[ExI] Bell's Inequality

Adrian Tymes atymes at gmail.com
Thu Dec 15 07:27:03 UTC 2016


On Wed, Dec 14, 2016 at 5:25 AM, Jason Resch <jasonresch at gmail.com> wrote:
> Given that the existence of quantum computers (I actually got to see one in
> person a few days ago) asserts the reality of the wave function, the next
> step to get to MWI is to imagine a future quantum computer that can run a
> brain emulation.

One might view the human brain as a kind of quantum computer, in this
sense.  If so, we can use our own experience as a guide.  (This also
gives us a limit on what that brain emulation can experience,
quantum-wise: if we can't experience it - either on our own, or with
the aid of technology that is at least theoretically possible -
there's no reason to assume an emulated brain could either.)

> Now we ask, "How many worlds does this simulated mind
> experience, as the wave function explores all possibilities (before it
> collapses from our vantage point)?" The answer can't possibly be 1, for we
> know the wave function is real, and it is in a superposition of many states.
> You could perhaps argue 0, if you reject the computational theory of mind.
> Otherwise, I think you must conclude "many".

I can experience many simulated worlds myself.  Not one hour ago, I
was experiencing one that is not our world, via a computer game.  That
doesn't mean the alternate worlds actually exist (though that
supposition has inspired many a tale), just that I can conceive of and
think through them.

There is also the question of how quantum computers work.  As I
understand it, they are fed a problem for which there are many
possible solutions, all of which could in theory be evaluated by
traditional computers in parallel - if you had enough processors.
Only one solution is correct, though, and that solution gets weighted
positively while the others are weighted negatively.  You run this
weighting repeatedly - annealing - until the odds of the quantum state
representing the single correct solution is very high.

But we already have that, kind of, in fluid dynamics.  Present a fluid
(say, a gallon of water) with a board through which it can only go at
one point in one shape, then press the fluid into the board.  Even if
the fluid is somehow sentient enough to have experiences, it does not
experience going through at any other point.  But it certainly presses
against all the other points on the board at the same time.



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