[ExI] digital simulations, descriptions and copies

[Stathis Papaioannou]

2010/1/21 Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com>:
> --- On Tue, 1/19/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>>> More on topic: At some level of description almost
>>> anything can be seen as digital. The high priests of
>>> computationalism noticed this mundane fact and made a
>>> religion out of it. They conflate the digital descriptions
>>> of things with the non-digital things they describe.
>>
>> The theory is that it is matter acting in a particular way
>> that produces intelligence and that consciousness is a
>> necessary accompaniment of intelligence. Your theory is that matter
>> acting in a particular way produces intelligence and, independently of
>> this, it produces consciousness...
>
> Your words here don't seem to address the more general comment of mine that you quoted.
>
> Consider the ordinary apple that I introduced a few messages ago. I consider natural apples non-digital objects even if we can simulate them on digital computers.
>
> I contend that digital simulations of non-digital objects equal nothing more than *descriptions* of things and that we commit an egregious philosophical blunder when we conflate the digital descriptions of non-digital objects with the real objects they describe.
>
> Some people seem to think that a digital simulation of an apple somehow equals a real apple; that supposing we find ways to create digital simulations of ourselves along with digital simulations of apples then those simulations of ourselves will actually eat and enjoy the taste of those scrumptious digitally-simulated delicious red apples.

The problem is not that you make these assertions but that you make
them with a show of such overwhelming confidence, dismissing any
counterarguments without rebutting them. What do you say to someone
who confidently asserts that matter *cannot* give rise to thought, so
the mind must be due to a magical immaterial substance? Whatever you
say, they will just keep repeating that matter *cannot* give rise to
thought. It's obvious. A chair can't think; a glass of water with
chemicals in it can't think; and if you believe a bunch of chemicals
in your head can think, you're just deluded. That's what you keep
doing with your argument. For example, I have *assumed* that you are
right and shown that it leads to the possibility of conscious zombies,
which you agree are absurd. But you don't adjust your position, or
attempt to show that it does not in fact lead to this absurdity, or
even that it is not an absurdity (as I think Lee Corbin was saying).
You just keep repeating that computers can't think, as if any
criticisms are a priori a waste of time. And you accuse others of
holding religious beliefs!


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou