[ExI] Real & virtual worlds

Stathis Papaioannou stathisp at gmail.com
Tue Mar 23 09:08:58 UTC 2010


On 23 March 2010 18:16, Lee Corbin <lcorbin at rawbw.com> wrote:
> Stathis writes
>
>> [Lee wrote]]
>
>>> Right now, playing golf sounds to me not at all fun. [Which
>
>>> *obviously* could altered by a minor cerebral modification.]
>>>
>>> The real question is, "When I can decide what feels like fun,
>>> what should I decide?".
>>>
>>> What do we want to decide, and why? I would gladly switch
>>> my taste and expertise in chess for an equivalent taste
>>> and expertise in finance.
>>
>> It seems that you consider chess as not being as intrinsically
>> worthwhile as finance,
>
> "Intrinsically worthwhile"?  Goodness, whatever do you mean by that!
>
>> which creates some tension as you prefer the
>> less worthwhile activity.
>
> "Prefer" has two senses here. I actually vastly prefer chess,
> but I would prefer to prefer finance. "Man can do what he wills
> but he cannot will what he wills", which is gonna change soon.
>
>> An alternative would be to make it so that chess is at
>
>> least as interesting as finance,
>
> Hmm?  I meant to state that right now, chess is very interesting
> to me, while finance is incredibly boring to me.
>
>> so that you can think of those people making millions
>
>> with a few mouseclicks as pitiful in their inability
>> to appreciate what's really important in life.
>
> "What's really important in life"?  Evidently you misunderstood
> the entire thrust of my argument. There are no such things that
> are of *intrinsic importance*, unless you impose a more or less
> arbitrary set of values on them (not a bad idea, of course).
>
> Consider these activities:
>
> A. trying to get the world's starving people adequately fed
>   (or if you live in a rich nation, spying on obese people
>   and strategically luring them into discussions that---so
>   to speak---tip the scales in their thinking so that they
>   make healthier life style choices)
>
> B. studying rocket science and scheming to do everything
>   possible to help along projects like Burt Rutan's, or
>   medicine and Aubrey DeGrey's
>
> C. investigating the world of household plumbing, especially
>   the myriad differences around the world, and learning
>   about the various solutions per dollar spent & becoming
>   a world-class master plumber
>
> D. playing chess, absorbing the striking masterpieces
>   of the famous grandmasters, and becoming much more
>   skilled at the game itself
>
> Do any of these have more "intrinsic worth", period?  I.e.,
> not merely more intrinsic worth to individual X (who is only
> a mere hypothesis by natural selection as to what might be
> fit and what might produce a lot of kids).
>
> The answer is no! "Intrinsic worth" unqualified, like beauty,
> lies strictly in the eye of the beholder!
>
> What is paramount in this discussion is that we will be able
> to soon alter our own will, alter our own preferences according
> to *any* set of criteria we choose. Call it the post-Schopenhauer
> era, if you will. :-)

If the intrinsic worth of each activity *to you* were directly
proportional to how motivated you were to do it then you would spend
exactly as much time on each activity as you felt it deserved, and
therefore you would never wish to deviate from this perfect system by
introducing an artificial preference distortion. However, people
frequently wish that they had less motivation to do something or more
motivation to do something else. Why do they wish this? As well as
giving each activity a score for motivation, based on negative as well
as positive feelings, they also give it a score for intrinsic worth.
The intrinsic worth score affects the motivation score, but not always
to the extent that people would like. Sitting around all day eating
chocolate may have a high motivation score (first order desire) but a
low intrinsic worth score (second order desire: a desire about what I
would like to desire). If I could modify my mind at will, I would
therefore arrange it so that I found it less enjoyable to sit around
eating chocolate and more enjoyable to go out and exercise, for
example. On the other hand, I might see that this belief about what is
worthwhile and what is not is due to the way I have been manipulated
by society, and modify myself so that I can be content in my
chocolate-eating idleness (third order desire: a desire about what I
would like to desire to desire).


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou




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