[ExI] <nettime> Forced Exposure: Groklaw closes down

[Anders Sandberg]

On 2013-08-25 09:42, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 22, 2013 at 12:47:34AM +0100, Anders Sandberg wrote:
>> If it was possible to run a darknet perfectly, so the inside had the
>> information and could watch the outside, then the intelligence
>> agencies would be much better off.
> The function of a darknet is uncensorable transport and tamper-proof
> publishing across of untrusted network. It is not about limiting access.

I use the term in a wider sense than just anonymizing P2P communication. 
Many organisations want to maintain VPNs that are uncensorable, 
tamper-proof and ideally invisible, even if they might not want to have 
anonymous participants (indeed, I assume NSA really wants to be able to 
log who is doing what in a tamper-proof way). The limited access is an 
optional thing, but a natural effect of making the network invisible 
(and even more so if identities are strictly controlled).

I guess the key question is what the inherent consequences of different 
capability choices are. Uncensorable seems to imply a broadcast model, 
even if there is just a single recipient. Lots of bandwidth usage. 
Tamper-proof likely requires cryptographic protocols, and hence stable 
nyms. Invisibility requires using "normal" protocols or encryption good 
enough to hide inside other communications, or an entirely separate 
system. Being able to look "out" into the wider Internet requires member 
computers to face it, which means intrusion risks and more subtle 
information leakage.

-- 
Dr Anders Sandberg
Future of Humanity Institute
Oxford Martin School
Oxford University