[ExI] my unified theory etc

spike spike66 at att.net
Wed May 11 20:17:32 UTC 2016

-----Original Message-----
From: extropy-chat [mailto:extropy-chat-bounces at lists.extropy.org] On Behalf
Of Keith Henson
Sent: Wednesday, May 11, 2016 12:16 PM
To: ExI chat list <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org>
Subject: Re: [ExI] my unified theory etc

On Wed, May 11, 2016 at 10:01 AM,
<extropy-chat-request at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

> >...  But the security team told her no, for perfectly understandable
reasons: the 
> technology did not exist (and still doesn't) for doing what she asked.  
> She wanted a secure blackberry which could be carried abroad.  These
cannot be secured abroad with current technology.

>...Perhaps you can explain why?

If end-to-end encryption isn't good enough, they can always use one time


Keith encryption would help, but they couldn't prevent the signals from
being intercepted, then arbitrary numbers of computers chewing away at it
for arbitrarily long.  Using one-time pads (or the electronic equivalent)
would work to defeat this, however any scheme we could come up with still
requires the kinds of password discipline that we now think Mrs. Clinton
flatly refused to perform (details not available on request (the way they do
passwords make that process a paaaaainnnn in the aaassssss (but it also
explains why Mrs. Clinton never activated her .gov account (and another
insight your question gave me: Mrs. Clinton didn't have a secure account,
never had one, so she was not reminded every day, every single time she
accessed a message that she could end up roommates with Mr. Sterling if she
mishandled the info on that server (but her staff did (which brings up a
whole sticky mess of questions in itself (such as the obvious: how did that
material get across the gap?))))))))


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