[ExI] common sense

Stefano Vaj stefano.vaj at gmail.com
Sun Mar 7 18:08:12 UTC 2010


On 4 March 2010 10:28, Gordon Swobe <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
> --- On Wed, 3/3/10, Stefano Vaj <stefano.vaj at gmail.com> wrote:
> >> We can quite easily reduce mental phenomena
> >> epistemically without reducing the same phenomena
> >> ontologically. I mean here that we can understand mental
> >> phenomena in scientific terms of neurological causes and
> >> effects without abandoning the common sense notion that
> >> mental phenomena have an irreducibly subjective ontology.
> >
> > We can perhaps. But why ever should we?
>
> We should for the sake of saving the notion of "common sense".

Common sense is simply a number of assumptions implicit in a (normally
collective) worldview. What is "obvious" changes in space and above
all in time. Some parts of it have mainly epistemological
implications, other are more emotional. Of course, we cannot ever
escape having one worldview, but it also evolves through the
relativisation of its tenets, which is mostly performed through the
deconstruction of its genealogy. Such process is of course resisted in
different degrees by any of us owing to our "faith" in the old ways to
interpret things.

> If input equals "Given that your performance seems equal to that of a human, do you have a mind?" then output "Yes indeed, I have a mind just like Stefano has a mind."
> Call me crazy, Stefano, but somehow I think that code above does not really give the computer a mind like you have a mind. What do you think?

If that system's abilities were limited to that, I would not call it a
system that has any expertise in checking Turing tests results,
something which was required by my hypothesis.

--
Stefano Vaj



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