[ExI] AGI Motivation revisited [WAS Re: Isn't Bostrom seriously ...]
Richard Loosemore
rpwl at lightlink.com
Wed Jun 22 19:11:33 UTC 2011
Stefano Vaj wrote:
> On 17 June 2011 17:28, Richard Loosemore <rpwl at lightlink.com
> <mailto:rpwl at lightlink.com>> wrote:
>
> If I had time I would extend this argument: the basic conclusion is
> that in order to get a really smart AGI you will need the alternate
> type of motivation system I alluded to above, and in that case the
> easiest thing to do is to create a system that is empathic to the
> human race .... you would have to go to immense trouble, over an
> extended period of time, with many people working on the project, to
> build something that was psychotic and smart, and I find that
> scenario quite implausible.
>
>
> It is not entirely clear to me what you think of the motivations of
> contemporary PCs, but I think you can have arbitrarily powerful and
> intelligent computers with exactly the same motivations. According to
> the Principle of Computational Equivalence, beyond a very low threshold
> of complexity, there is nothing more to "intrinsic!" intelligence than
> performance.
A "motivation mechanism" is something that an ordinary PC does not even
have, so I cannot for the life of me make sense of your first sentence.
A PC is roughly equivalent to a spinal column, in that its "motivation"
is only a set of reflex actions (it responds to specific pre-programmed
triggers). In effect, there is no motivation mechanism whatsoever,
because this is too trivial to deserve to be labeled that way.
You then mention the Principle of Computational Equivalence - you mean
Wolfram's definition? I am extremely familiar with this idea, but it
does not (as I understand it) have the implication that "beyond a very
low threshold of complexity, there is nothing more to "intrinsic!"
intelligence than performance." Or, if it does have that implication,
it is meant in a way that has no bearing on the question of motivation.
So I am twice puzzled by what you say.
> As to Turing-passing beings, that is beings which can be performant or
> not in the task but can behaviourally emulate specific or generic human
> beings, you may have a point that either they do it, and as a
> consequence cannot be either better or worse than what the emulate, or
> they do not (and in that event will not be recognisable as
> "intelligent" in any anthropomorphic sense).
>
> As to empathy to the "human race" (!), I personally do no really feel
> anything like that, but I do not consider myself more psychotic than
> average, so I am not inclined to consider seriously any such rhetoric.
Rhetoric? It is not rhetoric. If you are not psychotic (and I have no
reason to believe that you are), then you already have some empathy for
your species, whether you are introspectively aware of it or not.
> Sure, you may well hard-code in a computer behaviours aimed at
> protecting such a dubious entity, and if this work to operate the power
> grid you will end up without electricity the first time you have to
> perform an abortion. Do we really need that?
What?! I am sorry, but you will have to clarify your train of thought
for me, because I can make no sense of this.
Richard Loosemore
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