[ExI] Cryonics for uploaders discussion: Video

Re Rose rocket at earthlight.com
Tue Apr 10 13:16:40 UTC 2018

> Message: 4
> Date: Sat, 07 Apr 2018 10:36:48 +0100
> From: Ben <bbenzai at yahoo.com>
> To: extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org
> Subject: Re: [ExI] Cryonics for uploaders discussion: Video (John
>         Clark)
> Message-ID: <5AC89130.4080302 at yahoo.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
> Re Rose <rocket at earthlight.com> wrote:
> "Since the agency of an individual is subjective we have to be very careful
> we're not creating new beings with our uploading technology and still dying
> as individuals - unless your goal is to make an animated library of people
> patterned on existing people who died (or maybe didn't even die yet). We
> might all agree it would be very, very great to have certain people's
> connectomes preserved and reanimated - I'd have dinner with a reanimated
> Feynman or Turing in one second flat while jumping with joy for the good
> their re-existence would do the whole damn world while I'm at it, but if
> the originals would still be dead and gone - well, if that's the case, we
> should know that it is."
> This whole concept of a 'me that is not me' baffles me. Leaving aside
> ideas like the 'soul' (which I hope we can all agree is nonsense), what
> is it that constitutes an individual? More importantly, what is it that
> constitutes an individual that is somehow inherently not reproducible? I
> can't think of a single candidate. There are several ideas about what is
> necessary for an individual mind to exist, but all of the elements
> involved are reproducible.
> -----<snip>--------
> >>
> >>  Only your subjective, internal experience will allow you to be sure if
> >> it is you
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> In the future if something looks and behave like John Clark other people
> >> will be convinced it is John Clark, no different than how things are
> right
> >> now.
> >>
> >> John K Clark?

I don't think anyone would argue against the idea that a copy of a mind
> is not the same as the original, but the mistake lies in thinking that
> this means it doesn't recreate the /same mind/. Just as copying a CD of
> Beethoven's 9th Symphony recreates the same music.

Thing 1 (Ben): We all do seem to agree. If a perfect copy is made, the copy
is a conscious mind and it IS the SAME mind.

Thing 2 (Ben): Continuity needs to be defined. I don't believe sleeping
causes a discontinuity. I do believe reanimating a copy of the mind in
another agent is a discontinuity. I also believe reanimating the copy in
the same body (for example, after a traumatic brain injury or other cause
of significant neural information loss or derangement, with preservation of
the underlying physical connectome or some significant portion of it) is an
open question, my belief is that is a continuous experience, and the
reanimation is the same individual.

Thing 3 (John): "What does it mean to be me? It means if something tomorrow
remembers being me today then that thing is me. What else could it possibly
mean?". I respectfully disagree - what if we made 5 copies, or 8321 copies?
Are they all you? I suggest we need new language to keep up with this new
technology. Robin Hanson started this ball rolling with his "ems". IN this
case, no one is suggesting the copies work with or for you (although they
could, I guess). I am saying they are free conscious agents that are NOT
YOU. Even if they think they are, that's their error because we don't have
a concept yet for being a copy. The are independent agents with your
connectome, which will immediately diverge from your actual connectome (if
you remain living) and/or all other copies connectomes.

The essential concept I am trying to get across is that a copy of you, in
another agent of any kind, will *not be you*. You will still be dead. If
the point of the copying process is so that your YOU has extended life, I
think we should pay attention to this. Remember, a copy will honestly
believe its you - and everyone else who knows you, even your mother, will
believe its you. It is a you. the only agent who will know for sure its not
the original you is YOU. You will be dead. That, for me, does not work. I
want to come back, me myself. A copy is a nice legacy, but I won't be in
it. It will be some other Regina, and she will be very glad someone has
developed the technology, but she and I will be different people. If we
met, we would have different lives after the copy point. We would do
different things, and eat different meals, and hang out with different
people on different days, and our lives - after the copy point - would be
unique. I'd love to meet her someday.

Thing 4 (John): Please note I do not believe in all of Susan Greenfield's
theories, but I do believe in neural hub assembly, which has been shown by
others besides Greenfield both experimentally, and in theoretical
calculations of spiking neural assemblies and other dynamic neural models.
In any case, it was just meant as an example of levels of consciousness
being linked to underlying physical neural phenomena. I'm not married to
the way it happens, just the concept that as conscious states change
(alertness to somnolent, as example), neural correlations change.

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