[ExI] The Robot Reply to the CRA

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 29 January 2010 04:00, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
> Before I answer this message, Stathis...
>
> I picked up a copy of _Rediscovery of Mind_. Chalmers quoted Searle out of context, just as I suspected. Searle considers three different versions of the silicon brain thought experiment and does not endorse of any of them. In the first version the chip-brain works fine (the extropian pipe dream), in the second the relationship between mind and behavior is broken (Chalmers quotes a part of this) and in the third version the patient retains a mental life but becomes paralyzed.
>
> Just three sentences before the Chalmers quote, Searle adamantly rejects the notion that chips can duplicate the causal powers of neurons. He explains the different versions of the thought experiment only by way of bringing attention to some important ideas in the philosophy of mind. More later.

I don't have access to the book and would be interested in the actual
quote. It sounds like Searle may be saying the only thing he can
consistently say: that the artificial neurons won't work because the
brain's behaviour cannot be replicated by a computer. This also
implies that philosophical zombies and weak AI are impossible.
Functionalism remains intact, however, given that Chalmers' argument
is only that IF a functional analogue of the brain could be made THEN
that functional analogue would also necessarily duplicate
consciousness. This is a logical requirement: not even God could make
zombie neurons.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou