[ExI] for the fermi paradox fans

[Dennis May]

I see strong underpinnings of popular cosmology among the assumptions
being used.  

Both Dark Matter and Dark Energy are required in the orthodox
model of cosmology.  The problem is there is no General Relativity
plus Dark Matter model which satisfies the basic statistical mechanical
observations of spiral galaxies. Given that several competing models
produce statistically valid results while GR + DM does not indicates
there is no valid basis for assuming the general validity of either GR
or DM as currently being used in cosmology.  Hence any thermodynamic
results from those theories are also suspect since they rely upon an
observationally invalid foundation.

http://arxiv.org/pdf/1107.2934.pdf + several follow on papers.
The follow on papers also describe several modified GR theories
not requiring DM providing statistically valid results GR + DM 
cannot.

http://arxiv.org/pdf/1404.7525.pdf - the current state of things.

*****

Anders Sandberg <anders at aleph.se>,15 June 2014 5:29 PM:

"Basically, I think this points towards external rational adversaries being relatively manageable."

The separation issue depends upon cosmological models without a valid foundation.

"Singleton civilizations also prevent internal adversaries."

I do not see an argument in support of this statement.  All present known life began
as a singleton event yet immediately spawned countless adversarial relationships. No
example in nature or human civilization would seem to support this.

"The problem is the case where irrational adversaries are around (burning cosmic commons, the google-prime calculator),"

"Irrational adversaries" assumes a common knowledge of what are irrational
courses of action. I see no methodology where that assumption could be made.

"the case of utility functions that depend on each other (zorgons love to simulate humans in agony; our utility is decreased by theirs),"

A great many adversarial events in human history revolve around this issue.

"and non-singleton civilizations where internal adversaries evolve."

The safer assumption is that all civilizations deal with the issue of internal adversaries. 

I guess the question is can a singleton civilization come into existence at all
and if it does can it be a long term stable entity?  I believe the answer to the
first is situational dependent [requiring near ideal circumstances].  The 
answer to the second is no - castles and cannonballs.  One can imagine
unsupported cosmological models improving both situations but the number
of possible wrong cosmologies is arbitrarily infinite.

Dennis
 

________________________________
 From: Anders Sandberg <anders at aleph.se>
To: ExI chat list <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> 
Sent: Sunday, June 15, 2014 5:29 PM
Subject: Re: [ExI] for the fermi paradox fans
  


More thinking about the adversarial case:

The adversaries A and B want to calculate something, and their utilities UA and UB are monotonic functions of the amount of resources they get. (If we want to complicate things we may consider situations where utilities depend on what the other guy gets, but let's keep things simple). Each starts with an amount of resources RA and RB. 

The value of resources can change. Consider the Landauer model: temperature declines as exp(-Ht), which means that the value of a Joule increases as exp(Ht)! At least until we hit the horizon radiation temperature and it stays constant. If A has discount rate a, the value of a Joule t units into the future is exp((H-a)t). So if discounting is faster than the universe cools, A will want to burn resources *now*. If a is slower than H, then A will want to save until the horizon temperature era: using resources today is wasteful. 

If A and B can change their rate of subjective time, then discount factors presumably change in the same way (in fact, the clockspeed is likely proportional to resource usage and vice versa). If A is naturally short-term, it might still want to slow down its clockspeed for a few trillion years and then start gorging in the dark era since it will - subjectively - just get a lot more resources in the short term. So everybody will want to go to the far era... unless their utility levels off very fast (a being that only wants to calculate the googoolth prime does not benefit from resources beyond what is needed for this). So A and B are a bit concerned about those finitist beings who would want resources early and then stop - and the other guy! Just because both A and B want to use the resources later doesn't mean they will not try to grab them early.

There is an interesting physics of grabbing (kleptophysics?), I suspect. Can resources be stolen with an expected profit, or will it be zero or negative sum? Scorched earth situations makes grabbing negative-sum. Moving mass around incurs a rocket-equation cost of m(exp(v/k) -1) kg (where m is the grabbed 'payload', v the velocity and k isp - let's not do the relativistic case, it is even worse!). So the value today of stealing mass m to A will be proportional to UA(m)*exp((H-a)(d/v)) where d is the distance to move it. The cost to B if A steals the mass now is UB(m(exp(v/k)-1)). Suppose these U are just linear and identical. Then the loss to B is much larger than the gain to A. If A is short-term, then it will also want to use a big v, making things even more wasteful. Long-term civilizations are content to let the loot drift to their treasure pile over cosmological times, although presumably it might now be vulnerable (if not to stealing back, then at
 least to 'if I can't have this star, nobody will!' BOOM!) So it seems that unless UB is pretty convex, it might be rational for B to do scorched earth against A. The situation for energy might be tricky; Eric Drexler has mentioned some clever long-term storage ideas that might remove the exponential nastiness of the rocket equation and would hence move things closer to a zero-sum situation. More research is needed.

So if A and B do not care about each other other as potential threats to their resources, then it looks rational to try to negotiate an equilibrium. I guess this is totally standard economic game theory I cannot do at 23:21 in the evening. I suspect the end of the story is that they make a binding deal, leave each other alone or merge their resources and utilities, and live happily ever after. 

Also, accelerating expansion of the universe means that after a certain time their domains will be losing causal contact: they do not have to deal with each other eternally.

Basically, I think this points towards external rational adversaries being relatively manageable. Singleton civilizations also prevent internal adversaries. The problem is the case where irrational adversaries are around (burning cosmic commons, the google-prime calculator), the case of utility functions that depend on each other (zorgons love to simulate humans in agony; our utility is decreased by theirs), and non-singleton civilizations where internal adversaries evolve. Have I missed anything?


Anders Sandberg,
Future of Humanity Institute
Philosophy Faculty of Oxford University
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