[ExI] digital simulations, descriptions and copies

[Gordon Swobe]

--- On Sat, 1/23/10, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:

>> My assertion leads simply to a philosophy of mind in
>> which the brain attaches meanings to symbols in some way
>> that we do not yet fully understand. Nothing more.
> 
> But this is unnecessary, at best. You could say we do
> understand how meaning is attached to symbols when they are finally
> attached to an environmental input. Only if you really *want* the brain 
> to remain mysterious would you add the superfluous magical layer.

I have no desire for the brain to remain mysterious but we should admit the fact of our own ignorance: nobody in 2010 understands how the brain becomes conscious, much less how it has conscious experiences of understanding the meanings of symbols. 

30 years ago computers seem so groovy that some idealists hoped they would would explain the Mind along with Life, The Universe and Everything. I believe now that they were wrong.  

First came the abacus, then came the digital computer. Technologically, the computer seems completely different from the abacus. But philosophically speaking they do not differ. 

>> Looks to me like the world is comprised of just one
>> kind of stuff. Some configurations of that one stuff have
>> conscious understanding of symbols. Most if not all other
>> configurations of that stuff do not.
> 
> Yes, but the claim that it is impossible for matter other
> than that in brains to produce consciousness is irrational. 

You should know by now that I don't make that claim. I claim that matter configured in the form of digital computers won't produce consciousness, and that natural selection configured organic brains in a manner different from how we have configured digital computers.

-gts