[ExI] Semiotics and Computability

[Christopher Luebcke]

Gordon, if I may ask directly: How do you determine whether someone, or something, besides yourself is conscious?


----- Original Message ----
From: Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>
To: ExI chat list <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org>
Sent: Tue, February 16, 2010 4:45:56 AM
Subject: Re: [ExI] Semiotics and Computability

--- On Tue, 2/16/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:

> I have proposed the example of a brain which has enough
> intelligence to know what the neurons are doing: "neuron no.
> 15,576,456,757 in the left parietal lobe fires in response to 
> noradrenaline, then breaks down the noradrenaline by means of MAO and 
> COMT", and so on, for every brain event. That would be the equivalent of 
> the man in the CR: there is understanding of the low level events, but no
> understanding of the high level intelligent behaviour which these events 
> give rise to. Do you see how there might be *two* intelligences here, a 
> high level and a low level one, with neither necessarily being aware of
> the other?

Doesn't matter. If you cannot see yourself understanding the symbols as either the man considered as the program (IN the room or AS a neuron) or as the man considered as the system (AS the room or AS a brain) then Searle has proved his point.

And it seems he has proved his point to you, but that you want nevertheless to fabricate some imaginary way around the conclusion. These attempts of yours amount to saying "Suppose that even though Searle is right that the man cannot understand the symbols either as the program or as the system, pink unicorns on the moon do nevertheless understand the symbols." :)

-gts


      
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