[ExI] Let's play What If.

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Wed, Oct 27, 2010 at 11:02 AM, Damien Broderick <thespike at satx.rr.com> wrote:
> On 10/26/2010 6:35 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>> If you were given the choice of being duplicated a million times with
>> one of the copies being tortured or once with one of the copies being
>> tortured would you have any preference for one or the other case,
>> given that in both cases it is certain that there will be one
>> individual who is tortured?
>
> Aside from empathy and indignation at cruelty, why should it matter to *me*
> if one of the *copies* is tortured? --as long as I, the original, am allowed
> to go unmolested. (Well, except for the fear that the tortured copy might
> remain alive and hunt me down vengefully for a touch of the same treatment.)

One possible way to answer is to refer to the MWI of QM. Regardless of
whether it is the truth or not, it is usually agreed that it *could*
be the truth: it is compatible with all our observations, including
our subjective experiences of probability.

Under a single world view, a 1/million probability of being tortured
would be dismissed. You're as likely to win the lottery, and that
isn't going to happen.

Under a many worlds view, a 1/million probability of being tortured
amounts to you being duplicated (at least) a million times and
1/million of those copies being tortured. From my selfish point of
view that is subjectively the same as the single world case: I will
find myself as one, and only one, of the copies and there is only a
1/million probability that it will be a copy that is tortured, so I
don't need to worry about it. You, on the other hand, will want to
know which of the copies is the original, and whether that particular
copy will be tortured. But the answer to that question is that all the
copies are fungible, like subatomic particles: none is the "original"
and you have equal chance of ending up as any one of them, hence the
subjective impression that you are living in a probabilistic universe.
If you disagree with this then you are claiming that our probabilistic
world is proof that the MWI is false. Is that what you are claiming?
What would you expect to experience if the MWI were in fact true?


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou