[ExI] the ethics of the Vile Offspring

[Keith Henson]

On Sun, May 22, 2011 at 9:19 AM, Anders Sandberg <anders at aleph.se> wrote:

snip

> He is not basing it on qualia, he is using qualia as an example. Maybe the
> real value resides in something else, but his point still stands: the kind
> of evolution we might engage in in the future might push us away from
> whatever the real value is.

At the root of it, what evolves?  What changes?  Genes.  As far as I
can see our psychological mechanisms that determine "value" lead back
to advantage for genes (or did in the EEA).  If anyone can come up
with a counter example, where "value" has no connection to genes it
would be most interesting to examine.

We value our status among other humans for example.  But nothing was a
better predictor of reproductive success than having high status in
the EEA.  Even today high status and wealth can be turned into
children.  (Gordon Getty if want a non-current example.)

In the future, you might just run yourself through the copy machine.

> If we think evolution has so far pushed us in the direction of value it does
> not follow that future new kinds of evolution will continue to push in the
> right way.

More general than DNA type genes, replication of information of some
kind will define the entities of the future.  The ones who are better
at getting the information copied, instantiated, will become more
common.  That's the definition of evolution.

Assuming that there is not a freezing in of entities who suddenly
become immortal and powerful and strongly restrict the generation of
new individuals.

> It might of course be that we now, being better aware of value, can push our
> evolution in an even more desireable direction.

Can we even state what direction _is_ more desirable?

> But given past experience
> with human planning and coordination ability for complex social systems as
> well as our wide spread of opinion on what is valuable, this does not look
> guaranteed in any way. In fact, such projects might develop their own
> accidental dynamics pushing in the wrong way (like many of our social
> institutions do).
>
> The problem is not the overman, the problem is that it might be rational for
> everybody to become something that in the aggregate or individually has
> lower value.

Worse, what is rational for genes in some circumstances is irrational
for the individual.

> Monkeys might disagree with us about what is really valuable in life and
> might think that we have evolved in a direction that produces less value.

Good point.  I wonder if monkey genes might agree with human genes on
what is valuable?

> They could just be wrong about that, since we have sources of value they
> lack access to, like science, philosophy and culture. But that doesn't mean
> some forms of future evolution can't be value-eroding. Robin's paper on the
> cosmic commons points out one nasty possibility (turning into an
> interstellar locust swarm) that might be hard to avoid without rather
> serious coordination (perhaps necessitating other, dangerous social
> institutions).

If this option is open, it might be impossible to avoid it.  It could
be closed in a non-FTL universe.  I just don't know.

Keith