[ExI] Redness comes from Context?
brent.allsop at canonizer.com
Sun May 5 15:37:41 UTC 2013
You're clearly still missing much. First off, you said:
"I know it /feels/ like there is, but that's no guide."
Surely you must believe that if you know ANYTHING, whether mistaken or
not, there must be something that is that knowledge or that is the
seeming /feels/. If you don't agree with that, then you're not talking
about any kind of intelligence with knowledge that is physically real.
This entire conversation is about what it /feels/ like. This
conversation is about how it /feels/ to me, and how is this could be
different than what it /feels/ like to you. Whether such /feelings/ are
mistaken or "not a guide", has nothing to do with what this conversation
You also said:
"Forget 'a simple elemental redness quality', there is no such thing."
for which there is lots and lots of scientific evidence that falsifies
this, so don't expect me to believe such completely violates known
science assertions. For example, when people take certain psychedelic
drugs, all these bound together pieces of information "disassociate" and
become consciously clearly separated - having nothing to do with each
other. If you're interested, I can point you to a book where Steven
Lehar scientifically documents having such experiences.
To say nothing of brain defects like 'blind sight' where all the
cognitive information remains 'bound' together, and only the qualitative
information is missing. People can still catch the red strawberry, but
they can't 'see' any redness quality to what they just caught. The
opposite is also true with "associative agnosia" where people can
experience a redness qaulity, but there is nothing else bound to the
redness. There is nothing like warmth with it, they don't know that
what they are perceiving is a strawberry, and so on. Just that there is
a redness qualitative experience, and nothing more.
Again, this conversation is only about the redness quality that can
exist all alone. It is not about all the other coganative informaiton
that can also be 'bound' to it. We are talking about the necessary and
sufficient causal properties corelated with just that redness quality,
and how are these causal properties different from the ones you
represent the strawberry with. All the other same cognitive things,
like the abstract word 'red' we both bind to this possibly very
qualitatively different (either because it is a natural accident or via
neurally inverted architected and manipulated binding system) is
irrelevant to what this conversation is about. This conversation is
about whether those causal properties can be the same in two brains, as
long as there is only the correct 'functional isomorph' or must there be
something material, for another to /feel/ the same is I /feel/. The
necessary and sufficient causal causal properties responsible for what
it 'feels' like to me, is only what this conversation is about.
You seem to be talking about something different entirely, and
ignoring/missing, what the rest of us are attempting to talk about, and
what all of us know, absolutely, exists. (unless of course, you are a my
redness zombie - which of course would explain a lot of things, and make
what both of us are saying, correct, about only our own minds - in which
case boy are you in for a big surprise, when science finally enables me
to first 'eff' to you what my redness qualitatively /feels/ like.)
On 5/5/2013 6:42 AM, Ben Zaiboc wrote:
> Brent Allsop <brent.allsop at canonizer.com> wrote:
>> I'm predicting there are elemental qualities, like redness
> This is the heart of the matter.
> You think there are such things as 'qualities', which exist independently of anything else. I don't. I'm saying that the experience of a 'quality' like redness arises from combining many things together in the mind. These are not mysterious abstract things, they are the patterns of information-processing out of which experience is built.
> Note, I'm not saying "a huge amount of memories, emotions, us perceiving it, and other stuff /in with 'redness'/", I'm saying "a huge amount of memories, emotions, us perceiving it, and other stuff IS 'redness'".
> Are you familiar with binaural beats, or moire patterns? How about fluid vortices? Or the patterns in a wheatfield when the wind blows? These things all exist, but there is no way they could be described as 'elemental qualities'. Or elemental anything. Redness is like this, in my opinion. *All* of our experiences are like this.
>> It seems to me that Ben is
>> pulling a similar trick, claiming qualitative properties come from
>> complexities. But if this is the case, then you should be able to tell
>> me the nature of these complexities, and what or how is it that a simple
>> elemental redness quality can come from such
> This paragraph illustrates that you didn't understand what I meant. Forget "a simple elemental redness quality", there is no such thing. I know it /feels/ like there is, but that's no guide. Einstein's special theory of relativity feels wrong, too. So does quantum theory. It's tough that our instincts have evolved to cope with living on the savannah, chasing antelopes and avoiding lions. We have to rely on logic to guide us on these more recent concerns.
> Ben Zaiboc
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