[ExI] Usages of the term libertarianism

[BillK]

2011/5/10 Dan wrote>:
> I think it would be more useful to ask why people believe what they believe
> -- why they believe X and Y go together (are either compatible or
> implied/inferred/corollaries) or don't go together (are incompatible). This
> usually works better when people start discussing what it means for them to
> be X and why they believe Y follows from, does not follow from, or is
> inconsistent with X.
<snip>


I just came across and interesting article>
<http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/2011/05/how-not-to-argue-for-libertarianism/>
which (although it is written in support of libertarian POV) makes
some good points.

Quote:
Rothbard seems to think that he can show us that we are committed to
accepting self-ownership, and that once he does this we are committed
on pain of irrationality to accepting everything that follows
logically from it, no matter how absurd it might seem.***  But this is
not how moral reasoning works, or ought to work.  Demonstrating that a
moral principle has some intuitive support gives you some reason to
accept it.  (e.g. “taxation is like theft and theft is wrong so
taxation is wrong”).  But that reason can be overcome if it turns out
that the intuitive principle has deeply counterintuitive implications.
 (e.g., “it is wrong to tax $100 away from a millionaire to save the
life of a starving child”).  Good moral reasoning involves something
like the back-and-forth method of reflective equilibrium.  All but our
most deeply held moral beliefs, and perhaps even them, are held
subject to revision in the light of new evidence, new arguments, and
new inquiries.  This is why my own attraction to libertarianism is
grounded in a kind of moral pluralism.  Yes, I believe that coercion
is a prima facie bad.  But I also believe that it is prima facie bad
for people to fail to get what they deserve, or for their basic needs
to be unmet.  These moral beliefs, to my mind, have just as firm a
standing as my opposition to coercion.  I see no reason to believe
that in a conflict between them, the opposition to coercion should
always trump.  Of course, this also makes it difficult for me to
support an absolute, bright-line, form of minimal state
libertarianism, as opposed to a more modest form of classical
liberalism (see here for elaboration of the distinction).  But such is
the price of nuance, I think.
--------------


That points at one of the problems I have with libertarians --
Once you accept principle 'A' then we are committed on pain of
irrationality to accepting everything that follows logically from it,
no matter how absurd it might seem. Sorry, but I just won't do that.
<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reflective-equilibrium/>


BillK