[ExI] Semiotics and Computability

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 5 February 2010 08:41, Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com> wrote:

> >From my limited research, it appears Searle has never said anything
> about some unknown extra step necessary to produce meaning. If you
> think his arguments imply any such thing, that's your extrapolation,
> not his. The Chinese room argument isn't chiefly about meaning: it's
> about understanding. They're extremely different things. We take
> meaning as input and output, or at least feel like we do, but we
> simply HAVE understanding.
>
> And no, it isn't a substance. It's a measurable phenomenon. Not easily
> measurable, but measurable nonetheless.

By definition it isn't measurable, since (according to Searle and
Gordon) it would be possible to perfectly reproduce the behaviour of
the brain, but leave out understanding. It is only possible to observe
behaviour, so if behaviour is separable from understanding, you can't
observe it. I'm waiting for Gordon to say, OK, I've changed my mind,
it is *not* possible to reproduce the behaviour of the brain and leave
out understanding, but he just won't do it.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou