[ExI] Bell's Inequality

[Jason Resch]

On Sun, Dec 18, 2016 at 3:33 AM, Adrian Tymes <atymes at gmail.com> wrote:

> On Fri, Dec 16, 2016 at 2:49 PM, Jason Resch <jasonresch at gmail.com> wrote:
> > On Thu, Dec 15, 2016 at 2:43 AM, Adrian Tymes <atymes at gmail.com> wrote:
> >> On Thu, Dec 15, 2016 at 12:04 AM, Jason Resch <jasonresch at gmail.com>
> >> wrote:
> >> > The difficulty is we
> >> > can't prove there is no collapse from our vantage point. Running an
> >> > execution of some program on a quantum computer necessitates that
> there
> >> > is
> >> > no collapse from your point of view. If we run a brain simulation and
> we
> >> > know there is no collapse, then we know some, possibly exponentially
> >> > growing, number of divergent emulations of that mind were instantiated
> >> > in
> >> > that superposition.
> >>
> >> I don't see how we know that any divergent emulation were
> >> instantiated.  All we know for sure is that at least one was: the one
> >> resulting in the resulting state.  We don't know whether any others
> >> existed.
> >
> > If the wave function is real, and not merely a tool that yields right
> > probabilities for us, then the superpositions within the wave function
> would
> > all have an equal claim to reality.
>
> Not so much.  If there is a "right" probability, then by definition it
> has a superior claim.
>
> > E.g. a system of pies, each
> > of which splits into two pipes every foot
>
> I know that was a typo, but "a system of pies" calls into mind some
> weird mental imagery.  (Though the fact that I've been baking a bit
> today may have helped.)  :P
>
> >> > This is why fact that quantum computers can be built so strongly
> >> > suggests
> >> > the existence/reality/and effective causality of vast unseen resources
> >> > present throughout the (now assuredly very real) wave function.
> >>
> >> For certain definitions of "resources", but it doesn't suggest any of
> >> those resources exist outside of or necessarily spawn other worlds.
> >
> > Then what resources is the computation using? We can agree we get the
> final
> > answer and it is not by magic, so clearly something real is responsible
> for
> > yielding the answer. According to the theory, this thing is the wave
> > function, and the resources used are all of the wave functions various
> > superpositions.
>
> "Assume MWI, therefore MWI."  Sorry, that's circular reasoning.
>

But what, in "wave function isn't really real"-theories, can explain the
computational power of quantum computers? What is doing the calculating?
Are the vast numbers of states in the intermediate steps of the calculation
not the ultimate causes of the final answer the quantum computer spits out?
How can something that is not real cause a physical effect?


>
> >>   As the article
> >> notes, the friend could be in a superimposed state.  Another
> >> possibility, which I have illustrated before, is that which way the
> >> experiment would go was determined at least as early as the last
> >> conscious actor performing any action that could influence the
> >> experiment (such as the exact timing of putting the cat in the box),
> >> even if no such actor knew the outcome yet.
> >
> > There's nothing to motivate this theory.
>
> There's just as much to motivate that theory as there is MWI - to wit,
> nothing that proves either way.
>

There are proposed experiments that can prove it either way. E.g. a
reversible quantum computer running an AI. Or, using currently available
technology, quantum suicide: an iterated version of Schrodinger's cat, with
you as the cat.


>
> > In fact, there's been no reason to believe in Copenhagen Interpretation
> > since Everett used the assumption of no collapse to show how the math of
> the
> > theory produces the illusion of collapse. You can't get a more clear cut
> > case for Occam's razor's preference for MW over CI than this: explains
> more,
> > while assuming less.
>
> If we're using Occam's Razor (which, granted, I have been), then
> predetermination (with possible exception for conscious actors, up
> until their last action that could influence a given result) seems
> simpler than MWI, as it does not assume anything we can not observe.


You would need to add a lot of additional postulates to the theory of QM to
explain how and when collapse occurs, what about observers enables them to
initiate a collapse, etc. But none of this math is needed. The regular
existing postulates of QM can explain the appearance of wave function
collapse, and do not need to assume it.

Moreover, if collapse is real, it would be the only thing in physics that
is irreversible, fundamentally random, not time symmetric, has
faster-than-light influences, etc. It requires an extraordinary leap of
faith to believe these extra assumptions are at play in the theory, when
the math of the theory, pretty clearly tells us, such assumptions are
completely unnecessary.

Jason
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