[ExI] Destructive uploading.

Stefano Vaj stefano.vaj at gmail.com
Mon Sep 5 09:14:08 UTC 2011

On 4 September 2011 21:43, Kelly Anderson <kellycoinguy at gmail.com> wrote:

> I see the difference between replacing the atoms in your brain quickly
> vs. slowly to be an issue of continuity of consciousness. While you
> may perceive a me uploaded into a robot or VR to be the same as me,
> I'm more interested in the internal perception. Do I, internally to my
> thought processes feel as though I've had a nap, or just lived my life
> day by day, and the pattern is continuous. If there is a big
> discontinuity, then it will feel as though I've died. That would
> inflict a certain amount of psychological damage on me (or my copy)

Actually,... no. No matter how you perform the upload, perfect continuity is
perceived by the upload, by definition (one cannot be anybody but oneself at
any stage of the process, and at any stage either you are counscious -
including "sleep" consciousness - or you are not).

With regard to the public, which has nothing to do with internal perception,
it strictly depends on what you decide to show it, not on the mechanics of
the process.

Similarly, if one approximates B from A, either B' is different enough from
B that it can be described as a different result - and graduality is
irrelevant for this purpose, or is "similar enough", and in such event
nothing change.>If we continued conscious awareness when doubled, or tripled
if the process is non-destructive, which one are we aware of, or are we
aware in multiple places at the same time?

I like to think of it as multiple threads of execution, perhaps even
> distributed to different physical computers. When the threads are
> merged later, you just have new memory of having done two different
> things yesterday. It would be weird at first, but I think we could get
> use to remembering two yesterdays, or twenty. It would probably be
> percieved initially as yesterday, and the day before yesterday....

I suspect that the merger of two "threads" would be no different from any
practical purpose than the merger of any two individuals. You may probably
create an AGI as a patchwork of different experiences lived by several
persons, as in Blade Runner's Rachel, but *this* would certainly qualify as
a new person.

Stefano Vaj
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