[ExI] Newbie Question: Consciousness and Intelligence

Stathis Papaioannou stathisp at gmail.com
Mon Feb 15 09:28:24 UTC 2010

On 15 February 2010 11:46, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:

> It seems to me a digital simulation of a person, i.e., an upload existent on a computer, will have no more reality than does a digital movie of that person on a computer today. Depictions of things, digital or otherwise, do not equal the things they depict no matter how complete and realistic the depiction.
> This does not preclude the possibility that a complete digital description of a person might serve as a reliable blueprint for reconstructing that person in material form, but I see that as a separate question.
>> Sure, somebody may refuse his conclusion for philosophical
>> and ultimately arbitrary reasons
> Come the singularity, some people will lose their grips on reality and find themselves believing such absurdities as that digital depictions of people have real mental states. A few lonely philosophers of my stripe will try in vain to restore their sanity. :)

You keep repeating this as a fact but you don't explain why a digital
depiction of a person won't have real mental status. A pile of bricks
can duplicate the mass of a person; a car can duplicate the speed of a
person; an artificial joint can duplicate the function of a human's
joint. These devices are all very different from the the thing they
are copying. Why should the mind resist copying in anything other than
the original substrate?

Stathis Papaioannou

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