

> The purpose of publicly
> funded research is to discover things that are interesting or useful,
> which is not always the same as discovering things that can be sold
> for a lot of money. Drug companies generally won't spend money
> researching dietary supplements or doing basic research because they
> have nothing to gain from it, even though society does. If public
> researchers do not think it is worthwhile investigating something then
> it is probably because they think it is unlikely it will yield useful
> results.

Exactly. That was point of my first posting in this thread.

-Dave


From alfio.puglisi at gmail.com  Wed Feb 17 02:36:27 2010
From: alfio.puglisi at gmail.com (Alfio Puglisi)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 03:36:27 +0100
Subject: [ExI] Phil Jones acknowledging that climate science isn't
	settled
In-Reply-To: <201002161818.o1GIIWkS006446@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
References: <201002161818.o1GIIWkS006446@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
Message-ID: <4902d9991002161836w487577b5iefaac10dc3ba51a4@mail.gmail.com>

On Tue, Feb 16, 2010 at 6:50 PM, Max More <max at maxmore.com> wrote:

> Interesting:
>
> Phil Jones momentous Q&A with BBC reopens the ?science is settled? issues
> emperor is, if not naked, scantily clad, vindicating key skeptic arguments
>
> http://wattsupwiththat.com/2010/02/14/phil-jones-momentous-qa-with-bbc-reopens-the-science-is-settled-issues/
>
> Columnist Indur Goklany summarizes:
>
> Specifically, the Q-and-As confirm what many skeptics have long suspected:
> Neither the rate nor magnitude of recent warming is exceptional.
> There was no significant warming from 1998-2009. According to the IPCC we
> should have seen a global temperature increase of at least 0.2?C per decade.
> The IPCC models may have overestimated the climate sensitivity for
> greenhouse gases, underestimated natural variability, or both.
> This also suggests that there is a systematic upward bias in the impacts
> estimates based on these models just from this factor alone.
> The logic behind attribution of current warming to well-mixed man-made
> greenhouse gases is faulty.
> The science is not settled, however unsettling that might be.
> There is a tendency in the IPCC reports to leave out inconvenient findings,
> especially in the part(s) most likely to be read by policy makers.
>

Reading the article, you discover that most of those points are just made up
by the columnist. Why do you think that they are interesting?

Alfio
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From femmechakra at yahoo.ca  Wed Feb 17 03:58:41 2010
From: femmechakra at yahoo.ca (Anna Taylor)
Date: Tue, 16 Feb 2010 19:58:41 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Consciouness and paracrap
Message-ID: <517167.25357.qm@web110408.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

I know I'm simple minded but I don't understand why consciousness is such
a philosophical debate.  I wonder why science sometimes complicates
things.  

Let's say hypothetically I could change the definitions. (This is 
against academic rules but if Gordon GTE's to play master of definitions
why shouldn't I:). Let's say the word conscious meant alive versus
dead. Anything that is conscious is alive and awake.  Could everyone
agree on that? 
The problem lies within determining the levels of consciousness.
Does a worm possess consciousness? Will an AI? 

I'm rather curious as to understand why the scientific community is 
taboo against using the term the "subconscious" as it would be much 
easier to explain if they did. What if the subconscious is Darwin's 
Theory of Evolution?  The basic instinct for survival.  A tree 
requires many things to keep it alive but it doesn't know it.  
It depends on the sun, the earth, the rain and it will continue to 
grow or it will die.  We need trees and they are part of the 
evolutionary process. I would say they are subconsciously alive. 
In humans it's the instinct to take your hand off a hot stove.  
The embedded codes that evolution has installed.  

A person who is under anaesthesia should therefore be conscious and
subconsciously alive. The person requires oxygen, food and water yet 
has no idea. This would then mean that consciousness and awareness 
go hand in hand.  

What if consciousness is to be awake allowing the memories capability 
of recalling, extracting and processing information while awareness is
intelligence, experience and sense?  A worm doesn't live in a
subconscious state, it recalls, extracts and processes information
but does it recall the experience or have a sense as to why it does 
the things it does? Shouldn't this be an underlining question? If we 
knew the worm felt something when we poked it with a knife would we
declare it "aware"?  I know my cat is aware because once he decided to
stick his head too far into a bottle, he never did it again.  I think
to be human is to have awareness as well as consciousness.
 
I believe a strong as well as weak AI will not be conscious or
have any subconscious (well at least until technology merges with
biology then at least that will be a great philosophical discussion)
but only strong AI will have consciousness and somewhat awareness.
What is scary about Strong AI is that it may have the maximum capacity
of intelligence yet have no experience or sense.  We had better hope
that the programmer is fully aware.    

Stathis Papaioannou stathisp at gmail.com 
Sun Dec 13 23:08:02 UTC 2009 questioned gts_2000 at yahoo.com 

>To address the strong AI / weak AI distinction I put to you a 
question you haven't yet answered: what do you think would happen 
if part of your brain, say your visual cortex, were replaced with components that behaved normally in their interaction with the 
remaining biological neurons, but lacked the essential ingredient for
consciousness? 

My observation:
Well my contacts work fine. My memory would recall, extract and process
the information.  If the contacts are too weak and I can't see then 
yes one of my awareness factors would be limited but it would not stop  
me from being conscious or have consciousness. 
 
Btw...Even if all my crazy posts don't amount to anything I have to 
say that the Extropy Chat creates a whirl of imagination.  I can read
something that may lead to me to investigate something truly beneficial 
to my understanding.  Thanks.  Ok back to music...

Anna:)



      __________________________________________________________________
Ask a question on any topic and get answers from real people. Go to Yahoo! Answers and share what you know at http://ca.answers.yahoo.com


From emlynoregan at gmail.com  Wed Feb 17 05:37:24 2010
From: emlynoregan at gmail.com (Emlyn)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 16:07:24 +1030
Subject: [ExI] Phil Jones acknowledging that climate science isn't
	settled
In-Reply-To: <4902d9991002161836w487577b5iefaac10dc3ba51a4@mail.gmail.com>
References: <201002161818.o1GIIWkS006446@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
	<4902d9991002161836w487577b5iefaac10dc3ba51a4@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <710b78fc1002162137g524be15ai31739f5cc1769949@mail.gmail.com>

2010/2/17 Alfio Puglisi <alfio.puglisi at gmail.com>:
>
>
> On Tue, Feb 16, 2010 at 6:50 PM, Max More <max at maxmore.com> wrote:
>>
>> Interesting:
>>
>> Phil Jones momentous Q&A with BBC reopens the ?science is settled? issues
>> emperor is, if not naked, scantily clad, vindicating key skeptic arguments
>>
>> http://wattsupwiththat.com/2010/02/14/phil-jones-momentous-qa-with-bbc-reopens-the-science-is-settled-issues/
>>
>> Columnist Indur Goklany summarizes:
>>
>> Specifically, the Q-and-As confirm what many skeptics have long suspected:
>> Neither the rate nor magnitude of recent warming is exceptional.
>> There was no significant warming from 1998-2009. According to the IPCC we
>> should have seen a global temperature increase of at least 0.2?C per decade.
>> The IPCC models may have overestimated the climate sensitivity for
>> greenhouse gases, underestimated natural variability, or both.
>> This also suggests that there is a systematic upward bias in the impacts
>> estimates based on these models just from this factor alone.
>> The logic behind attribution of current warming to well-mixed man-made
>> greenhouse gases is faulty.
>> The science is not settled, however unsettling that might be.
>> There is a tendency in the IPCC reports to leave out inconvenient
>> findings, especially in the part(s) most likely to be read by policy makers.
>
> Reading the article, you discover that most of those points are just made up
> by the columnist. Why do you think that they are interesting?
>
> Alfio
>

I concur. This is largely commentary by the columnist, not what
actually transpired in the interview.

I haven't read the whole thing in detail, but one early piece stuck
out like a sore thumb, which is the old saw that there is no
significant warming since 1998. That's just flat out wrong, and it's
wrong because 1998 itself stuck out like a sore thumb; it was a
statistical anomaly, which anyone who wasn't being entirely
disingenuous would agree with.

Here's a discussion of that issue, along with graphs showing the 1998
sore thumb:

http://scienceblogs.com/illconsidered/2006/04/warming-stopped-in-1998.php

-- 
Emlyn

http://www.songsofmiseryanddespair.com - My show, Fringe 2010
http://point7.wordpress.com - My blog


From stathisp at gmail.com  Wed Feb 17 10:27:15 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 21:27:15 +1100
Subject: [ExI] Consciouness and paracrap
In-Reply-To: <517167.25357.qm@web110408.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
References: <517167.25357.qm@web110408.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002170227j3786afb8l17a5e022eaef87c1@mail.gmail.com>

On 17 February 2010 14:58, Anna Taylor <femmechakra at yahoo.ca> wrote:
> I know I'm simple minded but I don't understand why consciousness is such
> a philosophical debate. ?I wonder why science sometimes complicates
> things.
>
> Let's say hypothetically I could change the definitions. (This is
> against academic rules but if Gordon GTE's to play master of definitions
> why shouldn't I:). Let's say the word conscious meant alive versus
> dead. Anything that is conscious is alive and awake. ?Could everyone
> agree on that?
> The problem lies within determining the levels of consciousness.
> Does a worm possess consciousness? Will an AI?
>
> I'm rather curious as to understand why the scientific community is
> taboo against using the term the "subconscious" as it would be much
> easier to explain if they did. What if the subconscious is Darwin's
> Theory of Evolution? ?The basic instinct for survival. ?A tree
> requires many things to keep it alive but it doesn't know it.
> It depends on the sun, the earth, the rain and it will continue to
> grow or it will die. ?We need trees and they are part of the
> evolutionary process. I would say they are subconsciously alive.
> In humans it's the instinct to take your hand off a hot stove.
> The embedded codes that evolution has installed.
>
> A person who is under anaesthesia should therefore be conscious and
> subconsciously alive. The person requires oxygen, food and water yet
> has no idea. This would then mean that consciousness and awareness
> go hand in hand.
>
> What if consciousness is to be awake allowing the memories capability
> of recalling, extracting and processing information while awareness is
> intelligence, experience and sense? ?A worm doesn't live in a
> subconscious state, it recalls, extracts and processes information
> but does it recall the experience or have a sense as to why it does
> the things it does? Shouldn't this be an underlining question? If we
> knew the worm felt something when we poked it with a knife would we
> declare it "aware"? ?I know my cat is aware because once he decided to
> stick his head too far into a bottle, he never did it again. ?I think
> to be human is to have awareness as well as consciousness.
>
> I believe a strong as well as weak AI will not be conscious or
> have any subconscious (well at least until technology merges with
> biology then at least that will be a great philosophical discussion)
> but only strong AI will have consciousness and somewhat awareness.
> What is scary about Strong AI is that it may have the maximum capacity
> of intelligence yet have no experience or sense. ?We had better hope
> that the programmer is fully aware.
>
> Stathis Papaioannou stathisp at gmail.com
> Sun Dec 13 23:08:02 UTC 2009 questioned gts_2000 at yahoo.com
>
>>To address the strong AI / weak AI distinction I put to you a
> question you haven't yet answered: what do you think would happen
> if part of your brain, say your visual cortex, were replaced with components that behaved normally in their interaction with the
> remaining biological neurons, but lacked the essential ingredient for
> consciousness?
>
> My observation:
> Well my contacts work fine. My memory would recall, extract and process
> the information. ?If the contacts are too weak and I can't see then
> yes one of my awareness factors would be limited but it would not stop
> me from being conscious or have consciousness.
>
> Btw...Even if all my crazy posts don't amount to anything I have to
> say that the Extropy Chat creates a whirl of imagination. ?I can read
> something that may lead to me to investigate something truly beneficial
> to my understanding. ?Thanks. ?Ok back to music...

Anna, here are some definitions that I use:

Consciousness - hard to define, but if you have it you know it;
Strong AI - an artificial intelligence that is both intelligent and conscious;
Weak AI - an artificial intelligence that is intelligent but lacks
consciousness;
Philosophical zombie - same as weak AI.

Several people have commented that we need a definition of
consciousness to proceed, but I disagree. I think everyone knows what
is meant by the word and so we can have a complete discussion without
at any point defining it. For those who say that consciousness does
not really exist: consciousness is that thing you are referring to
when you say that consciousness does not really exist.

With the brain replacement experiment, the idea is that the visual
cortex is where visual perceptions (visual experiences/ consciousness/
qualia) occur. If your visual cortex is destroyed then you are blind,
even if your eyes and optic nerve are intact. When you see something
and describe it, information goes from your eyes to your visual
cortex, from your visual cortex to your speech centre, and finally
from your speech centre to your vocal cords. The question is, what
would happen if your visual cortex were replaced with an artificial
part that sent the same signals to the rest of your brain in response
to signals from your eyes, but lacked visual perception? By
definition, you would see nothing; but also by definition, you would
describe everything put in front of you correctly and you would claim
and honestly believe that you could see normally. How could you be
completely blind but not notice you were blind and behave as if you
had normal vision? And if you think that is a coherent state of
affairs, how do you know you are not currently blind?

The purpose of the above is to show that it is impossible (logically
impossible, not just physically impossible) to make a brain part, and
hence a whole brain, that behaves exactly like a biological brain but
lacks consciousness. Either it isn't possible to make such an
artificial component at all, or else it is possible to make such a
component but it will necessarily also have consciousness. The
alternative is to say that you're happy with the idea that you may be
blind, deaf, unable to understand English etc. but neither you nor
anyone else has noticed.

Gordon Swobe's response is that this thought experiment is ridiculous
and I should come up with another one that doesn't challenge the
self-evident fact that digital computers cannot be conscious.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Wed Feb 17 14:05:51 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 06:05:51 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
Message-ID: <579192.36870.qm@web36507.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Tue, 2/16/10, Christopher Luebcke <cluebcke at yahoo.com> wrote:

> Gordon, if I may ask directly: How do you determine whether someone, or 
> something, besides yourself is conscious?

I believe we know enough about the brain and nervous system to infer the existence of subjective experience in other animals that have the same kind of apparatus. 

We see that other people and other primates and certain other animals have nervous systems very much like ours, eyes and skin and noses and ears very much like ours, and so on, and from these physiological facts in combination with their behaviors and reports of subjective experiences we can infer with near certainty that they do in fact have subjective experiences.

-gts


      


From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Wed Feb 17 14:45:31 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 06:45:31 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] glutamine and life-extension
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002160035y3af693afk88a7294d49ebd2fb@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <836720.57934.qm@web36507.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Tue, 2/16/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:

>> All this talk of neurons reminds me of a paper I wrote
>> circa 1999:
>>
>> Glutamine Based Growth Hormone Releasing Products: A
>> Bad Idea?
>> http://www.newtreatments.org/loadlocal.php?hid=974
>>
>> My article above created a surprising amount of
>> controversy among life-extensionists. I closed down my
>> website, but recently found my paper republished on the site
>> above without my permission.
>>
>> Thought you might find it interesting given your
>> profession and the general theme.
> 
> Thank-you for this, it is not something I knew much about.

You're welcome.

> It's important to know about the *negative* effects of any
> treatment, and this is often overlooked by those into non-conventional

I agree completely. You might find it surprising how much controversy my paper above created. At the time (1999-2000) some people interested in life-extension considered megadoses of glutamine as a means for delaying the effects of aging. My paper exposed the risks associated with such megadosing. 

I took my research over to the LEF forum. As I describe in the article, they put a temporary moratorium on the subject of glutamine in their online forum (no surprise there: LEF sells the stuff) until they could get their facts straight. To LEF's credit, they took my findings seriously enough to stop promoting megadosing of glutamine on their forum, and invited me back to educate people about the risks. A small victory for me.

As you can see I'm no stranger to controversy. :-)

-gts





      


From cetico.iconoclasta at gmail.com  Wed Feb 17 16:27:34 2010
From: cetico.iconoclasta at gmail.com (Henrique Moraes Machado (CI))
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 14:27:34 -0200
Subject: [ExI] QET
References: <8885036.1601541266266257004.JavaMail.defaultUser@defaultHost>
Message-ID: <013201caafee$1dec8ec0$fd00a8c0@cpdhemm>

<scerir> No idea about this specific process of dr. Hotta. But it seems to 
me that the
 strange nature of quantum mechanical phenomena, and in particular quantum 
non-
 locality and quantum non-separability, could be easily extended - at least
 heuristically - to different contexts (i.e. gravitational fields) to get 
new
 and relevant results (i.e. non-local gravitational fields). See i.e. Adrian
 Kent here http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0507045
</scerir>

By non-local gravitational fields you mean putting gravity on a spaceship 
for instance? Now that would be interesting. 



From natasha at natasha.cc  Wed Feb 17 16:55:51 2010
From: natasha at natasha.cc (Natasha Vita-More)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 10:55:51 -0600
Subject: [ExI] Phil Jones acknowledging that climate science isn'tsettled
In-Reply-To: <412543.58639.qm@web111214.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
References: <201002162111.o1GLBY3S004345@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
	<412543.58639.qm@web111214.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <81DEE08EF6054121B466A3303CF6ADF9@DFC68LF1>

Christopher Luebcke writes:

"... I just find it sadly ironic, and a dark reflection on the petty,
fiercely partisan, politicized nature of what should in fact be a sober,
scientific discussion, that a man accused (in the court of political
opinion) of fraud should suddenly be taken at his word by those same
accusers, when that word apparently agrees with their position."

Many of us find it frustrating. Nevertheless the biggest problem and
disappointment is that, while everyone seems to annoyed and saddened, there
is a lack of intelligent communication between all parties in viewing the
situation from diverse perspectives.

Max is working to develop a level ground for discussion.  Bravo to him.

Best,
Natasha



From rafal.smigrodzki at gmail.com  Wed Feb 17 16:59:10 2010
From: rafal.smigrodzki at gmail.com (Rafal Smigrodzki)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 11:59:10 -0500
Subject: [ExI] Phil Jones acknowledging that climate science isn'tsettled
In-Reply-To: <412543.58639.qm@web111214.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
References: <201002162111.o1GLBY3S004345@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
	<412543.58639.qm@web111214.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <7641ddc61002170859g6c25fcag3ddb51826fff23bd@mail.gmail.com>

On Tue, Feb 16, 2010 at 5:25 PM, Christopher Luebcke <cluebcke at yahoo.com> wrote:
>> The peer-reviewed science (which, as has been clear for some time, is not always a guarantee of accuracy), does not all agree. So that doesn't settle the issue.
>
> No, but almost all of it supports the positions that the Earth has been warming over the last century, that the warming has primarily been caused by mankind's introduction of greenhouse gasses into the atmosphere, and that this warming trend will continue, with projected results over the next 100 years ranging, roughly, from pretty bad to catastrophic in terms of human suffering.

### Did you ever read any of this peer-reviewed literature?

Most likely not, since if you did (as I did), you wouldn't have
written the paragraph. In fact, only a minority of peer-reviewed
literature actively endorses the statements you made, and most of this
has been produced by environmental activists who infiltrated CRU,
GISS, and NOAA.

Give me a reference to a peer-reviewed primary research paper showing
manmade global warming and I'll give you two disagreeing with it.

Rafal


From pharos at gmail.com  Wed Feb 17 17:05:48 2010
From: pharos at gmail.com (BillK)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 17:05:48 +0000
Subject: [ExI] Phil Jones acknowledging that climate science isn'tsettled
In-Reply-To: <81DEE08EF6054121B466A3303CF6ADF9@DFC68LF1>
References: <201002162111.o1GLBY3S004345@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
	<412543.58639.qm@web111214.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
	<81DEE08EF6054121B466A3303CF6ADF9@DFC68LF1>
Message-ID: <ee50357e1002170905x6ba62eeamab2ad80be166e45e@mail.gmail.com>

On Wed, Feb 17, 2010 at 4:55 PM, Natasha Vita-More wrote:
> Many of us find it frustrating. Nevertheless the biggest problem and
> disappointment is that, while everyone seems to annoyed and saddened, there
> is a lack of intelligent communication between all parties in viewing the
> situation from diverse perspectives.
>
> Max is working to develop a level ground for discussion. ?Bravo to him.
>
>

The discussion is over and science has lost.

Once the argument was moved to lobbying and politics and PR campaigns
then Big Carbon can do this sooooo much better than scientists that
science was swept aside.

So, carry on as normal for the big corporations. Once New York floods,
then there will be more big profits to be made.

BillK


From cluebcke at yahoo.com  Wed Feb 17 16:44:15 2010
From: cluebcke at yahoo.com (Christopher Luebcke)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 08:44:15 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <579192.36870.qm@web36507.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <579192.36870.qm@web36507.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <218661.53873.qm@web111208.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

Could one detect or measure consciousness on the basis of "behaviors and reports of subjective experiences" alone, without direct anatomical knowledge of a "brain and nervous system"?

Conversely, does a system with a "brain and nervous system" necessarily have consciousness, even in the absence of "behaviors and reports of subjective experience"?



----- Original Message ----
From: Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>
To: ExI chat list <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org>
Sent: Wed, February 17, 2010 6:05:51 AM
Subject: Re: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability

--- On Tue, 2/16/10, Christopher Luebcke <cluebcke at yahoo.com> wrote:

> Gordon, if I may ask directly: How do you determine whether someone, or 
> something, besides yourself is conscious?

I believe we know enough about the brain and nervous system to infer the existence of subjective experience in other animals that have the same kind of apparatus. 

We see that other people and other primates and certain other animals have nervous systems very much like ours, eyes and skin and noses and ears very much like ours, and so on, and from these physiological facts in combination with their behaviors and reports of subjective experiences we can infer with near certainty that they do in fact have subjective experiences.

-gts


      
_______________________________________________
extropy-chat mailing list
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat



From natasha at natasha.cc  Wed Feb 17 17:19:11 2010
From: natasha at natasha.cc (Natasha Vita-More)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 11:19:11 -0600
Subject: [ExI] Phil Jones acknowledging that climate science isn'tsettled
In-Reply-To: <ee50357e1002170905x6ba62eeamab2ad80be166e45e@mail.gmail.com>
References: <201002162111.o1GLBY3S004345@andromeda.ziaspace.com><412543.58639.qm@web111214.mail.gq1.yahoo.com><81DEE08EF6054121B466A3303CF6ADF9@DFC68LF1>
	<ee50357e1002170905x6ba62eeamab2ad80be166e45e@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <26B286FC724A4FF2A04AAF4F353B882B@DFC68LF1>

BillK wrote:

> Many of us find it frustrating. Nevertheless the biggest problem and 
> disappointment is that, while everyone seems to annoyed and saddened, 
> there is a lack of intelligent communication between all parties in 
> viewing the situation from diverse perspectives.
>
> Max is working to develop a level ground for discussion. ?Bravo to him.


"The discussion is over and science has lost.
Once the argument was moved to lobbying and politics and PR campaigns then
Big Carbon can do this sooooo much better than scientists that science was
swept aside.
So, carry on as normal for the big corporations. Once New York floods, then
there will be more big profits to be made."

Science has not lost because science is not a fait accompli. Just because we
lack a skill set for finding solutions to the problem does not mean anyone
wins.


Natasha



From x at extropica.org  Wed Feb 17 17:29:34 2010
From: x at extropica.org (x at extropica.org)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 09:29:34 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity
Message-ID: <f7bfe5741002170929x4712647lac8a5261fbca66cc@mail.gmail.com>

On Sun Nov 23 17:39:04 UTC 2003, Jef wrote:
> I received my copy of this book from Amazon and it exceeded my expectations.
> The first chapter describes what I think are the key issues today in
> undertanding the illusion of self that colors so much of the thinking and
> discussion on this list.  The text is dense, not for the casual reader.
>Highly recommended for those seeking a wider view of consciousness that
> encompasses the "paradoxes" of qualia and subjectivity and David Chalmers'
> so-called "hard problem of consciousness."
>
> - Jef

[Note that I'm replying to a thread on this list from 2003.]

For those *serious* participants in this discussion who for some
reason aren't already familiar with Metzinger's work, there is now an
easy one hour introduction by video available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mthDxnFXs9k.


>
>
> Human Nature Review wrote:
>> Human Nature Review  2003 Volume 3: 450-454 ( 17 November )
>> URL of this document http://human-nature.com/nibbs/03/metzinger.html
>>
>> Book Review
>>
>> Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity
>> by Thomas Metzinger
>> MIT Press, (2003), pp. 699, ISBN: 0-262-13417-9
>>
>> Reviewed by Marcello Ghin.
>>
>> The notion of consciousness has been suspected of being too vague for
>> being a topic of scientific investigation. Recently, consciousness
>> has become more interesting in the light of new neuroscientific
>> imaging studies. Scientists from all over the world are searching for
>> neural correlates of consciousness. However, finding the neural basis
>> is not enough for a scientific explanation of conscious experience.
>> After all, we are still facing the 'hard problem', as David Chalmers
>> dubbed it: why are those neural processes accompanied by conscious
>> experience at all? Maybe we can reformulate the question in this way:
>> Which constraints does a system have to satisfy in order to generate
>> conscious experience? Being No One is an attempt to give an answer to
>> the latter question. To be more precise: it is an attempt to give an
>> answer to the question of how information processing systems generate
>> the conscious experience of being someone.
>>
>> We all experience ourselves as being someone. For example, at this
>> moment you will have the impression that it is you who is actually
>> reading this review. And it is you who is forming thoughts about it.
>> Could it be otherwise? Could I be wrong about what I myself am
>> experiencing? Our daily experiences make us think that we are someone
>> who is experiencing the world. We commonly refer to this phenomenon
>> by speaking of the 'self'. Metzinger claims that no such things as
>> 'selves' exist in the world. All that exists are phenomenal
>> self-models, that is continuously updated dynamic
>> self-representational processes of biological organisms. Conscious
>> beings constantly confuse themselves with the content of their actual
>> phenomenal self-model, thinking that they are identical with a self.
>> According to Metzinger, this is due to the nature of the
>> representational process generating the self-model. The self-model is
>> mostly transparent - the information that it is a model is not
>> carried on the level of content - we are looking through it, having
>> the impression of being in direct contact with our own body and the
>> world. If you are now thinking that this idea is at least
>> counterintuitive, you should read Being No One and find out why it is
>> counterintuitive, and yet that there are good reasons to believe that
>> it is correct.
>>
>> Full text
>> http://human-nature.com/nibbs/03/metzinger.html
>>
>> Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity
>> by Thomas Metzinger (Author)
>> Hardcover: 584 pages ; Dimensions (in inches): 1.56 x 9.25 x 7.32
>> Publisher: MIT Press; (January 24, 2003) ISBN: 0262134179
>> AMAZON - US
>> http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0262134179/darwinanddarwini/
>> AMAZON - UK
>> http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/0262134179/humannaturecom/
>>
>> Editorial Reviews
>> Book Info
>> Johannes Gutenberg-Universitat, Mainz, Germany. Text introduces two
>> theoretical entities that may form the decisive conceptual link
>> between first-person and third-person approaches to the conscious
>> mind. Explores evolutionary roots of intersubjectivity, artifical
>> subjectivity, and future connections between philosophy of mind and
>> ethics.
>>
>> Book Description
>> According to Thomas Metzinger, no such things as selves exist in the
>> world: nobody ever had or was a self. All that exists are phenomenal
>> selves, as they appear in conscious experience. The phenomenal self,
>> however, is not a thing but an ongoing process; it is the content of
>> a "transparent self-model." In Being No One, Metzinger, a German
>> philosopher, draws strongly on neuroscientific research to present a
>> representationalist and functional analysis of what a consciously
>> experienced first-person perspective actually is. Building a bridge
>> between the humanities and the empirical sciences of the mind, he
>> develops new conceptual toolkits and metaphors; uses case studies of
>> unusual states of mind such as agnosia, neglect, blindsight, and
>> hallucinations; and offers new sets of multilevel constraints for the
>> concept of consciousness. Metzinger's central question is: How
>> exactly does strong, consciously experienced subjectivity emerge out
>> of objective events in the natural world? His epistemic goal is to
>> determine whether conscious experience, in particular the experience
>> of being someone that results from the emergence of a phenomenal
>> self, can be analyzed on subpersonal levels of description. He also
>> asks if and how our Cartesian intuitions that subjective experiences
>> as such can never be reductively explained are themselves ultimately
>> rooted in the deeper representational structure of our conscious
>> minds. Metzinger introduces two theoretical entities--the "phenomenal
>> self-model" and the "phenomenal model of the intentionality
>> relation"--that may form the decisive conceptual link between
>> first-person and third-person approaches to the conscious mind and
>> between consciousness research in the humanities and in the sciences.
>> He also discusses the roots of intersubjectivity, artificial
>> subjectivity (the issue of nonbiological phenomenal selves), and
>> connections between philosophy of mind and ethics.
>>
>> Human Nature Review http://human-nature.com
>> Evolutionary Psychology http://human-nature.com/ep
>> Human Nature Daily Review http://human-nature.com/nibbs


From cluebcke at yahoo.com  Wed Feb 17 17:33:16 2010
From: cluebcke at yahoo.com (Christopher Luebcke)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 09:33:16 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Phil Jones acknowledging that climate science isn'tsettled
In-Reply-To: <7641ddc61002170859g6c25fcag3ddb51826fff23bd@mail.gmail.com>
References: <201002162111.o1GLBY3S004345@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
	<412543.58639.qm@web111214.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
	<7641ddc61002170859g6c25fcag3ddb51826fff23bd@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <154647.10956.qm@web111212.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

Let me just add: I am not a climatologist, and therefore even if I had read a wide variety of peer-reviewed papers on the subject, I would not be qualified to determine whether I had made an accurate sampling, much less judge the papers on their merits.

My claim comes in fact from paying attention to those organizations who are responsible for gathering and summarizing professional research and judgement on the subject: Not just IPCC, but NAS, AMS, AGU and AAAS are all organizations, far as I can tell, that are both qualified to comment on the matter, and who have supported the general position that AGW is real.

If you are going to dismiss well-respected scientific bodies that hold positions contrary to your own as necessarily having been "infiltrated by environmental activists", then it is incumbent upon you to provide some evidence that such infiltration by such people has actually taken place.

I wonder if it wouldn't be possible to disagree with their positions, though, without also presuming that the people you disagree with are wicked? That's the larger point of what I was trying to get at.


----- Original Message ----
From: Rafal Smigrodzki <rafal.smigrodzki at gmail.com>
To: ExI chat list <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org>
Sent: Wed, February 17, 2010 8:59:10 AM
Subject: Re: [ExI] Phil Jones acknowledging that climate science isn'tsettled

On Tue, Feb 16, 2010 at 5:25 PM, Christopher Luebcke <cluebcke at yahoo.com> wrote:
>> The peer-reviewed science (which, as has been clear for some time, is not always a guarantee of accuracy), does not all agree. So that doesn't settle the issue.
>
> No, but almost all of it supports the positions that the Earth has been warming over the last century, that the warming has primarily been caused by mankind's introduction of greenhouse gasses into the atmosphere, and that this warming trend will continue, with projected results over the next 100 years ranging, roughly, from pretty bad to catastrophic in terms of human suffering.

### Did you ever read any of this peer-reviewed literature?

Most likely not, since if you did (as I did), you wouldn't have
written the paragraph. In fact, only a minority of peer-reviewed
literature actively endorses the statements you made, and most of this
has been produced by environmental activists who infiltrated CRU,
GISS, and NOAA.

Give me a reference to a peer-reviewed primary research paper showing
manmade global warming and I'll give you two disagreeing with it.

Rafal
_______________________________________________
extropy-chat mailing list
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat



From cluebcke at yahoo.com  Wed Feb 17 17:18:53 2010
From: cluebcke at yahoo.com (Christopher Luebcke)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 09:18:53 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Phil Jones acknowledging that climate science isn'tsettled
In-Reply-To: <7641ddc61002170859g6c25fcag3ddb51826fff23bd@mail.gmail.com>
References: <201002162111.o1GLBY3S004345@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
	<412543.58639.qm@web111214.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
	<7641ddc61002170859g6c25fcag3ddb51826fff23bd@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <723938.90546.qm@web111204.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

> most of thishas been produced by environmental activists who infiltrated CRU,
GISS, and NOAA.

Infiltrators? Oh my. Sounds like we need a purge.


----- Original Message ----
From: Rafal Smigrodzki <rafal.smigrodzki at gmail.com>
To: ExI chat list <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org>
Sent: Wed, February 17, 2010 8:59:10 AM
Subject: Re: [ExI] Phil Jones acknowledging that climate science isn'tsettled

On Tue, Feb 16, 2010 at 5:25 PM, Christopher Luebcke <cluebcke at yahoo.com> wrote:
>> The peer-reviewed science (which, as has been clear for some time, is not always a guarantee of accuracy), does not all agree. So that doesn't settle the issue.
>
> No, but almost all of it supports the positions that the Earth has been warming over the last century, that the warming has primarily been caused by mankind's introduction of greenhouse gasses into the atmosphere, and that this warming trend will continue, with projected results over the next 100 years ranging, roughly, from pretty bad to catastrophic in terms of human suffering.

### Did you ever read any of this peer-reviewed literature?

Most likely not, since if you did (as I did), you wouldn't have
written the paragraph. In fact, only a minority of peer-reviewed
literature actively endorses the statements you made, and most of this
has been produced by environmental activists who infiltrated CRU,
GISS, and NOAA.

Give me a reference to a peer-reviewed primary research paper showing
manmade global warming and I'll give you two disagreeing with it.

Rafal
_______________________________________________
extropy-chat mailing list
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat



From alfio.puglisi at gmail.com  Wed Feb 17 18:10:00 2010
From: alfio.puglisi at gmail.com (Alfio Puglisi)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 19:10:00 +0100
Subject: [ExI] Phil Jones acknowledging that climate science isn'tsettled
In-Reply-To: <7641ddc61002170859g6c25fcag3ddb51826fff23bd@mail.gmail.com>
References: <201002162111.o1GLBY3S004345@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
	<412543.58639.qm@web111214.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
	<7641ddc61002170859g6c25fcag3ddb51826fff23bd@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4902d9991002171010q488c79e1td46df27ddcd96f77@mail.gmail.com>

On Wed, Feb 17, 2010 at 5:59 PM, Rafal Smigrodzki <
rafal.smigrodzki at gmail.com> wrote:

> On Tue, Feb 16, 2010 at 5:25 PM, Christopher Luebcke <cluebcke at yahoo.com>
> wrote:
> >> The peer-reviewed science (which, as has been clear for some time, is
> not always a guarantee of accuracy), does not all agree. So that doesn't
> settle the issue.
> >
> > No, but almost all of it supports the positions that the Earth has been
> warming over the last century, that the warming has primarily been caused by
> mankind's introduction of greenhouse gasses into the atmosphere, and that
> this warming trend will continue, with projected results over the next 100
> years ranging, roughly, from pretty bad to catastrophic in terms of human
> suffering.
>
> ### Did you ever read any of this peer-reviewed literature?
>
> Most likely not, since if you did (as I did), you wouldn't have
> written the paragraph. In fact, only a minority of peer-reviewed
> literature actively endorses the statements you made,
>
> Give me a reference to a peer-reviewed primary research paper showing
> manmade global warming and I'll give you two disagreeing with it.
>

Mmm.... each chapter of the IPCC report has dozens of references. Can you
really find two times that amount?

> and most of this
> has been produced by environmental activists who infiltrated CRU,
> GISS, and NOAA.

And they managed to convince the uK Royal Society, many national academies
of science, and even the American Association of Petroleum Geologists.
"infiltration" doesn't begin to describe it.

Alfio



> Rafal
> _______________________________________________
> extropy-chat mailing list
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
>
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From alfio.puglisi at gmail.com  Wed Feb 17 18:15:04 2010
From: alfio.puglisi at gmail.com (Alfio Puglisi)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 19:15:04 +0100
Subject: [ExI] Phil Jones acknowledging that climate science isn'tsettled
In-Reply-To: <81DEE08EF6054121B466A3303CF6ADF9@DFC68LF1>
References: <201002162111.o1GLBY3S004345@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
	<412543.58639.qm@web111214.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
	<81DEE08EF6054121B466A3303CF6ADF9@DFC68LF1>
Message-ID: <4902d9991002171015k3a0124c2qc19aaf1abc14f3bb@mail.gmail.com>

On Wed, Feb 17, 2010 at 5:55 PM, Natasha Vita-More <natasha at natasha.cc>wrote:

> Christopher Luebcke writes:
>
> "... I just find it sadly ironic, and a dark reflection on the petty,
> fiercely partisan, politicized nature of what should in fact be a sober,
> scientific discussion, that a man accused (in the court of political
> opinion) of fraud should suddenly be taken at his word by those same
> accusers, when that word apparently agrees with their position."
>
> Many of us find it frustrating. Nevertheless the biggest problem and
> disappointment is that, while everyone seems to annoyed and saddened, there
> is a lack of intelligent communication between all parties in viewing the
> situation from diverse perspectives.
>
> Max is working to develop a level ground for discussion.  Bravo to him.
>

I don't agree. Posting all those links to garbage blogs like WUWT, and
quoting them like they had any value instead of laughing at them (or
desperating, depends on the mood), does a disservice to the Extropy list. It
shows how a group of intelligent people can be easily manipulated by PR
spin. I find it depressing.

Alfio



> Best,
> Natasha
>
> _______________________________________________
> extropy-chat mailing list
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
>
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From natasha at natasha.cc  Wed Feb 17 19:49:45 2010
From: natasha at natasha.cc (natasha at natasha.cc)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 14:49:45 -0500
Subject: [ExI] Phil Jones acknowledging that climate science	isn'tsettled
In-Reply-To: <4902d9991002171015k3a0124c2qc19aaf1abc14f3bb@mail.gmail.com>
References: <201002162111.o1GLBY3S004345@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
	<412543.58639.qm@web111214.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
	<81DEE08EF6054121B466A3303CF6ADF9@DFC68LF1>
	<4902d9991002171015k3a0124c2qc19aaf1abc14f3bb@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <20100217144945.t2astxtwhwowssg8@webmail.natasha.cc>

Your observation is irrational.

Natasha

Quoting Alfio Puglisi <alfio.puglisi at gmail.com>:

> On Wed, Feb 17, 2010 at 5:55 PM, Natasha Vita-More <natasha at natasha.cc>wrote:
>
>> Christopher Luebcke writes:
>>
>> "... I just find it sadly ironic, and a dark reflection on the petty,
>> fiercely partisan, politicized nature of what should in fact be a sober,
>> scientific discussion, that a man accused (in the court of political
>> opinion) of fraud should suddenly be taken at his word by those same
>> accusers, when that word apparently agrees with their position."
>>
>> Many of us find it frustrating. Nevertheless the biggest problem and
>> disappointment is that, while everyone seems to annoyed and saddened, there
>> is a lack of intelligent communication between all parties in viewing the
>> situation from diverse perspectives.
>>
>> Max is working to develop a level ground for discussion.  Bravo to him.
>>
>
> I don't agree. Posting all those links to garbage blogs like WUWT, and
> quoting them like they had any value instead of laughing at them (or
> desperating, depends on the mood), does a disservice to the Extropy list. It
> shows how a group of intelligent people can be easily manipulated by PR
> spin. I find it depressing.
>
> Alfio
>
>
>
>> Best,
>> Natasha
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> extropy-chat mailing list
>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
>> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
>>
>





From thespike at satx.rr.com  Wed Feb 17 19:51:14 2010
From: thespike at satx.rr.com (Damien Broderick)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 13:51:14 -0600
Subject: [ExI] Phil Jones acknowledging that climate science isn'tsettled
In-Reply-To: <4902d9991002171015k3a0124c2qc19aaf1abc14f3bb@mail.gmail.com>
References: <201002162111.o1GLBY3S004345@andromeda.ziaspace.com>	<412543.58639.qm@web111214.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>	<81DEE08EF6054121B466A3303CF6ADF9@DFC68LF1>
	<4902d9991002171015k3a0124c2qc19aaf1abc14f3bb@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4B7C48B2.1030303@satx.rr.com>

On 2/17/2010 12:15 PM, Alfio Puglisi wrote:

>>     Max is working to develop a level ground for discussion.  Bravo to him.

> I don't agree. Posting all those links to garbage blogs like WUWT, and
> quoting them like they had any value instead of laughing at them (or
> desperating, depends on the mood), does a disservice to the Extropy
> list. It shows how a group of intelligent people can be easily
> manipulated by PR spin. I find it depressing.

Have to agree with Alfio--sorry. Quoting should at least have url'd the 
full BBC interview text, which gives a rather different impression (to 
me, anyway):

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/8511670.stm>

Damien Broderick


From natasha at natasha.cc  Wed Feb 17 20:07:39 2010
From: natasha at natasha.cc (natasha at natasha.cc)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 15:07:39 -0500
Subject: [ExI] Phil Jones acknowledging that climate science	isn'tsettled
In-Reply-To: <4B7C48B2.1030303@satx.rr.com>
References: <201002162111.o1GLBY3S004345@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
	<412543.58639.qm@web111214.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
	<81DEE08EF6054121B466A3303CF6ADF9@DFC68LF1>
	<4902d9991002171015k3a0124c2qc19aaf1abc14f3bb@mail.gmail.com>
	<4B7C48B2.1030303@satx.rr.com>
Message-ID: <20100217150739.8qmf6mzz4gokc8cc@webmail.natasha.cc>

You agree with the irrational of Alfio that Max is easly manipulated  
by PR spins?  We'd have to ask why the other url was not included; but  
I hardly think it is sufficient evidence that one is being manipulated.

Natasha



Quoting Damien Broderick <thespike at satx.rr.com>:

> On 2/17/2010 12:15 PM, Alfio Puglisi wrote:
>
>>>    Max is working to develop a level ground for discussion.  Bravo to him.
>
>> I don't agree. Posting all those links to garbage blogs like WUWT, and
>> quoting them like they had any value instead of laughing at them (or
>> desperating, depends on the mood), does a disservice to the Extropy
>> list. It shows how a group of intelligent people can be easily
>> manipulated by PR spin. I find it depressing.
>
> Have to agree with Alfio--sorry. Quoting should at least have url'd the
> full BBC interview text, which gives a rather different impression (to
> me, anyway):
>
> <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/8511670.stm>
>
> Damien Broderick
> _______________________________________________
> extropy-chat mailing list
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat





From thespike at satx.rr.com  Wed Feb 17 20:36:29 2010
From: thespike at satx.rr.com (Damien Broderick)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 14:36:29 -0600
Subject: [ExI] Phil Jones acknowledging that climate science	isn'tsettled
In-Reply-To: <20100217150739.8qmf6mzz4gokc8cc@webmail.natasha.cc>
References: <201002162111.o1GLBY3S004345@andromeda.ziaspace.com>	<412543.58639.qm@web111214.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>	<81DEE08EF6054121B466A3303CF6ADF9@DFC68LF1>	<4902d9991002171015k3a0124c2qc19aaf1abc14f3bb@mail.gmail.com>	<4B7C48B2.1030303@satx.rr.com>
	<20100217150739.8qmf6mzz4gokc8cc@webmail.natasha.cc>
Message-ID: <4B7C534D.5040807@satx.rr.com>

On 2/17/2010 2:07 PM, natasha at natasha.cc wrote:

> You agree with the irrational of Alfio that Max is easly manipulated by
> PR spins?

Alfio was making a general and quite rational point about some posters 
to the list, I think, and in this case it does look as if Max jumped the 
gun in citing spin stories rather than the original interview. Calling 
Alfio "irrational" doesn't get us very far in advancing the discussion.

Christopher commented: "I wonder if it wouldn't be possible to disagree 
with their positions, though, without also presuming that the people you 
disagree with are wicked?" Ditto "irrational." HOWEVER... that doesn't 
mean some players in the supposed debate *aren't* wicked--consider, by 
analogy,. the decades-long and perhaps equivalent role of corporate 
advocates for carcinogenic smoking. If that was not wickedness, what is? 
It is arguable that climate change deniers are in a similar position.

That said, I agree with Barbara Lamar, who comments:

<Since I agree with James Lovelock that there is no way we can prevent 
major climate change at this point, I find it highly irresponsible to 
pass laws and force people to take actions they would not otherwise take 
based on the false assumption that humans can somehow make things go 
back "to normal."

I would far rather see money spent on developing plants that are not 
sensitive to heat & cold (interestingly, when plants are bred for cold 
tolerance, they often have heat tolerance as well, as "side effect."), 
on efficient energy production (so we can create affordable 
microclimates and deal with rising sea levels, if we have to), etc. In 
other words - figure out how to DEAL with the problem, not STOP it.>

Damien Broderick


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Wed Feb 17 20:38:24 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 12:38:24 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Consciouness and paracrap
In-Reply-To: <517167.25357.qm@web110408.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
References: <517167.25357.qm@web110408.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002171238x4b3be1efm9da976cbbe28b282@mail.gmail.com>

Anna Taylor <femmechakra at yahoo.ca>:
> I know I'm simple minded but I don't understand why consciousness is such
> a philosophical debate. ?I wonder why science sometimes complicates
> things.

Simplicity is a virtue. But, have you seen much scientific reasoning
going on here?

I haven't!

Anna Taylor <femmechakra at yahoo.ca>:
> Let's say the word conscious meant alive versus
> dead. Anything that is conscious is alive and awake. ?Could everyone
> agree on that?

I have no problem with that definition, but then you also need to
define "alive". Lots of disagreement there. I think "awake" is
sufficiently unambiguous. You might run into the question of what
androids dream of, though.

Does it make sense to speak of sleeping rocks?

Being alive may be a prerequisite for being awake or asleep.

Anna Taylor <femmechakra at yahoo.ca>:
> My observation:
> Well my contacts work fine. My memory would recall, extract and process
> the information. ?If the contacts are too weak and I can't see then
> yes one of my awareness factors would be limited but it would not stop
> me from being conscious or have consciousness.

This isn't actually what Stathis was talking about. He wants the
answer to this question:

If I were to replace your visual cortex with a device* wired to
exactly reproduce its normal inputs and outputs, would you still have
the subjective experience of seeing?

*There is an implication that the device in question is a digital
computer, which I take to mean something with registers and clock
cycles.

Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com>:
> Several people have commented that we need a definition of
> consciousness to proceed, but I disagree. I think everyone knows what
> is meant by the word and so we can have a complete discussion without
> at any point defining it.

Dude, I barely know what I mean by the word when I use it in my own
head. Are you talking about access consciousness? Phenomenal
consciousness? Reflexive consciousness? All of the above?

http://www.def-logic.com/articles/silby011.html

The reason I haven't supplied a rigorous definition for consciousness,
as I have for intelligence, is because I can't articulate the meaning
of it for myself. This, to me, does not seem ancillary to the
discussion; it seems to be the very root of the discussion, namely the
question, "what is consciousness?".

Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com>:
> For those who say that consciousness does
> not really exist: consciousness is that thing you are referring to
> when you say that consciousness does not really exist.

That's fair. There isn't any question of what I'm talking about when I
refer to the Flying Spaghetti Monster.

I can describe the FSM to you in great detail, however. I can't do the
same with consciousness, except perhaps to say that, if it exists, it
occasionally compels normally sane people to begin a sentence with
"dude".

Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com>:
> The purpose of the above is to show that it is impossible (logically
> impossible, not just physically impossible) to make a brain part, and
> hence a whole brain, that behaves exactly like a biological brain but
> lacks consciousness. Either it isn't possible to make such an
> artificial component at all, or else it is possible to make such a
> component but it will necessarily also have consciousness. The
> alternative is to say that you're happy with the idea that you may be
> blind, deaf, unable to understand English etc. but neither you nor
> anyone else has noticed.
>
> Gordon Swobe's response is that this thought experiment is ridiculous
> and I should come up with another one that doesn't challenge the
> self-evident fact that digital computers cannot be conscious.

Gordon doesn't disagree with that proposition as-stated, even if he
sometimes claims that he does (for some reason). He's consistently
said that we should be able to engineer artificial consciousness, but
that to do so requires more than a clever piece of software in a
digital computer.

So, I suggest that you rephrase the experiment so that it explicitly
involves replacing neurons, cortices, or whole brains with
microprocessor-driven prosthetics. We know that he believes the
whole-brain version will be a zombie, but I haven't been able to
discern any clear conclusions from him on the other two.

He has said before that partial replacement only confuses the matter,
implying that it's a useless thought experiment. I do not see why he
would think that, though.

The only coherent answer of his I remember goes something like this: a
man has a damaged language center, and a surgeon replaces neurons with
artificial substitutes one by one. This works so poorly that the
surgeon must replace the entire brain before language function is
returned, at which point the man is a philosophical zombie.

But we always start with the assumption that computerized neurons do
not work poorly, indeed that they "depict" ordinary neurons perfectly
(using that depiction as a guide to manipulate their synthetic axons
and such), and I've never seen him explain why he considers this
assumption to be inherently false.


From joe.dalton23 at yahoo.com  Wed Feb 17 20:14:07 2010
From: joe.dalton23 at yahoo.com (Joe Dalton)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 12:14:07 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Test from new subscriber
Message-ID: <939179.93622.qm@web113907.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

Testing -- Subscribed to this list a few months ago... only got one message thru. Trying again from a new address.

Joe


      
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From max at maxmore.com  Wed Feb 17 20:49:31 2010
From: max at maxmore.com (Max More)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 14:49:31 -0600
Subject: [ExI] Phil Jones acknowledging that climate science	isn'tsettled
Message-ID: <201002172049.o1HKnewH023195@andromeda.ziaspace.com>

Damien says:

>Alfio was making a general and quite rational point about some posters
>to the list, I think, and in this case it does look as if Max jumped the
>gun in citing spin stories rather than the original interview.

Oh give me a break. The piece cited included a link to the original 
BBC story in the *first sentence*.

I should note that I will not engage Alfio in discussion on this 
issue, since it's clear to me that anything that disagrees with his 
view is automatically dismissed. The latest evidence for that is his 
calling WUWT a "garbage blog". It is not. I could reply -- equally 
unreasonably -- by calling RealClimate a garbage blog. Neither of 
them are garbage, though both may contain some mistaken material.

Max





From lacertilian at gmail.com  Wed Feb 17 21:03:24 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 13:03:24 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Test from new subscriber
In-Reply-To: <939179.93622.qm@web113907.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
References: <939179.93622.qm@web113907.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002171303h6b64791fob186f7ddd238bf7f@mail.gmail.com>

Joe Dalton <joe.dalton23 at yahoo.com>:
>
> Testing -- Subscribed to this list a few months ago... only got one message thru. Trying again from a new address.
>
> Joe

Seems to be working on our side.


From joe.dalton23 at yahoo.com  Wed Feb 17 20:37:25 2010
From: joe.dalton23 at yahoo.com (Joe Dalton)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 12:37:25 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Fw: Test from new subscriber
Message-ID: <534353.36367.qm@web113909.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

Arg. Trying again. Is someone trying to keep me out??



----- Forwarded Message ----
From: Joe Dalton <joe.dalton23 at yahoo.com>
To: Extropy-Chat <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org>
Sent: Wed, February 17, 2010 2:14:07 PM
Subject: Test from new subscriber


Testing -- Subscribed to this list a few months ago... only got one message thru. Trying again from a new address.

Joe


      
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From mbb386 at main.nc.us  Wed Feb 17 21:11:03 2010
From: mbb386 at main.nc.us (MB)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 16:11:03 -0500 (EST)
Subject: [ExI] Test from new subscriber
In-Reply-To: <939179.93622.qm@web113907.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
References: <939179.93622.qm@web113907.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <38630.12.77.168.255.1266441063.squirrel@www.main.nc.us>


Received here. Looks fine.

Regards,
MB

> Testing -- Subscribed to this list a few months ago... only got one message thru.
> Trying again from a new address.
>



From thespike at satx.rr.com  Wed Feb 17 21:11:57 2010
From: thespike at satx.rr.com (Damien Broderick)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 15:11:57 -0600
Subject: [ExI] Phil Jones acknowledging that climate science	isn'tsettled
In-Reply-To: <201002172049.o1HKnewH023195@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
References: <201002172049.o1HKnewH023195@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
Message-ID: <4B7C5B9D.7010502@satx.rr.com>

On 2/17/2010 2:49 PM, Max More wrote:

> Oh give me a break. The piece cited included a link to the original BBC
> story in the *first sentence*.

My goof, sorry. Didn't notice that, because the url was embedded behind 
a bolded phrase in the "Annotated Version of the Phil & Roger Show".

Damien Broderick


From natasha at natasha.cc  Wed Feb 17 21:15:09 2010
From: natasha at natasha.cc (natasha at natasha.cc)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 16:15:09 -0500
Subject: [ExI] Phil Jones acknowledging that climate science	isn'tsettled
In-Reply-To: <4B7C534D.5040807@satx.rr.com>
References: <201002162111.o1GLBY3S004345@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
	<412543.58639.qm@web111214.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
	<81DEE08EF6054121B466A3303CF6ADF9@DFC68LF1>
	<4902d9991002171015k3a0124c2qc19aaf1abc14f3bb@mail.gmail.com>
	<4B7C48B2.1030303@satx.rr.com>
	<20100217150739.8qmf6mzz4gokc8cc@webmail.natasha.cc>
	<4B7C534D.5040807@satx.rr.com>
Message-ID: <20100217161509.hvzuebfszockcwkg@webmail.natasha.cc>

Quoting Damien Broderick <thespike at satx.rr.com>:

> On 2/17/2010 2:07 PM, natasha at natasha.cc wrote:
>
>> You agree with the irrational of Alfio that Max is easily manipulated by
>> PR spins?
>
> Alfio was making a general and quite rational point about some posters
> to the list, I think, and in this case it does look as if Max jumped
> the gun in citing spin stories rather than the original interview.

This was not my take on it at all:  The first sentence of the first  
paragraph of the article has a link to the original BBC Q&A interview.  
And in Max's post, he said that the piece was "interesting".   
Interesting to me means that it gets a person's attention - whether  
positive or negative and does not mean that one agrees or disagrees.   
Further, when asking why a person did not find it interesting, invites  
an exchange into thinking processes (maybe not totally Socratic, but  
it opens dialogue).  But, let's step back a moment: this topic is  
fascinating and, while I was out of the country (in Auzzi land) when  
it broke, it got a heck of a lot of attention in lots of circles and  
this BBC-WUWT is the first I personally have read about it since that  
time ... so for me anyway, it is "interesting" and, mind you, I am not  
saying that I agree with it or disagree with it. I am merely absorbing.

> Calling Alfio "irrational" doesn't get us very far in advancing the
> discussion.

Let's step back a moment: A perspective that lacks understanding (in  
this case an understanding of a person's intention (which we do not  
know yet because Max is not in this conversation and I do not speak  
for him) is not rational, especially when taking a post to court  
because it did not include a URL and taking "interesting" as more  
powerful than it could have been intended.

If you read my first post in this thread concerning the issue of  
global warming and discourse surrounding global warming, -- I wrote:

"Nevertheless the biggest problem and disappointment is that, while  
everyone seems to annoyed and saddened, there is a lack of intelligent  
communication between all parties in viewing the situation from  
diverse perspectives."  This sums up my view.

> Christopher commented: "I wonder if it wouldn't be possible to disagree
> with their positions, though, without also presuming that the people
> you disagree with are wicked?" Ditto "irrational."

This is incorrect.  Wicked does not equal irrational. And again here  
is another supposition. Irrational in this instance means a "LACK OF  
UNDERSTANDING". However, it is very true that irrational can be taken  
as pejorative - which is not how I meant it - I simply found the lack  
of dialogue, stated in an absolutist fashion, to be the result of a  
missed understanding.  Nevertheless, let's move on (or should I say  
backwards):  What does "manipulated" mean? Let's see:  I "assume" that  
Christopher means being "control shrewdly" or maybe "deviously".  But  
let's suppose the article does have a devious characteristic - does  
this result in a person being influenced by deception just because  
s/he says it is interesting?  I think not.

> HOWEVER... that
> doesn't mean some players in the supposed debate *aren't*
> wicked--consider, by analogy,. the decades-long and perhaps equivalent
> role of corporate advocates for carcinogenic smoking. If that was not
> wickedness, what is? It is arguable that climate change deniers are in
> a similar position.

I'd love to have a darn good discussion about players of debates,  
advertizing, PR, marketing, etc. under a different thread subject line  
which is more appropriate to its contents.

Best,
Natasha




From joe.dalton23 at yahoo.com  Wed Feb 17 20:52:50 2010
From: joe.dalton23 at yahoo.com (Joe Dalton)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 12:52:50 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Phil Jones acknowledging that climate science isn'tsettled
Message-ID: <960175.20814.qm@web113903.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

Puglisi:
   Mmm.... each chapter of the IPCC report has dozens of references. Can you really 
find two times that amount? 

Doubt it. But there's no shortage of skeptical peer-reviewed papers. e.g.:

http://wattsupwiththat.com/2009/11/15/reference-450-skeptical-peer-reviewed-papers/#more-12801

JoeD



      
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From max at maxmore.com  Wed Feb 17 21:24:54 2010
From: max at maxmore.com (Max More)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 15:24:54 -0600
Subject: [ExI] Phil Jones acknowledging that climate science	isn'tsettled
Message-ID: <201002172125.o1HLP3dO006994@andromeda.ziaspace.com>

Thanks, Damien. Since the article I did cite linked so immediately to 
the BBC piece, I didn't think it necessary to separately include it in my post.

Still, in one way, I may have to agree that I might have "jumped the 
gun" in posting that. I did think it was interesting that a central 
figure was moderating his position, but perhaps I should have gone to 
the trouble of analyzing where I agreed, disagreed, or doubted the 
summary and inferences made by Goklany.

I should also have anticipated the renewed firestorm it might set 
off. Or perhaps this was a sinister plot by me to draw attention away 
from the endless consciousness/Searle discussion...

>On 2/17/2010 2:49 PM, Max More wrote:
>
> > Oh give me a break. The piece cited included a link to the original
> > BBC story in the *first sentence*.
>
>My goof, sorry. Didn't notice that, because the url was embedded behind
>a bolded phrase in the "Annotated Version of the Phil & Roger Show".
>
>Damien Broderick

Max


-------------------------------------
Max More, Ph.D.
Strategic Philosopher
The Proactionary Project
Extropy Institute Founder
www.maxmore.com
max at maxmore.com
------------------------------------- 



From max at maxmore.com  Wed Feb 17 21:35:26 2010
From: max at maxmore.com (Max More)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 15:35:26 -0600
Subject: [ExI] Phil Jones acknowledging that climate science isn'tsettled
Message-ID: <201002172135.o1HLZYFR020721@andromeda.ziaspace.com>

Emlyn:

>I haven't read the whole thing in detail, but 
>one early piece stuck out like a sore thumb, 
>which is the old saw that there is no 
>significant warming since 1998. That's just flat 
>out wrong, and it's wrong because 1998 itself 
>stuck out like a sore thumb; it was a 
>statistical anomaly, which anyone who wasn't 
>being entirely disingenuous would agree with.
>
>Here's a discussion of that issue, along with 
>graphs showing the 1998 sore thumb:
>
>http://scienceblogs.com/illconsidered/2006/04/warming-stopped-in-1998.php

The source you cite (which is almost four years 
old now), seems to rely for the recent period 
exclusively on NASA GISS analysis. (References to 
CRU data are for other periods. I didn't see any comparison with UAH or RSS.)

In contrast, the following piece..
http://wattsupwiththat.com/2008/03/08/3-of-4-global-metrics-show-nearly-flat-temperature-anomaly-in-the-last-decade/

...compares that analysis to three other sources 
and notes "NASA GISS land-ocean anomaly data 
showing a ten year trend of 0.151?C, which is 
about 5 times larger than the largest of the 
three metrics above, which is UAH at 0.028?C /ten years. "

Is there a good reason to rely completely on the 
source that seems out of alignment with the 
others? (I'm going to look at the two contrasting 
sources more closely when I have more time.)

I'm not clear whether any or all of the four 
sources count as showing "statistically 
significant warming" (though RSS obviously does 
not, since it shows a very slight decline), but 
they do at least show warming greatly below IPCC trend.

To be clear: Whether or not warming since 1995 or 
1998 has stopped or considerably slowed down is 
of little importance. The orthodoxy and the 
skeptics can agree that one decade is too short 
to show anything significant about long-term 
trends. It does, however, raise additional doubts 
about AGW models. I haven't seen a good 
explanation of why the models completely fail to 
account for this -- and previous multi-decade, 
industrial-age pauses in warming, if CO2 really is the main driver.

Not only is the one-decade/12-year record of 
little importance, I still have not seen adequate 
reason to maintain my doubts about the claim that 
century-long warming is definitely and entirely 
due to human activity rather than to a natural 
cyclical recovery from a cold period.

But, obviously, that must be because I'm either 
stupid, evil, or probably both. ;-)

Max



-------------------------------------
Max More, Ph.D.
Strategic Philosopher
The Proactionary Project
Extropy Institute Founder
www.maxmore.com
max at maxmore.com
------------------------------------- 



From scerir at libero.it  Wed Feb 17 21:55:03 2010
From: scerir at libero.it (scerir)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 22:55:03 +0100 (CET)
Subject: [ExI] QET
Message-ID: <18113742.1858661266443703358.JavaMail.defaultUser@defaultHost>

Henrique:
> By non-local gravitational fields you mean putting gravity on a spaceship 
for instance? Now that would be interesting.

Paul Simon sings: < "The problem is all inside your head", she said to me / 
The answer is easy if you take it logically [...] > (from '50 Ways To Leave 
Your Lover', 1975)

So, let us start from the beginning.

In "Relativity and the Problem of Space" (1952), Albert Einstein wrote:
"When a smaller box s is situated, relatively at rest, inside the hollow space 
of a larger box S, then the hollow space of s is a part of the hollow space of 
S, and the same "space", which contains both of them, belongs to each of the 
boxes. When s is in motion with respect to S, however, the concept is less 
simple. One is then inclined to think that s encloses always the same space, 
but a variable part of the space S. It then becomes necessary to apportion to 
each box its particular space, not thought of as bounded, and to assume that 
these two spaces are in motion with respect to each other. Before one has 
become aware of this complication, space appears as an unbounded medium or 
container in which material objects swim around. But it must now be remembered 
that there is an infinite number of spaces, which are in motion with respect to 
each other. The concept of space as something existing objectively and 
independent of things belongs to pre-scientific thought, but not so the idea of 
the existence of an infinite number of spaces in motion relatively to each 
other."

If we follow Einstein, and encode gravity in the geometry of space-time, 
matter curves space-time, and its metric is no longer fixed. However, space-
time is still somehow represented by a *smooth continuum*. To restore coherence 
of physics or - to say it better - to get a perfect coherence between GR and QT 
(not just the present  "peaceful coexistence") one has to abandon the idea that 
space-time is fixed, immune to change. One has to encode gravity into the very 
geometry of space-time, thereby making this geometry *dynamical*.

Thus, while spacetime can be defined by the objects themselves, and their 
dynamics, it is well known the nonlocal (rectius: nonseparable) behaviour of 
entangled particles, and these entangled particles should live in the Hilbert 
spaces but also in a well-designed space-time. Now, a simple question would be: 
if spacetime is defined by objects, and if the nature of these objects may be 
quantal, can we say that spacetime may be 'nonlocal' (or 'nonlocally causal')? 
Does it make any sense?

For, general relativity completely ignores quantum effects and we have learned 
that these effects become important both in the physics of the *small* and in 
the physics of long
distance *correlations* (even between *spacelike separated* regions of the 
universe, at least in principle).

It has been said that primary goal of *quantum gravity* is to uncover the 
quantal structure of spacetime, and coarse-graining, backreaction, fluctuations 
and correlations may play an essential role in such a quest. Quantum gravity is 
not equivalent to a local field theory in the (bulk) spacetime and there's a 
lot of powerful evidence that quantum gravity is not strictly local or causal 
(holography; getting the information out of the black hole; there is no 
connection operator in LQG and as a result the curvature operator has to be 
expressed in terms of holonomies and becomes non-local, etc.).

Summing up. It is not about 'putting gravity on a space-ship'. It is more 
about thinking the space-time as something strictly dependent of the dynamics 
of massive objects and of quantal objects, it is more about the possibility of 
changing the gravitational field at-a-distance, via quantum entanglement 
correlations coupled to massive objects, or via more efficient quantum gravity 
mechanisms. (Quantal randomness and related a-causality might still preserve 
the no-signaling postulate.) 
  








From alfio.puglisi at gmail.com  Wed Feb 17 22:02:17 2010
From: alfio.puglisi at gmail.com (Alfio Puglisi)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 23:02:17 +0100
Subject: [ExI] Phil Jones acknowledging that climate science isn'tsettled
In-Reply-To: <201002172049.o1HKnewH023195@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
References: <201002172049.o1HKnewH023195@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
Message-ID: <4902d9991002171402p44079507p9ebe64e9576a6d9e@mail.gmail.com>

On Wed, Feb 17, 2010 at 9:49 PM, Max More <max at maxmore.com> wrote:

I should note that I will not engage Alfio in discussion on this issue,
> since it's clear to me that anything that disagrees with his view is
> automatically dismissed.
>

Let's rewrite that: anything that disagrees with the current scientific
understading is dismissed. And not automatically. I usually try to show why,
and I think that I posted more than enough links in the previous global
warming thread. I am very disappointed that you think that I'm just
defending a personal opinion. English is not my mother language, but I
thought that I was writing at a decent enough level to be understood.

We just got another link to WUWT from JoeD a few minutes ago. Oh, and
another one from you while I'm writing this. I have seen so many links to it
on this list, from multiple people, that it seems to have become the primary
source of information for many people. Or at least, the source that they are
going to cite.

Alfio
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From alfio.puglisi at gmail.com  Wed Feb 17 22:07:57 2010
From: alfio.puglisi at gmail.com (Alfio Puglisi)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 23:07:57 +0100
Subject: [ExI] Phil Jones acknowledging that climate science isn'tsettled
In-Reply-To: <20100217144945.t2astxtwhwowssg8@webmail.natasha.cc>
References: <201002162111.o1GLBY3S004345@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
	<412543.58639.qm@web111214.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
	<81DEE08EF6054121B466A3303CF6ADF9@DFC68LF1>
	<4902d9991002171015k3a0124c2qc19aaf1abc14f3bb@mail.gmail.com>
	<20100217144945.t2astxtwhwowssg8@webmail.natasha.cc>
Message-ID: <4902d9991002171407p5ef97706sd378917a44e17434@mail.gmail.com>

On Wed, Feb 17, 2010 at 8:49 PM, <natasha at natasha.cc> wrote:

> Your observation is irrational.
>
>
It's not. The global warming debate only exists because of PR, media and
political spin. The scientific debate was over many years ago. I highly
suggest Spencer Weart's history of global warming science:
http://www.aip.org/history/climate/

Alfio





> Natasha
>
>
> Quoting Alfio Puglisi <alfio.puglisi at gmail.com>:
>
>  On Wed, Feb 17, 2010 at 5:55 PM, Natasha Vita-More <natasha at natasha.cc
>> >wrote:
>>
>>  Christopher Luebcke writes:
>>>
>>> "... I just find it sadly ironic, and a dark reflection on the petty,
>>> fiercely partisan, politicized nature of what should in fact be a sober,
>>> scientific discussion, that a man accused (in the court of political
>>> opinion) of fraud should suddenly be taken at his word by those same
>>> accusers, when that word apparently agrees with their position."
>>>
>>> Many of us find it frustrating. Nevertheless the biggest problem and
>>> disappointment is that, while everyone seems to annoyed and saddened,
>>> there
>>> is a lack of intelligent communication between all parties in viewing the
>>> situation from diverse perspectives.
>>>
>>> Max is working to develop a level ground for discussion.  Bravo to him.
>>>
>>>
>> I don't agree. Posting all those links to garbage blogs like WUWT, and
>> quoting them like they had any value instead of laughing at them (or
>> desperating, depends on the mood), does a disservice to the Extropy list.
>> It
>> shows how a group of intelligent people can be easily manipulated by PR
>> spin. I find it depressing.
>>
>> Alfio
>>
>>
>>
>>  Best,
>>> Natasha
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> extropy-chat mailing list
>>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
>>> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
>>>
>>>
>>
>
>
> _______________________________________________
> extropy-chat mailing list
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat
>
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From lacertilian at gmail.com  Wed Feb 17 22:40:56 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 14:40:56 -0800
Subject: [ExI] Phil Jones acknowledging that climate science isn'tsettled
In-Reply-To: <201002172135.o1HLZYFR020721@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
References: <201002172135.o1HLZYFR020721@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002171440k6e6ec87eye8ee5a1deeed4658@mail.gmail.com>

Max More <max at maxmore.com>:
> Not only is the one-decade/12-year record of little importance, I still have not seen adequate reason to maintain my doubts about the claim that century-long warming is definitely and entirely due to human activity rather than to a natural cyclical recovery from a cold period.

Haven't seen reason to maintain your doubts, eh? Perhaps you should
abandon them, and jump on the mankind-driven bandwagon instead!

Couldn't resist.

Personally I am more-or-less with Max here in saying that we do not
yet have nearly enough evidence to support either view. Truly
conclusive proof would require, at the very least, an alternate Earth
(real or simulated) in which no species ever evolved to the point
where it became a good idea to just start burning everything.

It's fairly obvious, though, that if we are the chief cause of global
warming then we have no idea what we should do differently to prevent
it or even slow it down.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greenhouse_gas#Greenhouse_effects_in_Earth.27s_atmosphere

http://www.aip.org/history/climate/othergas.htm

http://www.geocraft.com/WVFossils/greenhouse_data.html

Ugh, I actually hadn't read any of these before now (except the
Wikipedia one, maybe, but I only skimmed it). Just Googled them up on
the spot. We don't know anything!

Damien Broderick <thespike at satx.rr.com>:
> I would far rather see money spent on developing plants that are not
> sensitive to heat & cold (interestingly, when plants are bred for cold
> tolerance, they often have heat tolerance as well, as "side effect."), on
> efficient energy production (so we can create affordable microclimates and
> deal with rising sea levels, if we have to), etc. In other words - figure
> out how to DEAL with the problem, not STOP it.>

Seconded.

More heat just means more energy. Let's load up on Stirling engines*
and start building cities underwater! No sense in waiting for the sea
level to rise and do it for us.

Or, you know, ideas that work. Like hardier plants.

This is not my job.


*Actually, as I understand it, global warming could more accurately be
called global climate change. The hots get hotter and the colds get
colder; everything, everywhere, grows extreme. So a continent-spanning
array of Stirling engines might actually be useful, taking advantage
of temperature differentials on global scales. Any of our geoengineers
want to run the numbers on that? I'll bet you it would only be
economical if we could build such a device for almost nothing.


From thespike at satx.rr.com  Wed Feb 17 23:01:48 2010
From: thespike at satx.rr.com (Damien Broderick)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 17:01:48 -0600
Subject: [ExI] Phil Jones acknowledging that climate science isn'tsettled
In-Reply-To: <e321aa4b1002171440k6e6ec87eye8ee5a1deeed4658@mail.gmail.com>
References: <201002172135.o1HLZYFR020721@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
	<e321aa4b1002171440k6e6ec87eye8ee5a1deeed4658@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <4B7C755C.6060104@satx.rr.com>

On 2/17/2010 4:40 PM, Spencer Campbell wrote:

> Actually, as I understand it, global warming could more accurately be
> called global climate change. The hots get hotter and the colds get
> colder; everything, everywhere, grows extreme.

Yes, but the increased volatility is caused by an overall increase in 
trapped heat. So "global climate change" is a handy term to block idiots 
from waving "IT CAN'T BE GETTING HOTTER--THERE WAS SNOW HERE THIS WEEK!" 
mid-winter signs. But it's still warming on a global scale.

Damien Broderick


From lacertilian at gmail.com  Wed Feb 17 23:17:01 2010
From: lacertilian at gmail.com (Spencer Campbell)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 15:17:01 -0800
Subject: [ExI]  Dresden Codak has our number
Message-ID: <e321aa4b1002171517o751eef71u7b4ae44a137d2a60@mail.gmail.com>

I think Aaron Diaz might be reading the ongoing (and going, and going)
Extropy-Chat consciousness debate.

http://dresdencodak.com/2010/02/16/artificial-flight-and-other-myths-a-reasoned-examination-of-af-by-top-birds/

So uh, just in case:

Hi Aaron. Update more. Thanks. Bye.

(I am walking on thin ice by linking to something with so few
qualifying statements. Of this, I am aware. What's the worst that
could happen?)


From kanzure at gmail.com  Wed Feb 17 23:21:14 2010
From: kanzure at gmail.com (Bryan Bishop)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 17:21:14 -0600
Subject: [ExI] Dresden Codak has our number
In-Reply-To: <e321aa4b1002171517o751eef71u7b4ae44a137d2a60@mail.gmail.com>
References: <e321aa4b1002171517o751eef71u7b4ae44a137d2a60@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <55ad6af71002171521k4fed6cf2p7aa423fb2528ca4e@mail.gmail.com>

On Wed, Feb 17, 2010 at 5:17 PM, Spencer Campbell wrote:
> I think Aaron Diaz might be reading the ongoing (and going, and going)
> Extropy-Chat consciousness debate.
>
> http://dresdencodak.com/2010/02/16/artificial-flight-and-other-myths-a-reasoned-examination-of-af-by-top-birds/
>
> So uh, just in case:
>
> Hi Aaron. Update more. Thanks. Bye.

I saw Aaron at the last Singularity Summit. I was talking with him for
a while until I realized who he was. I had to interrupt him
mid-sentence with "YOU ARE A GOD".

Also, he's too humble.

- Bryan
http://heybryan.org/
1 512 203 0507


From cluebcke at yahoo.com  Wed Feb 17 23:30:20 2010
From: cluebcke at yahoo.com (Christopher Luebcke)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 15:30:20 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Phil Jones acknowledging that climate science isn'tsettled
In-Reply-To: <e321aa4b1002171440k6e6ec87eye8ee5a1deeed4658@mail.gmail.com>
References: <201002172135.o1HLZYFR020721@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
	<e321aa4b1002171440k6e6ec87eye8ee5a1deeed4658@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <758946.78766.qm@web111202.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

> we do not
> yet have nearly enough evidence to support either view.

I think you may be in the minority view there; a lot of people seem to think that there's quite enough evidence. 

> Truly> conclusive proof would require, at the very least, an alternate Earth
> (real or simulated) in which no species ever evolved to the point

> where it became a good idea to just start burning everything. 

This is in fact what climate modelers attempt to do, with imperfect but increasing accuracy (the accuracy of models being measured by "backcasting"--starting at a point some time in the past, running the model, and seeing if the predicted results match observations). See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_climate_model#Accuracy_of_models_that_predict_global_warming for some examples of how this problem is addressed. No models are perfect and climate is notoriously difficult to model, but that doesn't mean we know nothing, and it doesn't mean we can't improve our knowledge.

I will also second the proposition that the best use of our resources, outside of research dollars to improve our understanding and forecasting abilities, is to start planning adaptation now. Given where I live, this involves adding flippers to my earthquake preparedness kit :P


----- Original Message ----
> From: Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com>
> To: ExI chat list <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org>
> Sent: Wed, February 17, 2010 2:40:56 PM
> Subject: Re: [ExI] Phil Jones acknowledging that climate science isn'tsettled
> 
> Max More :
> > Not only is the one-decade/12-year record of little importance, I still have 
> not seen adequate reason to maintain my doubts about the claim that century-long 
> warming is definitely and entirely due to human activity rather than to a 
> natural cyclical recovery from a cold period.
> 
> Haven't seen reason to maintain your doubts, eh? Perhaps you should
> abandon them, and jump on the mankind-driven bandwagon instead!
> 
> Couldn't resist.
> 
> Personally I am more-or-less with Max here in saying that we do not
> yet have nearly enough evidence to support either view. Truly
> conclusive proof would require, at the very least, an alternate Earth
> (real or simulated) in which no species ever evolved to the point
> where it became a good idea to just start burning everything.
> 
> It's fairly obvious, though, that if we are the chief cause of global
> warming then we have no idea what we should do differently to prevent
> it or even slow it down.
> 
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greenhouse_gas#Greenhouse_effects_in_Earth.27s_atmosphere
> 
> http://www.aip.org/history/climate/othergas.htm
> 
> http://www.geocraft.com/WVFossils/greenhouse_data.html
> 
> Ugh, I actually hadn't read any of these before now (except the
> Wikipedia one, maybe, but I only skimmed it). Just Googled them up on
> the spot. We don't know anything!
> 
> Damien Broderick :
> > I would far rather see money spent on developing plants that are not
> > sensitive to heat & cold (interestingly, when plants are bred for cold
> > tolerance, they often have heat tolerance as well, as "side effect."), on
> > efficient energy production (so we can create affordable microclimates and
> > deal with rising sea levels, if we have to), etc. In other words - figure
> > out how to DEAL with the problem, not STOP it.>
> 
> Seconded.
> 
> More heat just means more energy. Let's load up on Stirling engines*
> and start building cities underwater! No sense in waiting for the sea
> level to rise and do it for us.
> 
> Or, you know, ideas that work. Like hardier plants.
> 
> This is not my job.
> 
> 
> *Actually, as I understand it, global warming could more accurately be
> called global climate change. The hots get hotter and the colds get
> colder; everything, everywhere, grows extreme. So a continent-spanning
> array of Stirling engines might actually be useful, taking advantage
> of temperature differentials on global scales. Any of our geoengineers
> want to run the numbers on that? I'll bet you it would only be
> economical if we could build such a device for almost nothing.
> _______________________________________________
> extropy-chat mailing list
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat



From gts_2000 at yahoo.com  Wed Feb 17 23:16:48 2010
From: gts_2000 at yahoo.com (Gordon Swobe)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 15:16:48 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <218661.53873.qm@web111208.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <760637.43302.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com>

--- On Wed, 2/17/10, Christopher Luebcke <cluebcke at yahoo.com> wrote:

> Could one detect or measure consciousness on the basis of "behaviors and 
> reports of subjective experiences" alone, without direct anatomical
> knowledge of a "brain and nervous system"?

No, I don't think so. Under those circumstances we could only speculate.

> Conversely, does a system with a "brain and nervous system"
> necessarily have consciousness, even in the absence of
> "behaviors and reports of subjective experience"?

If you have a brain and a nervous system but exhibit no associated behaviors then it seems to me that you have some serious neurologoical issues. 

What about you, Chris? Do you have a physical brain capable of having conscious thoughts?

-gts


      


From cluebcke at yahoo.com  Wed Feb 17 23:31:36 2010
From: cluebcke at yahoo.com (Christopher Luebcke)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 15:31:36 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Phil Jones acknowledging that climate science isn'tsettled
In-Reply-To: <4B7C755C.6060104@satx.rr.com>
References: <201002172135.o1HLZYFR020721@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
	<e321aa4b1002171440k6e6ec87eye8ee5a1deeed4658@mail.gmail.com>
	<4B7C755C.6060104@satx.rr.com>
Message-ID: <320317.89684.qm@web111209.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

Yes, every spring propels us towards Waterworld, and every fall sees us skidding towards the next ice age.


----- Original Message ----
> From: Damien Broderick <thespike at satx.rr.com>
> To: ExI chat list <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org>
> Sent: Wed, February 17, 2010 3:01:48 PM
> Subject: Re: [ExI] Phil Jones acknowledging that climate science isn'tsettled
> 
> On 2/17/2010 4:40 PM, Spencer Campbell wrote:
> 
> > Actually, as I understand it, global warming could more accurately be
> > called global climate change. The hots get hotter and the colds get
> > colder; everything, everywhere, grows extreme.
> 
> Yes, but the increased volatility is caused by an overall increase in trapped 
> heat. So "global climate change" is a handy term to block idiots from waving "IT 
> CAN'T BE GETTING HOTTER--THERE WAS SNOW HERE THIS WEEK!" mid-winter signs. But 
> it's still warming on a global scale.
> 
> Damien Broderick
> _______________________________________________
> extropy-chat mailing list
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat



From emlynoregan at gmail.com  Thu Feb 18 00:37:00 2010
From: emlynoregan at gmail.com (Emlyn)
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 2010 11:07:00 +1030
Subject: [ExI] Phil Jones acknowledging that climate science isn'tsettled
In-Reply-To: <201002172135.o1HLZYFR020721@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
References: <201002172135.o1HLZYFR020721@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
Message-ID: <710b78fc1002171637v76c67b76s781d9960af2faa4e@mail.gmail.com>

On 18 February 2010 08:05, Max More <max at maxmore.com> wrote:
> Emlyn:
>
>> I haven't read the whole thing in detail, but one early piece stuck out
>> like a sore thumb, which is the old saw that there is no significant warming
>> since 1998. That's just flat out wrong, and it's wrong because 1998 itself
>> stuck out like a sore thumb; it was a statistical anomaly, which anyone who
>> wasn't being entirely disingenuous would agree with.
>>
>> Here's a discussion of that issue, along with graphs showing the 1998 sore
>> thumb:
>>
>> http://scienceblogs.com/illconsidered/2006/04/warming-stopped-in-1998.php
>
> The source you cite (which is almost four years old now), seems to rely for
> the recent period exclusively on NASA GISS analysis. (References to CRU data
> are for other periods. I didn't see any comparison with UAH or RSS.)
>
> In contrast, the following piece..
> http://wattsupwiththat.com/2008/03/08/3-of-4-global-metrics-show-nearly-flat-temperature-anomaly-in-the-last-decade/
>
> ...compares that analysis to three other sources and notes "NASA GISS
> land-ocean anomaly data showing a ten year trend of 0.151?C, which is about
> 5 times larger than the largest of the three metrics above, which is UAH at
> 0.028?C /ten years. "

You know, what struck me about all the data presented in that article
is that they include the anomolous data from approx '98, and nothing
from before it. Have a look at those graphs, and tell me if you
wouldn't see a more positive trend if you either excluded the oldest
12 months (the anomaly), or included a few more years before that?
*Clearly* that would be the case. It's just exactly the same cherry
picking as before.

Have a look at the first graph:

http://wattsupwiththat.files.wordpress.com/2008/03/elnino-vs-hadcrut.png?w=510

and look at the clear spike in the data around '98. See it rises
higher than all the other points? If you include that anomaly and
begin there, of course you'll get a flat or shallow gradient on
average over a ten year period, even though the temperature (excluding
that anomaly) is clearly continuing to trend strongly upward. The
irony here is that people are using an anomalously hot year in a
particular way to obscure the upward trend. Hilarious.

I'll bet you that in a couple of years, these kinds of "skeptics" stop
using the 10 year data, and start finding an excuse to use a 12 year
window, 13 years, etc, for some reason, *or* inexplicably keep using
the current data sets (which stop in 2007).

>
> Is there a good reason to rely completely on the source that seems out of
> alignment with the others? (I'm going to look at the two contrasting sources
> more closely when I have more time.)

I don't think it's out of alignment. If he'd taken the CRU data over
the same period, wouldn't it be similarly crippled by the initial
anomaly?

>
> I'm not clear whether any or all of the four sources count as showing
> "statistically significant warming" (though RSS obviously does not, since it
> shows a very slight decline), but they do at least show warming greatly
> below IPCC trend.

really?

>
> To be clear: Whether or not warming since 1995 or 1998 has stopped or
> considerably slowed down is of little importance. The orthodoxy and the
> skeptics can agree that one decade is too short to show anything significant
> about long-term trends. It does, however, raise additional doubts about AGW
> models. I haven't seen a good explanation of why the models completely fail
> to account for this -- and previous multi-decade, industrial-age pauses in
> warming, if CO2 really is the main driver.
>
> Not only is the one-decade/12-year record of little importance, I still have
> not seen adequate reason to maintain my doubts about the claim that
> century-long warming is definitely and entirely due to human activity rather
> than to a natural cyclical recovery from a cold period.

As to that, it's a different claim, and none of the previous stuff
speaks to it, absolutely. All I was pointing out was that there is an
anomaly at 1998, and it is clearly disingenuous to include it at the
start of a period then do a simple regression. Why that is important,
is that it speaks to the motive of the person using the argument.
Someone with solid ground to stand on, with a rational basis for their
position, simply wont also include discredit arguments like the no
warming since 1998 one, because it would undermine their otherwise
grounded opinion and make them look like a liar.

> But, obviously, that must be because I'm either stupid, evil, or probably
> both. ;-)
>
> Max

I'd never call you any of those things, that'd be crazy. But, doesn't
the difference in styles of argument alone tell you something about
the global warming hypothesis? Doesn't the way that the no-warming
side keeps using discredited arguments, slipping from position to
position ("there is no warming" becomes "well, ok, maybe there is
warming, but it's not anthropogenic" becomes "well ok maybe there is
some anthropogenic warming, but it's too late to act"), doesn't all
that raise any red flags about what is going on here?

-- 
Emlyn

http://www.songsofmiseryanddespair.com - My show, Fringe 2010
http://point7.wordpress.com - My blog


From cluebcke at yahoo.com  Thu Feb 18 00:28:21 2010
From: cluebcke at yahoo.com (Christopher Luebcke)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 16:28:21 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <760637.43302.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
References: <760637.43302.qm@web36501.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <209813.32982.qm@web111211.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

> > Could one detect or measure consciousness on the basis of "behaviors and 
> > reports of subjective experiences" alone, without direct anatomical
> > knowledge of a "brain and nervous system"?
> 
> No, I don't think so. Under those circumstances we could only speculate.

I don't see how adding a knowledge of anatomy moves our position from speculation to certainty. 

> > Conversely, does a system with a "brain and nervous system"
> > necessarily have consciousness, even in the absence of
> > "behaviors and reports of subjective experience"?
> 
> If you have a brain and a nervous system but exhibit no associated behaviors 
> then it seems to me that you have some serious neurologoical issues. 

Doubtless, but you didn't answer the question.

> What about you, Chris? Do you have a physical brain capable of having conscious 
> thoughts?

I would prefer not to partake in rhetorical questions; life's too short. I suspect you have a point primed and ready to fire for the answer that I'm bound to give to such a question, and it would save time if you simply made it. 

For the record, I am not interested in detecting consciousness in myself, but in other systems.


----- Original Message ----
> From: Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>
> To: ExI chat list <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org>
> Sent: Wed, February 17, 2010 3:16:48 PM
> Subject: Re: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
> 
> --- On Wed, 2/17/10, Christopher Luebcke wrote:
> 
> > Could one detect or measure consciousness on the basis of "behaviors and 
> > reports of subjective experiences" alone, without direct anatomical
> > knowledge of a "brain and nervous system"?
> 
> No, I don't think so. Under those circumstances we could only speculate.
> 
> > Conversely, does a system with a "brain and nervous system"
> > necessarily have consciousness, even in the absence of
> > "behaviors and reports of subjective experience"?
> 
> If you have a brain and a nervous system but exhibit no associated behaviors 
> then it seems to me that you have some serious neurologoical issues. 
> 
> What about you, Chris? Do you have a physical brain capable of having conscious 
> thoughts?
> 
> -gts
> 
> 
>       
> _______________________________________________
> extropy-chat mailing list
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat



From joe.dalton23 at yahoo.com  Thu Feb 18 00:33:58 2010
From: joe.dalton23 at yahoo.com (Joe Dalton)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 16:33:58 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] K2, fake pot, a new massive threat to society?
Message-ID: <925660.90709.qm@web113904.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

Ahhhh! Noooo! People are getting high and having fun and we don't have no law that lets us throw them in jail! The world's coming to and end!

http://blogs.pitch.com/plog/2009/11/product_review_will_k2_synthetic_marijuana_get_you_high.php

and

Fake pot that acts real stymies law enforcementhttp://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/35444158/ns/health-addictions/


      
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From msd001 at gmail.com  Thu Feb 18 01:13:34 2010
From: msd001 at gmail.com (Mike Dougherty)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 20:13:34 -0500
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <f21c22e31002160256h1ed0cc8cv43ae0b2044314824@mail.gmail.com>
References: <466012.12578.qm@web111205.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
	<963975.24812.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
	<f21c22e31002160256h1ed0cc8cv43ae0b2044314824@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <62c14241002171713h7a1ad5c1xf6a6107846dfd396@mail.gmail.com>

On Tue, Feb 16, 2010 at 5:56 AM, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
> I have proposed the example of a brain which has enough intelligence
> to know what the neurons are doing: "neuron no. 15,576,456,757 in the
> left parietal lobe fires in response to noradrenaline, then breaks
> down the noradrenaline by means of MAO and COMT", and so on, for every
> brain event. That would be the equivalent of the man in the CR: there
> is understanding of the low level events, but no understanding of the
> high level intelligent behaviour which these events give rise to. Do
> you see how there might be *two* intelligences here, a high level and
> a low level one, with neither necessarily being aware of the other?

I had a thought to add the following twist to CR:  The man in the box
has no knowledge of the symbols he's manipulating on his first day on
the job.  Over time, he notices a correlation to certain values in his
lookup table(s) and the food slot opening and a tray being slid in...
I understand the man in the room is a metaphor for rules-processing by
wrote, but what if we take the literal approach that he IS a man -
even a supremely gifted intellectual who is informed that eventually
these symbols will reveal the means by which he can escape?  This
scenario segues to the boxing problem of keeping a recursively
improving AI constrained by 'friendliness' or some other artificially
added bounds.  (I understand that FAI is about being inherently
friendly and remains friendly after infinite recursion)

So assuming the man in the box has an infinite supply of pen/paper
with which to keep notes on the relationship of input and output (as
well as his lookup table for I/O transformations) - does it change the
thought experiment considerably if there is motivation for escaping
the room by learning how to manipulate the symbols?


From steinberg.will at gmail.com  Thu Feb 18 01:23:17 2010
From: steinberg.will at gmail.com (Will Steinberg)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 20:23:17 -0500
Subject: [ExI] K2, fake pot, a new massive threat to society?
In-Reply-To: <925660.90709.qm@web113904.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
References: <925660.90709.qm@web113904.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <4e3a29501002171723y211a33d6v41baab037a81e949@mail.gmail.com>

What's better, if one really wanted they could order a gram or two of pure
JWH-018 or some of the other synthetic cannabinoids, soak some
cigarettes/smokable herbs in a solution of it and sell the "buds" at a huge
premium, which is pretty much what those K2 folk are doing (and the Spice
guys too.)

Of course, methinks money would be perhaps better allocated to one of the
wonderful 2C compounds...and it's only a matter of time before those sweeter
RCs start looking different enough from illegal chemicals that they'll be
legal too, and the age of legal 'cid cometh...

A boy can dream, can't he?
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From emlynoregan at gmail.com  Thu Feb 18 01:48:10 2010
From: emlynoregan at gmail.com (Emlyn)
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 2010 12:18:10 +1030
Subject: [ExI] Chemists deserve more credit: Atoms, Einstein,
	and the Matthew Effect
Message-ID: <710b78fc1002171748l73316747xa75fa249927c6770@mail.gmail.com>

Some more non-controversial controversy for the list seems like a good idea.
I thought this article was interesting.

---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Newsfeed to Email Gateway <emlynoregan at gmail.com>
Date: 18 February 2010 12:03
Subject: Metamodern (1 new item)
To: emlynoregan at gmail.com


 Metamodern (1 new item) Item 1 (02/17/10 23:41:52 UTC): Chemists deserve
more credit: Atoms, Einstein, and the Matthew
Effect<http://feedproxy.google.com/%7Er/Metamodern/%7E3/pLezge9SXIo/>
 [image: Cork cells, from Hooke?s
Micrographia]<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johann_Josef_Loschmidt>
Johann Josef Loschmidt <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johann_Josef_Loschmidt>
Chemist, atomic scientist

Chemists understood the atomic structure of molecules in the 1800s, yet many
say that Einstein established the existence of atoms in a paper on Brownian
motion, <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brownian_motion> ?Die von der
Molekularkinetischen Theorie der W?rme Gefordete Bewegung von in ruhenden
Fl?ssigkeiten Suspendierten Teilchen?, published in 1905.

This is perverse, and has seemed strange to me ever since I began reading
the history of organic chemistry. Chemists often don?t get the credit they
deserve, and this provides an outstanding example.

For years, I?ve read statements like this:

[Einstein] offered an experimental test for the theory of heat and proof of
the existence of atoms?.
[?The Hundredth Anniversary of Einstein?s Annus
Mirabilis?<http://hera.ph1.uni-koeln.de/%7Eheintzma/ftp/2005/Einst0504157.pdf>
]

Perhaps this was so for physicists in thrall (or opposition) to the
philosophical ideas of another physicist, Ernst
Mach;<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ernst_Mach#Philosophy_of_science>he
had odd convictions about the relationship between primate eyes and
physical reality, and denied the reality of invisible atoms.

Confusion among physicists, however, gives reason for more (not less!)
respect for the chemists who had gotten the facts right long before, and in
more detail: that matter consists of atoms of distinct chemical elements,
that the atoms of different elements have specific ratios of mass, and that
molecules consist not only of groups of atoms, but of atoms linked by bonds
(?Verwandtschaftseinheiten?) to form specific structures.

When say ?more detail?, I mean a *lot* more detail than merely inferring
that atoms exist. For example, organic chemists had deduced that carbon
atoms form four bonds, typically (but not always) directed tetrahedrally,
and that the resulting molecules can as a consequence have left- and
right-handed forms.

The chemists? understanding of bonding had many non-trivial consequences.
For example, it made the atomic structure of benzene a problem, and made a
six-membered ring of atoms with alternating single and double bonds a
solution to that problem. Data regarding chemical derivatives of benzene
indicated a further problem, leading to the inference that the six bonds are
equivalent. Decades later, quantum mechanics provided the explanation.

The evidence for these detailed and interwoven facts about atoms included a
range of properties of gases, the compositions of compounds, the symmetric
and asymmetric shapes of crystals, the rotation of polarized light, and the
specific numbers of chemically distinct forms of molecules with related
structures and identical numbers of atoms.

And chemists not only understood many facts about atoms, they understood how
to make new molecular structures, pioneering the subtle methods of organic
synthesis that are today an integral part of the leading edge of atomically
precise nanotechnology.

All this atom-based knowledge and capability was in place, as I said, before
1900, courtesy of chemical research by scientists including Dalton, van ?t
Hoff, Kekul?, and Pasteur.
But was it really *knowledge?*

By ?knowledge?, I don?t mean to imply that universal consensus had been
achieved at the time, or that knowledge can ever be philosphically and
absolutely certain, but I think the term fits:

A substantial community of scientists had a body of theory that explained a
wide range of phenomena, including the many facets of the kinetic theory of
gases and a host of chemical transformations, and more. That community of
scientists grew, and progressively elaborated this body of atom-based theory
and technology to up to the present day, and it was confirmed, explained,
and extended by physics along the way.

Should we deny that this constituted knowledge, brush it all aside, and
credit 20th century physics with establishing that atoms even exist? As I
said: perverse.
But what about *quantitative* knowledge?

There is a more modest claim for Einstein?s 1905 paper:

?the bridge between the microscopic and macroscopic world was built
by A. Einstein: his fundamental result expresses a macroscopic quantity ?
the coefficient of diffusion ? in terms of microscopic data (elementary
jumps of atoms or molecules).
[?One and a Half Centuries of Diffusion: Fick, Einstein, Before and
Beyond?<http://www.uni-leipzig.de/diffusion/journal/pdf/volume4/diff_fund_4%282006%296.pdf>
]

This claim for the primacy of physics also seem dubious. A German chemist,
Johann Josef Loschmidt, had already used macroscopic data to deduce the size
of molecules in a gas. He built this quantitative bridge in a paper, ?Zur
Gr?sse der Luftmolek?le?, published in 1865.
------------------------------
I had overlooked Loschmidt?s accomplishment before today. I knew of
Einstein?s though, and of a phenomenon that the sociologists of science call
the Matthew Effect.<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matthew_effect#Sociology_of_science>
------------------------------
*See also:*

   - A Map of Science <http://metamodern.com/2009/05/20/a-map-of-science/>
   - How to Learn About
Everything<http://metamodern.com/2009/05/27/how-to-learn-about-everything/>

------------------------------
  Free Newsfeed to RSS gateway <http://www.productx.net>
 Unsubscribe<http://www.productx.net/deletersssub?code=31e10ed0-7138-4ebc-b0f8-3103aa59523a>



-- 
Emlyn

http://www.songsofmiseryanddespair.com - My show, Fringe 2010
http://point7.wordpress.com - My blog
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From stathisp at gmail.com  Thu Feb 18 01:49:01 2010
From: stathisp at gmail.com (Stathis Papaioannou)
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 2010 12:49:01 +1100
Subject: [ExI] Consciouness and paracrap
In-Reply-To: <e321aa4b1002171238x4b3be1efm9da976cbbe28b282@mail.gmail.com>
References: <517167.25357.qm@web110408.mail.gq1.yahoo.com> 
	<e321aa4b1002171238x4b3be1efm9da976cbbe28b282@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <f21c22e31002171749w1258715di197a13eba57212db@mail.gmail.com>

On 18 February 2010 07:38, Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com> wrote:

> Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com>:
>> Several people have commented that we need a definition of
>> consciousness to proceed, but I disagree. I think everyone knows what
>> is meant by the word and so we can have a complete discussion without
>> at any point defining it.
>
> Dude, I barely know what I mean by the word when I use it in my own
> head. Are you talking about access consciousness? Phenomenal
> consciousness? Reflexive consciousness? All of the above?
>
> http://www.def-logic.com/articles/silby011.html
>
> The reason I haven't supplied a rigorous definition for consciousness,
> as I have for intelligence, is because I can't articulate the meaning
> of it for myself. This, to me, does not seem ancillary to the
> discussion; it seems to be the very root of the discussion, namely the
> question, "what is consciousness?".
>
> Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com>:
>> For those who say that consciousness does
>> not really exist: consciousness is that thing you are referring to
>> when you say that consciousness does not really exist.
>
> That's fair. There isn't any question of what I'm talking about when I
> refer to the Flying Spaghetti Monster.
>
> I can describe the FSM to you in great detail, however. I can't do the
> same with consciousness, except perhaps to say that, if it exists, it
> occasionally compels normally sane people to begin a sentence with
> "dude".

You can't define it, but when I ask you if you are conscious now do
you have to stop and think? It is this immediately understood sense I
am referring to. This is not to say that further elaboration is
useless, but you can go a long way discussing it without explicit
definition.

> Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com>:
>> The purpose of the above is to show that it is impossible (logically
>> impossible, not just physically impossible) to make a brain part, and
>> hence a whole brain, that behaves exactly like a biological brain but
>> lacks consciousness. Either it isn't possible to make such an
>> artificial component at all, or else it is possible to make such a
>> component but it will necessarily also have consciousness. The
>> alternative is to say that you're happy with the idea that you may be
>> blind, deaf, unable to understand English etc. but neither you nor
>> anyone else has noticed.
>>
>> Gordon Swobe's response is that this thought experiment is ridiculous
>> and I should come up with another one that doesn't challenge the
>> self-evident fact that digital computers cannot be conscious.
>
> Gordon doesn't disagree with that proposition as-stated, even if he
> sometimes claims that he does (for some reason). He's consistently
> said that we should be able to engineer artificial consciousness, but
> that to do so requires more than a clever piece of software in a
> digital computer.
>
> So, I suggest that you rephrase the experiment so that it explicitly
> involves replacing neurons, cortices, or whole brains with
> microprocessor-driven prosthetics. We know that he believes the
> whole-brain version will be a zombie, but I haven't been able to
> discern any clear conclusions from him on the other two.

The thought experiment involves replacing brain components with
artificial components that perfectly reproduce the I/O behaviour of
the original components, but not the consciousness. Gordon agrees that
this is possible. However, he then either claims that the artificial
components will not behave the same as the biological components (even
though it is an assumption of the experiment that they will) or else
says the experiment is ridiculous.

> He has said before that partial replacement only confuses the matter,
> implying that it's a useless thought experiment. I do not see why he
> would think that, though.

Perhaps because he can see that it shows that his thesis that it is
possible to separate consciousness from behaviour is false. It's
either that or accept the possibility of partial zombies.

> The only coherent answer of his I remember goes something like this: a
> man has a damaged language center, and a surgeon replaces neurons with
> artificial substitutes one by one. This works so poorly that the
> surgeon must replace the entire brain before language function is
> returned, at which point the man is a philosophical zombie.
>
> But we always start with the assumption that computerized neurons do
> not work poorly, indeed that they "depict" ordinary neurons perfectly
> (using that depiction as a guide to manipulate their synthetic axons
> and such), and I've never seen him explain why he considers this
> assumption to be inherently false.

That's the problem: he could say that they can't work properly on the
grounds that there is something non-computable about neuronal
behaviour, but he does not. Instead, he agrees that they will work
properly, then in the next breath says they will not work properly.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou


From max at maxmore.com  Thu Feb 18 02:00:26 2010
From: max at maxmore.com (Max More)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 20:00:26 -0600
Subject: [ExI] Phil Jones acknowledging that climate science	isn'tsettled
Message-ID: <201002180200.o1I20aeI019649@andromeda.ziaspace.com>

Emlyn,

See this is what happens... I'm spending way too 
much time on a point that really doesn't 
matter... I just find it frustrating that it's 
difficult to come to a conclusion even about a 
relatively narrow issue like temperatures trends in the most recent years.

>You know, what struck me about all the data 
>presented in that article is that they include 
>the anomolous data from approx '98, and nothing from before it.

Yes, you're right. That is a problem. Picking 
different base years would affect the results. 
But how much? Look at the charts again -- it 
seems clear that the moderated warming/actual 
cooling picks up in the last years. So, just 
start in 1999, 2000, or 2001, and recompute the 
numbers. I think the point would be essentially 
the same, although the analysis would yield somewhat different numbers.

Although I don't have them at hand right now, I 
know I have seen other analyses which definitely 
and explicitly avoided starting at 1998. Googling around, I see this:

http://rankexploits.com/musings/2008/ipcc-projections-overpredict-recent-warming/

-- which argues that temperature trends *since 
2001* fall well below IPCC projections. I 
remember reading other reasonably credible 
sources that agree with that, and others that disputed it.

One commentator says:

John V (Comment#1009) March 10th, 2008 at 8:53 pm

Hmmm, my numbers don?t quite match yours. I hope 
you don?t mind a question or two to track down the discrepancies:

Using monthly data, I get the following global 
trends from Jan 2001 to Feb 2008:

GISS: +0.83 C/century
HadC: -0.55 C/century
RSS: +0.41 C/century
UAH: -0.07 C/century
AVERAGE: +0.16 C/century

However, when I compute the trends from Jan 2002 to Feb 2008 I get:

GISS: -0.29 C/century
HadC: -1.67 C/century
RSS: -0.91 C/century
UAH: -1.71 C/century
AVERAGE: -1.14 C/century

I cannot evaluate those numbers, since I don't 
know Cochrane-Orcutt. Anyway, as I said before 
(and I think you agreed), these short-term trends 
really don't tell us anything, so I'm going to 
try not to spend more time on this particular 
point. Actually, it's really quite annoying that 
the author did use 1998 as a base year. That just 
obscures the point that was to be made by opening 
him (rightly) to cherry-picking charges.

It is clear to me that there are plenty of 
analyses suggesting that warming has recently 
been below trend that do NOT depend on starting with 1998. For example:

The following post seems quite interesting and 
helpful. It explains why Lindzen's claim that 
there has been no "statistically significant" 
warming over the last 14 years (since 1995, not 
1998, note) is "not wrong, per se, but neither are they particularly robust":
A Cherry-Picker's Guide to Temperature Trends (down, flat?even up)
http://masterresource.org/?p=5240

and, related:
http://rogerpielkejr.blogspot.com/2009/10/cherry-pickers-guide-to-global.html

BTW, I notice that even Gavin at RealClimate 
acknowledges that "(2) It is highly questionable 
whether this ?pause? is even real. It does show 
up to some extent (no cooling, but reduced 
10-year warming trend) in the Hadley Center data"
http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2009/10/a-warming-pause/comment-page-7/#comment-138126
Again the GISS data gives a different result. (At 
a quick look, I don't see him discuss the other 
two datasets.) Of course RealClimate attacks the 
analysis, then that attack is attacked...

There's more commentary on the disagreement here 
(but, note, using only Hadley and GISS):
http://rankexploits.com/musings/2009/adding-apples-and-oranges-to-cherry-picking/
Among "lucia's" conclusions: "It does look like 
both RC [RealClimate] and Lindzen are doing some 
cherry picking of different sorts as suggested by Chip in his article."

I don't think you can rightly dismiss doubts 
about claims of continued or accelerated recent 
warming by looking only for those who start their 
charts with 1998. I agree completely, however, 
that it's right to criticize those who do so.

Sorry for wasting your time and mine on this 
rather insignificant (but annoyingly nagging) issue.

Max




From cluebcke at yahoo.com  Thu Feb 18 01:43:17 2010
From: cluebcke at yahoo.com (Christopher Luebcke)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 17:43:17 -0800 (PST)
Subject: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
In-Reply-To: <62c14241002171713h7a1ad5c1xf6a6107846dfd396@mail.gmail.com>
References: <466012.12578.qm@web111205.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
	<963975.24812.qm@web36502.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
	<f21c22e31002160256h1ed0cc8cv43ae0b2044314824@mail.gmail.com>
	<62c14241002171713h7a1ad5c1xf6a6107846dfd396@mail.gmail.com>
Message-ID: <465007.28439.qm@web111210.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>

It's also worth considering in what way teaching the man to follow all the rules for manipulating symbols is a different activity than teaching him Chinese. It may be different at the start, but I suspect that, if successful, it amounts to the same thing at the end.


----- Original Message ----
> From: Mike Dougherty <msd001 at gmail.com>
> To: ExI chat list <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org>
> Sent: Wed, February 17, 2010 5:13:34 PM
> Subject: Re: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability
> 
> On Tue, Feb 16, 2010 at 5:56 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > I have proposed the example of a brain which has enough intelligence
> > to know what the neurons are doing: "neuron no. 15,576,456,757 in the
> > left parietal lobe fires in response to noradrenaline, then breaks
> > down the noradrenaline by means of MAO and COMT", and so on, for every
> > brain event. That would be the equivalent of the man in the CR: there
> > is understanding of the low level events, but no understanding of the
> > high level intelligent behaviour which these events give rise to. Do
> > you see how there might be *two* intelligences here, a high level and
> > a low level one, with neither necessarily being aware of the other?
> 
> I had a thought to add the following twist to CR:  The man in the box
> has no knowledge of the symbols he's manipulating on his first day on
> the job.  Over time, he notices a correlation to certain values in his
> lookup table(s) and the food slot opening and a tray being slid in...
> I understand the man in the room is a metaphor for rules-processing by
> wrote, but what if we take the literal approach that he IS a man -
> even a supremely gifted intellectual who is informed that eventually
> these symbols will reveal the means by which he can escape?  This
> scenario segues to the boxing problem of keeping a recursively
> improving AI constrained by 'friendliness' or some other artificially
> added bounds.  (I understand that FAI is about being inherently
> friendly and remains friendly after infinite recursion)
> 
> So assuming the man in the box has an infinite supply of pen/paper
> with which to keep notes on the relationship of input and output (as
> well as his lookup table for I/O transformations) - does it change the
> thought experiment considerably if there is motivation for escaping
> the room by learning how to manipulate the symbols?
> _______________________________________________
> extropy-chat mailing list
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
> http://lists.extropy.org/mailman/listinfo.cgi/extropy-chat



From rafal.smigrodzki at gmail.com  Thu Feb 18 03:55:34 2010
From: rafal.smigrodzki at gmail.com (Rafal Smigrodzki)
Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2010 22:55:34 -0500
Subject: [ExI] Phil Jones acknowledging that climate science isn'tsettled
In-Reply-To: <154647.10956.qm@web111212.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
References: <201002162111.o1GLBY3S004345@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
	<412543.58639.qm@web111214.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
	<7641ddc61002170859g6c25fcag3ddb51826fff23bd@mail.gmail.com>
	<154647.10956.qm@web111212.mail.gq1.yahoo.com>
Message-ID: <7641ddc61002171955i33b65d34i80dcef79dc21669b@mail.gmail.com>

On Wed, Feb 17, 2010 at 12:33 PM, Christopher Luebcke
<cluebcke at yahoo.com> wrote:
> Let me just add: I am not a climatologist, and therefore even if I had read a wide variety of peer-reviewed papers on the subject, I would not be qualified to determine whether I had made an accurate sampling, much less judge the papers on their merits.
>
> My claim comes in fact from paying attention to those organizations who are responsible for gathering and summarizing professional research and judgement on the subject: Not just IPCC, but NAS, AMS, AGU and AAAS are all organizations, far as I can tell, that are both qualified to comment on the matter, and who have supported the general position that AGW is real.
>
> If you are going to dismiss well-respected scientific bodies that hold positions contrary to your own as necessarily having been "infiltrated by environmental activists", then it is incumbent upon you to provide some evidence that such infiltration by such people has actually taken place.

### Actually it's the other way around - once I started having doubts
(a long time ago) about the catastrophic AGW scare, I decided to check
some crucial publications myself, including their reviews by minority
scientists. Luckily, climate science is not rocket science or string
theory, so a mentally agile layperson can get a good idea of
plausibility of claims presented there, and can follow lines of
argumentation laid out by opposing sides sufficiently well to spot
gross aberrations, and very importantly, separate the actual claims
advanced in primary publications from the distortions introduced by
secondary publications (i.e. reviews in peer-reviewed literature), and
complete garbage spouted by tertiary publications (which is
unfortunately the only source of climate information for 99.9%
participants in the debate). Now, once I became in this way convinced
that peer-reviewed literature emphatically does not support AGW, I had
to explain why the tertiary literature and non-peer-reviewed
communications of some climate seem to be telling a dramatically
different story. So far my best explanation is that there is a clique
of environmental activists (James Hansen, Thomas Karl, Michael Mann)
who were appointed to a few key positions in the science
establishment, including review groups, and have since then
manufactured the AGW scare. Of course, scientific organizations, such
as NAS or APS don't have an opinion about science - they always rely
on the input of a small number of active researchers on any particular
issue, and if their input (produced by Mann et al.) is corrupt, their
output in the form of policy statements will be corrupt as well. GIGO.

But, the question of exactly what mechanisms ("infiltration" or
others) caused the science establishment to fail so badly here is just
a side issue - the key question is whether AGW is real, and for that I
can only urge you to delve into the primary literature and form an
opinion directly.
---------------------------------
>
> I wonder if it wouldn't be possible to disagree with their positions, though, without also presuming that the people you disagree with are wicked? That's the larger point of what I was trying to get at.

### The core group of about 50 climate activists (The Team, as they
refer to themselves), are wicked. They intentionally forged and
misrepresented data to advance a preconceived position. The remaining
"thousands of scientists" who lent their support to the AGW scare just
failed to read and critically analyze the literature, which makes them
incompetent but not wicked.

Rafal


From emlynoregan at gmail.com  Thu Feb 18 04:01:03 2010
From: emlynoregan at gmail.com (Emlyn)
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 2010 14:31:03 +1030
Subject: [ExI] Phil Jones acknowledging that climate science isn'tsettled
In-Reply-To: <201002180200.o1I20aeI019649@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
References: <201002180200.o1I20aeI019649@andromeda.ziaspace.com>
Message-ID: <710b78fc1002172001w2274af4dyaf24e6ee712f09bf@mail.gmail.com>

On 18 February 2010 12:30, Max More <max at maxmore.com> wrote:
> Emlyn,
>
> See this is what happens... I'm spending way too much time on a point that
> really doesn't matter... I just find it frustrating that it's difficult to
> come to a conclusion even about a relatively narrow issue like temperatures
> trends in the most recent years.

Hey, here we come to one of the really fundamental points about this.
How much time can you spend on stuff like this?

On one hand, you want to be an informed person, be able to hold only
opinions for which you have a rational basis. On the other hand, the
world is really vastly too complex for any one person to do that and
also function effectively. We're stuck with this efficiency tradeoff -
do I try to "focus across the board", and fail miserably, or do I
trust other people regarding the vast majority off stuff, the stuff
about which I know too little to comment.

Of course we do the latter. We temper it as much as possible with
meta-level techniques for judging knowledge not by the too-complex
content but by the approach and structure of those who work with it
(eg: religious "knowledge" can be rejected in part because of the
unsupportable approach and structure), debating techniques, prodding
for inconsistencies, etc etc.

With regard to the climate issue, it's clear at least to me that it is
far too complex to understand as a lay person. You either dive in deep
and become at least an amateur climatologist (like Darwin was an
amateur biologist, ie: you live it), or you trust the people who do.

As far as I can tell, the various minor scandals notwithstanding,
there are a lot of specialised people in this field who know their
stuff, and they say there's a serious, anthropogenic warming problem.
Most of what they argue about is the details, the scale.

> I don't think you can rightly dismiss doubts about claims of continued or
> accelerated recent warming by looking only for those who start their charts
> with 1998. I agree completely, however, that it's right to criticize those
> who do so.

There's so much written about all facets of this problem, that good
broad filters make sense IMO, and the first one I use is to remove
anything where people are boldly making specious claims, which they
must either know to be specious, or else they are incompetent.

I did consider for a while simply ignoring all content from the US,
and I still think that might provide a clearer picture, but since Lord
Monckton turned up it doesn't quite look as viable.

>
> Sorry for wasting your time and mine on this rather insignificant (but
> annoyingly nagging) issue.
>
> Max

Even though I cut a lot of what you wrote, I enjoyed your response
Max, there's a lot of meat in it. This whole climate change issue is
depressing, fundamentally because there's not much upside, but it's
important enough to be spending a few cycles on, so it's not a waste
of time. And, Searle's not involved, which is a relief, no?

-- 
Emlyn

http://www.songsofmiseryanddespair.com - My show, Fringe 2010
http://point7.wordpress.com - My blog


From emlynoregan at gmail.com  Thu Feb 18 04:29:05 2010
From: emlynoregan at gmail.com (Emlyn)
Date: Thu, 18 Feb 2010 14:59:05 +1030
Subject: [ExI] IPCC errors: facts and spin
Message-ID: <710b78fc1002172029q7d329f3bp34d66da0c13dc0be@mail.gmail.com>

Apologies if this has turned up before. I haven't read AR4 (because
I'm not a masochistic freak), so have to take this mostly on face
value. It seems reasonable though.

If I were to level any criticism at the IPCC report based on this, it
would be at the process; this laborious effort to coordinate the input
of thousands of volunteers to make several dense books, which then
inevitably have some problems, seems like a poor approach in the
modern world. Surely an online collaborative approach, with the
ability to amend (bug fix) would be vastly superior??

----

IPCC errors: facts and spin
http://www.realclimate.org/index.php/archives/2010/02/ipcc-errors-facts-and-spin/

Currently, a few errors ?and supposed errors? in the last IPCC report
(?AR4?) are making the media rounds ? together with a lot of
distortion and professional spin by parties interested in discrediting
climate science.  Time for us to sort the wheat from the chaff: which
of these putative errors are real, and which not? And what does it all
mean, for the IPCC in particular, and for climate science more
broadly?

Let?s start with a few basic facts about the IPCC.  The IPCC is not,
as many people seem to think, a large organization. In fact, it has
only 10 full-time staff in its secretariat at the World Meteorological
Organization in Geneva, plus a few staff in four technical support
units that help the chairs of the three IPCC working groups and the
national greenhouse gas inventories group. The actual work of the IPCC
is done by unpaid volunteers ? thousands of scientists at universities
and research institutes around the world who contribute as authors or
reviewers to the completion of the IPCC reports. A large fraction of
the relevant scientific community is thus involved in the effort.  The
three working groups are:

Working Group 1 (WG1), which deals with the physical climate science
basis, as assessed by the climatologists, including several of the
Realclimate authors.

Working Group 2 (WG2), which deals with impacts of climate change on
society and ecosystems, as assessed by social scientists, ecologists,
etc.

Working Group 3 (WG3) , which deals with mitigation options for
limiting global warming, as assessed by energy experts, economists,
etc.

Assessment reports are published every six or seven years and writing
them takes about three years. Each working group publishes one of the
three volumes of each assessment. The focus of the recent allegations
is the Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), which was published in 2007.
Its three volumes are almost a thousand pages each, in small print.
They were written by over 450 lead authors and 800 contributing
authors; most were not previous IPCC authors. There are three stages
of review involving more than 2,500 expert reviewers who collectively
submitted 90,000 review comments on the drafts. These, together with
the authors? responses to them, are all in the public record.

Errors in the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4)

As far as we?re aware, so far only one?or at most two?legitimate
errors have been found in the AR4:

Himalayan glaciers: In a regional chapter on Asia in Volume 2, written
by authors from the region, it was erroneously stated that 80% of
Himalayan glacier area would very likely be gone by 2035. This is of
course not the proper IPCC projection of future glacier decline, which
is found in Volume 1 of the report. There we find a 45-page, perfectly
valid chapter on glaciers, snow and ice (Chapter 4), with the authors
including leading glacier experts (such as our colleague Georg Kaser
from Austria, who first discovered the Himalaya error in the WG2
report).  There are also several pages on future glacier decline in
Chapter 10 (?Global Climate Projections?), where the proper
projections are used e.g. to estimate future sea level rise. So the
problem here is not that the IPCC?s glacier experts made an incorrect
prediction. The problem is that a WG2 chapter, instead of relying on
the proper IPCC projections from their WG1 colleagues, cited an
unreliable outside source in one place. Fixing this error involves
deleting two sentences on page 493 of the WG2 report.

Sea level in the Netherlands: The WG2 report states that ?The
Netherlands is an example of a country highly susceptible to both
sea-level rise and river flooding because 55% of its territory is
below sea level?. This sentence was provided by a Dutch government
agency ? the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, which has
now published a correction stating that the sentence should have read
?55 per cent of the Netherlands is at risk of flooding; 26 per cent of
the country is below sea level, and 29 per cent is susceptible to
river flooding?. It surely will go down as one of the more ironic
episodes in its history when the Dutch parliament last Monday derided
the IPCC, in a heated debate, for printing information provided by ?
the Dutch government. In addition, the IPCC notes that there are
several definitions of the area below sea level. The Dutch Ministry of
Transport uses the figure 60% (below high water level during storms),
while others use 30% (below mean sea level). Needless to say, the
actual number mentioned in the report has no bearing on any IPCC
conclusions and has nothing to do with climate science, and it is
questionable whether it should even be counted as an IPCC error.

Some other issues

African crop yields: The IPCC Synthesis Report states: ?By 2020, in
some countries, yields from rain-fed agriculture could be reduced by
up to 50%.? This is properly referenced back to chapter 9.4 of WG2,
which says: ?In other countries, additional risks that could be
exacerbated by climate change include greater erosion, deficiencies in
yields from rain-fed agriculture of up to 50% during the 2000-2020
period, and reductions in crop growth period (Agoumi, 2003).?  The
Agoumi reference is correct and reported correctly. The Sunday Times,
in an article by Jonathan Leake, labels this issue ?Africagate? ? the
main criticism being that Agoumi (2003) is not a peer-reviewed study
(see below for our comments on ?gray? literature), but a report from
the International Institute for Sustainable Development and the
Climate Change Knowledge Network, funded by the US Agency for
International Development. The report, written by Morroccan climate
expert Professor Ali Agoumi, is a summary of technical studies and
research conducted to inform Initial National Communications from
three countries (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia) to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, and is a perfectly legitimate
IPCC reference.

It is noteworthy that chapter 9.4 continues with ?However, there is
the possibility that adaptation could reduce these negative effects
(Benhin, 2006).?  Some examples thereof follow, and then it states:
?However, not all changes in climate and climate variability will be
negative, as agriculture and the growing seasons in certain areas (for
example, parts of the Ethiopian highlands and parts of southern Africa
such as Mozambique), may lengthen under climate change, due to a
combination of increased temperature and rainfall changes (Thornton et
al., 2006). Mild climate scenarios project further benefits across
African croplands for irrigated and, especially, dryland farms.?
(Incidentally, the Benhin and Thornton references are also ?gray?, but
nobody has complained about them. Could there be double standards
amongst the IPCC?s critics?)

Chapter 9.4 to us sounds like a balanced discussion of potential risks
and benefits, based on the evidence available at the time?hardly the
stuff for shrill ?Africagate!? cries. If the IPCC can be criticized
here, it is that in condensing these results for its Synthesis Report,
important nuance and qualification were lost ? especially the point
that the risk of drought (defined as a 50% downturn in rainfall)
?could be exacerbated by climate change?, as chapter 9.4 wrote ?
rather than being outright caused by climate change.

Trends in disaster losses: Jonathan Leake (again) in The Sunday Times
accused the IPCC of wrongly linking global warming to natural
disasters. The IPCC in a statement points out errors in Leake?s
?misleading and baseless story?, and maintains that the IPCC provided
?a balanced treatment of a complicated and important issue?. While we
agree with the IPCC here, WG2 did include a debatable graph provided
by Robert Muir-Wood (although not in the main report but only as
Supplementary Material). It cited a paper by Muir-Wood as its source
although that paper doesn?t