[ExI] Principle of Computational Equivalence

Gordon Swobe gts_2000 at yahoo.com
Thu Feb 4 19:09:39 UTC 2010

--- On Thu, 2/4/10, Stefano Vaj <stefano.vaj at gmail.com> wrote:

> Not really to hear him reiterate innumerable times that for
> whatever reason he thinks that (organic? human?) brains, while
> obviously sharing universal computation abilities with cellular
> automata and PCs, would on the other hand somewhat escape the Principle
> of Computational Equivalence.

I see no reason to consider the so-called Principle of Computational Equivalence of philosophical interest with respect to natural objects like brains.

Given a natural entity or process x and a computation of it c(x) it does not follow that c(x) = x. It does matter whether x = an organic apple or an organic brain.

c(x) = x iff x = a true digital artifact. It seems to me that we have no reason to suppose except as a matter of religious faith that any x in the natural world actually exists as a digital artifact.

For example we might in principle create perfect computations of hurricanes. It would not follow that hurricanes do computations. 



More information about the extropy-chat mailing list