[ExI] Some new angle about AI

Stathis Papaioannou stathisp at gmail.com
Thu Jan 7 14:40:52 UTC 2010

2010/1/7 Aware <aware at awareresearch.com>:

> As I've said already (three times in this thread) it seems that
> everyone here (and Searle) would agree with the functionalist
> position: that perfect copies must be identical, and thus
> functionalism needs no defense.

The functionalist position is that a different machine performing the
same function would produce the same mind. Searle and everyone on this
list does not agree with this, nor to be fair is it trivially obvious.

> Stathis continues to argue on the basis of functional identity, since
> he doesn't seem to see how there could be anything more to the
> question. [I know Stathis had a copy of Hofstadter's _I AM A STRANGE
> LOOP_, but I suspect he didn't finish it.]

I got to chapter 11, as it happens, and I did mean to finish it but
still haven't. I agree with Hofstdter's, and your, epiphenomenalism. I
usually only contribute to this list when I *disagree* with what
someone says and feel that I have a significant argument to present
against it. I'm better at criticising and destroying than praising and
creating, I suppose. The argument with Gordon does not involve
proposing or defending any theory of consciousness, but simply looks
at the consequences of the idea that it is possible for a machine to
reproduce behaviour but not thereby necessarily reproduce the original
consciousness. It's not immediately obvious that this is a silly idea,
and a majority of people probably believe it. However, it can be shown
to be internally inconsistent, and without invoking any assumptions
other than that consciousness is a naturalistic phenomenon.

Stathis Papaioannou

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