[ExI] Everett worlds

[Giulio Prisco]

On Mon, Aug 17, 2020 at 11:14 AM Stathis Papaioannou via extropy-chat <
extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:

>
>
> On Mon, 17 Aug 2020 at 18:52, Giulio Prisco via extropy-chat <
> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Aug 17, 2020 at 10:35 AM Stathis Papaioannou via extropy-chat
>> <extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>> >
>> > On Mon, 17 Aug 2020 at 00:04, Giulio Prisco via extropy-chat <
>> extropy-chat at lists.extropy.org> wrote:
>> >>
>> >> Thanks John. Yours is the standard Everettian answer. Others dislike
>> Everett’s fully deterministic QM because it leaves no room for free will.
>> Some kind of post-decoherence selection could allow for free will in a
>> quasi-Everettian framework.
>> >
>> >
>> > There are various definitions of “free will” but if you use the
>> incompatibilist one, requiring that our actions be undetermined, Many
>> Worlds still allows for that because there is true randomness from the
>> first person perspective due to the impossibility of self-locating. Having
>> said that, we would not be able to function, or even survive outside of a
>> nursing home, if to a significant extent our actions were undetermined.
>> >
>>
>> Good point. I have never understood compatibilist free will. It seems
>> to me that if I am an automaton with a delusion of being a free agent,
>> I am still an automaton.
>>
>
>
Compatibilists say that you act freely if your actions are determined by
> your preferences, and you do not act freely if your actions are determined
> by someone coercing you or by a mental illness. This is the definition of
> what it means to act freely used by most people; for example, it is the
> definition used in courts, and it is put to the test many times a day
> around the world.
>
> Incompatibilists add to the above that you cannot act freely if your
> actions are determined. What they can't explain is how it would be possible
> to function if your actions were not determined. It might not matter much
> if you were choosing a flavour of ice cream, but it would quickly kill you
> if you were trying to cross the road, for example.
>

Not predetermined does not necessarily mean random. I claim that I CAN
choose a flavor of ice cream or when to cross the road independently of the
present and past states of the universe. Of course, since I want to stay
alive, I would take the state of the world into account in deciding when I
want to cross the road. In Everett's terms, the measure of the region of
the multiverse where I cross the road carelessly and get killed is small.


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