[ExI] possible scheme for privacy
rafal.smigrodzki at gmail.com
Mon Jul 21 04:09:14 UTC 2014
On Sun, Jul 20, 2014 at 12:52 PM, Harvey Newstrom <mail at harveynewstrom.com>
> In TOR, a far-reaching entity can monitor a very large number of ISPs and
> exit nodes to match traffic patterns between the sender (real IP and
> encrypted message) and the TOR exit node (fake IP and unencrypted message)
> to link the real IP with the unencrypted message. Although TOR is
> generally safe, there is no way to prevent a big enough monitoring system
> from catching everything.
> ### How about using a continuous data stream from all users to cover up
actual usage pattern? If I am sending and receiving an encrypted one-time
pad-randomized 1 kb/s 24/7, I can send and receive an arbitrary number of
text messages without an adversary being able to determine when or what I
send to or from whom, unless they have the one time pad and full access to
the stream of data and access to the nodes routing my data stream, or they
have hardware access on my end (i.e. they own me anyway).
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