[ExI] simulation as an improvement over reality.

[scerir]

Stathis writes:
> That is, instead of saying that you survive because a copy lives
> on with your mental qualities you [Damien] prefer to say that since
> you self-evidently survive in ordinary life you can't really be a copy.
> This would not be so problematic if applied consistently, but it is
> not. In the case of destructive teleportation the sequence of
> reasoning is reversed: the self-evident belief is that you are a copy,
> so it follows that the belief that you have survived must be false.

By "destructive teleportation" do you mean quantum teleportation?
Asking this because, in this case, the quantum state of the original
would be destroyed, but not the "meat" (and his "consciousness"?)
and recreated, at a distance, provided there is enough "meat" there.
s.