[ExI] Tunnels

[spike]

>... On Behalf Of BillK
Subject: Re: [ExI] Tunnels

On Sun, Jul 20, 2014 at 6:04 PM, spike wrote:
> The whole notion of a tunnel is a gift to Israel.  The Presbyterians 
> surrounding Israel fire cheap unguided rockets by the dozens into 
> Israel who respond by firing expensive high-tech guided missiles to 
> take out their cheap missiles.  (Remember all that debate we had here 
> about THAAD?  Where are the nay-sayers now that they are saving 
> lives?)  In the long run, the Episcopalians win that battle, even if 
> no one perishes: they spend millions attacking, Israel spends billions
defending.

There is an analysis out that claims that the Israel Iron Dome system is
virtually useless.
What saves Israel lives is the warning system and underground shelters (and
the fact that the Hamas rockets have pretty small warheads).
Iron Dome does have propaganda value, in that it tells the population that
their government is trying hard yo defend them. Much like as in WWII the
British installed lots of anti-aircraft guns which rarely, if ever, hit
anything. But made people feel better.

See: <http://thebulletin.org/evidence-shows-iron-dome-not-working7318>

BillK
_______________________________________________


Hi BillK, I saw a couple things wrong with the article.  If an Iron Dome
missile is fired against an incoming missile, there is a high chance the
shot will be diverted after it is fired.  Reasoning: radar picks up the
missile during boost phase, then as soon as the motor burns out and the
weapon enters the coast phase, a circle of equal probability (CEP) can be
calculated, which is the area on the ground the missile is likely to strike.
The Israelis have a value map; they decide if the target area is worth a
response.  As I understand it, most of the missiles are not worth a
response.  If the value-map indicates high-value targets within the CEP, at
some point in the coast phase an antiballistic missile (ABM) must be fired.
During the upward flight of an ABM, the CEP is in the process of shrinking,
since more radar readings are made from a closer source.  If the CEP
shrinks down to an expendable area during the upward flight of the ABM, then
the ABM is called off.  Reasoning: if you hit a missile which is coming down
in a harmless area and it is hit by an ABM, it might go off into an area
which is harmful.  Alternately a missile exploded over a high value area
might cause more damage than letting it explode on the ground, since it
would scatter shrapnel.  So the strategy in many cases after an ABM is fired
is to disengage the countermeasure and let it hit.  By Postol's analysis,
this would be scored as a failure, since the contrails would cross.

Another problem I saw is that the conclusions are based on contrail analysis
that fails to distinguish between types of outgoing missiles.  Some of the
outgoing missiles might not be Iron Dome ABMs but rather countermeasures
which follow contrails back to their source.  A contrail makes an excellent
targeting mechanism, and it works even better at night, since the ground is
cooler, making the still-warm rocket launcher show up cherry red in IR.  Any
missile which follows a contrail back to its source is way cheap compared to
a body-on-body countermeasure.

I had a notion on how the Palestinian government could defend itself.  They
would arm the civilian population with ordinary low-cost rifles and
night-vision goggles.  The locals soon observe that every time a rocket is
fired from their neighborhood, pretty soon return fire starts coming in.
The portion of the populace unwilling to be human shields would fire upon
anyone they witness setting up a rocket launcher.  Those launching the
rockets want to attract return fire into populated areas for PR value, but
the locals might have other opinions on the matter.

spike