[ExI] Humans losing freewill

[Stathis Papaioannou]

On 23 November 2016 at 15:20, Stuart LaForge <avant at sollegro.com> wrote:

Stathis wrote:
> <I assume that I make choices because my brain is in a particular
> configuration, and that my brain is in that configuration because of the
> way the universe has evolved up to that point. When I say I could have
> chosen differently, I mean that if my brain had been in a different
> configuration I would have chosen differently; and my brain could only
> have been in a different configuration if the universe had evolved
> differently to the way it actually has. This is a counterfactual; all that
> is required is logical possibility.>
>
> So you are saying that you are assuming determinism, i.e. every choice you
> make is caused by events in your past light-cone and that your decisions
> are shaped by the actual history of the universe and not by any of the
> other possible histories. Here you also seem to rule out that any of your
> decisions are made because of events in the future or undetectable fairies
> on the other side of the universe. So far so good.
>

I'm not assuming this is true, I'm just considering the implications for
free will if it is true.


> Stathis continues:
> <There is the possibility that I might make different choices given the
> same brain configuration, because there is some truly random element in my
> brain. This is in fact slightly disturbing, because it means I may make a
> choice at some point not because [of] my experiences and disposition, but
> for no reason at all.>
>
> Ok here you are back-pedaling from determinism and saying that your
> decisions are sometimes random. So could you describe what you mean by
> random as randomness can be very subjective and relative. Are you talking
> ontological or epistemic randomness? Objectively random or subjectively
> random?
>

Ontological randomness. Apparent randomness due to ignorance in a
deterministic universe is less interesting.


> Stathis continues:
> <If you used the term "free will" for this random component, then we might
> say that a person is not to be held responsible for their behaviour if it
> is freely willed, but only if it is determined. This, of course, is not
> how "free will" is normally conceived; which supports the point that it is
> an incoherent concept, and we are best to have the discussion using other,
> universally agreed to terms.>
>
> But I am not suggesting that randomness is the same as free will. They are
> not necessarily mutually exclusive but they certainly are not the same
> thing. Indeed our best applications of free will are those that are causal
> to our well-being and gratification or the well-being of the people and
> causes we care about.
>
> Instead I am saying that free will is a choice precipitated by factors
> intrinsic to the agent rather than extrinsic to him or her. That is to say
> that there are no invisible puppet strings on you causing your behavior.


It's difficult to understand what this could possibly mean. Unless the
agent is in an isolated system there are always puppet strings from the
environment, both visible and invisible. Even if the agent is isolated,
again his behaviour is either determined by the configuration of his brain
or by truly random processes in his brain. So "free will" doesn't amount to
any more than something like "doing what you want to do", which is
coherent, but trivial.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou
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