[ExI] Let's play What If.

[Ben Zaiboc]

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

Ben Zaiboc wrote:
>> Here's a thought experiment: ?Imagine a machine which
>> could create two atoms where there was one, and move
>> each atom exactly 1 metre away from the original
>> position, in opposite directions, very quickly. This
>> process is applied to your entire body, creating two
>> exact copies, 2 metres apart.
>>
>> So which one is 'you'?

> Both have equal claim to being «you», but each copy feels that it is
> the real «you». This translates to a 1/2 probability of finding
> yourself the copy on the left or the copy on the right. This is a
> *subjective* probability, an illusion if you prefer. It is what is
> supposed to happen in ordinary life under a multiverse model of
> reality: when you toss a coin one version of you sees heads and
> another version sees tails, but you have the illusion that you
> «become» one or other version with a 1/2 probability of seeing heads
> or tails.

If 'you' find yourself 'in' only one copy, what is 'in' the other?
Makes no sense, does it?

Each you is as 'real' as any other. There's no need for the "but" in your 
first sentence. Each copy is quite correct in feeling that it's the real
you, because it is. 'You' are no longer unique.  There's nothing mystical 
or mysterious about it, it's just a consequence of the fact (as far as we 
know) that 'you' are what your brain does.  It's not intuitive, certainly, 
and it's difficult to wrap your head around, but it has to be true.

'Yourself' has been duplicated.  They are both yourself.
As John K Clark has already said, there is 100% probability of finding 
yourself to be copy x, and 100% probability of finding yourself to be 
copy y.

Under these circumstances, /there is no singular you/.  Not any more.
There are two of you.  Each one is the 'real' one.  Each one has an 
identical history up until the split.  How can it be possible 
for 'you' to only exist in one of them?  Can you see why this 
hanging on to the idea of a singular you, in the face of copying
is tantamount to dualism?  If there is indeed a singular you, that 
'goes' into one or other of the copies, what the hell is it?
It must be something unknown to science.

My question "So which one is 'you'?" is a trick question, really.  
The only possible answer (assuming that souls do not exist) is 
"both of them".  Choosing just one (the 'real' you) implies that 
souls, or some equivalent, do exist.

Ben Zaiboc