[ExI] Digital Consciousness .

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On Wed, Apr 24, 2013 at 4:31 PM, Gordon <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
> Eugen,
>
>> First question: what do you mean by consciousness?
>
> I mean, exactly, what philosophers mean by intentionality:
>
> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality/
>
>> Second question: what do you think computational neuroscientists are doing?
>
> If by computational neuroscientists you mean cognitive scientists, I believe they are following a false model. The computational model of mind is, I think, wrong.

There is an argument from David Chalmers which proves that computers
can be conscious assuming only that (a) consciousness is due to the
brain and (b) the observable behaviour of the brain is computable.
Consciousness need not be defined for the purpose of the argument
other than vaguely: you know it if you have it. This makes the
argument robust, not dependent on any particular philosophy of mind or
other assumptions. The argument assumes that consciousness is NOT
reproducible by a computer and shows that this leads to absurdity. As
far as I am aware no-one has successfully challenged the validity of
the argument.

http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou