[ExI] Zombie glutamate

Stathis Papaioannou stathisp at gmail.com
Sat Feb 21 15:22:30 UTC 2015

On Saturday, February 21, 2015, John Clark <johnkclark at gmail.com
<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','johnkclark at gmail.com');>> wrote:

> On Fri, Feb 20, 2015 at 6:47 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <stathisp at gmail.com>
> wrote:
> > If the replacement part perfectly copies the observable I/O behaviour of
>> the original part, then consciousness will necessarily also be copied.
>>  [...] consciousness is a necessary side-effect of behaviour
> I think that's true, I'd bet my life that's true, but I'll never be able
> to prove it and neither can you.

You more or less agreed in your previous post with what you just quoted
from me above - except you said that perfect copying of the I/O behaviour
could only be done by replacing like for like, which would be no
replacement (there are some who claim that even replacing like for like
would not reproduce consciousness, but let's not get into that). But in
a thought experiment it is enough to consider the case where a volume of
neural tissue is replaced by a black box which has the appropriate I/O
behaviour. Do you accept that such a black box would necessarily preserve
consciousness, or can you conceive of a way of partly replacing the
putative consciousness-generating apparatus without the subject or an
observer noticing, respectively, a gross change in consciousness or

Stathis Papaioannou
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