[ExI] Continuity of experience

Stathis Papaioannou stathisp at gmail.com
Fri Feb 26 01:59:42 UTC 2010

On 26 February 2010 07:44, Spencer Campbell <lacertilian at gmail.com> wrote:

> Basically I am stressing the profound uncertainty involved here.
> However, even assuming that you COULD determine the mental states
> cycled through by any given brain with enough precision to
> differentiate between individuals, I don't see any obvious reason to
> believe that sufficiently-similar states would somehow "attract" your
> M to occupy what was (moments before) a completely distinct body.

If I tell you that sneezing destroys M what is your response? Your
response is that that's silly: you sneezed a few minutes ago and
you're still the same person, and your friend next to you also sneezed
(it was dusty environment) and you aren't in mourning for him either.
I could present you with scientific evidence that sneezing increases
intracranial pressure and claim that it's this which destroys the M,
but you will again reply that this is absurd, since it's self-evident
that people survive sneezing. The point is that you already implicitly
define M in terms of continuity of mental states. There is no other
standard to which you can refer, either objective or subjective, to
settle a dispute if we disagree on whether M is preserved.

Stathis Papaioannou

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