[ExI] Let's play What If.

Sat Oct 30 01:16:15 UTC 2010

Unfortunately my last reply contained the crucial point toward the end, 
with supporting material at the front.  That left a lot of targets for 
you to knock down without really zooming in on what I was trying to 
claim.  (So I won't defend against any of your points because they are 
valid enough when removed from the context of my final line).

Remember that the question is only about whether the person before the 
operation should feel afraid.

************

That person should NOT feel afraid if they are going to be the one that 
is not the duplicate.  But before the operation, there is not a single 
aspect of the person that you can point to and say "This aspect of the 
person is going to remain as the original" EXCEPT the physical aspects. 
(This is the CRUCIAL point).  So any attempt to point to something and 
say "This is the real me that is going to continue on and remain the 
original" will founder, unless the pointing is a pointing at something 
physical.

But there are a thousand games we can play to make those physical 
aspects irrelevant to "personhood", and in the limit as those games 
become more comprehensive, the level of personhood continuity stays the 
same, at 100% original.  Then, finally, when the games are pushed to the 
limit itself there is a sudden switch and some people would say that the 
personhood continuity suddenly comes down to zero (they would say "Ah, 
that is no longer the original, that is a copy").

The games start innocently enough:

1) The end of one of my fingernails is actually on the duplicate person, 
after the operation.  (Who cares?  Me as a person, I am still 100% the 
original me).

2) All of my arms and legs are transferred to the copy, with me getting 
new ones.  (Who cares? ..... ditto).

3) Some of my neurons are replaced by new neurons that function exactly 
the same as the originals are rapidly transported across the to copy. 
(ditto).

4) Some of my neurons are replaced by synthetic copies that function 
exactly as same and the originals are rapidly transported across the to 
copy.  (ditto).

5) Unbeknowst to both of them, the original and the copy are placed in 
identical, featureless rooms, so when they both wake up (or when the 
instantaneous operation happens, if that is the way it is done), the 
first thing they say is "Thank god!  Nothing happened, so I must be the 
original!".

6) Same as 5, but the original is told that both will seem to be in the 
original room after the operation.  Then, the first thing both will say 
is "Am I the original?".

7) Same as 6, but after the operation the two of them will never be told 
which one is the original and which is the (we will assume) atomically 
perfect copy.  Instead, the sadistic torturers tell them that foir the 
rest of their lives neither will be told which is the original, except 
that on some randomly chosen future day the copy will suddenly be picked 
up and taken to the torture chamber.  (Now both of them live in equal fear).

8) Exactly 49.999% of my neurons are transferred to the copy, while the 
remainder stay put.  The ones that are replaced are (of course) perfect, 
functionally identical new neurons.

9) ALL of my neurons are transferred to the copy and replaced by 
functional duplicates (with such a perfect continuity of signals that no 
glitch is observed by the original), with all of them being moved to the 
copy's new brain cavity.

10) All of me (... why not take all of me?...) is taken in an instant 
and transferred to the duplicate's body and brain, except for one 
remaining tip of one fingernail, which stays in the original location.

************

Question:  in how many of these cases is it clear that the original SELF 
of that person (not the original body, but the original self) is in one 
place, while the duplicate self is in the other place?

In the scenario as described by John Clark, you maintain that the 
original is clearly in the original body and somebody else comes into 
existence.  But is it possible to make that same declaration in all of 
these intermediate cases? ... because it looks to me like we could make 
a complete continuum of cases from the original case all the way across 
to my case 10, which looks exactly like case 1, but reversed.  If we can 
make that continuum of cases, and if one end of the continuum is 
interpreted one way, but the other end is interpreted the opposite way, 
at which point did a flipover occur (and why)?

************

This is an old version of the argument (first time I read it was in the 
replies to Searle, but I recall it being a staple of philosophy 
discussions long before that).  The point of it is that different people 
choose different points at which to get leary about which one is the 
real them and which is the copy.  And in the end, the decision about 
which one is the continuously connected original turns out to be decided 
by fiat:  people usually just declare that there is a line beyond which 
the original stays or moves.

Richard Loosemore

Damien Broderick wrote:
> On 10/29/2010 1:43 PM, Richard Loosemore wrote:
> 
>>> Since I am the original prior to any duplicating, I know I'm safe i
> 
>> But that interpretation implies an asymmetry between the two people,
> 
> Of course there's an asymmetry. Sometimes it is an asymmetry observable 
> only by others, but so what? If the original remains awake during the 
> operation, he can be in absolutely no doubt that he is the original. The 
> duplicate *must* be in doubt, because his situation is radically 
> discontinuous in ways the original's isn't.
> 
> The situation reminds me a bit of the asymmetry in special relativity, 
> where the twin remaining on earth objectivity ages faster than the twin 
> in the starship, because the starship underwent an acceleration, a 
> discontinuous  change of state.
> 
>> After the duplication, the original would think to himself "Poor
>> bastard, but at least I get to go free".
> 
> He would be right.
> 
>> The duplicate will wake up and say "WAIT!  What happened?!!!  You said
>> the original would be okay!"
> 
> But then after a moment's thought, and a look around to see that he is 
> in the compilation vat or receiving platform (or on the Moon, as in 
> Budry's great novel ROGUE MOON) he'll realize he's mistaken.
> 
>> These two will be functionally identical.
> 
> Yes.
> 
>> Each will claim to be the
>> original, though one will have physical evidence that he woke up in the
>> wrong place.
> 
> Untrue. The twin in the starship might feel no different from the twin 
> back on earth, but a look at his circumstances will quickly set him 
> straight (if he's honest).
> 
>> The thought will be stored in both versions after the operation.
> 
> Indeed, which will raise interesting issues for therapists, but in one 
> case this thought will be recognized as an error.
> 
> *This has nothing to do with whether the copy IS NOW (for a moment) an 
> exact duplicate, another "you", etc*. His history is different, and this 
> can be proved using instruments, appeals to witnesses, etc.
> 
> Damien Broderick
> 
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