[ExI] scurrilous commentary

[spike]

On Tue, Dec 16, 2014 at 10:26 PM, spike <spike66 at att.net> wrote:
>
>>... SONY employees are sweating bullets right now because they know that 
> whoever hacked them might publish any embarrassing thing they wrote in 
> privacy to a recipient... spike



>... On Behalf Of David Abreu
Subject: Re: [ExI] scurrilous commentary

>...OR they'd think it was by them. So it makes things worse.
I'm pretty sure just encryption would solve things rather nicely.

Welcome David!  When replying, trim the original and put your comment below the comment to which you are replying.  This is a longstanding ExI-chat tradition and helps us get the flow of the discussion in chronological order, thanks.

Encryption can be broken by guessing passwords or by bribing insiders to hand over the keys.

If we had a system like what I envision, then when a big company gets hacked, it can tell its employees they needn't worry about it, for 90% of the company email archives are bogus machine-generated messages which the employees never see, but the hackers can't tell the difference.  

So if you ever did write an actual scurrilous message, only you know for sure it was you who wrote it.  All the metadata collected by evolution-knows-who, shows all the machine-generated messages the same as all the real ones.  The filtering is done at the individual machine level.

We could even set up bogus senders and receivers, with actual human-generated scurrilous content, such as disrespectful commentary on all the latest politically incorrectness.  Then the hackers get that and splay across the headlines that Corporate VP Mortimer Q. Snorklebean wrote to Corporate VP Hephzibah E. Hardlebunz all this garbage insulting the government, the customer, the latest movie star, everything else.  Then of course the company only needs to point out that neither Snorklebean nor Hardlebunz exist and that clearly the hackers wrote the offending emails.

But before they do, they can bait the hackers along by offering passwords and encryption keys to databases filled with still more bogus material, in exchange for not revealing the damaging email.  From that we might be able to trace access.

spike