[ExI] Some new angle about AI

Stathis Papaioannou stathisp at gmail.com
Thu Jan 7 22:54:38 UTC 2010


2010/1/8 Aware <aware at awareresearch.com>:

> Your insistence that it is this simple is prolonging the cycling of
> that "strange loop" you're in with Gordon.  It's not always clear what
> Gordon's argument IS--often he seems to be parroting positions he
> finds on the Internet--but to the extent he is arguing for Searle, he
> is not arguing against functionalism.

Searle is explicitly opposed to functionalism. He allows that *some*
machine that reproduces the function of the brain would reproduce
consciousness but not that *any* machine would do so: computers, beer
cans and toilet paper and the CR wouldn't cut it, for example.

> Given functionalism, and the "indisputable 1st person evidence" of the
> existence of consciousness/qualia/meaning/intensionality within the
> system ("where else could it be?"), he points out quite correctly that
> no matter how closely one looks, no matter how subtle one's formal
> description might be, there's syntax but no semantics in the system.
>
> So I suggest (again) to you and Gordon, and Searle. that you need to
> broaden your context.  That there is no essential consciousness in the
> system, but in the recursive relation between the observer and the
> observed. Even (or especially) when the observer and observed are
> functions of he same brain, you get self-awareness entailing the
> reported experience of consciousness, which is just as good because
> it's all you ever really had.

Isn't the relationship between the observer and observed a function of
the observer-observed system?

>> It's not immediately obvious that this is a silly idea,
>> and a majority of people probably believe it.
>
> Your faith in functionalism is certainly a step up from the
> assumptions of the silly masses.  But everyone in this discussion, and
> most denizens of the Extropy list, already get this.
>
>
>>  However, it can be shown
>> to be internally inconsistent, and without invoking any assumptions
>> other than that consciousness is a naturalistic phenomenon.
>
> Yes, but that's not the crux of this disagreement.  In fact, there is
> no crux of this disagreement since to resolve it is not to show what's
> wrong within, but to reframe it in terms of a larger context.

Maybe, but it's also satisfying to show in a debate without
introducing extraneous ideas that the premises your opponent presents
you with lead to inconsistency.

> Searle and Gordon aren't saying that machine consciousness isn't
> possible.  If you pay attention you'll see that once in a while
> they'll come right out and say this, at which point you think they've
> expressed an inconsistency.  They're saying that even though it's
> obvious that some machines (e.g. humans) do have consciousness, it's
> also clear that no formal system implements semantics.  And they're
> correct.

What about this idea: there is no such thing as semantics, really.
It's all just syntax.

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou



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