[ExI] Coherent vs. Incoherent Fears of Being Uploaded

[Stefano Vaj]

2010/1/18 Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com>:
> The standard definition of a philosophical zombie is that it does not
> have any consciousness, only intelligent behaviour.

Yes, I know, but I would follow Dennett in including in "behaviour",
intelligent or otherwise, the kind of physical states, expressions,
(self-)declarations, etc. which exhaust the concept of "believing to
be conscious", or for that matter "believing X".

But I realise that this would not satisfy dualists, who would be ready
to admit, for instance, that somebody may be wrong not just in, but
also on, his or her actual beliefs, as in "I believe (that I believe
(X, but I am wrong, because in fact I do not believe it". The second
"believing" being a behaviour, the first being something ineffably
"else".

-- 
Stefano Vaj