[ExI] Digital Consciousness .

Stathis Papaioannou stathisp at gmail.com
Thu Apr 25 10:04:48 UTC 2013


On Thu, Apr 25, 2013 at 3:44 PM, Gordon <gts_2000 at yahoo.com> wrote:
> Hello old friend Stathis. You understand me on this subject probably better
> than anyone here. We discussed these issues at length back some 4-5 years
> ago. I think I am experiencing deja vu.
>
> Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> That's where you're wrong. If we could simulate a brain we could
> simulate part of a brain. We could replace your visual cortex with an
> artificial visual cortex, for example, that reproduces the I/O
> behaviour of your biological cortex. If the I/O behaviour is
> reproduced, than the rest of your brain will behave normally as it
> receives the same inputs.<
>
> Granted, it does seem possible to create simulated digital sensory inputs to
> the mind/brain, as in your example of an artificial visual cortex.. But then
> we can also wear sunglasses to change our visual inputs. Are we supposed to
> think sunglasses are conscious?
>
> What if I implanted a physical calculator in my head to do math for me? I
> could hook it up to all the right "math willing" neurons to do the job for
> me. I'm pretty sure the calculator would give me the right answers, but that
> I would have nothing to do with the calculations. It would not be much
> different from holding the calculator in my hand, except that I would be
> pushing the buttons with my thoughts alone.

That's not the sort of replacement I was talking about. That would be
like giving me a wheelchair if I had an arthritic knee rather than
replacing the knee with an artificial joint. I could still get around
with the wheelchair, but it would be completely different to walking;
whereas with the artificial it will feel close to what it felt like
when my knee was good.

With the brain, imagine that an engineer wants to replace a neuron in
the visual cortex. The engineer is a simple fellow who knows nothing
about philosophy and the mind, so he treats the neuron like a machine,
the same as the knee joint. He monitors the neuron and notes how it
behaves given a wide range of inputs and environmental conditions. For
example, he notes that the neuron depolarises its membrane producing a
waveform of a particular shape and magnitude if exposed to a certain
threshold concentration of neurotransmitter, and this threshold goes
up or down depending on the concentration of sodium, potassium and
calcium, the pH, the temperature, the time since the last
depolarisation, and so on. From this information he produces a
computer model and uses this to program an artificial neuron with
sensors to measure the various environmental parameters and the
ability to interface with neighbouring neurons, stimulating them
either electrically or by releasing neurotransmitter from stores.

The engineer replaces the original neuron with the artificial one and
tests the modified network, making adjustments to the software and
hardware if necessary until satisfied that it is functioning normally
according to his measurements.

Given that the artificial neurons do in fact function normally in the
engineering sense, is it possible that they do not reproduce
consciousness? Think about what that would mean.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou



More information about the extropy-chat mailing list