[ExI] Garage Innovation - The Scientist - Rob Carlson
Bryan Bishop
kanzure at gmail.com
Sat Jan 1 21:35:55 UTC 2011
On Sat, Jan 1, 2011 at 3:22 PM, Michal Galdzicki <mgaldzic at gmail.com> wrote:
> Garage Innovation - The Scientist - Magazine of the Life Sciences
> via www.the-scientist.com on 1/1/11
> http://www.the-scientist.com/article/display/57880/#
> By Rob Carlson
> The potential costs of regulating synthetic biology must be counted against
> putative benefits.
"""
What to do about biohackers in the garage? The apparent answer from
the US Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues,
whose first task has been to examine the emerging field of synthetic
biology, is “prudent vigilance.”
It isn’t just tinkerers who are intrigued by the prospect of building
genes and genomes. Many scientists are discovering exciting new ways
to use synthetic DNA. Moreover, the exponentially decreasing cost of
such DNA has encouraged innovative approaches to making drugs,
biofuels, and other materials. As early as next year, synthetic
biology may be used to produce flu-vaccine strains in days to weeks,
rather than the 12 months now required.
Yet discussions of synthetic biology always include the din of
warnings about artificial pathogens and Frankenstein experiments
escaping the lab. Therein lies the rub for the commission: “Let
science rip,” in the words of chair Amy Gutmann of the University of
Pennsylvania, or attempt to constrain access to an already globally
commercialized technology.
When I addressed the commission in July of last year, I emphasized the
critical importance of small organizations in producing technological
innovations. There is every reason to expect that garage innovation
will be as important to biological technologies as it was to IT and
dozens of others that we rely on every day. Consequently, one
challenge the commission faces is to reconcile the concern for safe
development with the drive for rapid development. Restriction of
access to technology and markets would slow development.
Regulation could result
in a black market
—the worst possible outcome.
Given the apparent power of the emerging toolkit of synthetic biology,
it is too easy to call for restrictions, such as regulations and
licensing, without pausing to account for the consequent potential
costs.
One possible strategy—restricting access to raw materials and
markets—has had very clear negative consequences in the effort to
reduce the production and consumption of illegal drugs. In the case of
methamphetamine, the US Drug Enforcement Administration’s own
reporting reveals that suppression of “mom-and-pop” production has
resulted in foreign manufacture that surpasses the domestic production
it replaced. In the case of cocaine, restricted access to markets led
drug cartels to build semisubmersible vessels that can carry illicit
cargo worth hundreds of times the cost of the vessel itself. In both
cases, the basic policy failure lay in the attempt to control tools
and skills in the context of a market in which consumers are willing
to pay prices that support use of those tools and skills.
The potential negative consequences of regulating the synthetic
biology toolkit are similar. Many questions must be addressed before
implementing any such policy. For instance, what is the line dividing
do-it-yourself biology from a start-up company operating in a garage?
Should all individuals interested in learning about biotechnology be
certified in some way? If so, that process will increase the costs of
both education and innovation. What if those costs are so large that
they discourage research and innovation, and thereby depress economic
growth? Alternatively, what if the certification costs are large
enough, but the physical barriers to use low enough, that it is
possible to avoid certification while engaging in backroom research
and development? What if backroom R&D finds a demand for illicit
products at prices that encourage avoiding certification—the very
definition of a black market? As the meth and cocaine examples
demonstrate, many policies intended to increase safety and security
turn out to be counterproductive in practice. Regulation of synthetic
biology could result in a black market—the worst possible outcome, and
one that should be avoided as an unbearable cost.
Everyone involved in this conversation wants to maximize safety and
security. Regulation might be an appropriate mechanism toward this
end, but it must be smart regulation. Proposals to regulate are every
bit as deserving of “prudent vigilance” as the field of synthetic
biology itself.
Dr. Rob Carlson is a Principal at Biodesic, an engineering,
consulting, and design firm in Seattle. At the broadest level, Carlson
is interested in the future role of biology as a human technology. He
has worked to develop new biological technologies in both academic and
commercial environments, focusing on molecular measurement and
microfluidic systems. Carlson is the author of the book Biology is
Technology: The Promise, Peril, and New Business of Engineering Life,
published in 2010 by Harvard University Press. Carlson earned a
doctorate in Physics from Princeton University in 1997. Links to
additional articles and his blog can be found here.
"""
--
- Bryan
http://heybryan.org/
1 512 203 0507
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